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This -thesis is a study of some aspects of James Gregory's 
philosophical and medical thought. Gregory's work is discussed 
in relation to its local intellectual context of later 18th-century 
Scottish scientific metaphysics. I show the importance of his 
writings for understanding how the relationships between epistemology, 
natural knowledge and religious belief were perceived by some members 
of the Scottish scientific metaphysics community. This is done 
empirically by considering Gregory's responses to several other 
writers. In particular, I show that Gregory's views on causality 
were put forward to counteract what he perceived as the dangerous 
influence of Hume's philosophy upon Scottish scientific meta- 
physicians. This subject is also approached thematically, through 
what is called the epistemological interiorisation of nature, or 
the search for the conditions of men's judgements about causes and 
effects. I identify two principgI strategies for epistemological 
interiorisation. These are termed 'voluntarist' and 'necessitarian'. 
I show that while Gregory was a severe critic of what he perceived 
as the necessitarianism of Hume's philosophy and some other -- 
forms of scientific metaphysics, Gregory also rejected forms of 
voluntarism found in the writings of John Stewart, Robert Whytt and 
Thomas Reid. Finally, Gregory's concern with the nature of cause 
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Abbreviated titles used in thesis 
A. WORKS BY JAMES GREGORY 
(i) Motive and action, Aberdeen University Library 
MS. 2206.15 
Read: Introductory essay. 
(ii) Power, Edinburgh University Library MS. LaIII 789. 
Read: Power. 
(iii) Activity, Aberdeen University Library MS. 2206.15 (in 
three sections). 
Read: Activity 1,2and 3. 
(iv) "Essay on the difference between the relation of 
motive and action and that of cause and effect in 
physics, on physical and mathematical principles", 
in Philosophical and literary essays, 2 vols. 
(Edinburgh, 1792). 
Read: Essay. 
(v) The Essay also contains an "Introduction" and an 
"Appendix". 
Read: Introduction. 
Read: ' Appendix. 
(vi) Gregory conceived of (i) - (v) as separate parts of one 
work entitled "An essay towards an investigation of the 
exact import and extent of the common notion of cause 
and effect in physics and of the real nature of that 
relation". 
Read: Project. 
(vii) "A theory of the moods of verbs", Transactions of the 
Royal Society of Edinburgh, 2 (1790), 193-250. 
Read: Theory. 
(viii) An answer to Messrs Crombie, Priestley and Co., 
Edinburgh University Library MS. Gen 788G. 
Read: Answer. 
(ix) Letters from Dr. James Gregory with replies by the 
Rev. Alexander Crombie (London, 1819). 
Read: Letters. 
10 
(x) Conspectus medicinae theoreticae, 2 vols. (Edinburgh 
1778-82), translated as A view of the theory of 
medicine, 2nd ed. (Edinburgh, 1844). 
Read: Conspectus. 
(xi) Lectures on the institutes of medicine, Edinburgh 
University Library MS. Dc3. 
Read: Lectures. 
B. OTHER AUTHORS 
William Cullen, The Works of William Cullen, M. D., 
ed. John Thomson, 2 vols. (Edinburgh, 1827). 
Read: Works, and including "Physiology" and "Lectures" 
David Hume, A treatise of human nature, ed. P. H. Nidditch, 
2nd ed. (Oxford, 1978). 
Read: Treatise 
David Hume, An enquiry concerning human understanding, 
ed. P. H. Nidditch, 3rd ed. (Oxford, 1975). 
Read: Enquiry. 
Isaac Newton, Sir Isaac Newton's mathematical principles of 
natural philosophy and his system of the world, translated 
by Andrew Motte and revised by Florian Cajori (Berkeley, 1946). 
Read: Principia. 
Thomas Reid, The works of Thomas Reid, D. D., ed. W. Hamilton 
(Edinburgh, 1846). 
Read: Works, and including "Inquiry"; "Intellectual powers" 
and "Active powers". 
Robert Whytt, The works of Robert Whytt, eds. Robert Whytt (jnr. ) 
and Sir John Pringle (Edinburgh, 1768). 
Read: Works, and including "Essay" and "Observations". 
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'Tis evident, that all the sciences have a relation, greater 
or less, to human nature; and that however wide any of them 
may seem to run from it, they still return back by one passage 
or another. Even Mathematics, Natural Philosophy, and Natural 
Religion, are in some measure dependent on the science of MAN; 
since they lie under the cognizance of men, and are judged of 
by their powers and faculties. 
Hume, Treatise, xv. 
If inquisitive men can be brought to the same unanimity in the 
first principles of the other sciences as in those of mathematics 
and natural philosophy ... this might 
be considered a third grand 
era in the progress of human reason. 
Reid, Works, 713. 
It is necessary likewise, as far as reasoning is concerned that 
a person be, in some sense, a logician before he be an orator; 
since it is by the rules of logic, that we judge everything 
relating to arguments, their perspicuity or confusion, their 
fallacy or their force. More especially, it is of consequence 
to every orator whose business is with men to be acquainted 
with human nature. 
Priestley, Lectures on oratory and criticism, 3-4. 
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CHAPTER 1 
A MANIFESTO FOR SCIENTIFIC METAPHYSICS: 
GREGORY'S INTRODUCTORY ESSAY ON CAUSE AND EFFECT IN PHYSICS 
1. INTRODUCTION 
2. CAUSATION AND LINGUISTIC ANALYSIS 
3. PRIVATE DEFINITIONS AND PUBLIC NOTIONS OF CAUSATION 




This thesis is a study of the metaphysical and medical writings of 
James Gregory M. D. (1753-1821). He was descended from a family 
which figured prominently in the intellectual life of Scotland from 
the late 17th to the early 19th centuries. He was the son of 
John Gregory (1724-1773), Professor of the Practice of Medicine at 
Edinburgh University, cousin of Thomas Reid and founder member of 
the Aberdeen Philosophical Society. After spending some time at 
King's College, Aberdeen and Christ, Church, Oxford, James Gregory 
began his medical education at Edinburgh University in 1767. He 
took his degree in 1774, having been taught by Cullen, Monro secundus, 
Black and John Hope. Gregory completed his studies on the Continent; 
he returned to Edinburgh in 1776, and was elected Professor of the 
Institutes of Medicine in the same year. In 1790, Gregory succeeded 
Cullen as Professor of the Practice of Medicine. As well as being 
a teacher of international repute, Gregory also had a very successful 
private practice, becoming First Physician to the King in Scotland in 
1799. A list of the chief biographical sources for Gregory's life, 
together with a simplified genealogy of his family are provided in 
Appendix 1. 
In view of Gregory's eminence as a doctor, it is perhaps surprising 
how little he actually published on medicine. Besides his obligatory 
medical dissertation, 
I his only other work was a small textbook on 
the theory of medicine, the Conspectus, which was originally published 
in two parts between 1780 and 1782. This was no doubt partly due to 
Gregory's repeated involvement in controversies with medical 
colleagues, with the Royal College of Physicians and with the 
Managers of the Royal Infirmary. However, most of these occurred 
after 1800, and will not be considered here. Instead, this thesis 
is largely based upon several essays which Gregory wrote on the 
subject of causation during the 1780s and early 1790s. These are 
referred to collectively as parts of Gregory's Project on cause and 
effect in physics. The purpose of this thesis is to locate an 
intellectual context for Gregory's concern with causation, which 
permeated his medical writings as well as the Project itself. This 
entails a close examination of Gregory's texts and a reconstruction 
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of the local community of texts to which they refer. In this first 
chapter, a hitherto unknown and undiscussed essay by Gregory is 
examined in order to provide an introduction to Gregory's concern 
with causation and its significance in the context of later 18th 
century Scottish scientific thought. To assist the exposition in 
this and subsequent chapters, a diagram illustrating the various 
parts of the-Project and the dates they were read to the Literary 
Class of the Royal Society of Edinburgh is provided in Appendix II. 
Gregory did not give his first essay a specific title. Instead, on 
the first page he simply designated it as "part 1" of an Essay 
towards an investigation of the exact import and extent of the common 
notion of the relation of cause and effect in physics and of the real 
nature of that relation. This title is typical of Gregory's generally 
verbose and inflated style. However, it does convey two central aspects 
of. his project, on causation. Firstly, Gregory restricted himself to 
a discussion of cause and effect in "physics", rather than treating 
causation in general. Although he subsequently examined the concepts 
of "power", "aätivity" and "motive" in other essays, Gregory's 
primary aim was always to clarify the nature of physical causation, 
or the kind of change characteristic of inanimate nature. Secondly, 
the precise wording of the title indicates that Gregory's enquiry was 
primarily epistemological. He-was concerned to investigate "the 
common notion of the relation of cause and effect in physics", and 
then assess the reality of that relation. 
Gregory's general sense of the problematic character of natural 
knowledge is informative. It indicates that he considered a philo- 
sophical investigation into the status and condition of-the human 
mind to be a necessary precondition-to the acquisition of natural 
knowledge. Viewed in its 18th century Scottish context, Gregory's 
attempt to develop an-epistemological and metaphysical propaedeutics 
for natural knowledge was not in any way unusual. Rather, it was 
definitive of the 18th century Scottish attitude to natural knowledge 
as a whole. Although members of the Scottish scientific literati 
disagreed continually, over what sorts of philosophical presuppositions 
were to be, employed as part of the framework to guide, the inter- 
pretation of nature, they were virtually unanimous about the , 
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importance of epistemological considerations. This fact has been 
noted with varying degrees of emphasis by Buckle, Davie and Olson. 
2 
It has also informed the work of historians of science such as 
Morrell, Shapin, Emerson and Christie3 who have discussed the local 
institutional factors which nurtured the development of Scottish 
science during the Scottish Enlightenment. 4 
The interaction between Scottish philosophy and forms of natural 
knowledge during this period is central to understanding both 
Gregory's writings and the distinctive cognitive style of Scottish 
science as a whole. The phrase I use to convey this theme here is 
the epistemological interiorisation of nature. It describes the 
distinctive attitude which Gregory and his peers took to the 
relationship between natural knowledge and metaphysics or, more 
specifically, between natural philosophy and the philosophy of mind. 
The central feature of this attitude was determined by a shared 
belief that a sound knowledge of nature was only possible on the 
basis of a correct understanding of the nature of mind. It was 
assumed that if men could understand the conditions of and constraints 
upon their perception of events in nature, then they could map the 
order of nature on to an order of thoughts in the mind. The necessary 
order of such thoughts would, in turn, determine the structure of 
men's understanding and explanation of the natural world. The means 
of understanding change in nature was through a correct understand- 
ing of the nature of causation. Therefore causation was perceived to 
be the central concept to be mastered in order to successfully 
accomplish the epistemological interiorisation of nature. 
In speaking of a search for the epistemological interiorisation of 
nature, the aim is to convey this as a process in which historical 
actors actively engaged for a variety of moral and religious as well 
as purely intellectual reasons. Hence, I do not treat the epistemo- 
logical and scientific writings of Gregory and his contemporaries in 
a solely philosophical way, but also in terms of their perceived 
social significance. What is referred to here as 'Scottish scientific 
metaphysics' can be understood as a community of mutually referring 
texts by Gregory and others. Together, these formed a discourse which 
specified the means for attaining the epistemological interiorisation 
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of nature. In practice, this meant referring men's perception of 
nature to the conditions which underlay their judgements about 
causes and effects in the physical world. As a result, causation 
was a prominent and important subject in Scottish scientific 
metaphysics during this period. In particular, Hume's views on this 
subject were a standard reference point for most writers. In 
Gregory's case, his perception of the dangerous nature of Humeian 
metaphysics underlay-the concerns of the Project as a whole. It 
is argued that the account of causation developed by Gregory was 
put forward largely to counter the perceived influence of Hume's 
ideas on members of the later 18th century Scottish scientific 
literati. 
The taken-for-granted emphasis on the theory of knowledge shared by 
Gregory and his contemporaries requires careful handling. Although 
epistemological interiorisation will be treated as a general theme 
uniting. the activities of Gregory's contemporaries, many of them 
displayed quite different intellectual-loyalties from Gregory himself. 
It will be shown that the interaction between Scottish philosophy and 
natural knoweldge cannot be interpreted within the confines of a 
unified and coherent tradition of common sense philosophy. This is 
a limitation of Olson's recent book. 
5 
Thus although Gregory's 
principal loyalties lay with Stewart, Reid and Robison, differences 
among common sense philosophers are as much a part of the story as 
the antagonism between common sense and other schools of thought 
such as Humeian scepticism, Monbbddo's revived Aristotelianism and 
Hutton's science of wisdom. 
6 
Also, it must be emphasised that this 
isa study based largely upon one individual. Even though an 
important aim is to situate Gregory's thought firmly within his local 
intellectual community, this is not the same as a comprehensive 
survey of Scottish scientific metaphysics as a whole. As a result, 
some notable figures are omitted from consideration. Others who 
deserve independent treatment for their contribution to the 
epistemological interiorisation of 18th century Scottish natural 
philosophy are treated here only in terms of their relationship to 
Gregory's thought. Nevertheless, it is also important to note that 
Gregory was a prominent member of the later 18th century scientific 
literati. Among his professional colleagues were Cullen, Black, 
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Daniel Rutherford, and John Playfair, all of whom he referred to 
either directly or indirectly in his writings. Through his family 
connections, he was also on intimate terms with Thomas Reid and 
Lord Monboddo. Gregory also dealt with the writings of Hume, 
Kames, Hutton and Joseph Priestley, one of the few English 
scientists to receive any widespread consideration during this 
period. In view of these manifold connections, Gregory's writings 
on causation provide a convenient and useful access point to several 
aspects of the Scottish scientific metaphysics community in later 
18th century Scotland. 
The choice of the time frame 1750 to 1800 is largely dictated by the 
nature of the subject matter. Although Gregory lived until 1821, he 
wrote the Conspectus and the Project in the 1.780s and 90s. Many of 
his concerns emerged out of disputes about mechanics and physiology 
which occurred in Edinburgh during the 1750s and early 60s. The 
community of thought in which Gregory's ideas make sense is'to be 
found in the later 18th century. The authors he was familiar with 
and referred to such as Hume, Reid, Cullen, Hutton, Kames, Monboddo 
and Robison, had either died or were soon to die by the early years 
of the 19th century. These are the men with whom his thought will 
be compared and contrasted. The possible exception to this is 
Dugald Stewart, whose thought belongs largely to the next century, 
in which conmon sense philosophy came to occupy a. pre-eminent 
place in the Scottish university curriculum. Therefore where 
Stewart is discussed, this is done with reference to part one of his 
Inquiry into the human mind and not part two published much later. 
7 
Finally, no attempt is made to relate Gregory's work to either the 
"Leslie Affair"8 or the subsequent writings of Thomas Brown. 
9 This 
is because apart from some incidental and allusive evidence, there 
is no indication of Gregory's involvement in the events surrounding 
John Leslie's election to the Professorship of Mathematics at 
Edinburgh in 1805.10 Similarly, while Gregory enlisted Brown as a 
junior assistant in his medical practice, there is no indication of 
any collaboration between them. Although Brown may constitute the 
best case for Gregory's impact upon 19th century Scottish meta- 
physics, apart from the relatively insignificant work of 
RE Scott, 11 Gregory's writings, on causation at least, were largely 
ignored. 
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2. CAUSATION AND LINGUISTIC ANALYSIS 
Gregory's introductory essay on cause and effect in physics was 
devoted to showing that men actually had a common notion of cause 
and effect, which they routinely applied to the processes of change 
evident in inanimate nature. Once this was shown to be the case, the 
scientific metaphysician could proceed to carry out two other 
important tasks identified by Gregory. One of these was clarifying 
how the common notion of cause and effect in physics differed from 
other notions such as "power", "motive" and "action". The other was 
showing how this notion functioned in explanations of change in 
nature. In his preliminary investigation, Gregory sought to show 
that: 
(i) there is, and always has been, a notion of a certain relation 
between things and events expressed by the term cause and 
effect; 
(ii) this notion has been distinctly and uniformly conceived 
among mankind; 
(iii) despite-the opinions of philosophers, there must be one or 
more circumstances common to the relation of cause and effect 
and the contrary opinion is false and absurd; 
(iv) such common circumstances can be termed the common notion of 
this relation; 
(v) this notion cannot be termed just or erroneous until its 
exact import and extent is ascertained; 
(vi) this cannot be done by definition until it is shown that the 
definition is a good one. The only way for this to be decided 
is by evidence of language - by attending to the use and 
application of the terms expressing this notion as employed by 
men of good sense; 
(vii) this approach is shorter, more methodical, and leads to more 
distinct and satisfactory conclusions than a separate consider- 
ation of different circumstances said to make up cause and 
effect; 
12 
To assist his treatment of these points Gregory divided the rest of 
his essay into four sections. The first gave observations, arguments 
and illustrations to prove the truth of aims (i) - (iv). The second 
considered the means by which such a common notion of cause and effect 
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could be ascertained (vi). The third dealt with possible objections 
to the approach put forward in the previous section and compared the 
role-of definitions in different disciplines. Finally, Gregory's 
fourth-section contained a wider methodological justification of his 
approach (vii). Point (v) received no independent treatment under 
any section, although Gregory made several references to the problem 
of validity throughout. 
13 
Gregory posed two related questions which he planned to consider 
successively. The first was: how do we know that we have a common 
notion of physical causation? The second was: what characteristics 
does it have? In actual fact, the Introductory essay only dealt 
with the first of these questions, although Gregory gave some hints 
about the second in several places. What is significant about his 
answer is that Gregory did not make a routine appeal to common 
sense in order to ground man's belief in physical causation. Rather 
than saying that men were constitutionally predisposed towards the 
notion of physical causation, Gregory explicitly stated that he did 
not want to make "the common and popular notions of mankind founded 
on common sense the standard and test of truth". 
14 Instead, he 
claimed to answer the questions inductively "in the common way of 
physical observation and experiment" by making use of "a species of 
philological investigation". This, he claimed, made it possible 
to discover and demonstrate what people have thought 
on certain subjects; and especially to ascertain what 
their simple natural, uniform notions or conceptions 
have been with respect to subject of cause and effect. 15 
By focussing upon the evidence of ordinary language, Gregory claimed 
to have found a way of applying principles of observation and 
induction which guided physical science to a metaphysical question. 
Furthermore, he considered this avoided appeals to common sense which 
might be challenged or even dismissed as deductive introspective 
dogma. In this sense, Gregory claimed that his enquiry was partly 
physical, partly metaphysical and he hoped that his analysis of 
physical causation would actually reconcile the provinces of 
metaphysics and physical science. 
The epistemological grounding of natural knowledge was a shared 
imperative among members of Gregory's intellectual community. This 
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implied some form of achieved rapprochement between natural knowledge 
or science, and metaphysics or philosophy. Yet Gregory significantly 
referred to their current alienation from one another. In one way 
or other, Scottish intellectuals who wrote on scientific metaphysics 
were continually attempting to marry natural philosophy and meta- 
physics into one comprehensive system. Gregory was no exception. 
His own strategy involved accommodating the study of mind to the 
logical forms and procedural techniques he considered characteristic 
of physical science. The immediate result of this process was 
envisaged to be a correct understanding of physical causation. This 
could then be applied correctly in physics. Thus the reform of 
natural philosophy and the philosophy of mind were perceived to be 
closely connected, although not all Scottish scientific metaphysicians 
subscribed to the particular study of mind commended by common sense 
philosophers such as Reid, Stewart and Gregory himself. 
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It has been noted that Gregory was committed to some form of 
linguistic analysis; the precise form this took has yet to be explained. 
On the basis of the evidence of language, Gregory undertook to prove 
that men had a common notion of physical causation. Therefore he 
needed an argument or assumption which connected together the 
linguistic evidence or expressions of physical causation with its 
mental representation, the concept or common notion of causation. 
Gregory's solution was 
that language must be expression of thought, and that every 
word and phrase in common use must have that meaning which 
it is employed and understood to denote. / 
Gregory made it absolutely clear that this proposition was the basis 
of all his subsequent arguments and demonstrations. He sought to 
give it axiomatic status by commending it as true, not only as a 
matter of fact, but also as intuitively self-evident. Furthermore, 
he undertook to demonstrate it was necessarily true in the manner of 
mathematical truths. This was a departure from conventional common 
sense wisdom_which held that the axioms of any system of reasoning, 
or for that matter, the. constitutional givens of the human mind, 
such as the common notion of physical causation, could only be 
assumed and not proved. This point was an important source of 
disagreement between Gregory and Reid and will be treated in chapter 
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four. For now, it is sufficient to note that Gregory's proposed 
demonstration consisted of an argumentum ad absurdum. For example, 
Gregory stated that if the identity between language and thought 
did not subsist at all or even if it was only occasional, then men 
used words in everyday discourse without comprehending their meaning 
at all; or they comprehended such words at one moment but not the 
next. This was an absurd consequence - "as if one were to speak of 
iron as a wholesome food, and of bread as the best metal to make". "18 
Logically, if such absurd consequences were false, then by implication 
their contraries were true. Hence it was demonstratively true that 
there was an identity between thought and language. Gregory was in 
effect saying that men's use of language had to be underwritten by 
stable and consistent common notions to which words referred. 
Otherwise communication would be impossible. This general argument 
applied to particular instances such as physical causation. Thus men 
employed a uniform and consistent language of physical cause and 
effect which referred to an underlying common notion in men's minds. 
Gregory's perception of the relationship between things, language 
and mental representations was succinctly expressed by means of a 
comparison: 
Now common words or phrases are to general notions or 
conceptions and to the subjects of these precisely what 
proper names are to the notions which we have of particular 
persons, and to such persons themselves. 19 
This is an important statement for several reasons. The account of 
Gregory's philosophical methodology given so far indicates that it 
actually resembles 20th century post-Wittgensteinian language 
philosophy. Gregory's emphasis upon the close relationship between 
meaning and usage can appear broadly post-Wittgensteinian. Such 
parallels have been stressed by Wiener; 
20 
and they are further 
apparent in Gregory's analysis of power which is based upon the 
distinction between the use of active and passive verbs. However, 
to view Gregory as something of a precursor to modern philosophy 
is misleading. 
21 In fact he had a very orthodox 18th century view 
of the relationship between language, concepts and things. It is 
useful to briefly recount this because it provides a more immediate 
and relevant context for Gregory's ideas. Also, it helps to specify 
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20 
and they are further 
apparent in Gregory's analysis of power which is based upon the 
distinction between the use of active and passive verbs. However, 
to view Gregory as something of a precursor to modern philosophy 
is misleading. 
21 In fact he had a very orthodox 18th century view 
of the relationship between language, concepts and things. It is 
useful to briefly recount this because it provides a more immediate 
and relevant context for Gregory's ideas. Also, it helps to specify 
22 
precisely why Gregory actually placed so much importance upon the 
evidence of language. 
Gregory subscribed to a standard account of the role of experience 
in learning causal relationships. He emphasised that it was "in 
that great and silent school of things, not words, that men 
acquire [d] the notion of cause and effect". 
22 
By experience, 
Gregory understood repeated patterns of human action and he explicitly 
contrasted this with knowledge acquired by a purely reflective analysis 
of the necessary logic of ideas. Speaking in this empirical and 
psychologistic fashion, he suggested that children acquired the 
notion of cause and effect at a very early age, before they were 
proficient language users. He cited experiences like whipping a top, 
whistling ("playing at jaw"), or avoiding being burnt by fire. He 
referred to the receptacle which contained such experiences as the 
"great school of nature, 
23 
and held it responsible for the evident 
uniformity of human beliefs. In this account of the genesis of the 
common notion of cause and effect, and presumably of other fundamental 
concepts, language very much played the role of second fiddle. Men 
acquired notions by their interaction with things; subsequently, they 
learned language by an analogous process of repetition or habit, 
whereby words were uniformly and consistently applied to the things 
they denoted. 
24 
Having thus redressed the balance and situated Gregory firmly in an 
18th century context of thought which took some aspects of Locke's 
empiricism for granted, the question remains: why did Gregory develop 
a philosophical methodology which emphasised the role of language 
usage? Although other writers such as Karnes, Reid and Robison made 
reference to the evidence of language, their remarks always gave it 
a secondary corroborative role rather than thrusting it into the 
forefront of the analysis of mind. 
25 
So there is a case for viewing 
Gregory's methodology as unusual and in need of clarification. The 
argument put forward here and in following chapters is that Gregory's 
use of linguistic evidence and indeed the whole thrust of his 
philosophy of causation was designed to oppose Hume and to counter 
the influence of Humeian philosophy upon Gregory's colleagues and 
contemporaries. The next two sections of this chapter are devoted 
23 
to showing how Gregory's perception of Hume's philosophy structured 
the metaphysical standpoint found in Gregory's earliest essay on 
cause and effect, regarding the nature and role of definitions and 
demonstration in scientific metaphysics. 
24 
3. PRIVATE DEFINITIONS-AND PUBLIC NOTIONS OF CAUSATION 
Gregory expressed considerable pride that his philosophical method- 
ology appealed to "matters of plain observation or direct and easy 
experiment". 
26 
He explicitly contrasted his approach with others 
which were hypothetical, metaphysical and analogical. 
27 
His criticism of philosophers who followed the latter path was that 
they reasoned from vaguely employed words and phrases and then 
arrived at "conclusions equally repugnant to the direct consciousness 
of every individual untutored by them". 
28 
Hume epitomised such 
philosophers who wielded the "science of words" because he undertook 
To explode'as groundless and foolish the common notion 
of the relation of cause and effect and to give a just 
account of the nature of that relation, and a good 
definition of the notion which we ought to have of it, 
nay of that very notion which we always had of it. 29 
Gregory'objected to the fact that Hume's view of causality was based 
upon "various arguments founded chiefly on his own philosophy" 
maintained in defiance of the evidence of direct consciousness and 
the structure of language. 
30 As a result, Gregory argued, Hume and 
others had confounded common notions and relations which even "the 
rudest'Boar that Dwel[t] in a forest never failed to distinguish. " 
Gregory's stance is further confirmation that he was interested in 
common usage in order to get to those common notions and relations 
which had been misrepresented by philosophical systems such as 
Hume. 's. His methodology was a means to an end. He used it to 
reassert the natural and universal nature of the human mind against 
those he considered to have appropriated and distorted it. In 
pursuing this aim, Gregory chose to give a critique of the role of 
definitions in metaphysics and other subjects. In a sense, 
Gregory argued that Hume had appropriated the concept of causation 
by re-defining it and thus developing what in Gregory's eyes was 
a 'private"language'" of causation. Gregory opposed this by 
emphasising the limitations of definitions and reasserting the 
centrality of the common notion of causation. By using his principle 
of the necessary identity between thought and language, Gregory claimed 
to have demonstrated that men had a common notion of physical causation, 
which was consistent and uniform. This conclusion followed whatever 
25 
the contents of the common notion. Any attempt to define such 
contents presupposed Gregory's own argument; he pointed out that 
this was because it was absurd to define anything which either did 
not exist or which was intrinsically variable. Therefore the first 
stage in Gregory's critique of definitions of causation was to show 
they were themselves parasitic on their underlying common notion. 
Gregory pushed his argument yet further. He contended that as the 
common notion of physical causation was grounded in the everyday use 
of the terms cause and effect when applied to inanimate events, then 
definitions of cause and effect could be tested according to their 
correspondence with common usage. Thus, 
the evidence of language 
application of the terms 
enable us to appreciate 
to perceive their merit, 
supply their defects, or 
and attention to the use and 
denoting the notions defined, 
the definitions offered; 
to correct their errors, to 31 
to lop off their redundancies. 
This provided a means of correcting or extirpating bad definitions 
of causation, such as Humes, which deviated from the common notion 
of physical causation. However, the result of this process was not 
necessarily a perfect definition; rather it culminated in a clearer 
idea of what the common notion of physical causation actually 
consisted of, when freed of "all disguise, all ornament, all covering, 
32 
provided by bad definitions, hypotheses and philosophical embellish- 
ments. Gregory was, in effect, suggesting that a definition of 
physical causation was not necessary to understanding it as a 
common notion. He made a revealing analogy between investigating 
the common notion of causation and a person learning a foreign 
language. The latter discovered the meaning of terms by examining 
the use and application of new words without the help of definitions 
or dictionaries. It was this prior skill that actually made men 
able to compile dictionaries and construct definitions in the first 
place. He went on to compare the necessary knowledge of good usage 
which enabled people to compile dictionaries with an equivalent 
knowledge of "the fundamental notions of mankind", which enabled men 
to become good philosophers. 
33 
Gregory was attacking a time-honoured way of arriving at knowledge. 
By speaking of the bad definitions of causation by Aristotle and 
26 
Hume, he implied that Hume followed discredited scholastic methods. 
He repeatedly referred to such methods as esoteric and artificial, 
whereas common notions arrived at through a study of linguistic 
usage were-publicly accessible and resulted-in the comprehension of 
the "natural-relations" of the human mind. - However, Gregory could 
not leave his general denunciation of definition without qualification. 
Definition had an honourable role in many sciences and was crucial 
to mathematics, which was held in high regard by 18th century Scottish 
intellectuals and treated as an exemplar of exactness and precision. 
34 
In order to substantiate his claim, Gregory felt compelled to enter 
into a discussion of the comparative role of definition in mathematics, 
natural science and the philosophy of mind. 
Gregory emphasised the importance of a discussion of this kind. It 
presented an opportunity to point out differences in the kinds and 
origins of men's notions. The ordering and classification of men's 
notions was an essential part of the epistemological interiorisation 
of nature in general because arranging the different types of human 
notions was the necessary prelude to determining the boundaries of 
disciplines. In particular, it informed the relation of natural 
knowledge to the philosophy of mind and to other subjects. 
Olson has referred to the variety of positions taken up by Scots 
about the foundations of mathematics, especially geometry. Both he 
and George Davie have emphasised that the Scots seem to have favoured 
an intermediate view of the origin and nature of geometrical entities 
known as "abstractionism". Abstractionism mediated between pure 
formalism or mathematical Platonism in which mathematical objects 
were unconnected to physical reality, and empiricism, in which all 
mathematical statements were founded upon physical measurements. 
Scottish abstractionists such as Reid and Stewart held that 
fundamental mathematical concepts derived originally from our 
experience of everyday objects but were rendered general and abstract 
by an operation of the human intellect. From Gregory's various 
remarks, it appears that he subscribed to the formalist position. 
However, as we shall see, he nevertheless retained a vew of 




Gregory stated that the items defined in geometry which became the 
basis of subsequent mathematical reasoning, such as lines, angles, 
parallels, proportionals etc, were "fictions. of their own" as 
imaginary as "ghosts and faeries". 
36 
Such notions as defined by 
geometers were in no way common or universal and where men had the 
power of comprehending their meaning, this was only achieved by a 
voluntary and perceptible effort. They were not implanted by nature, 
or nurtured by experience. The crucial difference about such 
geometrical objects was that the subjects of definition in geometry 
were all general. As a result, particular descriptions of individual 
geometrical objects such as a triangle or a circle would not provide 
the learner with the general notion of such figures. This was the 
role of geometrical definitions. A definition of a geometrical object 
revealed . 
the full nature, and intimate constitution of it whence 
all its properties and relations may be deduced and 
demonstrated not as matters of fact or contingent truths 
which are or were or will be, but as necessary truths 
which ever must be37 
Because of the constitutive role that definitions played in geometry, 
they were indispensable: reasoning and communication between geometers 
would be impossible without them. 
38 
In contrast to geometrical notions which Gregory presented as 
essential, general and artificially invented by mathematicians, he 
argued that the notions at the basis of other subjects were of a quite 
different nature. These were natural, universal and formed by 
experience. Their very familiarity precluded adequate and precise 
definition. Rather, the nature of a common notion could only be 
evinced by pointing to the particular instances in which it was 
deployed, as in the use of words which referred to it. This form 
of ostensive identification and subsequent classification through 
repeated experience gained in the "great school of nature", was 
presented by Gregory as a natural and public alternative to the role 
of"artifical and private definition. Men understood notions of 
existence, consciousness, memory, identity and, of course, causation 
independently of philosophical definitions. 
28 
To bring home the central point that definition was not always 
essential to precise thinking. and good reasoning, Gregory returned 
to the foundations of mathematics. His former arguments were based 
upon the geometrician's apparatus of representation - lines, angles, 
shapes etc. - which were human inventions rather than natural 
objects. When viewed in terms of the axioms and definitions which 
specified this apparatus, geometry was justly seen as a paradigmatic, 
exact and certain science. However, he asked: 
do not these very definitions and axioms refer to 
rest upon other preconceived and undefined and 
undefinable notions? 39 
Gregory was referring to notions such as space, extension, figure 
and divisibility40 which were natural, real and universal among men. 
Yet he pointed out that conceding this did not mean rejecting 
geometry's claim to exact reasoning and certain demonstration. He 
added: 
If in any other science and with respect to any other 
objects of thought, whether simple or compound, men's 
notions were distinct and uniform, might they not reason 
in that science without perfect precision, without the 
help of any definitions? 41 
Thus while not an abstractionist as such, Gregory did subscribe to 
the search for the epistemological basis for mathematical knowledge. 
Like his contemporaries, he believed that ultimately it and all 
other forms of human knowing depended upon mind and its internal 
order and arrangement. Gregory's apparatus of epistemological 
interiorisation consisted of common notions or natural relations of 
the mind which were accessible through the structure of their 
linguistic significations. However, Gregory went further and argued 
that some such notions, like causation, were not actually to be 
discovered through definition. His argument was that whether the 
common notion of causation was simple or compound, it was distinctly 
and uniformly conceived by men. Therefore it was evident that 
a definition or description of it must be superfluous 
at least if not nugatory or bad; and that we may reason 
about it clearly and accurately,. as we may do about our 
friends John and James, or about number or time, a man 
or a horse, a tree or a ship, without the help of any 
definitions of it. 42 
29 
To summarise Gregory's position thus far,, he argued that definition 
was constitutive and necessary in geometry but misleading and 
redundant in metaphysics. However, this did not mean that the 
philosophy of mind was any less scientific than mathematics. 
Although mathematical reasoning had a deductive form which could not 
be emulated with such strict precision in metaphysics, both 
disciplines were nevertheless founded upon common notions which 
resisted any formulation in terms of definitions and axioms. This 
dependence of mathematics upon the philosophy of mind implied a 
dilemma for those who wished to deny metaphysics scientific status 
unless it could be ordered deductively according to strict axioms 
and definitions. Either scientific status had to be withdrawn from 
mathematics because it too was embarrassed by undefinable common 
notions, or it had to be accepted that metaphysics was capable of 
scientific truth without having to exhibit the formalised structure 
of mathematical reasoning. 
43 
Having discussed Gregory's attitude to the role of definitions in 
mathematics and metaphysics, it remains to account for his views on 
definition in natural science. Unfortunately, Gregory dealt with 
this briefly and in passing. Nevertheless his remarks are worthy of 
consideration as they give a provisional sense of how Gregory thought 
natural science should be conceived of and carried out. Gregory 
emphasised that his strictures on bad and nugatory definitions were 
not a plea for their elimination from all knowledge. He accepted 
they had an important role to play in "Newtonian physics", chemistry, 
medicine and natural history. 
44 
But Gregory still maintained that 
definitions in these subjects were quite different from those found 
in mathematics. In many cases, what passed as definition in the 
natural sciences was based upon ostensive description. Thus a new 
natural object or a discovered property of a known substance was 
identified by pointing out a specimen of it and subsequently 
describing its features. This process and the schemes of classifi- 
cation developing from it were entirely acceptable in natural science 
and medicine which dealt with particulars. Mathematics, as Gregory 
had pointed out, was concerned with generals. This brief view of 
the logic of natural science is instructive. Gregory was 
apparently committed to a classificatory view of natural knowledge, 
30 
rather than any theoretical form of explanation. Gregory placed 
natural limits upon the role of theory and explanation in science. 
Therefore, when he claimed to be applying the logic and methodology 
of natural science to metaphysics, the resulting science of mind was 
itself based on natural classifications. Common notions were to be 
distinguished and not collapsed into one another. Gregory contended 
that Hume's metaphysics was artificially based on impressions and 
ideas and therefore to be repudiated. Gregory's alternative position 
is reflected elsewhere in his choice of language to articulate his 
conception of causality. He spoke of different "species" of cause 
and effect. 
45 
Similarly, because the mind had natural relations, 
it was amenable to natural classification. But Humeian metaphysics 
and the science which made use of his theory of causation as an 




4. DEMONSTRATION AND THE THREAT OF HUME'S PHILOSOPHY 
Gregory's arguments for an investigation of cause and effect which 
did not require definitions have been considered. Gregory's 
presentation of the common notion of physical causation emphasised 
its natural self-evidence to all men. Yet Gregory had to explain 
why, to some men, Hume's definitions of causation seemed just. How 
could Hume have persuaded himself and his followers that his conception 
of causation was correct, when several of its characteristics were 
actually counter-commonsensical? 
Gregory had several answers to this question. One was based upon a 
particular view of language which emphasised its power to distort the 
direct evidence of consciousness. The self-evident nature of 
causation and other common notions was often obscured by "a thin but 
very dark covering of words". 
46 This was because language had its 
origin in the distant and barbaric past, and forms of expression bore 
the legacy of the savage's anthopomorphism. A second answer lay in 
man's nature. He was perennially tempted to find similarities between 
words and natural relations which actually bore no real resemblance to 
one another. This resulted in similar expressions being used to 
describe quite different relations of thought. 
47 
However, Gregory 
placed most emphasis upon the peculiar character of the men who went 
astray. Absurd definitions of causation could never mislead anyone 
who had acquired a solid grasp of those "common and natural notions" 
universal among men. But they did have the power to disturb and 
unsettle one who was already "restless" and over-inquisitive. Because 
of his contempt'for "vulgar notions", this sort of person might well 
be tempted to believe that he knew how to acquire a more accurate 
notion of causation from which he could then draw infallible con- 
clusions. Gregory pointed out that he then fell into the error of 
believing his own definitions of causation had an equivalent status 
and role to those employed in geometry. 
48 
Gregory convicted Humes metaphysics of making this last sort'of 
error and endowed it with the power of leading others into the same 
mistake. He therefore denounced it as scientifically pretentious49 
or as a "science of words'R. 
50 
In the closing pages of his 
32 
Introductory essay Gregory returned to this persistent theme and 
expressed the opposition between Hume's philosophy and his own on a 
broader canvas. He contested Hume's empty science of words and his 
philosophy which championed that "solid and useful knowledge of 
things which [was] acquired in the great school of nature". Having 
decried the dangers of metaphor and analogy throughout his essay, 
and praised plain speaking, Gregory used some equally figurative 
language in his own concluding remarks. In a passage similar to 
MacLaurin's rhapsodic conclusion to his Account of Sir Isaac Newton's 
philosophy, 
51 he dwelt upon the comparative-merits of two attitudes 
towards human knowledge, or rather two epistemological pathways to 
the understanding of nature. One way of epistemological interior- 
isation led to solid and useful knowledge because it followed nature 
itself. On this pathway, men were guided by 
the goodness of our great unseen teacher who first 
by ways of his own, imparts to us the useful knowledge 
of ourselves and then by secret but not dark, nor yet 
thorny paths, leads us to that, happy station whence we 
have a clear and delightfull, though no doubt very 
limited view of the order and beauty of"Nature..... 
52 
Gregory then surveyed the alternative path by means of a rhetorical 
question. Shall we, he asked, 
as a proof of great knowledge and an effort of 
superior wisdom, close our eyes on that engaging, 
that glorious prospect, and forsaking our first, 
our sure Conductor, turn away our steps from the 
cheerfull ways of men, and these gay fields where 
ten thousand charms on every side atract our eyes and 
warm our hearts, to follow an untimed and much suspected 
guide, through many a dark and rugged path, into an unknown 
world of spirits and beings, if such there be, yet more 
visionary; a dreary and desolate waste, haunted, not 
peopled, by a race of spectres, ghastly to our eyes, 
and horrible to our thoughts, which either our own 
wayward fancy, or some magic power, still deceiving 
and still misleading us had called into being. 
53 
These quotations, together with many other remarks found in the 
texts of Gregory's contemporaries, indicate that the search for the 
correct epistemological principles which would guarantee a sound 
knowledge of nature was a profoundly moral and even a religious 
enterprise for many participants. Viewed from this perspective, 
Humeian philosophy and Gregory's linguistically-based common sense 
philosophy were rival metaphysical technologies for securing the 
33 
order of nature in men's minds. A key resource for achieving this 
was the concept of causation itself. Wider considerations of this 
kind fed directly into Gregory's own discussion and showed that he 
was not engaged in a disinterested and technical exercise, but 
with issues which were perceived to have consequential repercussions 
for human moral conduct. At one point, he spoke of the common 
notion of causation as "an instructive and usefull companion on 
[hisj journey through life". 54 He continued this personification 
of the notion of causation saying that he would not want such a 
"companion" if half of the falsities attributed to it by Hume and 
others were actually true. Rather he would 
like a good citizen of the Republic of Science, 
renounce all private considerations and gladly tend 
my assistence to bring him justice. 55 
Gregory commended the relation of physical causation and spoke of it 
being as "real and as natural as that of father and son". 
56 Or again, 
when referring to its self-evidence he added: 
I will not fight for it; it must fight for itself: 
if it cannot stand on its own legs it must ever be 
in vain to attempt to support it; and if it cannot 57 
fight its own battles it does not deserve a champion. 
Despite Gregory's statement to the contrary, he was very much the 
champion of the common notion of physical causation and his job was 
to parade its self-evidence and so establish a secure connection 
between the order of things in nature and the manner in which 
men 1s mind perceived the connection between physical events. 
In Gregory's first, essay he repeatedly expressed his reservations 
about Humeian causality. From his perspective, sceptical doubts 
about physical causation or misleading statements of its nature, 
were revealing indications of men pursuing mistaken pathways to 
the epistemological interiorisation of nature. It was largely in 
opposition to Hume's and other rival systems of metaphysics that 
Gregory felt compelled to offer a demonstration of the common 
notion of causation. Hume's assault on the bastions of common 
sense had made it necessary to make the self-evidence more evident. 
This is why Gregory ultimately sought to ground his inductively 
orientated and factual examination of linguistic truth deductively, 
34 
on the basis of a proposition which necessarily connected 
language and the common notions represented by it. 
58 
In this 
manner he hoped to reform the dangerous opinions of 
some men, whose judgement and knowledge on 
other subjects entitle all their opinions in 
science to some regard at least, so far as not 
to be disregarded withouta reason given, have 




This introductory chapter has used Gregory's earliest essay on cause 
and effect to outline the main features of his manifesto for 
scientific metaphysics. Gregory's attitudes to linguistic analysis, 
the role of definition and the nature of demonstration have been 
considered. This has been done in relation to Gregory's concern 
to oppose Hume's philosophy, which he perceived as a rival philosophy 
of mind with dangerous implications for a morally sound knowledge of 
nature. Throughout, the clash between Humeian and Gregorian 
metaphysics has itself been interpreted as particular expressions of 
a wider search for the epistemological interiorisation of nature. 
This, in Gregory's case at least, had a moral and perhaps even a 
religious significance, as well as having a technical importance 
within natural philosophy. It is also important to note that Gregory 
and other writers, such as Monboddo, illustrate the perceived 
importance of the role of language in some forms of later 18th 
century Scottish scientific metaphysics. In the search for the 
epistemological interiorisation of nature, the close interaction 
between the philosophy of mind and natural knowledge was often 
mediated by a concern with men's understanding of language. Gregory's 
emphasis upon the corrupted state of men's language is found in Locke, 
together with exhortations to eschew metaphor, analogy and figurative 
language in scientific discourse. 
60 
During this whole period, there 
was a sustained interest in the nature and significance of language 
for the study of human understanding. This has been noted by 
Aarsleff in the broader British and European contexts of the 
Enlightenment generally. 
61 
However, there was an important Scottish 
sub-community within this, which is also deserving of independent 
consideration. It-includes Smith's essay on language, Monboddo's 
Of the origins and progress of language, together with the work of 
Beattie, Blair and the various comments by Reid and Dugald Stewart, 
as well as Gregory's own work. 
62 
Viewed against this background, 
Gregory's concern with language is entirely comprehensible. Yet his 
own distinctive approach to the philosophical import of linguistic 
usage is less easily accounted for. Most discourse of the period 
addressed the issue of the sacred or secular origins of language; 
or it dealt with the understanding of grammatical structures and 
36 
etymologies. 
63 Gregory certainly treated language in a wholly secular 
way rather than for theological purposes. Yet his use of linguistic 
evidence was based upon current usage, not on the origin and evolution 
of language. Certainly, the use of language in metaphysics was hardly 
new; but the particular form this took in Gregory appears to have been 
unusual, and worthy of further study. One of the aims of this thesis 
is the more limited task of understanding the importance of linguistic 
evidence for Gregory's scientific metaphysics. in its local intellectual 
context of use. 
In subsequent chapters, further aspects of Gregory's metaphysical and 
medical writings are considered. In each case, the major themes of the 
perceived threat of Hume's philosophy, the nature and role of 
demonstration, and the importance of linguistic evidence will recur 
and the general notion of epistemological interiorisation will be 
expanded. The chief emphasis is always upon the detailed content of 
Gregory's ideas about causation. But these are not described or 
evaluated according to purely philosophical criteria. Instead, 
attention is given to the ways in which Gregory used his scientific 
metaphysics within a wider moral and religious context. From this 
perspective, Gregory's and other rival systems of scientific metaphysics 
are viewed as socially significant representations which had a 
culturally important meaning within the local community of Scottish 
scientific thought during this period. 
64 
In chapter two, a dispute about the foundations of mechanics in the 
1750s between John Stewart and Henry Home, Lord Kames is examined 
in order to provide an intellectual context for Gregory's subsequent 
discussions of cause and effect in physics. In chapter three, 
Gregory's texts Power and Activity are discussed in relation to the 
concern to justify the distinction between the passivity of matter 
and human action. In chapter four, Gregory's critique of Reid and 
Hume is examined. Some features of the deployment of key concepts 
such as physical cause, efficient cause, power and necessary 
connection are considered. In chapter five, Gregory's views on the 
nervous system are explored. This is done by comparing them with 
those of Robert Whytt and William Cullen in order to show how 
different conceptions of causality informed some aspects of 
37 
physiology. In the_final chapter, Gregory's persistent opposition 
to necessitarianism is considered in order to show his view of the 
role of human judgement in the identification of physical causation. 
Gregory's concerns in the Project are related to John Robison's 
reform of natural philosophy at the close of the 18th century. 
38 
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In the previous chapter, the central importance of causation for the 
epistemological interiorisation of nature was emphasised. In order 
to know nature, men had to understand the mind's perception of change. 
An internal mental landscape had to be surveyed and mapped in 
conjunction with investigating the cartography of external nature. 
In his Introductory essay, Gregory put forward a : metaphysical manifesto 
for accomplishing just this. Some central features of it have been 
described, but little has yet been said about the contents of Gregory's 
actual analysis of cause and effect in physics. This is only 
considered obliquely in his Introductory essay. However, the 
scattered remarks to be found there provide a useful preliminary to 
more detailed analyses of the content and significance of Gregory's 
conception of physical causation presented in chapters 3 and 4. 
As we have seen, in Gregory's view "the great school of nature" 
operated on men rather like a programmed-learning device which told 
them about the common notion of cause and effect in physics. But 
what exactly did it teach men? Gregory's answer was that it instructed 
men to distinguish cause and effect in physics from other relations 
concerning men and the world. For example, physical causation was 
not like the relation between a human agent and the acts he 
performed. Nor did it resemble the relation between motives, or 
final causes, and the actions of men. Finally, Gregory reiterated 
that the natural relation of physical causation was quite unlike 
Hume's philosophical definition of causation, considered solely in 
terms of uniform priority and succession among events. But 
within Gregory's careful classification of philosophical relations 
he placed most emphasis upon the fact that 
above all we learn to distinguish uniformly 
and precisely between the active operation of 
mind and the changes which occur in inanimate 
matter. I. 
All Gregory's various essays on cause and effect in physics, in one 
way or another, maintained this boundary between human agency or 
volitional acts of mind and inanimate nature or processes of 
physical causation. On one side of this divide stood man, an 
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essentially active being capable of producing change. On the other 
stood passive nature which possessed no intrinsic or ontological 
power to produce change. The categorical distinction between physical 
change and human activity was the bulwark of Gregory's dualism. He 
regarded any deviations from this preferred ontology as perversions 
of common sense and sound reasoning, and repeatedly laid the blame 
upon the careless use of vague words and phrases. The hypothetical, 
analogical and metaphorical language used by some scientific 
metaphysicians led them to blur the boundary between the behaviour 
of men and the activity of matter. They were then prone to a dual 
mistake. If they applied the concept of power or activity to non- 
human events, then they endowed inanimate nature with activity. Or, 
if they applied conceptions of physical change to man, then they 
robbed him of his intrinsic activity. Gregory considered that these 
two "errors" lay at the basis of all defective philosophies of 
nature which he opposed. 
In asserting the absolute distinction between the activity of men and 
the passivity of matter, Gregory put forward views which can also be 
found in the broadly-based Christian apologetic tradition of natural 
theology. 
2 Clerical intellectuals routinely used stipulations 
about the nature of matter and spirit to articulate perceptions of 
the relations between God, man and nature. Such writers can be 
thought of as voluntarists in so far as they emphasised God's free 
and active role of superintending events in nature. If matter could 
be shown to be passive, then some form of God's power was required 
to sustain nature's processes. On the-other hand, if matter was 
inherently active, then nature became self-sufficient and God became 
relegated to the status of a "first mover". Or he was denied a role 
in nature altogether and replaced by matter which, since it was 
active, might also be self-organising and capable of intelligence and 
thought. The issue of 'thinking matter' is itself an indication of 
the close connections made in natural theological discourse between 
the nature of matter and the nature of man. 
3 Voluntarists placed a 
parallel emphasis upon man's will, acting in harmony with God's will. 
Because God had endowed men with an immaterial spiritual substance 
or soul, they were capable of acting freely. Consequently, those who 
viewed men as subject to a physical necessity, based on the activity 
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of matter, were perceived to disrupt this preferred account of the 
relationship between man and God, and challenge the soul's 
immateriality. 
The revealed, scriptural and doctrinal dimensions of voluntarism 
lie outside the scope of this thesis. However, it is germane to 
note that throughout this whole period, there was a considerable 
overlap between the natural theological work done by members of the 
literate clergy and natural philosophers, who also displayed 
sensitivities to the nature of matter and spirit and their 
theological uses. Perhaps the most well known instance of the 
interaction between natural philosophers and clerics within the 
voluntarist tradition is the Boyle Lectures. 
4 
Samuel Clarke and 
Richard Bentley pressed a particular version of Newton's natural 
philosophy into the service of providentialism. 
s In particular, 
they paid considerable attention to the nature and status of 
gravity and to the concept of a law of nature. Both men emphasised 
that gravity was not an inherent active power of matter, and that 
the means of explaining gravity as a law of nature conformed to the 
notion of a voluntarist law-maker, who sustained the active powers 
of nature by his free will. 
The configuration of the opposition to voluntarism in the later 
17th and early 18th centuries is less well known.. But recent 
research has begun to chart the alternatives to the Newton-Clarke- 
Boyle Lecturers axis, which variously made use of the writings of 
Stubbe, Hobbes, Toland, Leibniz and others. 
6 Perhaps the most 
familiar clash between voluntarism and writers in this group is the 
Clarke-Leibniz dispute. 7 However, it is evident that the range 
of rival philosophies, of which Leibniz was just one, is 
remarkably complex. Nor is it possible to classify them all as 
b protagonists of active matter. They included men branded by the 
voluntarist opposition as "mechanists", "materialists", "deists", 
"sceptics" and "atheists". But, significantly, they also included 
men who considered themselves better apologists for orthodox 
Christianity than "Newton's men". For example, the Hutchinsonians 
claimed that Newton's philosophy gave comfort to the deists 
because he had not asserted the passivity of matter in a manner that 
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was to their satisfaction. 
8 Such considerations have led to a 
much closer examination of the complex legacy of Newton's natural 
philosophy to the 18th century. This involves the development of 
approaches which do not presuppose either Newton's theological 
propriety, or that the institutionalisation of his views were 
unproblematic and uncontested by alternative philosophies of 
nature. 
Despite these complexities, which are themselves matters of dispute 
among historians of science, it is evident that ontologies of matter 
and spirit do seem to have been central to the natural theological 
uses of natural knowledge. 
9 Furthermore, the most important boundary 
stressed by the actors themselves was between the behaviour of 
matter and the action of God and men. This was the case even for those 
who wished to break it down. From this perspective, the notions of 
active matter and passive men were both perceived as infringements 
of that boundary. It therefore becomes important to focus upon the 
different ways historical actors actually sought to mobilise and 
justify accounts of matter and spirit within coherent philosophies of 
nature, and how others perceived their achievements. 
A concern with the manner in which matter was to be managed is very 
apparent in Gregory's work, especially his attention to the 
evidence of language. In his account of the ways in which the 
boundary between human activity and passive matter was blurred by 
misuses of language, Gregory did not cite many examples of this. 
But of the two he explicitly mentioned, both were drawn from local 
developments in Scottish scientific metaphysics. One of these was 
the philosophical doctrine of the necessity of human actions 
recently "aserted with the utmost confidence by Mr. Hume and 
Dr. Priestley". This is considered subsequently"in chapters four 
and six. The other was Kames's essay "Of the laws of motion", 
which was published as the outcome of a dispute over the 
foundations of mechanics in the Edinburgh Philosophical Society 
during the late 1740s and early 1750s. 
1° Kames's opponent was 
Dr John Stewart, Professor of Natural Philosophy at Edinburgh 
University. His own essay, "Some remarks on the laws of motion 
and the inertia of matter", was published alongside Kames's own 
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in the Philosophical Society's Essays and observations physical 
and literary. This appeared in-1754.11 
Gregory made it quite clear that Stewart's distinction between the 
motion of bodies and the action of men was basically correct. 
However, Gregory also considered that, despite being 'right', 
Stewart's views somehow appeared "obscure" in contrast to Kames's 
ingenious and superficially plausible position, which was 
nevertheless 'wrong'. Stewart actually perceived that the fallacy 
of Kames's whole position was hidden by an ambiguity of language. 
But, in Gregory's view, Stewart had failed to capitalise upon this. 
Gregory considered that by attending to the evidence of language 
more carefully, he would be able to articulate the case for the 
passivity of matter in a better way. However, the link between the 
evidence of language and the maintenance of the passivity of matter 
was not a direct one. Rather, the significance of linguistic 
evidence for Gregory was that it assisted men to develop a more 
adequate conception of causality, which could then be used to 
maintain matter's passivity. But how was this to be accomplished? 
Precisely how Gregory used linguistic evidence in conjunction with 
an account of physical causation appropriate to passive matter is 
the subject of the next chapter. However, before the detailed 
contents of this are examined, it is useful to take a general look at 
how ideas about causality could be used not only to defend the 
passivity of matter, but also to assert its activity. Examining the 
Kames-Stewart debate is a suitable way of doing this for several 
reasons. Firstly, Gregory appears to have framed his own views 
specifically in relation to it. Secondly and more generally, the 
nature and content of the debate is representative of the particular 
place the Philosophical Society occupied in the development of 
Edinburgh's scientific society and club culture. It stood midway 
between the technical and specialised concerns of the Medical 
Society, reflected in the contents of its Medical essays and 
observations, 
12 
and the much more broadly-based interests of the 
Royal Society of Edinburgh, evident in the Transactions of the 
Royal Society of Edinburgh. 
13 
Shapin has noted that the 
evolution of these three societies reflects developments in 
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Edinburgh's cultural climate of improvement, in which there was a 
general broadening of the audience for the consumption of natural 
knowledge ss the 18th century progressed. 
14 
University professors 
of science successfully elicited the patronage of the landed and 
legal classes for their activities. Also, a small but significant 
number of lawyers and gentlemen became performers themselves. 
Notable examples included James Burnett, Lord Monboddo, James 
Hutton, and of course, Henry Home, Lord Kames. 
15 Thirdly, the 
divergence of views expressed during the debate are indications of 
different orientations to the nature and status of natural knowledge 
among various elite groups of Edinburgh society, who responded in a 
variety of ways to Hume's philosophy. Fourthly and finally, it 
offers many insights into the nature and status of the kind of 
discourse referred to here as Scottish scientific metaphysics. 
In fact, the Kames-Stewart debate was probably the most important 
local progenitor of subsequent discussions of the metaphysics of 
motion found in the writings of Monboddo, Hutton, Dugald Stewart 
and John Robison. 
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2. THE KAMES-STEWART DEBATE 
Kames's discussion of mechanics was presented rather as one might 
expect an experienced lawyer to proceed. On topics such as 
resistance, the communication of motion, and gravity, he cited the 
views of Newton, John Keill and MacLaurin as precedents for current 
explanations of these phenomena. However, he also subjected the 
evidence put forward by natural philosophers to critical cross- 
examination. An example of this process can be found in Kames's 
discussion of gravity. Kames introduced his discussion by a brief 
description of its properties. He then went on to analyse and 
explore Newton's account of the metaphysical significance of the 
concept of gravity. 'He cited crucial passages from the General 
Scholium of the Principia in which Newton claimed that he had not 
found the cause of gravity; but the nature of its effects seemed 
to imply that its cause penetrated all the bodies of the universe. 
16 
Kames began his cross examination subtly by applauding Newton's 
circumspection and reserve about the cause of gravity. But he 
went on to suggest that Newton's claim to have discovered a fact 
rather than a cause was a pretence on his part. Kames was 
unsympathetic to Newton's apparent refusal to assign a cause to 
gravity. "For my part, " he wrote, 
I cannot see any difficulty of explaining the cause 
of attraction, or gravity more than of explaining 
the cause of a body's continuing in the same degree 
of motion with which it begins to move. 17 
Kames accepted that such explanations were theoretical and that this 
could be dangerous. For example, men might become enamoured of their 
own preferred explanations and forsake more painstaking methods of 
enquiry in favour of shortcuts which were only 
imaginary solutions 
to problems. Nevertheless his attitude to theory was much more 
than an endorsement of its limited utility: it was actually 
indispensable. Theory was "vain without experiments and experiments 
[were] best understood by applying them to theory". 
18 
If experiments 
were not the basis for subsequent reasoning then, like all facts, 
they were "useless lumber". But most important of all, Kames 
argued that men were constitutionally disposed to theorising: 
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In all our operations, we may have an eye to theory: 
nay we must have it; for such is the constitution 
of our mind. 19 
But what exactly did such theorising entail? 
Kames's theorising about the motion of bodies put forward an 
interpretation of the laws of mechanics based upon two central 
features: 
(i) matter was intrinsically active and self-moving; 
(ii) all the operations of matter were subject to strict 
invariable laws. 
In Kames's view, matter possessed a variety of distinguishable innate 
powers such as the vis insita, resistance, gravity and attraction 
and repulsion, to which the known laws governing the observed 
motions and collisions of bodies must be referred. It should be 
emphasised that Kames's discussions of topics such as gravity, inertia, 
resistance, action and reaction, the ether and the notion of force 
were non-mathematical and, in some senses, non-technical. This was 
itself very typical of the kind of discussion these concepts 
received by Scottish intellectuals. Notable examples include 
Monboddo, Hutton, Gregory and Cullen. Even where men such as Reid 
and Robison were mathematically competent, their discussions were 
usually pitched at a non-mathematical level. Although Kames used 
the term "force", he paid no attention to the quantitification of 
the various forces itself, using, on the whole, the language of 
powers and causes. Viewed out of context and with only mathematical 
and technical concerns in mind, Kames's theorising can seem 
pretentious and over simplistic. But his qualitative and discursive 
approach can also be found in other contemporary discussants of 
mechanics and motion such as Andrew Baxter, and was actually not far 
removed from the more mathematically competent opinions of Colin 
MacLaurin. 
20 What was important to Kames and his Scottish audience 
was the rational foundation of the laws of mechanics, and not their 
factual and mathematical expression. The predictive successes of 
mechanics in the 17th and 18th centuries had an emblematic status 
as symbols of man's intellectual conquest of nature's hidden secrets. 
If these discoveries could be systematised and their foundations 
displayed, then the moral value of this body of knowledge could be 
Ce 
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impressed upon a wider audience who were not necessarily 
mathematical sophisticates. But precisely because of the perceived 
cultural value attached to the systematisation of mechanics, 
disputes about it were endemic. Like all important cultural 
resources, some men sought to appropriate it and use it for their 
own ends; other men perceived themselves as guardians of its 
achievements and rejected the interpretations of rivals. 
From this perspective, it is clear that Kames's way of theorising 
was actually much more sophisticated than is usually thought. His 
particular competence did not lie in mathematics or skilled 
experimentation. Instead, it was Kames's distinctive approach to 
the epistemological issues at the basis of understanding concepts 
such as "force" " ower" " "p , cause and matter which informed his 
account of mechanics. Thus Kames's importance lies in the way he 
"interiorised" traditional problems in mechanics such as the status 
of the vis insita, the communication of motion, action and reaction, 
resistance etc. These issues were henceforth to be referred to the 
contents of men's minds and the nature of human understanding. 
Kames considered that men were constitutionally predisposed to 
theorise and he-argued that the epistemological constraints 
imposed upon their minds actually determined the kind of theorising 
men could legitimately engage in. 
At the heart of Kames's epistemological interiorisation of the 
science of mechanics lay a particular view about the constraints 
imposed upon men's conception of causation or power. His 
attitude to these constraints informed his views about the philosophical 
status of motion and rest, the meaning of the terms "material" and 
"immaterial", and the status of inherent and external forces. Kames's 
starting point for his whole discussion was to insist that were it 
not for the senses of touch and sight men would be wholly unable to 
perceive rest or motion. Both these concepts were simple ideas, 
derived from our sensations and therefore, he argued, motion and rest 
could not be defined. Similar difficulties confronted men when they 
sought the causes of motion. It was necessarily true that everything 
which moved implied a cause or a power. But human understanding 
could never comprehend its exact nature or mode of operation: 
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In general, as we have no means to discover power 
in any being but by the effects produced; so the 
nature and operation of the power are only to be 
discovered by the same means. 21 
This nescience regarding 'real' causes or powers was not unique in 
the 18th century; rather it was a taken-for-granted assumption of 
orthodox sensationalist epistemology. It is evident, for example, 
in Locke. 
22 
The general theme that men's knowledge of nature was 
limited to appearances and facts which were only signs of underlying 
causes was a persistent feature of much scientific writing in the 
17th century. Stipulations about the limits to explanations in 
natural philosophy can be found in the writings of Boyle, Barrow, 
Newton and other prominent figures of the Scientific Revolution. 
23 
So, insisting upon man's causal nescience and emphasising the 
constraints this placed on the perception of change in nature, was 
not new in itself. However, the particular uses Kames put this to 
and the drastic conclusions he drew from it were novel. 
Kames considered that causal nescience applied to men as well as 
inanimate nature. Men had no direct experience of their power to 
produce change either in their own bodies or in other objects. It 
was only upon the basis of such experiences that men inferred they 
did have power as a matter of fact, and not through some privileged 
inner awareness of it. The situation was precisely the same for men's 
knowledge of power in nature. By observation, they saw effects of 
the operation of bodies on one another that were in principle the 
same as the effects they produced by their own power. 
And by the 
same process of inference they concluded there was power 
in bodies too. 
Thus, although men could not know a priori that either men or nature 
had power, experience suggested that both did. The experience of men 
led them to conclude that "power may be equally applied to animate 
and inanimate beings, supposing them to be equally self movers". 
24 
In particular it was clear that matter was 
"endued with certain 
powers and faculties". 
25 
From the apparent insistence upon causal nescience, or man's 
inability directly to perceive power, or the productive means of 
change, Kames refused to draw a sceptical 
inference. Instead, he 
rýyr, `e 
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made the naturalistic step of endowing matter with power or causal 
efficacy. Kames's subsequent defences of this position indicate 
he was acutely aware of how his arguments would be perceived. By 
making matter intrinsically active, he had transgressed the sanctioned 
boundary between men's activities and nature's processes, which 
orthodox dualist philosophers still endorsed. Karnes referred to the 
orthodox position as one according to which 
matter is altogether incapable of active powers; 
that activity is confined to immaterial substances, 
and that inertness is implied in the very conception, 
of matter. 26 
Here he could use his epistemology to good effect, arguing that the 
distinction between material and immaterial substances was itself 
founded upon "the limited nature of our external senses". In fact, 
immateriality was "a merely negative term, comprehending everything 
that [was] not matter". 
27 
Kames did not deny the existence of 
immaterial substances, although he came perilously close to doing so. 
The force of his reasoning was that man's incapacity to know power 
directly through the senses left him unable to conclude that it was 
only an attribute of spirit, not matter: 
Power-is a property or quality, of which none of our 
external senses afford us the perception; and therefore 
our want of perception of power does not more conclude 
a negation of power to matter, than to spirit.. 
28 
Kames exploited his monistic, nescient and empirical philosophy of 
power to discredit dualism' generally. 
29 In particular, he used it 
to secure a foundation for mechanics which was liberated from 
dualistic assumptions about matter and spirit. Some instances 
and examples of this are given below. 
The starting point for Kames's discussions was always that the only 
way the "force of any power" could be estimated was 
by the effects 
it produced. This was because: 
in general, as effects must always correspond with their 
causes, -every 
force which is uniformly exerted without 
diminution or-augmentation, must produce an equable 
motion, without acceleration or retardation: and, on the 
other side, every varied effect which is gradually 




Therefore, Kames argued that the impulsive power of gravity was not 
itself constant but continually increasing when- a body was accelerated 
by it. Kames disagreed specifically with MacLaurin on this point31 
and affirmed that 
in the perpendicular descent of a body, the force of 
gravity varies every instant, and turns greater in its 
progress downward. And indeed gravity cannot otherways 
produce acceleration. 32 
For Karnes, the rules by which men deduced causes from their effects 
determined how men represented the underlying powers of nature. If 
gravity produced acceleration which increased according to the 
inverse square law, then its cause, the power of gravity, must 'also 
increase similarly. Mapping the nature of the effect to the cause 
meant that the power was itself variable. 
33 
This form of reasoning can also be found in Kames's discussion of 
the vis insita, the power responsible for a body's perseverance in a 
straight line or at rest unless affected by some external cause. 
Kames argued that as the vis insita produced a continuing effect, 
it was necessary to view it as a power which acted continuously. In 
Kames's mechanics the vis insita was virtually equivalent to the 
general cause of all motion nature. It was nature's workhorse, 
inherent to matter, and operating in conjunction with other powers 
such as attraction and resistance. The vis insita 
by the very conception of it, is action. While a 
bodyýis in motion, it is in continued action; and 
as action implies power, there must be a power 
continually exerted to preserve a body in motion. 
34 
The vis insita continuously acted to preserve motion which was 
its 
perceived and continued effect. Similarly, Kames did not agree with 
the dual nature of the vis insita as the power responsible for the 
resistance of bodies as well as the perseverance of a 
body in motion. 
Rest and motion were categorically different for. Kames. They could 
not be accommodated together under the principle of 
inertia expressed 
in Newton's first law. Rather, resistance was "a positive effect" 
"which requirjed] a positive cause". 
35 
Kames summarised this 
position in the second proposition of 
his essay: 
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As matter resists a change from rest to motion, as 
well as from motion to rest, this resistance is not 
to be accounted for by the mere negation of a cause, 
but is a positive effect to require a cause as much 
as motion does. 36 
Therefore the vis resistantiae and vis inertiae were different powers 
and conceptually quite distinct from one another. One accounted for 
the tendency of an impulse to produce motion in a body; the other 
tended to prevent it. Once again, men's conception of the powers of 
nature inherent to matter was dictated by what they must necessarily 
believe about causes on the basis of their effects. This, Kames 
contended, had far-reaching consequences for Newton's third law of 
action and reaction which Kames dismissed as counter-commonsensical, 
if offered as a universal principle of mechanics. At best it was 
a tautological restatement of the more restricted law of colliding 
bodies in which as much force was lost by the impelling body as 
gained by the impelled* 
37 
To summarise, Kames's theorising about motion was a search for its 
causes, expressed in terms of the inherent powers of matter. How 
such powers were to be conceived and employed to account for the 
behaviour of bodies depended upon the nature and circumstances of 
their perceived effects. The forces of nature had to be referred to 
an interior epistemological world. The dimensions of this world were 
fixed by the rules or maxims which expressed the ways in which the 
human mind made causal inferences. Chief among these was the maxim 
that from similar effects men inferred similar causes. This had been 
commended by Newton in rule 2 of his "Rules of reasoning in philosophy" 
at the opening of Book 3 of the Principia. 
38 But Kames's application 
of it to the problem of discrete and continuous change led 
him to 
argue that the continuous effect of motion observed in a body, 
implied 
a continuously acting cause. This produced profound consequences for 
Kames's views of mechanics, some aspects of which have been discussed. 
Before the significance of such developments can be estimated, it is 
necessary to hear the other side of the story and consider Stewart's 
response to Kames's essay. 
In his essay "Some remarks on the laws of motion and the inertia of 
matter", John Stewart set about defending the passivity of matter 
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against the counter-assertions of Kames. Like his opponent, 
Stewart also sought support by an appeal to Newton's motives and 
intentions: 
It seems to have been far from Sir Isaac's intention 
to ascribe activity to matter in any shape; tho' his 
meaning has sometimes been mistaken. To do so, would 
be a manifest contradiction to the primary laws of 
motion, delivered by himself in the beginning of his 
Principia. 39 
Yet the defensive, often belligerent tone of Stewart's essay 
suggests that by the 1150s, Newton's legacy was hotly contested 
and that a large number of litigants were currently suing for 
exclusive rights to control the estate of natural philosophy. 
40 
Furthermore, Stewart identified problems in Newton's own writings 
which may have been indirectly conducive to misunderstandings. For 
example, Newton's use of the term "vis inertiae" which, Stewart 
pointed out, when it was literally translated meant "active 
inactivity" or an "impotent power". While insisting that Newton's 
meaning and the use of this term was nevertheless clear, Stewart did 
suggest that new terminology might be helpful. 
41 Also, there was 
the difficulty of harmonising Newton's suggestions regarding an 
etherial mechanism for gravity with continued assertions about 
the passivity of matter. 
42 
In view of such difficulties, Stewart proposed a task for all those 
philosophers who were committed to the inactivity of matter. 
Inactivity was a general property of matter and all Newton's laws 
were founded upon this assumption. Yet "at the same time everyone 
[knew] that active powers [were] continually employed through all 
the parts of nature". Therefore the shared task was to explain 
and justify why matter was a "passive instrument" under the dominion 
of some superior being, rather than in "the free possession of such 
powers in-its own right". 
43 
But how was it to be accomplished, and 
what sort of metaphysical technology could be used to secure this 
objective? 
Stewart's first strategy was to reclaim the passivity of matter as a 
proposition consistent with the common sense of mankind. This meant 
proposing counter-arguments to Kames's opinion that this common sense 
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was in fact "ready to declare in favour of the activity of matter". 
For example, Stewart argued that Kames's use of the analogy between 
the continued activity of walking, and the continued action of the 
vis insita responsible for rectilineal motion was open to an opposite 
interpretation. Experience indicated that men often had to exert a 
considerable force to stop their bodies once in motion. Stewart used 
example of skating on ice as an illustration that even human bodies 
were subject to the vis inertiae. 
44 
In Stewart's view, the problem 
was that because men had experience of the gradual loss of force after 
a body was put in motion, they naively assumed that rest was the 
natural state of all bodies to which they would return unless sustained 
actively. However, even this did not provide a warrant for common 
sense to conclude that the matter of which bodies were composed was 
active. Instead men were disposed to believe "that as long as the 
motion continue[d], it [was] only an effect of the first impulse". 
45 
Stewart's alternative appeals to a counter-common sense, 
supporting the passivity of matter opposed all Kames's examples 
tit-for-tat. He accused Kames of simply illustrating the activity 
of matter by first presupposing it, and then interpreting favoured 
examples in conformity with it. 
46 
But on this point, Stewart's own 
counter-examples were subject to similar criticisms. Therefore, he 
sought to clarify the principles upon which the inertia of matter 
depeded. 
The true nature of the distinction between the vis inertiae and 
what Stewart called "active force" was this: one class of 
"beings" 
in the universe, which included inanimate bodies, had the property, 
of motion only as a result of being acted on by an external cause. 
However, another class could begin motion where none existed before, 
either in themselves or in other "beings" of the former class. This 
class of self-movers were "ACTIVE BEINGS" and: 
the genuine characteristic of an active being, is a 
power of beginning motion either in itself or another, 
without the means of preceding motion. 
47 
Stewart held that it was by virtue of their vantage point as active 
beings that men acquired the idea of force because when, "by exertion 
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of our own activity": 
we endeavour to communicate motion to ... a substance, 
we must be conscious of some kind of feeling; and these 
feelings must be different in different cases. 48 
Such feelings were the basis of men's experience of the resistance of 
matter; and they could only be explained by assuming the "sluggishness 
and inactivity of matter", or its inertia. But: 
when people talk of the resistance of matter at rest 
as of an active power, struggling against any agent, 
and actively opposing it, they surely frame to themselves 
some notion of force antecedent to all experience; 
and they would do well to inform the world in what 
manner this idea was suggested to them. 49 
Thus men's understanding of motion in nature was constrained by 
their conception of action and passion. The difference between 
these two categories was evident through men's experience in the 
world as active rather than passive beings. Stewart's own programme 
for the epistemological interiorisation of nature depended upon the 
strict segregation of these two classes of being. His metaphysics 
served to manage the distinction between them. 
Kames either promoted the activity of matter directly, or he 
discussed the inertia of bodies in a way which implied that it was 
an active power intrinsic to matter. Stewart argued that he had 
been misled by a fatal ambiguity of language, which resided in the 
way men described the action of one body on another. 
50 When it was 
said that the impelling body acted and the impelled body reacted, this 
way of speaking about resistance signified real activity 
in bodies. 
If understood literally, it was inconsistent with inertia. He cited 
several examples of how inertia, operating as resistance, was mis- 
leadingly described. Typical cases included a man pulling a boat 
towards the shore using a rope; a man in a boat using a pole to 
punt it; and a man rowing. In all of these, it was commonly 
asserted that respectively the shore, pole and oar somehow reacted 
to the force exerted upon them by men. 
51 But Stewart maintained that 
The only immediate cause of the motion (is) the . 
active force of the animal which presses the medium 
one way and its own body the other way. 
52 
Errors of language of this kind had led to serious misunderstandings 
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in other areas of mechanics such as the communication of motion 
during impact, the nature of resistance, and crucially, the 
operation of gravity. 
In his discussion of the first and second of these subjects 
Stewart put forward a distinction between the resistance of inertia 
and the resistance due to what was called the "attraction of cohesion". 
The latter possessed real activity because it opposed the motion of 
an impelling body until all the particles of the impelled body acquired 
a common velocity. However, while the attraction of cohesion was 
truly active, it did not contribute to the motion of a body because 
the attraction between the particles of a body was mutual and 
therefore it opposed motion in one direction as much as in another. 
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Stewart used this distinction both to give an account of the correct 
measure of forces during collisions between bodies, and to dismiss 
Kames's proposed "treaty of peace" between philosophers. 
54 Stewart 
saw Kames's discussion as a "new modelling" of old facts and accused 
him of misrepresentation. He scathingly remarked at one point that 
Greater stretches might well be permitted for the 
accomplishment of so desirable an end, as a compleat 
union and harmony amongst philosophers. 
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To summarise, Stewart had 'deactivated' inertia and placed constraints 
upon the activity of the attraction of cohesion by denying 
it any 
power actually to begin motion. As a result, it lay 
in an intermediate 
category somewhere between active beings and inert things. But 
Stewart still had to face the problem of the power of gravity which 
certainly did seem to begin motion. How could 
it be shown that it 
was not an intrinsic active power of matter itself? 
Stewart's initial strategy was always to invoke reasoned common sense. 
This amounted to the claim that the categorical distinction 
between 
active beings and passive things was the reasonable position to adopt. 
The attributes of active beings were intelligence, feeling and the 
power to begin motion. Matter as a passive thing was 
literally 
mindless, had no feelings and could only communicate motion rather 
than inaugurate it. In the light of this dualistic classification of 
all beings, Stewart rhetorically asked: 
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Is it then conceivable that an unthinking being should 
be endued with an activity which it regulates in proportion 
to the situation, distance and magnitude of another 
body, or any other being whatsoever? 56 
No, it was not. The "voice of nature loudly declar[ed]" that gravity 
was "the effect of the continued and regular operation of some other 
being upon matter", acting either immediately or perhaps mediately. 
Nor could the issue be evaded by referring gravity to a law originally 
impressed on matter because 
law, that is to say a mere abstract name or complex 
notion, which is no real being, cannot impel a stone, 
and cause it to begin to move. Law by itself, with 
submission to be spoken, will avail nothing, unless 
either the subjects of it have understanding to yield 
a willing obedience, or they be compelled to it by 
external force. 57 
Only active beings were real causes, not laws or matter, and such 
beings were the originators, supervisors and, above all, the 
guardians of the active powers of nature. 
The significant point in Stewart's exposition is that he left open 
the possibility of the mediate action of active beings upon matter. 
This meant that, in principle, gravity might be accounted for by 
some form of mechanical explanation. He cited Newton's 
gravitational ether as an exemplar of this kind of restricted 
secondary explanation, because it had an intermediate status 
somewhere between a wholly mechanical account of the course: of 
nature, and the resolution of all events into the immediate 
operation of active beings. One thing was certain to Stewart: 
Newton did not want his ether to be active in the Kamesian sense. 
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In support of his case, Stewart cited natural phenomena such as 
smoke, vapour and the phenomena of magnetism and electricity. He 
stated these had all been initially interpreted as indications 
that matter was active. However, these had subsequently been at 
least partly explained, using intermediate mechanical cases such as 
magnetic effluvia and electrical fluids. The message for 
explanations of gravity was made abundantly clear: 
Why then should it be accounted "whimsical" or 
unphilosophical to demand, a cause for the attractive 
power of gravity? Tho' all the mechanical accounts 
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hitherto given should be found unsatisfactory; may 
it not still be owing to some unknown mechanism or 
the intervention of matter moving other matter? 
39 
Stewart described causes which accounted for the action of matter 
upon matter as "secondary", and commended their investigation as 
the chief task of natural philosophy. The realm of secondary 
causes was where natural philosophers were to take their stand 
between two alternatives. One of these was the resolution of all 
natural processes into the immediate operation of the deity. This 
involved excluding secondary causes altogether "as sonne over-zealous 
friends to religion [hadl done". While Stewart regarded this as a 
danger, he did have some limited sympathy for it as a favoured 
position. 
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However, Stewart identified the real danger as one 
which followed from the Kamesian position of active matter because 
If all the motions and changes of bodies are performed 
immediately by those bodies themselves, without the 
influence of other matter, or any other power, there 
is an end of all enquiries into causes and effects 
philosophy must be degraded into a bare knowledge of 
facts, a history of nature. 61 
Some of the issues evident in the Karnes-Stewart debate have been 
outlined and discussed to show how, on the one hand, Karnes sought to 
break down the boundary between physical change and human activity 
while Stewart sought to maintain it. Each used a preferred ontology 
and an epistemological distribution of the powers, forces and causes 
in nature to sustain his respective position. It is now possible to 
take a second look at their conflict over this boundary in order to 
uncover the wider attitudes and values they articulated in the use 
of their philosophies of nature. This involves identifying the 
different images of natural and divine order which permeated their 
essays and how these informed their preferred strategies to achieve 
the epistemological interiorisation of nature itself. 
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3. IMAGES OF NATURAL ORDER IN KANES AND STEWART 
Karnes and Stewart were exponents of two antithetical conceptions of 
natural order. These may be described as 'necessitarian, and 
'voluntarist' respectively. 
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Each represented a particular view 
of the relationship between the creator and the created world, 
expressed in terms of the kinds of causal processes which were 
considered to occur in nature. Interestingly, both images-, of 
natural order began from two apparently similar starting points. 
Firstly, man was generally nescient. Secondly, the consequence of 
such nescience was that man's perception of the causes of change 
was restricted to the observation of effects. But despite these 
common-starting points, Karnes and Stewart proceeded to radically 
different conclusions about the order of nature. 
Stewart's voluntarism emphasised the providential nature of God's 
continued superintendence of nature. In Stewart's view 
The contemplation of every part of nature, furnishes 
us with irresistable proofs of intelligence, counsel 
and design still employed in actuating, moving, 
conducting and governing the universe. 
63 
Kames, on the other hand, instead of emphasising God's will, 
emphasised his wisdom. Active matter "acting according to general 
and invariable laws exhibited a more beautiful and complete system"64 
was perceived by men as "a beautiful chain of causes and effects". 
65 
Kames favoured analogies which represented the universe and its 
creator related to one another like an elaborate engine and 
its 
engineer, rather than an intelligent overseer regulating and 
controlling the motion of its parts. 
66 Furthermore, he sought to 
ridicule the image of natural order which led its apologists to 
ascribe all the activity discovered in matter to 
"some invisible 
agency". Kames referred to this as a "whimsical doctrine", 
in 
which an immaterial deity preserved all activity 
in nature, so 
that 
when a plague infests the world, it is the deity 
who spreads the infection, and directs inert matter 
to ravage and destroy. Arsenic is not of itself a 
poison; it is the immediate finger of the deity 
which makes it so. 67 
64 
Kames eschewed voluntarism because it presented nature as "a deformed 
and crude scene". He sought: to collapse all forms'of voluntarism into 
extreme occasionalism. 
68 
His own radical epistemology of power left 
no room for secondary causes. Instead, the course of nature was 
governed by strict necessity and the intrinsic powers of matter 
conformed to unalterable laws. In his essay, Kames was circumspect 
about the implications of this image of order for human conduct. 
But in his Essays on the principles of morality and natural religion 
he discussed such matters more openly. 
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For Kames, unless there 
could be a necessary order to human thought and action, then the 
necessary order of physical nature could not be known. 
As Kames's original discussant, Stewart had the advantage of 
responding directly to the views in Kames's essay. From what has 
already been stated, it is clear that Stewart perceived himself as 
a voluntarist, although not an occasionalist. Yet close attention 
to his justification of voluntarism shows that it oscillated 
between the endorsement of secondary causes as a basis for explana- 
tions of natural events in terms of mechanisms; and a more 
occasionalist perspective. His programme for natural philosophy was 
ambiguously balanced between these two alternatives. For example, 
he stated that the question of the immediate concurrence of the 
deity in natural events was difficult to determine, given men's 
limited capacities. Yet he added: 
If however, it could be demonstrated that body cannot 
continue to move in a straight line, by virtue of the 
first impulse, what more rational solution will be 
found than to have recourse to the efficiency of an 
intelligent principle? 70 
Having made this occasionalist concession about inertia, it is 
hardly surprising that Stewart strongly associated the operation of 
gravity with the "superintendence of an intelligent being". 
Similar statements endorsing a more extreme voluntarism can be 
found side by side with others reiterating the importance of 
secondary causal processes. Yet secondary causes were problematic 
precisely because they occupied a mid-point between action and 
passion. Critics might argue that beings either acted or they did 
not, and charge Stewart with the very ambiguities he found in 
Kames's essay. 
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Stewart was on much safer ground when he turned to the offensive 
and displayed his reading of the presuppositions and consequences of 
Kames's position. Just as Kames sought to collapse voluntarism 
based on secondary causes as disguised occasionalism, so Stewart 
sought to push Kames's philosophy of nature towards radical 
materialism. Stewart argued that the powers Kames accredited to 
matter when he explained gravity meant, in effect, that matter 
could think: 
If bodies are not sensible of the neighbourhood 
of other bodies, of their quantities of matter, and 
of their precise distance from them is it to be 
imagined that they will have themselves with such 
determined degrees of force, corresponding to the 
different quantities of matter and different distances? 71 
Also, Kames's comparisons of the universe with a machine operating 
according to strict necessity, implied that the universe would keep 
going "without any further interposition of the author of nature or 
any other being". 
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It is quite clear from the general nature of Stewart's attack on 
Kames and his emphasis upon a voluntarist conception of the universe 
that he adopted a position very like Samuel Clarke's. Stewart 
mustered support from Clarke's writings at crucial points in his 
essay. For example, he referred to Clarke's letters to Leibniz 
to back up his point that self-motion was a necessary attribute of 
a genuinely active being. Furthermore, he allied himself with a 
tradition in which Clarke was perceived of as something of a 
figurehead: 
Dr. Clarke, Wollaston, and others, have so fully proved 
that matter is incapable of any degree of thinking, that 
it is impossible to confute their arguments but by 
scornfully denying the force of all metaphysical 
demonstrations whatsoever. 73 
The central features of Kames's philosophy of nature - dynamic 
matter and necessitarianism - have analogues in Leibniz. However, 
on the two occasions he mentioned it, Kames was very critical of 
Leibnizian natural philosophy. 
74 Certainly, he made no explicit 
identifications with Leibnizian metaphysics. Although Stewart 
may have implied that Kames's views resembled Leibniz, he actually 
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identified them as part of a much more radical and damning 
tradition which included "Mess. Hobbs, Toland and Collins" . 
75 
Moreover, he considered that this deist-freethinking tradition 
culminated in the work of Hume. 
76 
Stewart proceeded to connect 
both Hume's and Kames's philosophy together. 
In Stewart's view, Kames indicated his contempt for Clarke's 
philosophy by denying the force of Clarke's demonstrative 
metaphysics. In its place, Kames had erected an epistemology where 
in judging the qualities of matter, we are in every 
case to rely upon the report of our external senses, 
and never to employ our reason in comparing one thing 77 with another, in order to correct our first impressions. 
As examples, he cited Kames's cavalier treatment of immateriality 
as a mere negative term; his refusal to accept that innate gravi- 
tating matter necessarily had to be granted other sentient 
attributes; and, in particular, his attitude to causal inference 
and power found throughout "Of the laws of motion". Kames's 
extreme empiricism emphasised that power could only be known 
through its effects. Stewart agreed . 
in general, but denied Kames's 
specific application of this rule to indicate that continued effects 
implied continuing causes: 
The trite maxim sublata causa tollitor effectus is 
not to be so literally interpreted, as that an effect 
may not continue, after its cause ceases to act.. 78 
Furthermore, Kames had used his epistemology to argue that power 
was an attribute of matter as well as of active beings precisely 
because, by experience, men could not know causes except by their 
effects. Unlike the dualists, Kames applied the principle of causal 
nescience without exception. If one could not know power except 
by the rules of causal inference by which men proceeded, then there 
was no reason to maintain a boundary between active beings and 
inert matter. Kames's epistemology rendered both equivalent 
because both produced similar effects; therefore both had power. 
However, Stewart perceived this quite otherwise. Operating with a 
different kind of epistemology which preserved this boundary, he 
stated that 
the production of motion from an internal inanimate 
principle is entirely without foundation; and seems 
to be much the same thing as to allow that motion may 
begin without any cause at all. 79 
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Stewart then proceeded to ascribe this latter viewpoint to Hume: 
That something may begin to exist, or start into 
being without a cause, hath indeed been advanced in 
a very ingenious and profound system of the sceptical 
philosophy*; but hath not yet been adopted by any of 
the societies for improvement of natural knowledge. ßO 
In a footnote to these remarks, Stewart explicitly mentioned Hume's 
Treatise, the Philosophical essays, the Essays moral and political 
and finally, what he called "that useful commentary": Kames's 
Essays on morality and natural religion. Stewart referred to the 
perceived amalgam of Hume and Kames's philosophy as based on 
"sublime conceptions" which were "far above the reach of an 
ordinary genius". He regretted that such "universal philosophers 
twere] not always well skilled in the elements of mathematics and 
natural philosophy": 
Men who puzzle themselves with self-evident axioms, 
and stumble at the plainest demonstrations, raise a 
shrewd suspicion that they may be liable to the human 
infirmities in other matters, and can have no 
pretensions to be received as infallible guides. 
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Finally, he suggested that such writers should either school 
themselves in Euclid if they genuinely sought the truth about 
natural phenomena or "throw away the rule and compass altogether", 
depart the arena of natural philosophy and enter other areas where 
simple mistakes could not be so easily detected. 
Stewart's general response to Kames and Hume reveals that 
he saw 
their metaphysics as a threat to the correct understanding of 
natural phenomena. He repeatedly cast doubt on 
Kames's credentials 
for engaging in natural philosophy and dismissed his 
irenic 
aspirations for the science of mechanics. Kames, and other 
similarly minded writers, corrupted the evidence of nature to 
further their own preferred metaphysical beliefs. As a result, 
natural philosophy-. could no longer fulfil 
its role and "beget in the 
mind a well-grounded piety with comfortable 
hopes". 82 Incorporated 
within heterodox systems of metaphysics which questioned the 
testimony of nature, it could no longer serve the ends of natural 
religion. 
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Yet for all Stewart's invective, his own account actually made 
little use of the "rule and compass" of mathematical proof either. 
Instead, it relied heavily on metaphysics. Stewart sought to ground 
the notion of force in man's sense of his own activity. He 
commended man's self-evident status as an active being and contrasted 
him with passive natures such as matter. Also, he endorsed the 
language of secondary causes which was ambiguously poised between 
action and passion. Then, unable to develop this further in the 
face of the problematic status of concepts such as the force of 
cohesion and the ether, Stewart toyed with occasionalist explanations 
of change for basic phenomena such as inertia. Despite using a very 
different metaphysical technology to the one found in Hume and 
Kames, Stewart also referred scientific concepts to the nature of 
human understanding. In this sense, he also sought the epistemological 
interiorisation of nature. By examining aspects of the response to 
Hume and Kames by members of the Edinburgh clerical literati during 
the 1750s, it is possible to locate the wider role for the kind of 
metaphysics which informed Stewart's justification of mechanics. It 
also indicates the perceived importance of metaphysical resources 
for articulating the voluntarist image of natural order and setting 
it to work in opposition to perceived necessitarianism. 
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4. RESPONSES TO HUME AND KANES IN THE 1750s 
The publication of the first volume of the Philosophical Society's 
Essays and observations, physical and literary in 1754 coincided 
with a wider campaign against Kames and Hume in Edinburgh during 
the mid-1750s. Doubts about Hume's moral and religious orthodoxy 
had been raised as early as 1745 when Hume was an unsuccessful 
candidate for the moral philosophy chair at Edinburgh University. 
As M. A. Stewart has shown, the local micro-politics of this episode 
are remarkably complex. 
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They are not less so, for a whole series 
of clashes which occurred between the church and university throughout 
the 18th century, including the campaign to get Kames and Hume 
censured for atheism at the General Assembly in 1755. Although no 
treatment of this episode comparable to Stewart's exists, the 
basic details of this dispute and the inevitable pamphleteering 
which followed in its wake can be found in Ross's biography of 
Kames and Sher's thesis on the moderate literati of Edinburgh. 
84 
In this section, the aim is to take a more general look. at the 
response of members of the clerical literati who opposed Kames 
and Hume. This is in order to observe the precise grounds upon 
which they connected both men's philosophies together and also to 
see if the general metaphysics of nature found in Stewart had more 
widespread support. 
There is considerable evidence that Stewart's Remarks was itself 
very much a part of the wider reaction to Kames and Hume within 
certain sections of Edinburgh's clerical literati. It appears 
that Stewart re-wrote part of his contribution in order to attack 
Kames more ferociously, for holding a heterodox philosophy of 
nature which had atheistic implications. In an undated letter 
Hume referred to Stewart's "remarkable alterations in the printed 
copy" and expressed a wish that Stewart had been "more reserved in 
his expressions". However, Hume would not allow Monro secundus, 
as Secretary of the Philosophical Society, to remove the passages 
where Stewart had attacked him; nor could anything be done about 
the attacks on Kames which were "so interwoven with the whole 
discourse". 85 Interestingly though, Hume seems to have sided with 
Stewart's justification of inertia rather than Kames's view. 
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Also, he sought to correct Stewart's misapprehensions about his 
own philosophy: 
Allow me to tell you, that I never asserted so 
absurd a proposition as that anything might arise 
without a cause, I only maintained that our certainty 
of the falsehood of that proposition proceeded neither 
from intuition nor demonstration, but from another source. 86 
Despite Hume's reassurances in private correspondence'and his evident 
disagreement with Kames's reformulation of mechanics, other publica- 
tions at this time continued to couple their philosophies together 
as Stewart had done. For example, the anonymous author of 
An analysis of the moral and religious sentiments contained in the 
writings of Sopho and David Hume87 also made this connection. He 
excused his method of simply compiling a list of Kames's and Hume's 
quotations under a number of heterodox propositions because others 
including George Anderson, chaplain to George Watson's Hospital, 
88 
James Balfour, Professor of Moral Philosophy at Edinburgh; 
89 
and 
Dr. John Stewart "in his very masterly reply to the Essay on 
motion", 
90 had already produced successful refutations of their 
works. This pamphlet was produced on the eve of the General Assembly 
of 1755 and was clearly intended to influence the voting of 
its 
members. 
91 Because of its format of selective quotation under 
particular headings, it reads like a metaphysical laundry-list of 
heterodox items to be found in Hume's and Kames's work. Kames in 
particular was accused of asserting "there was' no necessary 
relation betwixt cause and effect" and that "matter 
[was] possessed 
of self-motion". 
92 Several other accusations followed, focussed 
around the idea that Kames had laid the 
"very groundwork of atheism", 
culminating in the belief that "nature was God". 
93 However, the 
common factor linking the philosophies of each author was that 
both 
had attacked "the great principles and duties of natural and revealed 
religion". 
94 Precisely how they were perceived to have done so was 
discussed in Anderson's An estimate of the profit and loss of religion. 
Anderson's lengthy book is a suitable antidote for any attempt to 
dismiss the clerical reaction to Hume's philosophy as a hysterical 
response of "wild" Calvinist enthusiasts of the evangelical party. 
Rather, Anderson's views were 'moderate', in so far as he was prepared 
to put Clarkean metaphysics to moderate uses. He emphasised the role 
4 
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of reason in morality and maintained a parallel emphasis on human 
and divine liberty in a voluntarist providential universe.. 
5 He 
perceived that Kames and Hume had drawn their metaphysics from an 
antithetical tradition to Clarke's own, which had developed out of 
the emphasis upon sense and feeling, according to which: 
Feeling is perception, feeling is taste, feeling is 
knowledge, feeling is a notion, feeling is conscience, 
and feeling is light within. Then there is a feeling of 
approbation, and a feeling of disapprobation, a feeling 
of property, a feeling of duty, a feeling of justice, 
a feeling of merited punishment, a moral feeling, and a 
metaphysical feeling; ... 
96 
Despite some differences of opinion, Hume and Kames were both 
perceived to use a. -Shared epistemology of feelings which Anderson 
described as "Epicurean" because it appealed to sensations as the 
supreme judge of truth and falsity. 
97 He identified this kind of 
epistemology as contributing to the marked rise in atheism from 
1710-5098 and traced its consequences for standard'presentations of 
a priori and a posteriori arguments for the being and attributes of 
God, 99 "by which the belief of a Deity stood established in the 
religious and learned world". Arguments about causation were a 
crucial part of justifying the existence and superintendence of God 
over his. creation. Their subversion in heterodox systems of 
metaphysics could "take away the influence which the belief of God 
ought to have upon the conduct of men". 
100 
In a subsequent pamphlet against Kames, Anderson drew out the 
consequences of Kames's epistemology of feeling for orthodox 
justifications of the existence and attributes of God. In the place 
of a priori and a posteriori arguments, Kames 
substitutes his own feelings. And these are sometimes 
true and genuine, and sometimes false and deceitful; 
and because his. feelings admit of counter feelings, 
he cannot give implicit trust. And thus the Being and 
attributes of God, the foundation of all religion, 
instead of supported by reason, is by the author 
established on his fanciful, false and inconsistent 
feelings. The author-says (parag. 2I). That in man are 
accumulated all the prerogatives both a necessary and 
a free agent. In return, (if we may judge of him 
according to his writings) in him are accumulated all 
the vanity, weakness and wickedness of an Enthusiast 
and an Atheist. I0I 
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The comments found in Anderson, in the anonymous pamphlet, An 
analysis, in Stewart's Remarks and in Balfour's subsequent publications 
reveal the systematic nature of the discourse which wove together 
beliefs about God, man and nature into a comprehensive whole. The 
metaphysical apparatus for securing and maintaining it depended upon 
the passivity of matter, the superintendence of active intelligent 
causes and the soveieignty of human reason by which men could be 
certain that the order of the natural world was both proof of 
divine moral government and the basis of human virtue. Balfour's 
posthumously published Philosophical dissertations 
102 is a typical 
illustration of this metaphysical apparatus at work. Balfour also 
perceived the chief aim of "Epicureans" such as Hume and Kames was to 
dismantle this discourse, to break down the connections between 
nature, religion and morality in the mind of man. 
103 Once again the 
theme of epistemological interiorisation re-emerges fully. As part 
of his apologia to John Stewart, Hume had written: 
There are many different kinds of certainty; and some 
of them as satisfactory to the mind, though perhaps not 
so regular as the demonstrative kind. 104 
Remarks such as this in both Hume and Kames could be, and were 
actually, used to put the counter-view of the benignity of their 
philosophies. It could be argued that they had sought merely to 
shift the criterion of certainty in men's minds away from the 
demonstrative evidence of reason, not necessarily to destroy it 
altogether. However, in the eyes of their opponents, the whole 
complex structure of natural theological justification had shifted 
its foundations and was in imminent danger of collapse. 
From the various responses found among the clerical literati, it is 
clear that technical issues of natural philosophy were not at the 
heart of the wider reaction to Hume and Kames in the early 1750s. 
Nor would one expect them to be. Their clerical opponents were 
typically worried about the foundations of morality, the grounds of 
human action and the perceived threat to religious belief. However 
they were vitally concerned with the epistemological maintenance of 
the voluntarist dualism which infused their natural theological 
justifications. It is also very evident that these same men 
perceived close connections between broader images of nature which 
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permeated natural philosophy and questions of religious orthodoxy. 
For these men, the voluntarist image of nature found in Stewart could 
be pressed into service to uphold a basically providential view of 
natural and moral order in which inert matter was made to move under 
the guidance of spiritual agencies. Stewart's vacillation between 
secondary causes and the occasionalist option of an immediately 
superintending deity has been noted. Balfour in his Philosophical 
dissertations also made it clear that 
the agency of the Deity is a principle which natural 
philosophers cannot lose sight of, without danger of 
falling into the grosest absurdities; a principle as 
certain as it is certain that matter cannot possibly 
move itself. 105 
From their vantage point, the response of this group of clerical 
literati within the Church of Scotland is entirely intelligible. 
They were. not particularly responsive to any sophistications in 
Hume's epistemological position which might be cited to distinguish 
Hume from Kames. For them, it was enough that both philosophers had 
departed from the orthodox standard of dualism and seemed to supplant 
providence, reason and liberty by self-sufficiency, feeling and 
necessity. Both men's epistemologies were regarded as dangerous, 
precisely because they were perceived to have grave consequences for 
the evidences of natural religion. They were seen to cast doubt 
upon the basis of inferences which connected together men, God and 
nature within a benevolent theistic framework. Furthermore, when 
this epistemology was applied to natural philosophy, it could be 
used to free natural philosophy from its theological obligations and 
give it the kind of self-sufficiency which Kames contended was a 
property of matter itself. 
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5. CONCLUSION 
The attempt to censure Kames and Hume at the General Assembly came to 
nothing. This was largely due to the protection both men received 
from a small group of clerical literati who eventually developed into 
an ecclesiastical party known as the "moderates". 
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They included 
William Robertson (1721-93), Hugh Blair (1718-1800), Adam Ferguson 
(1723-1816), John Home (1722-1808) and Alexander Carlyle (1722-1805). 
Under the early leadership of Robertson, the moderate literati took 
their stand upon the enforcement of patronage appointments to the 
ministry at the Presbyteries of Linlithgow and Dunfermline. 
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The 
moderates have been characterised by Sher as "Whig Presbyterian 
Conservatives" who were insistent upon the enforcement of church 
government, in favour of religious toleration, and concerned to 
moderate more extreme forms of evangelical fervour within the Church 
of Scotland. The author of An analysis closed his attack with a 
direct challenge to this newly emerging moderate caucus who recently 
deposed a minister who disowned your authority, 
but enrol, as a member of your courts, an elder 
who has disowned the authority of almighty God; 
and that some of you at least live in the greatest 
intimacy with one who represents the blessed Saviour 
as an imposter and his religion as a cunningly devised 
fable - May your conduct be such as fully to wipe off 
all these reproaches; and testify to the world, that 
you will have no society with the workers of iniquity . 
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Moderates such as Blair were certainly active in the joint defence 
of Karnes and Hume. They countered the attack in An analysis almost 
immediately with Observations upon a pamphlet entitled "An 
analysis" etc. This was followed by the more substantial Objections 
against the essays on morality and natural religion examined. 
Typically, the former of these emphasised freedom of thought and 
toleration. It also stressed that Kames's conception of moral 
necessity was sanctioned by the founders of Calvinism. 
109 
The latter 
maintained that whatever might be the implication of Hume's position, 
Kames's writings sought more secure foundations for the arguments of 
morality and natural religion, not their complete demise. Instead of 
being devisive, the epistemology of feelings could be commended as 
suitable for popular consciousness, rather than the educated 
sensibilities of the few who understood a priori arguments. Thus 
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The: Deity has displayed himself to all men by means 
of an internal sense, which is common to all men, the 
ignorant as well as the learned. We have an intuitive 
perception of him, as we have of our own existence. 110 
After all, both pamphlets contended, metaphysics merely perplexed 
the understanding and did not have the power to impair morality 
itself. Therefore Kames should not be attacked simply because he 
had "deserted the beaten track, and followed a new. train of 
speculation". 
III Hence, Kames too could be successfully enlisted 
on the side of theism. In fact 
Convinced by his enquiries that religion and morality have a firm establishment in human nature, and finding 
at the same time loose and sceptical opinions spreading 
he flattered himself that his lucubrations might be of 
some use in preventing the infection-112 
If the "perfection of religion" was "the spirit of moderation", as 
one of these pamphlets suggested, 
113 
then it was a spirit broad enough 
to accommodate Kames's writings and possibly even Hume s. However, 
if one steps aside from the mutual accusations made by the "moderates" 
and 'anti-moderates' or "evangelicals", it is evident that the 
standard view of both groups' religious persuasions do not match 
their epistemological preferences. On the one side, we have the 
so-called "evangelicals" backing what appears to be a standard 
rationalistic natural religion. On the other, the moderate caucus 
fell into line with the new epistemology of feeling promoted by Hume 
and Kames; they even urged its suitability for popular consumption. 
One way of resolving the evident asymmetry here is to view both 
these groups as competing for a moderate religious stance. This 
certainly corresponds to the general picture of modernising 
Enlightenment Edinburgh in the latter half of the century. From 
this perspective, the intra-elite conflicts within Edinburgh at 
least, should not be viewed simply as involving religious enthusiast 
and secularised moderate. Rather, each group was committed to some 
form of rapprochement of metaphysics, natural knowledge and religious 
belief that was itself reasonable and justifiable. In many ways, 
it was the convergence of outlook which necessitated the clear 
demarcation of respective positions. What appears to be missing in 
the latter half of the century, is the insistence upon revealed 
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religion either among the clerical literati or more widely in the 
intellectual community. It is hard to find an equivalent to men 
such as Thomas Halyburton, Robert Riccaltoun, or even Duncan Forbes 
of Culloden. 
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In the ensuing intellectual climate, often referred to as the "Age 
of Improvement", natural theological justification was the norm, 
rather than the exception. 
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As a result, metaphysics was 
proportionally more important because it was the philosophical 
technology by which men could connect together (or break apart) 
connections between man, God and nature. Epistemological questions 
about men's perception of power in nature and his sense of causal 
connections between phenomena were issues which had to be confronted 
in order to develop a theologically sound philosophy of nature. 
Naturally, men differed about what a sound knowledge of nature 
consisted of and over the grounds upon which it was to be secured 
in man's minds. The Kames-Stewart debate illustrates that natural 
philosophy was perceived to have an important role to play in the 
articulation of wider belief systems. In particular, it could 
serve as a vehicle for the expression of voluntarist or necessitarian 
images of natural order which did important cognitive work in the 
general search for the epistemological interiorisation of nature. 
Furthermore, accounts of causality and power were crucial resources 
for negotiating the boundary between physical change and human 
activity, the central bone of contention between necessitarians and 
voluntarists. However, the dispute between protagonists of these 
rival images of natural order was not a simple dichotomy between 
seculariser and theist. Also, conceptions of causation and power 
were ambiguous tools capable of being given diverse interpretations 
in the search for the epistemological interiorisation of nature. 
This is epitomised by the subsequent uses of Hume's theory of 
causation by Gregory and others later in the century. 
As a postscript, it is significant that subsequent attempts to 
prosecute Hume and Kames also failed. The opposition lacked a 
powerful figurehead after Anderson's death and the later departure 
of John Witherspoon 
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for America. The 'unholy alliance' between 
the moderate literati, Hume, and his circle, went from strength to 
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strength. The period from 1760 to 80 was one in which they exerted 
a hegemony over Edinburgh's cultural life. Hume dominated the 
Select Society; 
117 
Karnes boasted of his control over the Philosophical 
Society118 and continued to promote his views on natural philosophy 
in his private correspondence with Reid. 
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What Phillipson has 
called the culture of "polite determinism" came to dominate 
Edinburgh during this period. 
120 
However, a reaction was afoot 
during this time which kept alive the opposition to necessitarianism, 
expressed largely in doubts about the nature of Humeian causality 
and its implications for a theologically sound knowledge of nature. 
Monboddo sought to find an alternative philosophy of nature based 
upon theistic Aristotelianism. In medicine, Robert Whytt, John 
Gregory and others continued to attack monistic accounts of 
physiological processes and the aetiology of disease. Yet the 
most significant reaction to Humeian metaphysics was to come from 
Thomas Reid and other members of the Aberdeen common sense school. 
Gregory's primary intellectual and family loyalties lay with Reid's 
circle. By the 1780s the time was ripe for a second major assault 
on Hume. The philosopher had recently died. But, as we shall see, 
his influence was perceived to be still very much alive among 
members of Edinburgh's scientific literati. 
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In the. previous chapter some aspects of the Kames-Stewart debate were 
discussed. It was shown that the search for the epistemological 
interiorisation of nature operated on several levels. In mechanics, 
the specification of the conditions under which men perceived the 
powers of matter was central to the Kames-Stewart debate. More 
generally, epistemology was a major resource for'maintaining wider 
conceptions'or images of natural order which were routinely used to 
articulate perceived connections between man, nature and God. For 
both these tasks, theories about the nature of causality were 
perceived to be of central importance. It is clear that Gregory 
completely supported Stewart's aim to defend the passivity of matter 
against writers such as Kames. Stewart had emphasised the role of 
active powers acting throughout nature which men, as active beings, 
could know through their privileged access to the notion of 
efficient causality. But Gregory regarded this as an inappropriate 
and anachronistic means of maintaining the passivity of matter. 
Given that Gregory rejected this voluntarist legitimation of natural 
philosophy, the question is: what did Gregory put in its place? 
The purpose of this chapter is to describe and discuss Gregory's 
alternative metaphysical technology for maintaining the boundary 
between physical change and human activity. 
In the first part of Gregory's Project, the Introductory essay, his 
self-appointed task was to show that men had a common notion of cause 
and effect in physics. But he did not enumerate its characteristics 
in any detail. Despite the fact that all the essays written 
in the 
1780s and. 90s were conceived of as parts of an investigation into the 
nature of physical causation, none of them dealt exclusively with 
the relation of cause and effect in physics. Therefore Gregory's 
views must be gathered together from various parts of the Project 
as a whole. The organisation of this chapter reflects the continuing 
importance of the interconnected themes of the relation of causality, 
linguistic evidence, and the role of demonstration in Gregory's 
search for the epistemological interiorisation of nature. In 
particular, Gregory's attitude to the certainty of truths in both 
89 
the philosophy of mind and natural philosophy is considered. This 
is done with respect to Gregory's aim to demonstrate the distinction 
between men's knowledge of the relation of cause and effect in 
physics and human activity, and hence, erect a boundary between 
matter and man. Finally, in the conclusion Gregory's new 
metaphysical technology is briefly compared and contrasted with the 
form of scientific metaphysics put forward by Lord Monboddo which 
also sought to re-assert the passivity of matter using different 
philosophical resources to those associated with the voluntarism of 
active powers. 
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2. GREGORY'S PLURALISTIC THEORY OF CHANGE 
Throughout the Project, Gregory developed a distinctive vocabulary 
for talking about causality which structured all his subsequent 
remarks. This vocabulary emerged from a fundamental attitude to the 
limits of the human understanding. Gregory wrote: 
We know little indeed, of what anything is in itself; 
but much of what many things are with respect to one 
another; wherein they agree, wherein they differ and 
how they stand related. 1 
The connected disciplines of natural history, natural philosophy and 
metaphysics were all subject to such limitations. Natural history 
classified material kinds according to the various resemblances and 
differences between them. Natural philosophy made use of resem- 
blances and differences; but it specifically "treat[ed] of physical 
events". 
2 
The natural philosopher determined the precise nature of 
events which occurred in the physical world by identifying causes 
and effects. Finally, the metaphysician discerned the similarities 
and differences between what Gregory called "relations of event", 
one of which was physical causality. As we have seen, Gregory held 
that all men had a common notion of the relation of physical 
causation. However, men's love of analogy and use of ambiguous 
words and phrases to denote it, led them to conflate physical 
causation with other relations such as activity or motive. 
3 The 
task Gregory set for his particular kind of scientific metaphysics 
was to undertake a careful comparison of men's common notions 
in 
order to distinguish the precise nature of the relation of cause and 
effect in physics. Among those to be examined and classified were 
existence, substance, quality, state, event, change, effect, action, 
cause, power, instrument, necessity, force, mind, body, faculty and 
motive. 
4 These notions were to be compared with one another and 
also with the different objects to which they referred. By this 
method, it was possible to assess the justness of men's common 
notions because 
If we find, on careful examination, that there is among 
other things and events a relation, corresponding to our 
common notion of cause and effect, this notion may with 
sufficient propriety be pronounced just and rational. 
5 
91 
In Gregory's view, men could only understand the world by comparing 
their common notions and the objects to which they referred. This 
procedure necessarily involved a complex process of interiorisation, 
in which perceived relations between things were examined, rather 
than any independent evaluation of the things themselves. Gregory's 
search for the epistemological inteiiorisation of nature is 
epitomised in his investigation of differences in the relations 
between things fashioned in men's minds according to the laws of 
human thought. 
What made the language of cause and effect so important was that it 
constituted the main vehicle for expressing what Gregory called the 
perceived "relations of event" between things. In the informal use 
of this language, "cause" usually denoted the principle of change; 
whereas "effect" denoted the change itself, considered in relation 
to the principle of change preceding it. Gregory emphasised this 
indicated that cause and effect were entirely relative terms. 
Substances, qualities or events themselves could all be considered 
as causes or effects. 
6 Despite the relativity that was built-in to 
the common usage of the language of causality, it was nevertheless 
evident to all men that nb. event occurred without being related to 
something else. Gregory noted this was both an important general 
fact and a law of human thought which found expression in the maxim 
"For every effect there must be a cause; nothing exists or nothing 
comes to pass without a cause". 
7 
Were this maxim untrue, Gregory stated, the foundations of both 
natural philosophy and geometry would be undermined. 
Yet despite 
its obvious importance, Gregory argued that its precise meaning 
needed clarification. Gregory stipulated that the common notion of 
causation always referred to change or event, rather than to 
existence. Therefore he argued that the maxim was 
formally 
incorrect and he censured most other philosophers for conflating 
rather than distinguishing the relations of causation and existence. 
8 
Suitably modified, the maxim read: 
It is universally admitted that there is no event, that is, 
no beginning or existence, no end of-existence, no change 
of state or mode of existence, not even the action of a 
living sentient being, without a cause. 9 
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But unless one fixed the precise meaning of cause, men could not yet 
assent to this proposition as either true or false. Gregory discussed 
four possible meanings. Two were Aristotelian, consisting of the 
typology of efficient, formal, final and material courses and 
Aristotle's general notion of causation. The other two were the 
contemporary notions of efficient and physical causes. Gregory 
actually made very short shrift of both Aristotelian options upon 
the precise meaning of causality. For example, he referred to the 
four-fold Aristotelian typology as an attempt "to make a false and 
unnatural genus" which violated "the laws of human thought". 
10 This 
narrowed down the meaning of causation to either physical causes or 
agent causes. Gregory proceeded to argue that in either of these 
senses the maxim was still false. The problem with the maxim was 
that it did not specify the precise sense of causation referred to. 
But if one specified that there was "no physical event without a 
physical cause", "no creation without a creator" and "no work of 
design and intelligence without an intelligent author ", 
11 
then all 
men would consent to it as necessarily true. 
Throughout his Project Gregory argued for just such a pluralism of 
relations of change to which different kinds of events between 
things referred: 
There are among things and events several different 
relations all of which have occasionally been expressed 
by the terms cause and effect; that there are not only 
very different kinds of events or effects (which is indeed 
self-evident), but also different kinds of causes or 
principles of change; and that between each of these and 
its corresponding event there is something peculiar or 
specific in the relation besides what is general or common 
in all such relations. 12 
In particular, Gregorian metaphysics sought to demonstrate the 
difference between relations such as cause and effect in physics, 
human activity and motive and action by specifying at least one 
characteristic peculiar to physical causation and not found in other 
relations. It is significant that when Gregory spoke of such 
distinctions he referred to different relations of event as "specimens" 
which were representative of the different "genera" and "species" 
of causes. 
13 By attending to differences to be found in the epistem- 
ological kingdom of causal relations, Gregorian metaphysics came 
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as near as the very different nature of things 
intellectual and things material will permit, to the 
exhibitions of well chosen and well arranged specimens 
in natural history, or well conducted experiments in 
natural philosophy. 14 
Although men could not know the exact nature of the relation of 
cause and effect in physics, they could know that it was different 
from others such as a man and his actions (agency and power), motive 
and action and the kind of change occurring in animated bodies. But 
what precisely distinguished physical causes from these other 
principles of change? 
Gregory considered his account of cause and effect in physics to be 
a restricted application of Hume's general analysis of causation. 
Thus Gregory stated that between physical causes and effects there 
was a "uniform, regular or inseparable connection or conjunction" . 
15 
For Gregory constant conjunction implied three principal things. 
Firstly, men were ignorant of any necessary connection between 
particular causes and their effects. Thus the precise manner in 
which the effect proceeded from a cause could not be known. 
16 
Secondly, the influence of causes in physics was constant. This 
meant that causes always had their full effects: 
17 
The full physical causes-are constantly conjoined with 
their respective effects; which accordingly correspond 
to them, not only in kind but in quantity. 18. 
Thirdly, the operation of physical causes never implied they had 
power or activity. There was no "reason to believe that what 
[was] 
called power in the common and strict and literal acceptation of 
that term belonged] to physical causes". 
19 Gregory made it 
equally clear that his sense of constantly conjoined physical 
causes and effects was not synonymous with mere uniform priority and 
succession of events. 
20 Rather, all that was meant by the constant 
conjunction of physical causes was that 4 
When the cause is applied to the subject, its effect 
will always and inevitably take place; and that a 
body has no power either of changing its. own state, 
or of preventing that change which the cause applied 
was fit to produce. 21 
The consequence of the absence of power in bodies was that all 
effects in physics passed inevitably. However, in conformity with 
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his denial of necessary connections between physical causes and 
effects, Gregory refused to confirm any stronger sense of necessary 
connection other than a regular, uniform and constant conjunction. 
It remained the case that the constant'conjunction of physical causes 
was an established matter of fact whether or not the relation was 
maintained necessarily, arbitrarily, or contingently. 
22 
Gregory's second implication of constant conjunction was an important 
criterion for him to distinguish further between different "species 
of physical cause". 
23 
Only causes and effects in physics always had 
their full effects. This was evident, for example, in the comparison 
between mechanical and chemical causes, where there was enough of a 
difference: 
to show that in the production of chemical phenomena 
something else is concerned besides the obvious 
external cause applied as, for example, heat. 
24 
It also seemed that physiological changes in plants and animals 
resembled change in physics. Yet: 
It appears, however, on giving due attention to the 
changes observed and to'all the circumstances connected 
with them, that the relation between the-changes and 
the external circumstances is not the same with that of 
cause and effect in lifeless bodies; that the external 
circumstances are not the sole causes or principles of 
the changes observed, but only partial and accessory 
causes of them, though perhaps indispensably requisite 
for them; and that there is in the subject another 
principle of change, the concurrence of which is no 
less requisite for the production of those changes 
than the application of the external causes. 25 
Gregory referred to such external causes as "partial", "exciting" 
or "occasional". What distinguished them was that they were not 
constantly conjoined with those changes in living 
bodies excited 
by them. As a result such changes did not "always correspond to 
them in degree or quantity, not even in kind". 
26 
The third implication of constant conjunction between physical causes 
and effects was the most important in Gregory's view. This was 
because it emphasised the complete difference between this kind of 
4 
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relation and others such as activity. Activity always implied a 
being producing change "by means of a voluntary exertion of its 
own power doing something, in consequence of which, change occurs 
or is produced". Inanimate things merely displayed 
27 
such relations that they may be mutually: causes 
or principles of change to one another without 
any exertion of power, or any operation of an 
agent strictly so called.. 28 
Gregory was so insistent upon the separation of physical causation 
and activity of power that he usually reserved the term "cause" for 
cause and effect in physics only. Because of the real difficulty of 
discussing intellectual objects without ambiguity, Gregory entertained 
the possibility of a philosophically pure language which would be "as 
perfect as algebraical notation". 
29 In such a language, the 
distinction between various relations of event would be marked by 
different words. As an example of what might be achieved Gregory 
pointed to the utility of new nomenclature in chemistry: 
In this science, many new notions have lately been 
introduced, many old abolished, and many disjoined 
which were formerly associated most intimately, and 
expressed by vague and otherwise inadequate terms. 
30 
Yet there were also problems concerning the introduction of 
neologisms into metaphysical discourse. How were such new words 
to be used and understood? As a compromise, Gregory employed a 
pragmatic restriction of the term "cause" to applications 
involving 
mechanical events. But he could hardly avoid using the generic 
term "causation" to denote any principle of change. 
Gregory regarded the denial of any power in physical causation as 
synonymous with the impossibility of bodies moving themselves. 
31 
However, direct appeals to the nature of bodies or matter were 
almost entirely absent in Gregory's work. Rather the nature of 
matter was dependent upon men's understanding. Therefore, 
he wrote 
the question is not whether body can act, either 
where it is, or where it is. not; but simply whether 
it be. consistent with the laws of human thought to 
believe that such relations many. subsist among bodies... 
that they shall, in certain circumstances, be mutually 
causes or principles of change to one another. 
32 
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Gregory always sought to establish and maintain the passivity of 
matter indirectly by uncovering the necessary conditions which 
underwrote this belief in men's minds. Thus the nature of cause and 
effect in physics could not be resolved inductively. It was to be 
displayed by referring it to "some fundamental principle of the 
human understanding". 
33 Gregory's analysis of the various relations 
of change in nature all served to elucidate the structure of the 
common notion of cause and effect in physics. If this could be 
described and demonstrated, then metaphysics would be of legitimate 
use and assist the natural philosopher in the correct resolution, 
classification and explanation of natural events. 
The strictures Gregory imposed upon his own metaphysical practice 
made the task of display and demonstration difficult. He eschewed 
introspective appeals to common sense. He was sceptical concerning 
men's knowledge of objects in themselves. Direct statements of the 
passivity of matter were displaced in favour of appeals to human 
understanding. Gregory's ontologically denuded vocabulary-of 
"relations of event" and "principles of change" emerged out of these 
strictures. It was idealistic, interiorised, unwieldy and, above 
all, indirect. Gregory presented himself as an inductive, factual 
scientific metaphysician. He was a natural historian of species of 
change. Yet how was the intellectual object of his discourse, viz. 
the relation of cause and effect in physics, to be realised in 
conformity with this language of the natural historian with its 
attendant emphasis on the accessible, the external and the publicly 
demonstrable object? Gregory's response was that the natural 
historian of metaphysical relations of change should attend to the 
structure of language. There the distinction between cause and 
effect in physics was manifest and could be demonstrated. Gregory's 
strategy for doing just this is considered in the next section. 
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3. POWER, ACTIVITY AND THE STRUCTURE OF LANGUAGE 
Gregory's use of linguistic analysis to show that men had a 
conception of cause and effect in physics has been discussed in 
chapter It section 2. The central features of Gregory's approach 
can be usefully reiterated here, this time in relation to the 
notion of power. 
Gregory's starting point was to clarify the aim of his discourse on 
power. It was not aphylogenetic enquiry into how men acquired the 
notion of power. Nor was it concerned to define or explain the 
concept in terms of how effects were produced by power. Instead, 
Gregory posed the question: 
have we, or have we not, any meaning or notion 
which we understand and express by the word power 
or by synonymous or convertable words and phrases? 34 
Gregory claimed that by attending to the "explicit" and "impartial" 
evidence of language, men had "incontrovertible" and "decisive" 
proof, they had a distinct notion of power. He also maintained the 
following two points: 
(i) Though men often applied the term power to physical 
causes and effects, this was a metaphorical and 
analogical use of language because power had no share 
in this relation. 
(ii) Men considered power was an attribute of mind only. 
35 
As we have seen, Gregory rendered the public evidence of language 
demonstrable, by means of his principle that language was necessarily 
the expression of men's thought. Because men routinely used the 
expression "power" and its derivatives in a fashion that was 
intelligible, then they must have some notion of power. This 
principle continued to serve as the crucial link which rendered the 
evidence of language a demonstration of the notion of power in men's 
mind. 
In order to confirm his other points, Gregory discussed four 
sentences, each of which illustrated a particular kind of power. 
He called these "animal power", "political power", "physical power" 
and the "moving power in machinery". Gregory stated that the 
C) 
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diversity of these applications indicated the word power was ambiguous. 
It was therefore necessary to explicate its various usages "to show 
the differences of the things or notions which it [was] on different 
occasions employed to denote" 
36 Gregory in fact identified animal 
power as the radical or root meaning of power when used correctly in 
particular instances. This was expressed for example, in the 
sentence "A man has the power of moving his hand, of eating, drinking, 
speaking, walking, riding etc. "37 Power was 
a general or abstract term employed to denote that state, 
condition, or predicament of a being, which is expressed 
in particular cases by the verb can, or by the corresponding 
verbs in different languages as in Latin by possum . 
38 
Thus the strict and literal meaning of power made it an attribute 
of mind. The power to do something implied with it "the optional 
or discretionary power not to do it". 
39 Gregory argued men never 
considered lifeless beings possessed any power not to act. Therefore 
when men applied the term power to inanimate nature, they were guilty 
of an impropriety of language which was evidence for an underlying 
absurdity of thought. Gregory discussed the example of saying "a 
statue can (has the power to) stand upright". The verb "can" linked 
the subject to a predicate that was inconsistent with it. This 
therefore constituted a metaphorical rather than a literal use of 
language. 
Gregory applied the distinction between the metaphorical and literal 
use of the term power to the problematic cases of "physical power" 
and "the moving power of machinery". An example of the former was 
the statement that "Heat has the power of melting lead" . 
40 To say 
that heat can melt lead simply meant that "if lead be heated to a 
certain degree, and for a sufficient length of time, it will melt". 
41 
But it never meant heat can, if it chose to, melt lead. 
42 The "moving 
power of machinery" was a particular case of physical power 
in which 
animal power was transferred by "a distant and fanciful analogy" to 
account for the beginning of motion in a mechanical device. Again, 
this never meant that the machine had the power of beginning motion, 
of not beginning it, or doing whatever it pleased. 
43 
Gregory raised the question of whether his stipulation of the radical 
meaning of power as animal power per se was not in fact a 
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petitio principii. He saw it as a self-evident truth, 
44 but gave 
the following justification in order not to be accused of indulging 
in hypotheses. If men considered the nature and import of language, 
then it was evident they understood power qua animal power rather 
than in another sense. Power expressed a "familiar-and well known 
thought", which could not be articulated in a different way without 
circumlocution and metaphor. Gregory stated that this was the only 
basis upon which men could decide whether the meaning of a word was 
literal or metaphorical. Common usage was the sole criterion one 
could appeal to. In Gregory's view, common usage indicated that 
men used the term "power" literally when they denoted an optional 
power of living beings to act or not act. 
The use of power in a, metaphorical sense to denote other kinds of 
events and relation was among 
the chief sources of all the errors, ambiguities, and 
perplexities, which have prevailed either in physics 
or in metaphysics with respect to the relation of cause 
and effect. 45 
This ambiguity was perpetrated in men's use of language when it was 
said that "a magnet attracts, that certain acids dissolve, and that 
heat melts iron". The use of active verbs implied something was 
actually done by the magnet, acids, and heat to the iron. Gregory 
sought to 
make it appear, that the notions expressed by the 
neuter verbs to move, to melt, to dissolve, and a certain 
relation between the events and the magnet, the acid and 
the heat, are all that we have any reason to believe with 
respect to the cases in question, either from the natural 
suggestions of our faculties, or from careful observation 
and experiment, and just induction. 46 
Throughout Power, Gregory continued his covert appeal to men's 
"natural faculties" and "common notions" which underlay the common 
usage of language. He considered men had separate and distinct 
notions of causation and power. By attending to the differences 
between phrases employing active and neuter verbs, Gregory sought 
to make these notions -'appear' in their correct form. Thus the 
evidence of language could serve to substantiate "a very important 
distinction in physics and metaphysics" by acting as a sort of 
honest broker between the scientific metaphysician and the notions 
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of the human mind he wished to demonstrate and display. This task 
was taken up in Gregory's essay Activity, the third part of his 
Project on cause and effect in physics. 
In his introductory remarks to section one of Activity, Gregory 
discussed the apparently contradictory, or at least paradoxical, 
47 
nature of his position. Gregory maintained, despite the evident 
fact that notions of activity and cause and effect were regularly 
confused, they were nevertheless completely independent relations. 
The common and natural suggestions of the human faculties confirmed 
this. Yet 
Some kind of activity or agency has, in words at least, 
been attributed to physical causes, by almost all, 
mankind, as their language abundantly testifys and 
in thought too, has by many of them been conceived, to 
form a part of the relation of cause and effect. 48 
The difficulty for Gregory's analysis lay in the fact that common 
language had a dual role. It was evidence for the correctness of 
men's common notions (activity and cause and effect relations 
distinct). At the same time, ordinary usage was embarrassed by 
repeated characterisations of cause and effect in terms of activity 
(activity and cause and effect relations indistinct). The purpose 
behind Activity was to specify the precise conditions under which 
language served as a correct indication of men's underlying common 
notions. 
As a propadeutic to analysing the linguistic means by which activity 
was expressed in language, Gregory followed the procedure found in 
the Introductory essay and in Power. The consistently understood 
usage of words and phrases denoting activity, confirmed men had a 
common notion of it, even if they sometimes applied it inconsistently 
in particular instances. He stated that activity was probably the 
most familiar common notion. It could be understood in two ways. 
In one sense, activity was "a generic term" which denoted a being 
either doing something or apprehending something to be done. 
Gregory stated this sense was implied in the meaning of all phrases 
involving transitive, intransitive and passive verbs. Because of 
its extreme generality, the exact signification of activity could 
not be defined accurately. Therefore Gregory confined his analysis 
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to a second and more restricted sense of it. Activity denoted some 
change produced by an agent in the subject of any particular action. 
49 
Gregory referred to this sense of activity as only a "species" of 
the generic sense of activity. But it was useful precisely because 
it provided an accurate means of comparison with the relation of 
cause and effect in physics. Gregory defined the restricted sense 
of activity as 
The common notion ... of a being producing change ... by means of a voluntary exertion of its own power doing 
something in consequence of --which change occurs or is 
produced. 50 
The philological basis of Gregory's argument throughout Activity 
was as follows. The complete distinction between the notions of 
activity and physical causation was evident in the fact that 
different forms of speech could be used to characterise each 
relation. In its strictly literal signification, activity was always 
expressed by active transitive verbs. The relation of cause and 
effect in physics entailed the use of neuter verbs implying event 
or change without any activity in the objects concerned. However, 
Gregory's problem remained because it was "very plain that we every 
moment employ transitive verbs either in the active or passive 
voice, in speaking of instances of cause and effect". 
51 How was 
this to be explained? The fact that men thought no activity was 
present in the relation of cause and effect in physics could be 
shown 
By proving that it is merely in a figurative and 
analogical sense, and not in their proper, literal, 
and common meaning, that all words and phrases expressive-. 
of activity or implying that anything is done by a cause, 
are employed in speaking of the relation of cause and 
effect in physics. 52 
To do this, Gregory had to extend the scope of his linguistic 
analysis. In his Introductory essay and in Power, the evidence of 
linguistic usage was presented largely as proof of men's underlying 
common notions. The use of the words "cause and effect", 
"power" 
and "activity" indicated men's underlying common notions to which 
these referred. But to substantiate the distinctions between 
cause and effect in physics and activity, Gregory had to specify 
the import of language for determining not just the existence of 
common notions but their contents as well. 
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Gregory made it clear that he was developing a "philosophical 
investigation" of the structure of language in which attention was 
given to "the information and evidence which the usage and 
53 
constitution of it afford". This approach emphasised 
the import of the particular instances suggested in 
illustration of the words, and not to the various and 
ambiguous import of the words themselves considered 
apart from the instanc34 employed in the different 
cases to explain them. 
What Gregory required was a clear case where a particular form of 
speech was consistently and routinely used to discriminate between 
the different cases of activity and causation. If this could be 
found, then, he argued, this proved that 
at least one, if not more than one, important 
circumstance, common to all the instances of cause 
and effect that are known to us, which does not 
occur in any one of those, of activity and vice 
versa. 55 
Unfortunately English, as Gregory noted, did not display this 
required distinction. In fact, the reverse was rather the case. 
In English, the want of proper inflections, the profusion of little 
words with ambiguous denotations, and a variety of other linguistic 
features "tend [ed] rather to conceal than to exhibit, those 
differences of thought which Pit was Gregory's] object to point out". 
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Therefore Gregory chose to investigate the evidence provided by 
another more suitable language. He spent the whole of Activity 2 
illustrating "proper instances of the different ways of expressing 
in Latin the relation of activity and that of cause and effect". 
57 
The meticulous detail of Gregory's investigation need not be replicated 
here. All his numerous examples cohered around a particular rule of 
Latin syntax. This involved the use of passive verbs which demanded 
a different syntax according to whether the noun to which the verb 
referred, was considered an agent or cause. In the case of agents, 
the passive voice was marked with the preceding preposition "a" or 
"ab". Thus it was correct and literal usage to say "Hic liber 
scriptus est a me". 
58 But in cases where the noun was considered as 
a cause, it took the ablative case without any governing preposition. 
Therefore the construction became "Hic liber scriptus est meä man1'. 
59 
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Thus even in the metaphorical usage, in which a book was spoken of 
as written by an author's hand, there was an evident syntactical 
difference. Therefore, Gregory concluded it was 
impossible to express in Latin by any neuter verb, 
except it be employed metaphorically, or even by a 
passive verb with the simple naked ablative, anything 
done by a living, sentient, intelligent active being. 
However 
every instance of mere effect that is every event 
and occurrence in the material world, every phenomenon 
in physics, and its relation to its supposed cause 
may be accurately and without metaphor expressed in 
Latin either by a neuter verb, or by a passive verb 
with that naked Ablative. 60 
Having thus identified a consistently expressed difference in the 
language of activity and causation, Gregory could modify his former 
argument about the existence of common notions. A difference in 
linguistic realisation indicated a difference in the content of the 
respective notions of activity and a physical causation. 
The whole of Gregory's argument rested upon the presumption that 
distinctions of linguistic usage referred to mental distinctions in 
common notions. As language users men must presuppose and understand 
these 'interior' differences, even if they did not raise them to 
consciousness. In this case, Latin was exemplary because it 
expressed 
simple and general notions, which are rational and 
common to all men and those plain and obvious differences 
and distinctions which all men are capable of. conceiving 
and understanding. 61 
Although this was the case, Gregory also emphasised that no language 
was a perfect expression of men's exact thoughts. 
62 Languages such 
as English were flawed. Therefore, the scientific metaphysician was 
at liberty to draw his evidence from a variety of 
languages to show 
what men were all capable of perceiving, understanding and thinking. 
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In Activity 3, Gregory applied his preceding argument analogically 
to English usage. The results of his analysis can be presented 
by 
means of a table 
64 
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ENGLISH USAGES RESEMBLING LATIN 
(i) Relation of activity may be 
accurately expressed by: 
(a) active verbs 
(b) passive verbs 
(c) circumlocations and the 
use of nouns derived from 
transitive verbs. 
GREGORY'S EXAMPLES 
(a) God created the heavens 
and the earth. 
(b) The heavens and the earth 
were created by God. 
(c) God was the creator of 
the heavens and the earth. 
(ii) An event, occurrence or matter The tower fell. 
of fact may be considered 
independently of causation or 
activity by the use of neuter 
verbs. 
(iii) The relation of events or 
matters of fact considered as 
effects to their causes, can 
be 
-literally expressed without the use of active or passive 
verbs or nouns derived from 
such verbs. 
The ship overset with the wind. 
(iv) The relation of cause and The earthquake overthrew the 
effect may be expressed by tower. 
the same words and phrases 
employed to denote activity, 
especially using transitive 
verbs in the active voice. 
(v) It is absurd and improper to Troy was burned by the Greeks 
combine both actions and and fire. 
causes in a sentence with 
respect to one verb, even 
though such sentences were 
syntactically correct. 
NO Both the relation of the agent Tiberius killed Germanicus 
and the cause may be properly with poison. 
expressed using one verb by 
means of different forms of 
speech to distinguish the 
relations. 
(vii) It is absurd to confound Troy burned with the Greeks. 
causation and activity by 
expressing an action by a 
neuter verb followed by the 
name of the agent governed 
by the same proposition. 
105 
ENGLISH USAGES RESEMBLING LATIN GREGORY'S EXAMPLES 
(viii) Neuter verbs and the Abel fell at the hand of his 
prepositions used to denote brother. 
causation may be used to 
express activity. But such 
usages are universally held 
to be metaphorical. 
(ix) It is improper to confound This book was written by my 
causation and activity in hand, or by my pen, or by my 
certain phrases. study or labour. 
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The main difference between English and Latin usage occurred when 
transitive verbs in the passive voice were used to express the 
relation of cause and effect. Thus using the passive equivalent of 
case (iv) given in the table, it was good English to say""The tower 
was overthrown by the earthquake. " English usage, although strictly 
incorrect in Gregory's view, enabled the same preposition and the 
same phraseology to be used to express either activity or causation. 
In Latin, such phrases, when they denoted causation rather than 
activity, omitted the preposition which was only properly used in 
cases of genuine activity. 
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Gregory explained this deviation of usage between the two languages 
as follows. In English the "analogical or figurative use of the 
proper expression had gone further". This was particularly true 
in cases involving what Gregory termed "mechanical power". Thus 
men were likely to use an expression like "The tower was overthrown 
by the earthquake" because of the analogy between it and, the actions 
of a living person. As the analogy between the causal process and 
the actions of men diminished, then they were less likely to 
conflate the two in common usage. For example, there was less of an 
analogy between the operation of fire and human action. Therefore, 
Gregory stated, it was commonly regarded as ridiculous to say, for 
ºº66 example "Fire was the burner of Troy. 
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4. COMMON NOTIONS, THE CLASSIFICATION OF VERBS AND THE 
STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC DISCOURSE 
In the last section, Gregory's appeal to the structure of language to 
segregate the notions of power and activity from cause and effect in 
physics has been described. However, precisely what significance 
Gregory perceived this to have for natural philosophy has yet to be 
discussed. The purpose of this and the next section is to probe 
further into this question. It is important to emphasise that neither 
Power nor Activity in its original three section manuscript form was 
ever published. 
67 Once again, material dealing specifically with 
natural philosophy is important but not prominent. Therefore it has 
to be brought to the forefront in the exposition. 
Gregory considered that the different usages of active, transitive 
and neuter verbs was an important linguistic fact both for the 
nature of scientific discourse and the nature of the human mind 
generally. Yet the current recognition of its significance was 
hampered by an inadequate linguistic analysis of the structure of 
verbs. The first task Gregory set himself in Activity 1 , 
was to develop 
a classification of the various kinds of verb. Gregory pointed out 
the utility of this by emphasising that both the notions of activity 
and power were expressed by verbs except in a small number of cases. 
He also criticised other accounts of the nature of verbs for regarding 
all verbs as expressing either being, doing or suffering. 
In his own 
classification Gregory included another class of verbs which 
he called 
neuter verbs. These verbs were related to 
becoming, waxing or growing 
and were implied in descriptions of physical causes and effect. 
Gregory's full classification was as follows: 
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(i) SUBSTANTIVE VERBS : those verbs expressing existence 
(ii) NEUTER VERBS : (a) those verbs expressing mere 
state or condition 
(b) those expressing event or change 
(iii) INTRANSITIVE VERBS : those verbs which imply something 
done by the subject of an action. 
(iv) TRANSITIVE VERBS (a) those verbs expressing a 
relation between a subject and 
the object of an activity in 
which no change takes place 
in the object 
4 
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(iv) TRANSITIVE VERBS (b) those verbs expressing a 
(Cont'd) relation between a subject 
and the object of an activity 
in which change takes place 
in the object. This class 
are ACTIVE TRANSITIVE VERBS 
and express the relation of 
activity in its restricted 
sense 
(v) PASSIVE VERBS those verbs expressing (iv)(a) 
and (b) in the passive form, thus 
altering the focus of attention 
in a sentence 
In his description of the second class of neuter verbs ((ii), (b)), 
Gregory gave a number of Latin examples including "calesco" and 
"albesco" which meant to become hot or cold. Generally though, this 
class of neuter verbs expressed event or change "such, for instance, 
as is implied in the notion of change which we always regard in 
physics, when it occurs in an inanimate being". 
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Thus, in effect, 
Gregory stipulated his second class of neuter verbs as that one 
which always denoted the kind of change expressed by cause and effect 
relations in physics. Although event or change was implied in the 
meaning of all verbs, Gregory regarded it as evident 
that neither the substantive verbs nor any of the neuter 
verbs denote any kind of activity, or anything done, 
either by or to the being whose name is the antecedent 
or nominative to them. 7° 
Given that Gregory's classification was itself determined by what he 
regarded as correct usage vis-a-vis the relations of causation and 
activity, what purpose could it serve? On purely analytical and 
critical grounds, it is difficult to see-how Gregory's classification 
of the structure of language was not in fact a petitio principii, 
or question begging. However he did not perceive his classification 
of the structure of verbs as an independent proof of the distinction 
between causation and activity. Instead it was a piece of linguistic 
apparatus which helped men to attend to their common notions. For 
intransigent men who would not admit, a distinction between causation, 
activity and power, Gregory suggested the following procedure to 
convince them of it: 
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For this purpose let them attend carefully to those cases 
of activity where no change is produced, except in the 
active being; such cases are expressed by the intransitive 
and by the first class of transitive verbs. When they have 
learned to make activity, independently of any change being 
produced in a subject, a familiar object of thought, let 
them attend to the meaning of the second class of transitive 
verbs ... Lastly, let them attend to the import of the 
phrases where neuter verbs occur such as salt dissolving in 
water, or ice melting with heat. There they will find the 
notion of change occurring, but nothing like the activity 
which they conceived and understood in the other cases. 71 
Ultimately, language was made and perceived by men. Men's strict 
usage of language always corresponded to common notions in the human 
mind. In Gregory's view, attending to the evidence of correct 
linguistic usage actually guided the recovery of these notions: 
It is chiefly as an assistance in this attempt to attend 
to our most simple and fundamental notions with regard to 
the subjects of my enquiry, ... that I am disposed to 
attend minutely to the information and evidence which the 
usage and constitution of [language] afford [s]. 72 
The recovery of men's notions through the practice of language was 
regarded by Gregory as very important. Despite their paramount 
importance to human life, ` such notions were actually little known or 
attended to. This was to be the function of Gregory's metaphysics 
of linguistic usage. The consequence of re-acquainting men with 
their "natural, simple and fundamental notions" was that men 
liberated themselves from the opinions and systems "held and taught 
by philosophers, from the days of Pythagoras, to those of Mr Hume". 
Common notions were 
parts, and very essential parts too of human nature; 
and may be regarded as the immediate operation, or 
inspiration of that power which hath made us what we 
are: while the systems formed of them are fabrications 
of our own, perhaps ingenious, or at least pleasing, 
but too often,. visionary and foolish. 73 
Nevertheless, such philosophical systems were predicted upon the 
same common notions shared with ordinary men. They could be combined 
in new ways but no man "coul"d by any exertion or contrivance of 
[his] 
own create or form, new and simple notions". Thus: 
These simple, natural and fundamental notions, we must 
attend to likewise, not merely for their own sake, but 
in order to understand, and judge of those philosophical 
systems, of which they are the basis. 
74 
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Men were not only misled by, a love of analogy and by ambiguous words. 
Philosophical systems were an effective barrier to understanding the 
structure of the human mind. This made direct appeals to men's 
consciousness ineffective. Therefore Gregory sought to reclaim what 
he regarded as the universal features of the mind by a circuitous 
appeal to language which had the additional advantage of appearing 
empirical and in conformity with the inductive scientific method. 
The immediate field of application of Gregory's new linguistic 
technology for segregating physical causation and human activity 
was scientific discourse where such confusions were legion. Gregory 
pointed to the paradigmatic example of Newton's Principia to show 
that Newton was aware of the difference between the import of neuter 
and transitive verbs. For example, in his definition of centripetal 
force, Newton had substituted the neuter verb "tendo" for the passive 
verbs "trahor" and "impellor" because he wanted to exclude even the 
slightest notion of activity from the concept of a centripetal 
force. In this, and in other examples where he did have recourse 
to passive verbs, Newton 
effectually excluded all thoughts of the moving body 
being acted on by any agent from our conceptions of the 
motions which he was considering, leaving only the 
notion of a certain state or condition, which stands 
opposed to rest. 75 
However, Gregory noted that Newton "in some of his speculations" lost 
sight of the distinction between active and neuter verbs "as indeed 
most of his followers 
[had] done, perhaps deceived and misled, as 
all mankind [were] apt to be, by the unsuspected ambiguity of words". 
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The absence of a clear syntactical marker in English to differentiate 
whether activity or causation was denoted in sentences utilising 
passive verbs, contributed to this state of affairs. Gregory's 
classification of verbs gave him an authoritative means of policing 
scientific discourse and so maintaining the passivity of inanimate 
nature. 
This was a particularly useful asset in relation to the English 
language. Gregory noted that in scientific reasoning, English had 
the advantage of brevity because the same word may be used on 
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occasion as an active transitive verb, a transitive one or a neuter 
verb. 
77 But this ambiguity could also mislead. Gregory's classifi- 
cation enabled the correct meaning to be aligned with its appropriate 
instance. For example, when it was said "The earth moves in an 
elliptical orbit"78 the sense of "to move" was neuter. And when 
it was said "The earth is attracted by the sun", 
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this was only a 
metaphorical use of an active transitive verb. In this manner 
Gregory discussed the important example of the verb "to move" which 
was routinely used in mechanics. "To move" or the passive form "to 
be moved" could serve as a neuter verb or an active transitive verb. 
What determined whether it was deployed literally or metaphorically 
was always the particular instance of use. Gregory's classification 
of verbs was a metaphysical resource which enabled him to stipulate 
whether a literal or metaphorical use was actually the case. Thus 
when "to be moved" was deployed in denoting a cause and effect relation 
in physics, Gregory stated this was a metaphorical use. Or he stated 
that in this particular usage, the-verb actually lost "the peculiar 
meaning of a passive verb, retaining only what 
[was] in common between 
neuter and passive verbs; to wit the expressing of event or state". 
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Gregory developed his classification of neuter verbs to determine what 
particular usages were valid in the science of mechanics. The meaning 
men were to understand from usages of "to move" or "to be moved" 
in 
mechanics could be interpreted as either neuter verb meanings or 
their equivalent phrases. In this fashion, Gregory aimed to expel 
any notion of the activity or power of bodies from scientific discourse 
and render mechanics the legitimate province of cause and effect 
relations. 
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5. DEMONSTRATION AND RELATION IN GREGORY'S SCIENTIFIC METAPHYSICS 
Gregory's account of the constant conjunction between causes and 
effects in physics has been discussed in section two. His new 
metaphysical technology for distinguishing between physical 
causation and human activity has been extensively discussed in 
sections two and four. These aspects of Gregory's Project had two 
fundamental and persistent features in common. The first was that, 
throughout his work, Gregory made a careful discrimination about- 
the epistemological limits of his enquiry. In almost all cases, he 
carefully and steadfastly distinguished between what all men must 
conceive to be the case about causation and activity, and the 
reality of both relations. This was a crucial distinction because, 
as we shall see, it was intimately connected to the demonstrative 
role Gregory considered his scientific metaphysics to have. The 
second and perhaps more important feature, was that Gregory always 
analysed the perceived relations between things and not the things 
themselves. In his discussion of constant conjunction, Gregory 
stressed he was concerned with the relation between those things 
and events that men considered to be causes and effects respectively. 
In his analysis of activity, Gregory emphasised that it was a 
relation between an agent and the change he produced in the subject 
of his action. In both these cases relations took analytical 
precedence over things related. This feature is important because 
Gregory's use of the concept of relation was closely connected to the 
central role that language played in his thinking, which distinguished 
his work from other writers who also utilised the concept of 
philosophical relations. Of course these major themes of 
demonstration and the analysis of relations were actually closely 
connected with one another. But for convenience of exposition, they 
will be treated consecutively here. 
In Power and Activity, Gregory continued to emphasise the 
need for his scientific metaphysics to be demonstrative. The 
Introductory essaz and Power were largely concerned to demonstrate 
men had common notions of physical causation and power. Activity 
took this a stage further because it attempted to demonstrate the 
difference between the relations of cause and effect in physics and 
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activity. Gregory summarised the steps of this proposed demonstration 
in Activity 2. As the passage is rather lengthy, it can be para- 
phrased into a number of consecutive points which formed the parts 
of a three-stage argument developed by Gregory. 
STAGE I 
(i) Language must be the expression of thought. 
(ii) Therefore the Latin language must have expressed the thoughts 
of the people who used it. 
(iii) Every word and phrase in common use must have just that meaning 
in every application of it, which it is employed and under- 
stood to denote. 
(iv) Therefore the phrases employed in Latin to express the 
relations of activity and cause and effect must have 
expressed the thoughts of the Roman people with respect to 
these two relations. 
(v) But those phrases are not in general convertible; therefore 
the thoughts expressed by them must have been different. 
(vi) Those phrases employed occasionally to express either 
activity, or cause and effect cannot be employed to express 
both relations at once without a confusion of thought, 
incongruity and absurdity. 
(vii) Therefore the thoughts expressed by them in these different 
applications must be incongruous as well as different. 
STAGE 2 
(viii) These rules and phrases of Latin which express the 
distinction between activity and causation are equally fit 
to express the thoughts of all mankind. 
(ix) The thoughts so expressed by the Romans can be understood by 
others and accurately expressed by corresponding phrases in 
other languages. 
(x) Others have actually learned to express the difference 
between activity and causation in Latin. 
(xi) Therefore the peculiar phrases and syntax employed in Latin 
in speaking of activity and causation must express varieties 
of thought and distinctions real or supposed, between the 
two relations which all men either: 
(a) must have perceived and acknowledged 




(xii) But it is impossible that all men should perceive and 
understand a distinction in order to be able to apply it 
uniformly and consistently to its proper objects where 
there is no difference among the things distinguished. 
(xiii) Therefore there must be a real difference between the 
relation of activity and that of cause and effect. 
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Thus Gregory's acknowledgement of the ambiguity, arbitrariness and 
contingent nature of language did not preclude his claim to have 
demonstrated point (xiii). However, he did express some doubts 
about the final stage of his argument. Gregory considered there 
were "certain necessary relations" between words and thoughts, which 
were either self-evident or demonstrable from those that were self- 
evident. Also there were certain necessary relations between thoughts 
and things. But Gregory was only prepared to say "there may be certain 
necessary relations between words and things". 
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Yet without this 
axiom Gregory could not proceed validly to stage three, which was 
the transition from what all men perceived, supposed and 
acknowledged was the case to what was really so. Almost everywhere 
else in the Project, the analysis to determine the existence of the 
common notion of physical causation and how it differed-from other 
relations took precedence over the assessment of the validity of 
relations itself. The presuppositions of Gregory's scientific 
metaphysics ruled out any independent access to what was actually the 
case in nature. Instead nature had to be interiorised epistemologically. 
From this process, what men might reasonably believe about it 
emerged. The role of demonstration then, was to construct what men 
must believe about the world, based upon the constraints of the 
human mind, not to show what the world was really like. This 
emerges clearly in Gregory's discussion of the nature and constraints 
of demonstration itself. 
Gregory's model for his demonstrative metaphysics of relations of 
change was founded upon parallels with the role of demonstratiön 
in both geometry and natural philosophy. For Gregory, geometry was 
always a paradigm example of a demonstrative science. However, 
there was a strong analogy between the. role of-demonstration in 
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geometry and physics because: 
The simple ultimate facts in physics correspond to the 
axioms in geometry: a series of such facts, or as we 
commonly call it, a chain of causes and effects, 
corresponds to demonstration in geometry. the final 
result of such a series in physics corresponds to a 
complex proposition in geometry. 83 
Of course, Gregory noted, the difference between the two, lay in 
the status of their end products. In geometry, axioms and 
deductions from them were all necessary truths; whereas, for all 
men knew, their analogues in physics were only contingent. Yet 
this was ultimately irrelevant because "the limits of [men's) 
enquiries [were] the same in both: the knowledge of the simplest 
truths which are, or which must be". 
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The same applied to 
scientific metaphysics. It sought simple self-evident necessary 
truths about the human mind and from thence drew conclusions about 
what men must think and believe about nature. Thus, if men could 
consent to the existence and nature of their common notions, then 
they must consent to the deductions made from them. Gregory's 
scientific metaphysics had to be demonstrative in order to secure 
consent. In fact, as we have seen in the previous section, 
Gregory actually perceived his scientific metaphysics as a device 
for producing and securing consent in men's minds. 
The second feature of Gregory's Project was the unremitting emphasis 
upon relations, not things. Different "species of change" perceived 
in nature displayed particular "relations of event" which 
characterised them. But how were men to know the relation of 
activity and physical causation and successfully distinguish between 
them? In Gregory's view, men knew activity and causation because 
they had common notions which referred to "being done by an agent" 
and "occurring, or coming to pass in consequence of a cause". 
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But the chief means of acquaintance men had with the common notions 
of activity and causation was through their realisation in language. 
This was the role of transitive and neuter verbs in their literal 
acceptations. Transitive verbs signified relations of activity; 
neuter verbs signified relations of causation. Thus the relations 
of language were representations of the cognitive relations men 
perceived according to their common notions: 
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Those different forms of expression, appropriated to 
instances of activity and of causation, denote and plainly 
relate to differences real or supposed in the relations 
between the persons, things, and events, that are 
mentioned, and not by any means to the difference of the 
persons, things and events that are related, and are the 
subjects of discourse.. 86 
Gregory acknowledged the emphasis on relations as the distinctive 
feature of his analysis at the close of Activity 3. Playing the 
devil's advocate, he proposed the following objection: 
It appears from the evidence of language that the natural 
suggestions of our faculties teach us to distinguish 
between the relation of any occurrence to mind, and the 
relation of any occurrence to any inanimate being that 
we regard as the cause of it: but may not this distinction 
depend entirely on the thing related not on the relation 
between them? 87 
In his reply, Gregory pointed to instances where agents were 
actually regarded as causes or, as Gregory put it, a person 
standing in the relation "of causes or occasion, to any event". 
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However, he also drew an example from physiology to show that some 
operations of the mind did not necessarily imply activity: 
Many remarkable occurrences or changes in our own bodies 
and some important functions of our animal oeconomy 
depend upon, and proceed from, certain states of the mind: 
yet such occurrences ... never were nor ever could 
be 
regarded by mankind as any actions of theirs. 
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Thus the fact that agents' minds could sometimes be causes, 
indicated that it was not intrinsic natures of things that always 
determined the kinds of change associated with them. 
From these and other similar remarks, it is clear that the general 
direction of Gregory's analysis of relations of change was away 
from the view that causes, in physics at least, were in any way 
productive of their effects. It might be objected, 
he said, that 
nothing could legitimately be called a cause that was not active 
in 
the production of its effect. But Gregory insisted that 
however 
the word "cause" was derived from the idea of production; or 
however men arrived at the notion of causation 
by the exertion of 
power, the evidence of language 
indicated that the term "cause" 
was "applied to certain things conceived to stand 
in a peculiar 
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relation to the occurrences which happen in the material world". 
And that relation was expressed by the phrase "constant 
conjunction". 
90 
Aspects of this 'de-ontologised' account of physical causation were 
actually carried over into Gregory's analysis of activity. Activity 
in its broadest sense was not confined to change produced in the 
object acted on, as denoted by active transitive verbs. 'There was 
another kind of activity in which change only occurred in the active 
being himself often denoted by intransitive verbs. So again 
different kinds of activity were determined by the relation in which 
active beings stood to other things. However, Gregory did not enter 
into any detailed analysis of the nature of a philosophical relation. 
It is clear that, in keeping with most of his contemporaries, he 
considered men's knowledge of relations was more reliable than 
knowledge of the things so related. Indeed, the emphasis upon 
philosophical relations was a standard feature of sensationalist 
epistemology. 
91 Hume's own analysis of relations was presented in 
the Treatise but is less immediately apparent in the Enquiry. 
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Yet despite some similarity between Hume's and Gregory's use of the 
concept of relation, it does not follow that Gregory also viewed 
relations as a kind of complex. idea. In fact Gregory explicitly 
denied this. An indication of Gregory's alternative position can 
be found in his Theory of the moods of verbs in which he connected 
the concept of a philosophical relation to a linguistic relation 
between words. 
To reiterate, Gregory's essay Activity was the least complete part 
of the Project. It was certainly never published and it 
is not 
clear whether it was ever read to the Literary Class of the Royal 
Society of Edinburgh. Instead, it was something of a pilot study 
for his Theory, as Gregory revealed in his opening remarks: 
In the prosecution of certain philological and philo- 
sophical speculations, very ample specimens of which have 
already been submitted to the consideration of the Royal 
Society of Edinburgh, I had occasion to consider more 
minutely than I believe had ever been done before, many 
particulars relating to the nature the structure and the 
import of verbs. 93 
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In Activity, Gregory dealt only with the various classes of verbs. 
His analysis was limited to their infinitive form only. Gregory 
argued that infinitives conveyed what he called the different 
"accidents" of verbs such as existence, state, event, intransitive 
action or transitive action. 
94 He- therefore ignored the "inflections" 
of verbs which Gregory classified into moods, tenses, persons and 
numbers. 
95 In the Theory Gregory increased the power of his 
philologico-metaphysical microscope to consider the import of the 
moods of verbs. This change of direction appears to have led Gregory 
away from producing a detailed analysis of the role of neuter and 
active transitive verbs in natural philosophical discourse. However, 
Gregory's Theory does offer a considerable insight into how he 
perceived the general relationship between language and thought. 
Throughout Activity this was never really made explicit. Gregory 
merely insisted that language was necessarily the expression of 
thought. But how precisely did language express thought? Gregory's 
answer to this question reveals how completely he rejected the 
doctrine of ideas and with it the conventional apparatus for 
articulating the concept of a philosophical relation. 
Gregory was critical of all former accounts of the moods of verbs, 
including one recently published by Lord Monboddo in The Origin and 
progress of language, volume 2.96 However, Gregory's criticisms 
concerned the incompleteness and undue restriction Monboddo 
had 
placed upon such moods which he reduced to three: affirming, wishing 
and commanding. 
97 What Gregory endorsed was much more significant. 
This was that the moods of verbs expressed what Gregory and 
Monboddo 
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referred to as "energies" or "modifications"or 
"moods of thought". 
Thus every grammatical mood was evidence of a corresponding energy 
of thought. 
Gregory stated that all language was deficit in its capacity to 
express the variety and combinations which occurred 
in thought and 
this applied as much to the inflections of verbs as much as any 
other feature of grammar. Yet the moods of verbs expressed 
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much better than any succession of words do, the intimate 
connection and the relation of various thoughts, which are 
not successive, but simultaneous or coexistent, and which 
appear unnaturally disjointed, and in some measure altered, 
when they are expressed by a series of words denoting each 
of them separately and in succession. 99 
Because of their capacity to be inflected, verbs were of vital 
importance in the expression of thought. Gregory noted it was often 
very necessary to break-down the simultaneous mass of human thoughts 
into regular trains of succession. For this the grammatical arrange- 
ment of words was eminently suitable. But it remained the case that 
many single words, for example prepositions, and most 
sentences, denote some kind of-relation but we cannot, 
I think, conceive a relation, without thinking at once 
of the things (two or more) that are related, as well as 
of the relation (both in its generic and in its specific 
nature) that subsists between them; 100 
In this process, verbs played a crucial role by conveying relations 
such as cause and effect and activity, in which a number of thoughts 
were represented simultaneously. 
In his discussion of the simultaneity of thought and its linguistic 
realisation in the inflections of verbs, Gregory emphasised that 
thoughts were never arranged in an order of place. This was self- 
evident to anyone who could 
shake off the long established philosophical hypothesis 
of ideas, or images of things in the mind, as subservient 
to thought; or even who will take the trouble to 
distinguish between such supposed images, which like 
those of a magic lanthorn, may be conceived to be 
arranged in place, and the thoughts corresponding-to 
them. 
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Similarly, the simultaneity of thought would only be questioned 
by adherents of the doctrine of ideas who had imbibed the dogma that 
a person could only have one thought at once. Gregory clearly 
opposed the ideal theory of mind. Furthermore, 
he argued that the 
complex energies of thought denoted, 
in the main 
the social operations of mind as they have been very 
properly termed by Dr. Reid; that is to say, such as to 
imply the belief of some other intelligent being to whom 
they are related and which cannot be supposed to take 
place in a solitary being. 
102 
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In the final part of the Theory, Gregory returned to his favoured 
comparison with the nature of mathematics to bring out the funda- 
mental importance of moods of verbs and the inflections of language 
generally. Gregory stated that mathematical propositions expressed 
"co-existent thoughts which bore no relation at all to time". 
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"When such propositions were contained in a complex theorem, they 
represented "masses of co-existent thoughts". Whereas all men 
could readily conceive of an axiom or simple mathematical proposition, 
many often had great difficulty in thinking of a number of co-existent 
mathematical objects and relations simultaneously. This was not 
easily overcome by examining individual items serially in words. 
Instead, men had to develop the "comprehensiveness of mind" by which 
good mathematicians comprehended a set of mathematical relationships 
at a glance without going through all the laborious stages of 
demonstration. Mathematicians and ordinary men could be helped in 
this matter by the astute use of diagrams and mathematical formulae 
in algebra. Gregory maintained that there was an analogy between 
the role of such diagrams and formulae in mathematics and the role 
of moods of verbs and inflected language in common discourse. Both 
expressed 
infinitely better than any succession or arrangement 
of words can do, combinations of thoughts which are 
almost perfectly co-existent and which by means of them, 
are apprehended more justly, more quickly and more 
forcibly than otherwise they could be. 104 
If anything, the use of such verbs in ordinary language served to 
express "masses of co-existent thoughts" which were more complicated 
than those to be found in mathematics, even though the 
latter were 
more abstruse. 
The glimpses of Gregory's otherwise unarticulated theory of 
language 
found in the Theory indicate further aspects of how Gregory perceived 
the themes of language usage, philosophical relations and 
demonstration 
to be connected. Firstly, Gregory considered common notions such 
as cause and effect in physics and activity were simultaneous groups 
of thoughts which were 
instantly self-evident to men. Secondly, the 
evidence of language and verbs 
in particular, were indications of 
and evidence for relations of thought which made up men's 
common 
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notions. Thirdly, Gregory perceived demonstration as a kind of 
serial unfolding of the simultaneously self-evident relations of 
thought by attending carefully to the structure of language 
itself. Thus by showing the structure of verbs, Gregory was at 
the same time uncovering and demonstrating the-nature of thought 
and the contents of men's minds. 
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6. CONCLUSION 
The material presented in this chapter as a whole has shown how 
Gregory developed his new metaphysical technology for maintaining 
the boundary between physical causation and human activity. 
Gregory perceived that this boundary had been infringed during the 
Kames-Stewart debate. This had cast into doubt men's understanding 
of mechanics. In particular, Gregory considered that Kames used 
his necessitarianism to assert the activity of matter. But, 
although he was generally sympathetic to Stewart's defence of 
inertia, he criticised the precise form this took. Thus Gregory 
agreed with Stewart that the aim of the "Newtonian" philosopher was 
to show that all Newton's laws were in fact founded upon the 
passivity of matter. But he rejected the second part of Stewart's 
task, which was to justify why matter should be considered a 
passive instrument under the dominion of higher active powers. In 
place of Stewart's insistence on the role of active beings as the 
superintendent agents of the deity, Gregory developed his relational 
account of cause and effect in physics. Instead of the meta- 
physical hegemony of mind-based efficient causes, Gregory tried to 
demonstrate that the relations of causation and activity were 
categorically different. Furthermore, this difference was apparent 
in the structure of language. In this way, Gregory ceased to 
emphasise the role of mind as the sole underlying efficient causes 
of all physical processes. However, he continued to maintain that 
men rightfully possessed power, the free exercise of which 
distinguished them from physical nature. This led Gregory to an 
unusual two-way defence of his position. He had to assert that 
power existed and was correctly known as an attribute of mind, not 
matter. But he also had to uphold the view that physical causation 
did not imply any activity, produced either 
by the powers of matter, 
or by mind-based efficient causes. 
Significantly, Gregory-was not alone in rejecting the form the defence 
of matter took in the writings of 
John Stewart, Thomas Reid and, RobertWhytt, 
who are also discussed 
in subsequent chapters. Lord Monboddo expressed 
severe doubts about the role of active powers 
in Newton's philosophy 
and in the writings of those who called 
themselves "Newtonians". 105 
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In. his volumes of Ancient Metaphysics, Monboddo discussed both 
Newton and Newtonian natural philosophy. Like contemporary 
historians of science, Monboddo was greatly interested in Newton's 
writings. He did not have access to the manuscripts from which 
present-day commentators extract the 'real' Newton's views. But 
he did subject Newton's published texts to critical scrutiny. While 
he failed to appreciate all the changes present in successive editions 
of the Principia, he used Coates's Preface to the second edition 
containing the General Scholium. Also, he compared the Latin 3rd 
edition with its English translation three years later. He followed 
a similar procedure and compared statements in the Principia with 
the Queries in the Opticks; he also made use of Newton's correspondence 
with Bentley. Monboddo examined the writing of 18th century Newton 
commentators, such as John and Samuel Clarke Whiston, Derham and 
their Scottish counterparts Baxter and MacLaurin, as well as the 
French commentary by Le Seur and Jacquier. Monboddo corresponded 
with Richard Price and Samuel Horsley, the 18th century editor of 
Newton's Works. He discussed Priestley's views with both of them. 
Finally, Monboddo was on familiar terms with members of Scotland's 
scientific literati, including Dugald Stewart, Playfair, Robison, 
Black, Hope, John Steadman, and Hutton. In these various ways, 
Monboddo's views provide a valuable perspective on the nature, 
status and propriety of Newton's natural philosophy in the later 
18th century. 
Monboddo argued that Newton's first law conflated the distinction 
between motion and rest. This blurred the more fundamental 
distinction between mind and body, which formed the basis of 
Monboddo's conception of a theologically sound scientific meta- 
physics. Rather like Gregory, Monboddo developed his arguments by 
examining the language of both the English and 
Latin 3rd editions 
of the Principia. He contended that even 
in Latin, the distinction 
between moving and being moved was not always maintained, and he 
contrasted this with the perfect denotation evident 
in Greek. 
Monboddo considered that Newton's natural philosophy raised problems 
about the powers of matter and the eternity of motion which could 
not be solved by mechanical philosophy and geometry. Instead, they 
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were metaphysical questions. Because of Newton's ignorance of the 
philosophy of mind and its role in producing and sustaining motion, 
his astronomy had opened the way for a thoroughly mechanical and 
materialistic philosophy of nature. In particular Newton failed to 
distinguish what, for Monboddo, were two fundamentally different 
kinds of motion. These were motion produced by the operation of 
body on body, and that produced by mind on body. Monboddo contended 
that the former was exclusively the concern of the Principia, and that 
the formulation of the first law of motion referred only to motion 
which resulted from body operating on body, or what he termed 
mechanical motion. This was because, for Monboddo, mind-produced 
motion required the constant agency of mind to sustain it. Thus 
when mind acting as efficient cause ceased to maintain it, the 
motion also stopped. But Newton's law predicted that motion was 
propagated indefinitely after impact: 
In short, through the whole Principia, he treats of 
no other motion but that which is produced by body 
operating on body. And his notions appear to me to 
have been so gross, and so little raised above 
matter, that he had no idea of any moving power, 
except that alone which is perceived by sense; I 
mean body. 106 
Monboddo used his analytic classification of different kinds of 
motion to'undermine the status of mechanical motion produced by 
impulse and confine its role in natural events to impacts only, 
after which mind-based efficient causes took over. In his view, 
this account of motion supported and maintained: 
That all the great motions in the world are caused by 
some Immaterial Power ... perpetually and actually 
exerting itself every moment, in every part of the world 
and that the Original Laws of Motion themselves cannot 
continue to take place, but by something superior to 
Matter, continually exerting on it a certain force or 
power, according to such certain and determinate 
laws. 107 
2lonboddo systematically worked through Newton's writings on the 
subjects of gravity, elliptical motion, comets' tails, planetary 
perturbations, subtle etherial fluids 
in magnetic and chemical 
phenomena, and God's sensorium of space and the role of the nervous 
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ether in perception. In each case, instead of interpreting such 
instances as indications of Newton's providential, voluntarist and 
active philosophy of nature, he regarded them as indications of 
mechanism and materialism in Newton's thought. He therefore 
connected the development of Newtonian natural philosophy in the 
18th century to sensationalist epistemology in the hands of Locke, 
Berkeley and Hume. 
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To oppose what Monboddo regarded as the 'unholy alliance" of 
Newton's natural philosophy and sensationalist epistemology, he 
sought to develop an alternative philosophy of nature. This was 
based upon a rehabilitation of Aristotelian metaphysics. He 
considered that nature was animated by a hierarchy of minds which 
men could progressively know because of innate ideas planted in 
their minds by God. When such ideas were awoken by the senses, 
they became progressively free of what Monboddo regarded as the 
corruption of matter, and so offered the possibility of 
demonstrative knowledge. 
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It is important to emphasise that Gregorian scientific metaphysics 
was not just criticial of forms of necessitarianism developed by 
Hume and Kames which sought to understand the actions of men by 
analogy with the behaviour of bodies. He regarded ambiguities 
about the role of mind in nature which were evident, for example, in 
Monboddo to have been equally detrimental to natural philosophy and 
metaphysics. In contrasting both necessitarian and voluntarist 
positions with his own, he noted the range of views about body and 
mind in nature. Some writers denied body, some denied mind, while 
others denied both. Gregory added: 
One author at least may be found, who holds, that there 
is in every living person, and even a vegetable, a 
plurality of minds, of different kinds of orders; nay, 
there is a mind of a certain kind, in every particle 
of matter, which is the principle of motion, or of every 
change whatever in it; without the agency of which, 
motion could not begin, nor even continue 
in a body. 110 
By emphasising relations of event and menu 
indirect knowledge of 
mind and body through their attributes, 
Gregory considered that 
many of the ontological ambiguities which 
hindered the reform of 
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natural philosophy could be avoided. Epistemological interiorisation 
involved justifiable claims about. what men must believe about body 
and mind. Hence Gregory stated that despite being "in the dark" 
about the real nature of such substances, the infinite differences 
in their respective attributes led "the wisest and best men to 
believe they were essentially different". 
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From a lengthy note appended to Activity 2, it is evident that 
Gregory had Monboddo's Ancient Metaphysics as well as his work on 
language very much in mind while developing his own linguistic 
technology for maintaining the passivity of matter. 
112 Gregory's 
remarks make it clear that he perceived Monboddo was attempting 
a similar task to his own, based on the distinction 
uniformly observed in Greek being moving and being moved. However, 
Gregory considered that the definitions of mind as that which moves, 
and matter as that which is moved were insufficient: 
If every thing which is in motion yet does not move 
itself be moved, in the literal sense of the passive 
verb, it will follow according to the proposed 
definition that what at one time is Mind, at another 
time may be matter; nay, that the same thing may be 
at once both mind and matter; which I am sure was 
very far from the thoughts of the learned Author whose 
reasonings I am at present considering. 113 
Gregory did not discuss Monboddo's views any further. Instead, 
the critique of Ancient Metaphysics was developed more fully by 
Robison. 
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Overall, this exposition has brought out Gregory's emphasis upon the 
analysis of relations. It was also suggested that the whole of 
Gregory's analysis tended away from the notion of causes being in 
any way productive of their effects. However, 
it is equally 
important to note that Gregory still had recourse to an ontological 
criterion to distinguish what actually was an active 
being. This 
was that active beings possessed the power to act or not. Thus 
power, unlike activity and physical causation, was not a relation 
as such, but "an attribute of mind" which, ex 
hypothesi, was not 
present in matter or body. Gregory stated that 
in all cases of 
physical causation it was rational to enquire 
how a cause exerted 
its power, if and only if, men conceived something was actually 
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done by a physical cause. Buf if: 
it be true, or conceived only, that iron moves or tends 
to move towards the magnet, that it dissolves in the acid, 
and that it melts with heat, it would be very foolish to 
enquire about the power of the magnet, the acid, and the 
heat to attract to dissolve or to melt the iron: for we 
should then have no reason to think that they do anything; 
and where being is not conceived to do anything, there is 
no occasion to attribute power to it. 115 
Gregory's analysis and his pluralistic theory of change embraced 
two positions simultaneously. On the one hand, physical causation 
implied no power, nor any relation between a being with power and 
a subsequent event. Thus physical causes had nothing to do with 
agents at all. On the other hand, activity was a characteristic 
of beings possessing power, which they exerted to produce change, 
either in themselves or in objects they acted on. To maintain the 
boundary between physical causation and human activity Gregory 
insisted that, speaking literally, it could not be said "that a man 
[was] the cause of his own voluntary actions". 
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Nor, - and here 
the implications were yet more startling - could it even be said 
"that the Deity [was] the cause, the first cause of the universe". 
'17 
Thus according to Gregory there was no activity in causation and there 
was no causation in activity. 
In articulating the claims for his pluralistic theory of change, 
Gregory persistently criticised what he perceived as contemporary 
forms of voluntarism and necessitarianism. Though Gregory also 
considered other forms of scientific metaphysics such as Monboddo's, 
he was mainly concerned with Reid and Hume as the major protagonists 
of these images of natural order. In fact, Gregory put forward many 
of the claims of the Project in the form of a critique of Reid and 
Hume, perhaps the two most important metaphysicians of the period. 
Because of Gregory's interiorised metaphysics of "relations of event" 
and his emphasis upon the role of language, the discussion centred 
upon the vocabulary of causation and the deployment of key concepts 
such as physical cause, efficient cause, power and necessary 
connection. The nature and significance of Gregory's critique is 
the subject of the next chapter. 
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In the previous chapter, Gregory's pluralistic theory of change was 
described and discussed. Gregory continually emphasised the need to 
differentiate between relations of event, such as physical causation, 
and activity. The evidence of language was presented as an empirical 
confirmation of the distinction between such relations in human 
thought. But language was also perceived by Gregory as the means of 
demonstrating, and maintaining the distinction between physical 
causation and human activity in the discourse of scientific 
metaphysics itself. 
In Gregory's view, two principal difficulties impaired the development 
of scientific metaphysics. One was fallacious appeals to the evidence 
öf consciousness; the other was men's instinctive predilection to 
discover analogies, or similarity relations between things. The 
ambiguous and metaphorical use of language was detrimental to 
metaphysics and led to the mistaken belief in natural philosophy 
that inanimate bodies were active and possessed power. 
' Gregory 
commended his own scientific metaphysics precisely because of the 
strictures it imposed upon analogical reasoning. 
2 
The discovery of similarity relations had its most damaging 
consequences in the analysis of causation itself. What Gregory 
called the current "perplexity" of scientific metaphysics was due 
to the practice of referring "every kind of event or effect which 
[men] observed to one kind of cause". 
3 Thus necessitarians 
emphasised the hegemony of physical causes to the 
detriment of other 
relations of change. Voluntarists emphasised the 
hegemony of 
efficient causes in an equivalent fashion. 
Gregory considered that 
Hume and Reid were representative of these necessitarian and the 
voluntarist orientations respectively. 
The common factor was that 
both men advocated forms of causal monism: 
It appears. to me that Dr. Reid and many philosophers 
who hath thought and argued nearly as 
he hath done, 
have gone just as far wrong as one side as Mr. Hume, 
Dr. Priestley or Mr. Leibniz, or, in general, all 
assertors of the doctrine of necessity 
have done on 
the other. 4 
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Gregory sought to ameliorate what he perceived as the stark contrast 
between these positions by maintaining that, just as there were many 
events which men had no reason to refer to activity or efficient 
causes, there were also other events which could legitimately be 
understood in this way; and vice versa, for physical causation or 
cause and effect in physics. 
Gregory developed and defended his pluralistic theory of change 
by means of a critique of Reid and Hume. The purpose of this 
chapter is to document and discuss the nature and significance of 
these exchanges. However, no attempt is made to stipulate what 
either Reid or Hume 'really said' and then compare this with 
Gregory's version. Rather it is to focus upon what issues emerged 
as important when Gregory compared and contrasted his views with 
Reid's and Hume's. Thus in the next section, Gregory's criticisms 
of Reid are outlined. Then Reid's various responses to Gregory's 
Project are considered. In section three, a similar procedure is 
followed for Gregory's criticisms of Hume, which concentrated upon 
Hume's use of the terms "power" and "necessary connection". Then 
Gregory's reading of Hume is discussed in relation to a more general 
problem of interpreting Hume's philosophy. This problem is also 
very evident in present-day philosophy and concerns whether Hume 
should be considered as a negative, sceptical and destructive, or 
as a positive, naturalistic and constructive philosopher. The 
currently accepted view is that Hume's 18th century Scottish critics 
read him as an unremitting sceptic. However, itis shown here that 
Gregory does not correspond to this simple picture. Gregory 
perceived naturalistic as well as sceptical tendencies in Hume's 
philosophy. In fact Gregory placed more emphasis upon the dangers 
of Hume's naturalism, or what Gregory called Hume's necessitarianism. 
In section four, what is termed the Janus-faced nature of Hume's 
metaphysics is discussed and illustrated by an analysis of Enquiry 7 
and 8. It is argued that Hume's new-modelled necessitarianism did 
not entirely conform to that found, for example, in Kames's writings, 
or in Scottish scientific metaphysics generally. The distinctiveness 
of Hume's position stemmed from his relative 
lack of concern with the 
ontological categories of matter and spirit, for which he substituted 
an account of the nature of causal 
inference in human judgements 
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about the world. Thus Hume's distinctive programme for attaining 
the epistemological interiorisation of nature wäs itself instrumental 
in shifting discussion about the powers and laws of nature to prior 
questions about the powers and laws of the human mind. In 
conclusion, the discussion returns to Gregory. It summarises the 
similarities and differences between Gregory's, Reid's and Hume's 
deployment of the key concepts of constant conjunction, power and 
necessary connection. 
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2. THE CRITIQUE OF REID: EFFICIENT CAUSE AND PHYSICAL CAUSE 
2.1 The nature of Gregory's objections 
Gregory's major published work, The philosophical and literary 
essays, was prefaced with a dedicatory letter to Reid. In it 
Gregory acknowledged his obvious debt to Reid, whom he regarded 
as the chief saboteur of the ideal system or theory of ideas: 
"that false system of science" which Reid "so happily exploded 
as dangerous to the best interest of mankind". 
5 
Yet in, the same 
brief letter Gregory also made reference 'to a difference of 
opinion between them. Gregory 'glossed' this by stating that 
Reid had taken a more remote and general view of a number of 
points which he "had occasion to examine very minutely". He 
also cautioned readers not to either mistake the nature and 
significance of their disagreement or to disregard the agreement 
between them on other important principles. 
6 Later, Gregory 
emphasised that what he regarded as Reid's errors and short- 
comings did not affect Reid's fundamentally correct philosophy 
of mind where it dealt with men's active powers and moral 
responsibility. 
7 Evidently, this disagreement between them was 
something of a sensitive subject. Reid certainly sought to play 
it down at several points in his letters and remarks. 
8 Several 
years later Dugald Stewart returned to the subject with a 
similar aim during the "Leslie Affair" in 1805.9 What, then 
was Gregory's assessment of their differences? 
Gregory characterised Reid as an advocate of a particular kind 
of causal monism where 
every change which we observe always proceeds (as 
many of them unquestionably do) either immediately 
or ultimately, from the agency of some living being, 
perhaps from the immediate operation of the supreme 
being himself. '° 
Gregory regarded this as a metaphorical usage of the term 
"cause"; it was like saying God was the father of all things. 
Yet Reid and many other philosophers considered the manner of' 
God's actions in nature, a fit subject of scientific enquiry. 
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Some even held the notion of efficient causation to be a law of 
thought. By efficient causation Gregory understood what he 
termed "activity",, or that relation of change in which a man 
stood "to his own voluntary actions, or to those changes which 
he produce [d] directly in himself, and by the occasional 
exertion of his own power". 
1? In his search for terminological 
exactitude, Gregory strove wherever possible not to describe 
activity as a kind of causation at all. Gregory certainly 
regarded it as self-evident that agents such as men and the 
Supreme Being existed. What he objected to was that all events 
should be referred to efficient causes, which always implied 
the operation of such agents and powers. Gregory argued that, 
while all men must believe in the existence of such beings, 
it was not a necessary truth that all events had to be referred to 
them. 
12 From Gregory's remarks, it is clear that he had 
reservations about the scope of Reid's voluntarist image of 
nature and its applicability to natural philosophy. 
To support this evaluation of Reid's position, Gregory gave a 
number of exemplary quotations, all of which were taken from the 
Essays on the active powers: 
1. The exertion of active power we call action; and as every 
action produces some change, so every change must be caused 
by some exertion, or by the cessation of some exertion of 
power. That which produces a change by the exertion of its 
power we call the cause of that change; and the change 
produced, the effect of that cause. 
2. From this principle it follows, That everything which under- 
goes any change, must either be the efficient cause of that 
change in itself, or it must be changed by some other being. 
In the first case, it is said to have active power, and to 
act in producing the change. In the second case, it is 
merely passive or is acted upon, and the active power is in 
that being only-which produces the change. 
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3. A constant antecedent oz concomitant of the phenomenon 
whose cause is sought, may answer the purpose of the 
inquirer, as well as if the real cause were known. Thus 
a sailor desires to know the cause of the tides, that he 
may know when to expect high water. He is told that it 
is high water when the moon is so many hours past the 
meridian: and now he thinks he knows the cause of the 
tides. What he takes for the cause answers his purpose, 
and his mistake does him no harm. 
4. Thus we say, the sun rises and sets, and comes to the 
meridian; the moon changes; the sea ebbs and flows; the 
" winds blow. Languages were formed by men who believed 
these objects to have life and active power in themselves. 
It was therefore proper and natural to express their 
motions and changes by active verbs. 
5. But as to the real causes of the phenomena of nature, how 
little do we know! All our knowledge of things external 
must be grounded upon the informations of our senses; 
but causation and active power are not objects of sense; 
nor is that always the cause of a phenomenon which is 
prior to it and constantly conjoined with it; otherwise 
night would be the cause of day, and day the cause of the 
following night. 
6. It is to this day problematical whether all the phaenomena 
of the material system be produced by the immediate 
operation of the First Cause, according to the laws which 
his wisdom determined, or whether subordinate causes are 
employed by him in the operations of nature; and, if they 
be, what their nature, their number, and their different 
offices are? And whether, in all cases, they act by 
commission, or in some, according to their discretion. 
13 
From Gregory's perspective, these representative quotations and 
indeed the "whole tenor of his reasoning" showed that Reid had 
not "attended to the many important differences among several 
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kinds of causes; especially between agent and physical cause". 
14 
He noted that Reid was entirely right in his analysis of human 
active power, and that Reid had, on occasions, supported his 
position with evidence from linguistic usage. But he accused 
him of failing to attend to the difference between literal and 
metaphorical uses of transitive verbs in both the active and 
passive voice. Reid also disregarded the evident differences 
between active and neuter verbs. Reid had 
on many occasions made an admirable and truly philosophical 
use of the evidence which language affords with respect to 
thought. But on this point I think his observations 
inaccurate and inconclusive, and his induction imperfect 
and consequently erroneous. 15 
Finally, Gregory stated that the maxim "Every change or effect 
must have a cause"lwhen understood in Reid's sense of efficient 
cause was not acceptable to natural philosophers who commonly 
adopted a very different conception of causation. Many meta- 
physicians would also reject it, especially Hume, Priestley and 
their necessitarian disciples. 
The remarks contained in Gregory's Philosophical and literary 
essays, some of the objections posed at the end of Activity 3, 
and a very important note amended to Power form all that is 
known of Gregory's criticisms of Reid. Gregory's letters to 
Reid appear no longer extant. A similar fate seems to have 
befallen Reid's original letters to Gregory. Fortunately, 
they were arranged and published beforehand by Sir William 
Hamilton in his 19th century edition of Reid's Works. This is 
probably now the only source for them. 
17 Reid's letters to 
Gregory, and to Karnes, have become a major source for under- 
standing Reid's conception of physical causation and his 
philosophy of science generally. 
is This is understandable 
because although Reid continually deployed ideas about physical 
causation in his books, his discussions were almost 
invariably 
intertwined with other tasks, for example, with natural 
theological arguments about first causes or with polemical 
refutations of the ideal theory of perception. 
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Despite the greater accessibility to Reid's views that 
Gregory's letters offer, a number of problems attend their use. 
These concern Hamilton's editorial arrangement. He was 
certainly aware that Reid's commentary referred to Gregory's 
work. However, he mistakenly considered all Reid's remarks 
dealt with the Essay and the Theory, the only parts of the 
Project to be published. In fact the comments concerned the 
Project as a whole, including the unpublished essays presented 
to the Royal Society of Edinburgh. From various remarks in the 
letters, it is clear that Reid sent Gregory (and Dugald Stewart) 
drafts of essays making up the Intellectual powers and Active 
powers. 
19 Both younger men made comments and suggestions. They 
also assisted with the details of publication. Reid's earliest 
surviving letter was written to Gregory early in 1783, a few 
months after Kames's death. For the next ten years, Gregory 
became Reid's replacement philosophical correspondent and 
Gregory's name appeared, along with Stewart's, as a co-dedicatee 
of the Intellectual powers. Not to be outdone, Gregory 
reciprocated by sending Reid virtually all. of his essays and 
by dedicating the Philosophical and literary essays to him. 
20 
The general importance of the letters has been acknowledged by 
McCosh. 
21 
By careful cross-referencing with the consecutive 
parts of Gregory's Project, they can be rxearranged in a more 
logical way which is probably closer to their original order. 
The full details of this new arrangement is given in appendix 
III. However, for the sake of convenience all references in 
the text here are to Hamilton's edition. 
Reid's letters to Gregory overlapped with Reid's drafting of the 
Intellectual powers and the Active powers. At one point, he 
referred to views put forward in chapters 1,2 and 
3 of essay 4 
in the Active powers ("Of the liberty of moral agents"), which 
he had already sent to Gregory for comments. 
22 
In fact all but 
one of the representative quotations 
Gregory eventually published 
in the Introduction were drawn from this source. The views 
expressed in them cover the major themes of Reid's philosophy of 
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causation. Thus quotations one and two deal with the nature and 
scope of efficient causes. Quotation three concerns Reid's 
attitude to the status of physical causes, while number four 
reveals Reid's use of the evidence of language in metaphysics. 
Finally, quotations five and six reveal aspects of Reid's attitude 
to man's nescience about the nature and operation of efficient 
causes and human power. 
In what follows, each of these themes will be treated 
consecutively using material from Reid's letters. The letters 
themselves are representative of views which can be found 
elsewhere in his writings. This is entirely to be expected, 
given that Reid was drafting and revising his mature works 
during the course of his correspondence with Gregory. 
2.2 Reid's response to Gregory 
2.2.1. The nature and scope of efficient causes 
According to Reid there was a strict, literal and proper 
philosophical meaning of cause. This was "a being that 
produce [d] his effect by his will and power". 
23 
Reid expressed 
the same point in relational terms. Thus a cause was "that 
which [had] the relation to the effect which I have to my 
voluntary and deliberate actions". 
24 Reid termed the 
exertion of this power "efficiency"; therefore the only real 
causes were efficient causes. 
25 
The consequence of this view 
of causality was that "mind onely can be a cause 
in the strict 
sense" because power and activity were not attributes of 
corporeal substances. 
26 The second consequence was there was 
no efficiency or active power without will and understanding. 
"Therefore nothing [could] be an efficient cause in the proper 
sense, but an intelligent being": 
27 
Finally, agents' possession 
of power meant there were no constant conjunctions 
between 
efficient causes and their effects, 
because power continued to 
exist as an attribute of mind without always 
being exerted. 
Reid insisted that the power to produce an effect also 
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presupposed the power not to produce it. Otherwise it would be 
a necessity rather than a power. 
28 
According to Reid, man's conception of active power and 
efficient causation derived from something men felt in 
themselves. 
29 The first awareness of it came from a 
consciousness of their own exertions. As he wrote to Gregory, 
I see not how mankind could ever have acquired the 
conception of a cause or of any relation, beyond a 
mere constant conjunction in time and place between 
it and its effect, if they were not conscious of 
active exertions in themselves, by which effects 
are produced. This seems to me to be the origin 
of the idea of production. 30 
The theme of conscious willed action was central to Reid's 
thought because it was man's only access to the notion of divine 
power, and to the conception of God as a being that could do 
whatever he willed. 
31 According to Reid, when it was said 
that "every change or event must have a cause", then 
the only distinct and true meaning of this maxim 
is, that there must be something that had the power 
to produce the event, and did produce it. 32. 
Thus the concept of efficient cause was at the heart of Reid's 
voluntarist image of natural order. Reid himself underlined 
this point about the strict meaning of cause as efficiency: 
In this sense we ought to use it in the question 
about liberty and necessity, and I think, in all 
metaphysical reasoning about causes and effects; 
for when, in metaphysical reasoning we depart from 
this sense, the word is so value that there can be 
no clear reasoning about it. 3 
This sense of cause was prior to all other kinds, so that when 
the word cause was used without prefixed additions such as 
"efficient", Reid stipulated it was always to be read as a 
productive cause. 
34 In support of the position that "efficient 
cause" was the most common sense of a cause in metaphysics and 
theology, Reid cited "the authority of Des Cartes, Locke, Dr. 
Clarke, Bishop Butler and many other". 
35 
But then what did it 
mean to say that something was a physical cause? 
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2.2.2. The Status of Physical Causes 
Throughout their correspondence, Reid always insisted that the 
strict metaphysical meaning of causation and the related 
conceptions of activity and power implied efficiency or 
production by free intelligent beings. Therefore, Reid argued, 
the term physical cause was "a kind of abuse of the name" cause, 
because "the thing most essential to causation - to wit 
efficiency - was wanting". 
36 
An immediate consequence of 
maintaining the metaphysical reasoning of causation was that 
matter 
cannot be the cause of anything; it can only be an 
instrument in the hands of a real cause. Thus when a 
body has a certain force given it by impulse, it may 
communicate that force to another body, and that to a 
third and so on. But, when we trace back this notion 
to its origin, it must have been given not by matter, 
but by some being which had in itself the power of 
beginning notion - that is, by a proper efficient 
cause of motion. 37 
Also, this meant that in physics the effect was a, measure of the 
power of the cause because men conceived there was no "power" in 
inanimate causes but what was exerted. 
38 
Although the term physical cause was technically an oxymoron and 
in Reid's view "improper", he stated that in physics or natural 
philosophy it had a clear and distinct meaning which could be 
reasoned upon. Competent users of the term "cause" in physics 
meant by it "some law of nature, of which the phenomenon called 
the effect is a necessary consequence". 
39 
Reid's insistence on 
the virtual identity betwen the meanings of a physical cause and 
a law of nature is the most characteristic feature of his 
correspondence considered as a whole. 
40 A typical example is 
his statement that 
When a phenomenon is produced according to a certain law 
of nature, we call the law of nature the cause of that 
phenomenon ... The whole 
business of physics is to 
discover by observation and experiment the laws of nature, 
and to apply them to the solution of phenomena: thus we 
call discovering the causes of things. 
41 
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Reid emphasised that, like physical causes, laws of nature were 
not efficient. They had no agency because they were not existent 
beings, but things conceived by men, which could neither act nor 
be acted on. Reid said that a law of nature was analogous to a 
motive, which could not be an efficient cause either. A law 
of nature was also a purpose or resolution of the deity according 
to which, either he or subordinate intelligent beings, or 
instruments under his direction, acted to produce causes according 
to the law. Thus it always remained the case that an agent of 
some kind was required to produce phenomena in accordance with 
laws. 
The notion of laws of nature "according to which" effects were 
produced had, in Reid's view, "new modelled our notion of 
physical causes". He praised Newton's formulation of the relation- 
ship between laws and physical causes, describing it as one of 
Newton's "great discoveries". It circumscribed "the utmost that 
natural philosophy 
[could] reach, leaving what could be known of 
the agent or efficient cause to metaphysics". 
42 
Yet Reid also 
noted that the ironical consequence of Newton's "discovery" was 
that Newton's 'new-modelling' of the notion of physical cause 
removed its meaning yet further from the original notion of 
cause or agent. According to this meaning, a physical cause and 
its appropriate effect were related in the manner of a law of 
nature and a necessary deduction from it. 
43 
Reid's account of the identity between physical causes and laws 
of nature was also articulated using the vocabulary of constant 
conjunction between antecedents and consequents derived from 
Hume: 
What D. Hume says of causes, in general is very just 
when applied to physical causes that a constant conjunction 
with the effect is essential to such causes, and implied 
in the very conception of them. 44 
Hume's notion of causality with its emphasis upon priority and 
constant conjunction was that most commonly 
found in physics: 
45 
"Between a physical cause and its effect, the conjunction must 
be constant, unless in the case of a miracle, or suspension of 
the laws of nature". 
46 
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The notion of constant conjunction had utility for Reid because 
it could be rendered consistent with his conception of a law of 
nature which guaranteed a voluntarist law-maker God. Upon this 
basis Reid was even prepared to admit that "there may be such a 
nature and state of things which have no proper activity, as 
that certain events or changes must necessarily follow". 
47 
A further reason why Reid was able to make this concession to 
physical necessity without subverting his own voluntarism 
emerges in the following remark: 
Physicks, in all its branches, is conversant about the 
phenomena of nature, and their physical causes; and I 
think it may be admitted as a maxim that every 
phenomenon of nature has a physical cause. But the 
action of men or of other rational beings, are not 
phenomena of nature, nor do they come within the 
sphere of physicks. As little is a beginning of 
existence a phenomenon of nature. 
48 
Thus the disciplines of physics and metaphysics referred to two 
totally different domains, nature and mind. In nature, as 
understood by Reid, physical causes could be endorsed, provided 
they were not accredited efficiency and interpreted as laws of 
nature or rules according to which the Deity chose to operate. 
Minds existed outside nature in an incorporeal domain, but 
they somehow operated in nature as the only real efficient causes. 
Men's only understanding of how they did so was also derived from 
laws of nature. Reid insisted upon the separation of physics and 
metaphysics. Yet it was also clear that metaphysics completely 
dictated what could meaningfully be said in physics, just as 
intelligent beings controlled the inanimate world in Reid's 
voluntarist image of God and nature. 
From what has been said, it is evident that Reid 
incorporated 
aspects of Hume's analysis of constant conjunction 
into his own 
view of men's perception of change 
in physical nature. However, 
it is also important to emphasise that Reid was 
highly critical 
of what he perceived to 
be Hume's own usage of constant 
conjunction. In fact, Reid was totally opposed 
to the use of 
constant conjunction to characterise 
the world of mind and to 
deny men their rightful possession of 
human power. Reid made 
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this very clear in various remarks to Gregory: 
Mr. Hume holds it for a maxim no less applicable to 
intelligent beings and their actions, than to physical 
causes and their effects, that the cause is to be 
measured by the effect. And from this maxim he infers, 
or makes an Epicurean infer that we have reason to 
ascribe to the Deity, just as much of wisdom, power 
and goodness, as appears in the constitution of 
things, and no more. 49 
Or again: 
That nothing can happen without a cause is a maxim ... 
never brought in doubt till the time of D. Hume. If 
this be not understood of an efficient cause, it is not 
true of any other kind of cause; nor can any reason be 
given why it should have been universally received as 
an axiom. 50 
And finally: 
You have good reason to dispute the maxim about causes, 
as laid down by Mr. Hume, in whatever sense he takes the 
word cause. It is a maxim in natural theology universally 
admitted that everything that begins to exist must have a 
cause, meaning an efficient cause; and from this maxim we 
easily deduce the existence of a Being who neither had a 
cause nor a beginning of existence, but exists necessarily. 
51 
In many ways, Reid and Gregory had a similar attitude to Hume. 
Although Gregory was less strident about the theological 
deficiencies of Humeian causality, like Reid, he endorsed 
constant conjunction as an appropriate representation of men's 
perception of physical change. Gregory's pluralism of relations 
of change also left room for efficient causation, albeit in the 
restricted field of human activity. Yet Reid's letters are 
full of reservations about what he called Gregory's "system". 
During the course of their correspondence, Reid made several 
attempts to formulate the precise difference of opinion between 
himself and Gregory. A typical example occurs in letter XIV. 
He noted Gregory's explicit denial that every change required an 
efficient cause in the sense understood by Reid. In such cases, 
Gregory argued, change was effected by physical causes. By a 
physical cause Reid made it clear 
he understood merely "The 
52 
necessary consequence of things unintelligent and inactive". 
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Because this notion of a physical cause implied no activity, and 
because Reid could not conceive of change without an efficient 
cause which brought it about, Reid also thought Gregory agreed 
"that every physical cause must be the work of some agent or 
53 
efficient cause". Reid actually wrote: 
I suspect you use the word cause in this sense for a 
law of nature, according to which a phenomenon is 
produced. If so, it should appear distinctly that 
you do so. 54 
Reid specified that laws of nature always required a being who 
formulated them and made some provision for their enactment. He 
stated that if Gregory agreed with Reid on the equivalence between 
law of nature and physical cause, then there were no differences 
between them. 
55 Yet, a careful analysis of Gregory's Project 
on cause and effect in physics reveals that he did not actually 
equate laws of nature and physical causation. Although Gregory 
often spoke of laws of human thought, he rarely referred to 
physical laws of nature, precisely because of their voluntarist 
associations. By conceding the vocabulary of laws, Gregory 
would have accepted the notion of matter as an instrument in the 
hands of a law-giver or his agents. But whereas Gregory regarded 
matter as passive, he did not endorse either the vocabulary of 
secondary causes found in John Stewart, or Reid's theistic 
nomology of physical events. Reid, on the other hand, considered 
there were no other alternatives and actually put it to Gregory 
that everything he called a physical cause was actually only an 
instrument. 
56 
Reid's voluntarist monism of efficient causes involved a persistent 
reformulation of the language of physical causation in terms of 
laws of nature. This emphasised the distinction he sought to 
maintain, between events in nature and the action of real, 
intelligent and free beings. He perceived that Gregory's Project 
subverted this boundary by talking about species of the genus 
"change", of which an efficient cause was merely one among other 
kinds. Reid continually questioned the basis for this Classifica- 
tion of relations of event which informed Gregory's whole 
Project: 
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If you have found, as you seem to say, that the 
different relations of things, which we call cause. 
and effect differ only as species of the same genus, 
and have found the general notion which comprehends 
them all under it - this, indeed, is more than I am 
able to do. 57 
Reid stated that a physical cause and an efficient cause should 
not have been given a common name because they differed "toto 
eg nere". 
58 
Now Gregory had sought to distinguish them by calling 
physical causes "causes" per se, and efficient causes "agents", 
or relations of activity. In a way, this was precisely the kind 
of demarcation Reid himself insisted upon. Yet Reid was critical 
of the means by which Gregory sought to achieve this, describing 
it as "too bold an innovation in language". This raises the 
question of Reid's attitude to Gregory's philologico-philosophical 
technology for maintaining the boundary between physical causation 
and activity. From Reid's various remarks, it is evident he was 
largely unsympathetic to Gregory's distinctive appeal to the 
evidence of language in order to specify men's common notions of 
physical causation and activity. 
2.2.3. The evidence of language in metaphysics 
On the positive side, Reid certainly agreed with Gregory that 
confounding distinct relations such as physical causation and 
activity was a common philosophical error. Reid also approved 
of Gregory's fundamental principle or law of thought that 
every distinction which is found in the structure of 
language is a real distinction, and is perceivable by 
the common sense of mankind-59 
Reid went even further, noting he made good use of it himself 
and that others should do so because "the whole system of meta- 
physics, or the far greater part 
[might] be brought out of it. ""60 
Finally, Reid considered that Gregory's demonstration of the 
difference between causation and activity on the grounds of 
Latin syntax was basically sound, if in need of wider corrobor- 
ation. 
61 
Where Reid differed with him was over Gregory's stipulation that 
all uses of the word "cause" when applied to things other than 
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physical events, were always metaphorical. According to Reid, 
physical causes and efficient causes were simply "two different 
meanings of the same ambiguous word". 
62 Reid, on this matter 
at least, was content to "bear with the imperfections of 
language". 
63 
Particular uses of each meaning became clear 
because "the things of which they [were] predicted explainredj 
sufficiently what relations were meant ". 
64 
Far from holding 
that the evidence of language showed physical causation was a 
distinct relation from activity, Reid stated that power and 
activity had a share in the relation-of cause and effect. 
This was apparent in men's use of active verbs to characterise 
events in nature which, strictly speaking, implied no activity 
because they were inanimate. Both "cause" and "agent" had what 
Reid called a "lax and popular meaning" and a "strict philo- 
sophical" one, which were frequently substituted for one another. 
Thus all the evidence of language actually showed was that 
causation and activity were ambiguous words. 
65 
Reid regarded language as "a huge and complicated machine" which 
had been gradually perfected over time. 
66 Thus some meanings of 
causation current in the past had disappeared. He cited the 
example of Aristotle's four meanings of cause, some of which had 
subsequently been discarded. Other meanings such as Newton's 
'new-modelling' of physical causes in terms of laws of nature had 
emerged and men now understood this as correct usage in physics. 
Natural philosophers spoke the common language and suited it to 
their new notions as well as they could, "just as the philosophers 
say with the vulgar, that the sun rises and sets, and the moon 
changes". 
67 If not, 
Will they affirm that the sun does not shine nor give 
heat, that the sea never rages, nor do the winds blow, 
nor' the earth bring forth grass and corn? If any bold 
spirit should maintain such paradoxes, he would probably 
repent his temerity. 
68 
Reid held that the evidence of language did not support the 
position that cause was only used 
literally in instances of 
physical change. He therefore criticised Gregory's appeal to it 
as evaluative. Also, he questioned Gregory's appeal to common 
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notions as similarly normative rather than descriptive. To 
summarise, Gregory had argued that"the evidence of language 
indicated all men had a universal and unchanging notion of 
cause and effect in physics, which excluded all other notions 
such as power and activity. But by the term "notion" Reid 
understood a "simple conception" of the meanings of efficient 
and physical cause. He noted that Gregory sometimes used the 
terms "notion" in this way, for example, in the Introductory 
essay, where Gregory sought to show men had a common notion of 
cause and effect in physics. However, Reid said that Gregory, 
on other occasions, spoke of common notions as opinions which 
were either true or false, just or unjust. 
69 
Thus for. Reid the 
"seed of language [was] the natural signs of our thoughts which 
nature [had] taught all men to use and all men to understand ". 
7G 
But it could not actually be appealed to for a discrimination 
about the common notions men ought to have. Also, men's notions 
changed over time. 
In view of this difference over the reliability of language to 
indicate the justness of men's common notions, Reid reformulated 
the issue between himself and Gregory. The question was: 
Whether the words cause, and the corresponding words 
in other languages has, or has not, -from the beginning, 
to express, without a figure, a being that produces the 
effect by his will and power? 71 
Reid actually answered his own question several times during the 
correspondence. 
72 His position was founded upon a historical 
and anthropological appeal to the origins of language. He argued 
that men had first acquired the philosophical meaning of the word 
"cause" as efficiency or activity. This stemmed from men's 
consciousness of power in themselves. However, the strict 
philosophical sense of cause was then corrupted because of men's 
anthropomorphic tendency to ascribe such powers to other things. 
Subsequently, men discovered through experience that there was 
no reason to attribute power and activity to nature. But: 
language was formed on a contrary supposition before 
this discovery was made, and we must give a new, and 
perhaps a very indistinct, meaning to words which 
before had a clear and distinct one. 73 
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So men continued to deploy active verbs in their descriptions 
of change in physical nature. Yet although men spoke with the 
"vulgar" after this fashion, they nevertheless thought with the 
natural philosopher. 
For Reid, the notion of production was built into the language 
of causation, because of men's fundamental awareness of them- 
selves as active beings capable of producing change. Commenting 
more generally on the history of men's usage of the language of 
causality, he wrote: 
It is remarkable that the philosophical meaning of 
these two words, and of the others that depend upon 
them, must have been the first, and the popular meaning 
a corruption of the philosophical, introduced, by time, 
but so deeply rooted in the structure of all languages, 
that it is impossible to eradicate it; for L omethin 
external to us could introduce into the human mind tie 
general notion of priority and constant conjunction, 
but nothing farther. 74 
Thus the evidence of language was dependent upon the fundamental 
and prior experience of willing, around which all of Reid's 
philosophy of mind ultimately revolved. Neuter verbs had no 
special significance for Reid precisely because they were used 
"to express an event, without any signification of its having a 
75 
cause or not". 
Where Reid commended the evidence of language as a guide in 
metaphysics, it was always with a very important qualification. 
It was useful, but only as an accessory to the process of 
"accurate reflection by the mind upon itself". 
76 The evidence 
of consciousness indicated that power and activity were 
implicated in the. metaphysical meaning of causation. This was 
confirmed in men's use of active verbs to express change brought 
about by active beings. Reid was even prepared to uphold his 
perspective in the face of other difficulties. For example, 
explaining how the savage was originally philosophically 
correct is his conception of the meaning of causation; but then 
he entertained lax and popular meanings of the word, until 
finally corrected by modern natural philosophers. 
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From these and many other remarks made to Gregory it appears that 
Reid's chief justification for his voluntarist image of mental and 
natural order was based upon a fundamental point concerning men's 
consciousness of power. - Confronted with Gregory's attempt to 
restrict the literal meaning of causation to physical events, 
Reid insisted that causation and power were mutually implicated 
in the notion of efficiency. Also, he perceived that Gregory's 
stipulations confining the language of causality to inanimate 
nature would have dangerous consequences for natural theology. 
To maintain that the deity was no cause at all - as Gregory in 
fact did in "Objection 5" of Activity 3- was "too shocking" 
and to say that the world existed without a cause was "atheism" . 
77 
Reid wrote to Gregory that only if 
I were convinced that it cannot be said, in a plain, 
literal sense that I am the cause of my own actions, 
or that the Deity is the cause of the universe_, if 
I were convinced that my actions, or the production 
of the universe, are not effects, or that there must 
be a cause. of these effects distinct from the agent, 
I should in this case agree to your reasoning . 
79 
2.2.4. Nescience and the operation of efficient causes 
The final theme identified by Gregory was Reid's profession of 
nescience regarding the real'causes of natural phenomena and the 
nature of the spiritual agencies superintending the material 
system. This is perhaps the most under-represented theme in the 
correspondence and probably the most important. Implicit 
assumptions about man's nescience informed accounts of causality 
throughout Scottish scientific metaphysical discourse during 
this period. However, Reid's references to nescience during the 
correspondence are allusive. This is because his major dis- 
cussion of it in Letter XVII was prompted by a specific passage 
in Power. Without the context of Gregory's own discussion it 
is difficult fully to appreciate the depth of Reid's profession 
of nescience, which included man's knowledge of the operation 
of power as well as the manner of production of physical causes 
and effects. Hence it is useful 
briefly to review this topic 
in Reid's other writings before going on to the views expressed 
in his exchange with Gregory. 
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In section 2.2.2., it was noted that a significant part of Reid's 
discussion of physical causation utilised Humeian causality as. an 
appropriate description of men's perception of change in physical 
nature. Because men only perceived constantly conjoined ante- 
cedents and consequents and never the connection between them, 
Reid's profession of nescience was implied in his whole 
discussion of physical causation. This insistence upon men's 
ignorance of any necessary connections between natural phenomena 
can be found in many places throughout Reid's Works. For example 
in the Inquiry when he discussed men's perception of smell, 
Reid stated that 
The rose is considered as a cause, occasion or ante- 
cedent of the sensation; the sensation as an effect or 
consequence of the presence of the rose; they are 
associated in the mind, and constantly found conjoined 
in the imagination. 79 
Or again in the Intellectual powers, where Reid discussed the 
exact nature of the connection between the vibration of air and 
the sensation of sound: 
We know that such vibrations do really exist ... 
that they tally exactly with the most remarkable 
phenomena of sound. 
[But] we cannot indeed show 
how any vibration should produce the sensation of 
sound. s0 
Finally, Reid summarised his position more generally in the 
Active powers when he said "we see an established order in the 
succession of natural events, but we see not the bond that connects 
them together". 
81 
It is clear that Reid regarded men's confession of causal 
nescience as the most commendable aspect of natural philosophy, 
which he sometimes described as 
"Newtonian". 82 As we have seen, 
the denial of necessary connections in nature was a standard 
feature in some forms of scientific metaphysical discourse. 
Similar sorts of denials can be found in Dugald Stewart, John 
Stewart, and, of course, in Gregory himself. However, what is 
more surprising in Reid is the extent to which 
he also denied the 
existence of necessary connections in mental phenomena as well, 
including the exercise of power. 
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For Reid, men's accountability depended upon an assessment of what 
actions lay within human power in specified circumstances. But when 
it came to understanding the manner of operation of active power 
when agents acted as efficient causes, Reid stated there was a 
"darkness which I isJ faculties lwere not able to penetrate. 
J3 
In fact Reid cosistently professed nescience regarding the operation 
of active powers, either directing the operation of thought, or 
producing motion in the human body. Regarding the former, Reid 
stated that it was difficult to determine whether the mind was 
actually the sole efficient cause of voluntary changes in the 
direction of its thinking "or whether it requir 
redJ the aid of other 
efficient causes". Reid took an identical position regarding the 
connection between mind and body. In the movement of a limb, 
Whether this act of the mind have any physical effect 
upon the nerves and muscles; or whether it be only an 
occasion according to established laws of nature is 
hid from us so dark8s our own power when we trace it 
back to its origin. 
Finally, Reid gave a general summary of his nescience regarding 
the operation of efficient causes in the conclusion of the first 
essay of the Active powers: 
We perceive one event to follow another, according to 
established laws of nature, and we are accustomed to 
call the first cause, and the last the effect without 
knowing what is the bond which unites them. In order 
to produce a certain event we use the means, which by 
laws of nature are connected with that event, though 
other, efficient causes may have had the chief hand in 
its production. Upon the whole, human power, in its 
existence, in its extent and in its exertions is 
entirely dependent upon God, and upon the laws of 
nature which he has established. 
85 
According to Reid, men's experience of power was the only access- 
point for comprehending the real nature of cause and effect as a 
change produced by an active 
being. Yet men could never know how 
power operated. Nor could power 
be defined. Men only had a 
relative conception of power 
because power was not an operation of 
mind as such, but something presupposed 
in all its operations. 
Despite all these constraints and restrictions 
Reid imposed upon 
men's knowledge of power, unlike 
Hume, he maintained it could be 
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known and reasoned about. This was because power was a 
constitutional belief underwritten by God - just as for Reid, 
nescience was a positive resource in order to maintain God's 
providential presence in nature as the first and foremost agent of 
all change. 
It has already been shown that Gregory's conception of cause and 
effect in physics sought to eliminate the conception of production 
from the causal relationship. In other words, the manner in which 
causes proceeded from their effects was to be disregarded. In 
Power Gregory developed his position through an analysis of the 
manner in which a man moved his hand. Gregory acknowledged there 
were two different processes at work in this operation. One was the 
effort or power exerted by the mind; the other was the chain of 
physical causes and effects consequent upon it which eventually 
resulted in the movement of the hand itself. Gregory argued that 
the question of how a man moved his hand could only be answered by 
a careful enumeration of all the parts concerned in it. Gregory 
suggested that the mental effort or power was probably simple and 
resistant to further analysis; but the chain of causes and effects 
could, in principle, be documented by an exhaustive list of all 
the bones, ligaments, nerves and muscles etc. implicated in it. 
Thus an enumeration of all these parts and steps in their proper 
order would constitute "a kind of explanation of the manner in 
which a thing was done". 
86 However, with respect to the original 
exertion of power, or the simple steps enumerated 
in the physical 
explanation, the question of the manner 
in which a man moved his 
arm was no longer relevant. Gregory then generalised this argument 
for all causes and effects in physics: 
in the conception of an explanation of the manner in 
which an effect proceeds from its cause, or of a 
specification of that very circumstance in a cause 
by which it is enabled to produce its effect, is 
implied the belief that a cause is something compound 
comprehending many circumstances; and that in every 
instance of cause and effect besides the cause, and 
the subject, and the occurrence of the change or effect, 
there is something else concerned which may be called 
the manner of its occurring, and may be an object of 
knowledge.. 87 
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Gregory considered that questions about how causes produced effects 
when applied to perfectly simple operations were "nugatory and absurd , 088 
Although men were able to move their hand, "neither [they], nor any 
other being, Lcould1 know how [they] did it". 
89 
Gregory reemphasised 
this point about "any other being" in "Note A" alongside this passage. 
Even "omnipotence could not define a simple. notion, or explain how a 
perfectly simple operation was performed", or "explain that circum- 
stance in a physical cause on which its effect depends, when the 
cause [was] simple and the connection [was] immediate: that is 
without any intervening chain of causes and effects". 
90 
Thus Gregory 
professed a kind of nescience himself. But this form of nescience was 
the result of a kind of 'operationalism' which totally excluded the 
role of the 
Aeity 
as the productive cause of physical events and 
men's exertion of power. All such explanations in physics were to 
be based on "simple ultimate facts", or physical causes which had 
an equivalent status and role to axioms in geometry. 
91 
Reid's commentary upon Gregory's views found in Power reveal that he 
denied men's knowledge of the manner in which causes produced their 
effects for a very different and opposite purpose to the one found 
in Gregory. Reid maintained the same views found elsewhere in his 
writings. Thus like Gregory, he began by stating that in the 
operation of moving a hand, it was "one thing to know that such a 
thing, [occurred], and another to know how it roccurred]". 
92 Thus 
men knew there was a constant conjunction between volition and the 
motion of their hands but did not know the connection between them. 
But Reid added: 
Nay, I am'uncertain whether I be truly and properly 
the agent in the first motion; for I can suppose that, 
whenever I will to move my 
hand, the Deity or some 
other agent, produces the first motion in my body. 93 
The same applied to men's intellectual operations: other efficient 
beings besides men may have produced the sequence of thoughts in their 
minds. Finally, Reid emphasised that men's nescience regarding the 
manner in which effects were produced from causes did not extend to 
the 
deity, as Gregory suggested. In all these cases, Reid's 
insistence upon nescience tended to increase the superintending role 
of the deity in all kinds of*change mental and physical. 
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3. THE CRITIQUE OF HUME: POWER AND NECESSARY CONNECTION 
3.1 The problem of reading Hume 
In previous chapters the perceived importance of Hume's philosophy 
has been emphasised. In chapter one it was shown that Gregory 
acknowledged Hume as the principal threat to Gregorian scientific 
metaphysics. Also in chapter three, it was indicated that despite 
Gregory's use of a Humeian vocabulary of philosophical relations, 
Gregory sought to distinguish the presuppositions of his own 
analysis from Hume's philosophical apparatus of ideas and 
impressions. Finally, in chapter two it was shown that John 
Stewart and members of the Edinburgh clerical literati considered 
that Kames's scientific metaphysics drew its inspiration from 
Hume. All these and many other circumstances prompt the 
question of the precise role Hume's work actually played in the 
development of Scottish scientific metaphysics during this 
period. 
The problems one encounters in trying to specify Hume's actual 
role in the Kames-Stewart controversy are representative of 
his relationship to the period generally. Hume was one of the 
secretaries of the Philosophical Society, but there is little 
surviving evidence of his participation. He read at least one 
paper, wrote all or part of the preface to the Society's first 
publication, and corresponded with John Stewart about the 
debate with Kames. Apparently, Hume considered publishing an 
essay on mathematics and natural philosophy, but did not. 
94 
No drafts have survived. Therefore to search for Hume's 
direct engagement with 18th century Scottish scientific meta- 
physics is quite fruitless. 
In the face of such difficulties, it is inevitable that Hume's 
texts play a prominent role in any account of the relationship 
between Humeian metaphysics and natural knowledge during the 
period. 
95 The problem here is that there is currently 
considerable disagreement about the 
interpretation of Hume's 
philosophy. This problem emerged 
in the 20th century through 
the writings of Norman Kemp Smith. In a pioneering article 
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called "The naturalism of Hume", 
96 Smith put forward an 
alternative interpretation to the orthodox viewpoint that 
Hume was simply asceptical thinker. In his subsequent study 
of the Treatise, Kemp Smith argued that his viewpoint had been 
. transmitted uncritically 
into the 20th century through the 
earlier writings of Mill, Bain, Stephen and Green. In its 
place Smith argued that Hume was a positive, naturalistic and 
constructive philosopher who sought merely to specify the 
grounds upon which probable knowledge was possible, not to rule 
out the possibility of all knowledge whatever. This view has 
been expanded in a number of works following Smith's original 
lead. Among these, the most significant for historical 
purposes are those which have put forward the "naturalistic" 
interpretation of Hume in relation to Newton's natural philosophy. 
These works fall into more or less two groupings. One includes 
an earlier group of commentators commencing with Kemp Smith 
himself and including Hendle, Passmore, Chapple, Jessop, Flew 
and others. 
97 All of them consider Newton's science to have had 
a profound effect upon Hume's own philosophical programme. They 
invariably allude to Hume's famous remark on the title page of the 
Treatise about it "being an attempt to introduce the experimental 
method of reasoning to moral subjects". They also refer to his 
comparison between the importance of the association of ideas 
for metaphysics and the significance of the principle of 
attraction in physics. 
98 Such writers are discussed by James 
Noxon in Hume's philosophical development. He shows the very 
slender and unanalysed basis upon which it became standard 
practice to couple Newton and Hume as parts of one continuous 
enterprise. This emerges clearly in the phraseology used by 
these earlier commentators. Thus Hume is referred to as "the 
Newton of the moral sciences" who developed "a truly Newtonian 
system of mental mechanics". 
99 
The second grouping includes recent writers such as Capaldi, 
Hurlbutt, Battersby and Noxon himself, who have sought to 
analyse the connections 
between Hume and Newton more 
substantially-100 As a result, they 
have paid more attention 
to the 18th century historical context of Hume's thought, a 
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feature of recent Hume scholarship as a whole. 
101 However, in 
these works there is an unusual mixture of attention to the 
common context of scientific and religious ideas in the 18th 
century; and judgements about Hume's and Newton's philosophical 
'correctness' on various issues. Noxon's book can serve as a 
representative example of this clash between historical and 
evaluative approaches. 
Noxon emphasises that an examination of the relations between 
Newtonian and Humeian philosophy must pay close attention to 
contemporary scientific conceptions and achievements. He gives 
a detailed account of Newton's methodological writings. 
102 
Newton's twin denial and profession of hypotheses is 
explained by referring the Principia and Opticks to different 
kinds of science. Noxon points out that unlike mechanics, 
other areas of science were experimental and less well under- 
stood. In these areas, there was a legitimate role for 
hypotheses. So Newton's denial of hypotheses, in the "Rules 
of reasoning" was not inconsistent, but justifiable in relation 
to a particular kind of science. Noxon's aim in his 
discussion is largely to exonerate Newton from errors and 
inconsistencies. 
The best instance of this comes in Noxon's distinction between 
Newton and different kinds of Newtoniänisms. Thus Halley, 
Black, Franklin, Priestley and Cavendish all utilised Newton's 
"suggestions" for empirical work. This, in Noxon's view, is 
sufficient to "confer the name of Newton upon the mainstream of 
18th century English thought". These men are to be sharply 
distinguished from a group including Bentley, Clarke, Whiston, 
Cheyne and others, who sought to work out 
"the moral and 
theological implications of Newtonian science", Noxon actually 
acknowledges that Newton 
belonged to the latter group as well 
as the former. But instead of this 
leading him to question the 
utility of the division 
in the first place, he gives a wholly 
rational and intellectual reason 
for Newton's own theism. 
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Newton's assurance that discourse of God belonged 
to experimental philosophy presumably rested on 
his confidence that the strength of analogical 
arguments would be unimpaired by extensions into 
the religious domain. 103 
Armed with these various analytical distinctions, Noxon 
considers what sort of a Newtonian Hume actually was. He 
concludes that Hume was essentially a Newtonian methodologist. 
This was evident in the way he used the rules of reasoning 
precisely to eliminate the "pretentious" theological 
"speculations" of the Newtonians. Thus, because Hume was a 
'real Newtonian', his adherence to the essential meaning of the 
rules of reasoning stopped him from subscribing to theistic 
Newtonianism. 
104 In short: Hume was actually a better Newtonian 
than Newton was himself. Once Hume's methodology has been 
classified as genuinely scientific and therefore hostile to 
theology, Noxon proceeds to explain Hume's subsequent problems 
in the realisation of his science of human nature. Noxon argues 
that all Hume's difficulties arose because he dealt with mental 
phenomena, rather than objective scientific facts. Hume was 
forced to rely upon unverifiable introspection instead of the 
experimental approach definitive of science. Once again, 
potential inconsistencies are justified in terms of the kind of 
enterprise historical actors are perceived to be engaging in. 
Noxon's general analysis of Newton and Newtonian science will be 
familiar to contemporary historians of science. It corresponds 
largely to the view of Newton found in the work of I, B, Cohen 
and A. Koyre. 
105 But Noxon does not merely accept their view of 
Newton. He also incorporates the historiographic assumptions which 
underlie it. For example, Cohen identifies a "two Newtons" 
problem. He then sets out to harmonise different usages of key 
terms found in the Principia and the 0 tý icks. This kind of 
interpretive task has already been illustrated in Noxon's 
reiteration of the different senses Newton gave to the term 
hypothesis. What lies behind this approach generally is a 
commitment to the analysis of texts, in which their meaning is 
considered to lie, in the internal logic of the concepts they 
discuss. The essential relations of concepts such as hypothesis 
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or gravity is recovered, often in the face of imprecise language 
found in Hume or Newton. Once purified through conceptual 
analysis, these recovered meanings become the base-line for 
assessing misunderstandings by contemporaries, successors and, 
indeed, other present-day commentators. 
The Koyre-Cohen tradition has recently been criticised in the 
history of science, concerning the way some of its exponents 
have made stipulations about the meaning of Newtonianism. 
106 
But its great merit lies in the fact that historians of science 
now routinely accept that scientific concepts are to be inter- 
preted and understood within a context which transcends purely 
formal considerations. 
107 In the 18th century at least, 
discourse about nature interwove technical and mathematical 
explanations of phenomena, metaphysical views about matter and 
spirit, causality and apologetic statements concerning God's 
existence and role in nature. 
108 
Approaches such as Noxon's have 
begun to locate Hume's thought within this broader field. 
However the problems of evaluation and judgement confronting the 
Koyre-Cohen tradition are, if anything, more apparent in the 
work which attempts to deal with Hume's Newtonianism. This is 
because philosophers largely assume Hume's critique of religion 
was devastating and that the whole enterprise of natural theology 
was a rationally misguided form of discourse. 
109 
Thus science 
and theology are segregated rather than interpreted in a common 
context. This is certainly evident in Noxon. 
110 Alternatively, 
the kind of approach advocated here pays close attention to the 
situated understandings of historical actors. The ways in which 
Hume's contemporaries perceived and interpreted Hume's philosophy 
are studied in relation to their assumptions, purposes and 
background knowledge. From this perspective, Gregory and others 
are viewed as doing active interpretive work on Hume's texts. 
The original sceptical-destructive interpretation of Hume which 
dominated the 19th century actually originated from criticisms put 
forward by common sense philosophers, such as-Thomas Reid, James 
Beattie and Dugald Stewart. Kemp Smith gives a number of 
quotations from Reid's Inquiry to illustrate how common sense 
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philosophers responded to Hume. He was viewed as the heir to and 
culmination of, a philosophical tradition derived from Descartes 
and passed on by Locke and Berkeley. This was called the "doctrine 
of ideas", or "ideal system" and has recently been termed the 
"way of ideas". 
ill For common sense philosophers, the ideal 
system was virtually synonynous with scepticism itself. Another 
remark of Reid's from the Intellectual powers brings this out 
quite dramatically. Reid stated that the result of Hume's use 
of the doctrine of ideas was 
that there is no material world; No abstract ideas or 
notions: That the mind is only a train of related 
impressions and ideas, without any subject on which 
they may be impressed: That there is neither space 
nor time, body nor mind, but impressions and ideas 
only. j12 
Further indications of Reid's perception of the dangers under- 
lying Hume's philosophy of causation have been discussed in the 
previous section. 
The purpose here is to show that Gregory's own response to Hume 
cannot be accommodated to the standard view of the 18th century 
reception of Hume's thought. 
113 To be sure, at times Gregory 
accused Hume of scepticism. This is evident on occasions in 
the Introductory essay and Power. However, Gregory also 
perceived that Hume was advocating a more positive philosophy. 
Gregory called this Hume's necessitarianism, which can be 
broadly thought of as a historical equivalent to what contemporary 
commentators now call Hume's naturalism. In his criticisms of 
power and necessary connection it is evident that, if anything, 
Gregory was less concerned with Hume's scepticism and its threat 
to morality and religion than the dangers Humeian philosophy 
posed for science. Gregory attacked Hume's necessitarianism 
because it contravened what Gregory considered to be the 
criteria for a genuinely scientific metaphysics. This emerges 
clearly in Gregory's various criticisms of the key concepts of 
power and necessary connection. 
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3.2 Gregory's criticisms of power 
Gregory understood a correct application of the word power to 
denote an attribute of intelligent beings by which they were able 
to carry out or not carry out certain actions at their own 
discretion. 
114 
To Gregory, power was an irrefragable matter of 
fact known on the basis of consciousness, common sense and 
linguistic usage. Gregory regarded power as self-evident, but 
because Hume denied that men knew or could ever know power, some 
kind of a demonstration of it was necessary. Gregory said that 
Hume's followers and other like-minded philosophers still 
maintained "that the common notion and belief of optional or 
discretionary power belonging even to. animals or to mind [was] 
a mere vulgar prejudice and error". 
115 
Gregory's ensuing criticisms of Hume lacked that casuistical 
quality always found in Beattie and often present in Reid. 
116 
Instead, Gregory was actually prepared to state that Hume had 
sought to deny power "in a very reasonable like and scientific 
manner", 
117 
and in the process of his investigations had 
collected some "just and valuable observations". 
118 
In fact, 
Gregory's remarks at the beginning of Power suggest he viewed 
Hume as a rival exponent of a shared methodology for discussing 
issues in metaphysics. As a result, it was imperative for 
Gregory to show in what ways Hume had been unscientific and 
unreasonable in his denial of power. Gregory used a number of 
strategies to achieve this end. 
Gregory cited a remark by Hume in which the latter emphasised that 
the use of words such as "power", "force", "energy" etc., in 
everyday conversation did not amount to a proof that men were 
"acquainted in any instance with the connecting principle between 
cause and effect or 
[could]-account ultimately for the production 
of one thing by another". Hume went on to state that this was 
because such words had "very loose meanings attached to them and 
their ideas [were] very uncertain and confused". 
119 
If this were 
actually the case, Gregory argued, a 
"rational" philosophical 
enquiry would then proceed to discern the different meanings the 
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word "power" had in its different significations. But Hume had 
"set about proving that F 
-Power] 
had no meaning and expressed no 
idea at all" . 
120 
To Gregory, this seemed absurd because it 
attempted to prove certain ideas evident to common sense were 
not really ideas at all. Hume had gone about his philosophical 
analysis in the wrong way. Instead of attending to the matter- 
of-fact evidence afforded by language, Hume ignored this in 
pursuit of his concern to deny power altogether. 
01 
Gregory was aware that the term "idea" had a specific and 
technical sense within Hume's doctrine of ideas and impressions. 
12' 
Thus when Hume denied the idea of power, this was based upon a 
theory according to which all ideas were derived from impressions, 
either external or internal. Therefore Hume argued it was 
impossible to think anything that had not been antecedently felt. 
Gregory had deep reservations about Hume's doctrine of ideas and 
impressions which he regarded as a "hypothesis concerning the 
operation of thought". As in the Theory, Gregory sought to 
discredit Hume's apparatus of ideas and impressions. Gregory 
argued that however ideas were to be regarded in themselves, as 
"images, models, copies, phantasms or representative beings of 
some kind", 
122 it still followed that to understand something, 
it was necessary to have an idea of the thing in question. Thus, 
although Hume did use ideas in a specific sense and according to 
a distinctive theory of mental representation, nevertheless Hume 
conceded that to think of something was roughly synonymous with 
having an idea of the thing so thought. Therefore Gregory treated 
Hüme's denial of the idea of power as a general one, rather than 
simply a denial based upon the absence of any preceding impression. 
Gregory's second tactic regarding Hume's use of the doctrine of 
ideas and impressions to deny the idea of power was to argue that 
it conflated the distinction between inductive reasoning and 
demonstration. Gregory said that Hume's writings gave ample 
evidence that he understood the status of a mathematical 
demonstration. In fact all forms of demonstration showed why 
necessary truths must be so and could not be otherwise without 
absurdity or contradiction. But Gregory doubted whether Hume was 
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equally conversant with induction or "understood the limits, 
and the first principle of all reasonings from experiment and 
observation: that is, of all reasonings that relate merely to 




an established principle that every inference of 
induction is subject to the trial of observation and 
experiment, as an Englishman is subject to trial by 
a jury of his peers1Z4 
Having emphasised the complete distinction between induction and 
demonstration, Gregory applied this to Hume's denial of power. 
The question was: did Hume's use of the doctrine of ideas and 
impressions conform to the canons of inductive reasoning? 
Gregory contended that it did not and proceeded to show why. 
Gregory argued that in Enquiry 7, Hume strayed from his original 
insistence on the inductive basis of the doctrine of ideas, when 
he stated that it was "impossible for [men] to think of any thing 
which [they] have not antecedently felt". In Enquiry 8, Hume 
stated that the only way the doctrine could be falsified was to 
produce an idea not derived from a corresponding impression. 
Faced with such a candidate idea, Humeians then had to find a 
corresponding impression and so confirm the derivation thesis of 
ideas from impressions. 
125 But in the case of power 
Mr Hume instead of producing the corresponding 
impression as he had promised to do so in every such 
case, sets about proving that there is not such 
impression, and therefore concludes that the 
supposed idea of power is no idea at all. 126 
In short, Gregory accused Hume of misunderstanding the 
relationship between the doctrine of ideas and impressions and 
matters of fact. Hume had attempted to adjudicate the latter 
on the basis of the former rather than vice versa. Common sense 
evidence for the idea of power left Hume with three legitimate 
options in Gregory's view. Either Hume had to admit that there 
was indeed an impression of power from which the idea derived. 
Or he must concede that every idea was not derived from an 
impression. Or finally, Hume had to acknowledge that there were 
other objects of knowledge besides ideas and impressions. But 
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Hume adopted none of these because he had defended the denial of 
power on a priori grounds. This was Gregory's assessment of 
Hume's philosophy of power: Hume was not an empiricist because he 
used the doctrine of ideas and impressions in a systematic way 
rather than according to the rigorous demands of scientific 
induction. 
From the evidence presented so far, it is clear that Gregory's 
criticisms do not correspond to the standard image of the 
Scottish 18th century philosopher who viewed Hume as an out-and- 
out sceptic. Gregory did not challenge Hume's views on the 
casuistical grounds that they had pernicious moral and religious 
consequences. Rather, he analysed the logical form of Hume's 
denial of power. Gregory primarily viewed Hume's metaphysics as 
unscientific. At best it had a shallow commitment to genuine 
matters of fact and induction. Having dismissed Hume's denial of 
power founded upon the doctrine of ideas and impressions, Gregory 
turned his attention to Hume's second major argument against the 
idea of power. This was an ad absurdum argument which reasoned 
from the supposition that men knew power to conclusions that were 
false or absurd. Gregory analysed the details of Hume's 
reasonings because he considered they revealed an ambiguity about 
the meaning of power which helped to clarify why the concept of 
power could not be applied to physical changes as well as mental 
events. 
Hume's doctrine of ideas and impressions was a general and 
philosophical one. It was not restricted solely to perception of 
the external world. Impressions could be sense data external to 
the mind; or they could equally well be internal impressions. Hume 
devoted the beginning of Enquiry VII to denying that power could 
ever be perceived among external objects. In the remainder of 
part 1, he set about the task of showing that internal impressions 
could not give knowledge of power either. Hume marshalled his 
arguments against internal impressions of power into two groups, 
those which dealt with the will's control over the human body, and 
those which concerned the will's control over the mind itself. 
Gregory quoted those dealing with the former group in great 
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detail. 127 The extract which Gregory analysed is too long to 
reproduce here; but the details of Hume's argument can be rehearsed 
briefly. Hume stated that man's knowledge of willing his body to 
move was subject to the same restrictions applicable to knowledge of 
any other natural event. It depended solely upon experience. The 
consequent movement of the body could not be foreknown because it 
was impossible to discover the power in the cause by which it produces 
its effect. This latter information was the condition of knowing 
power. In Hume's view, if men knew power, then they knew the 
necessary connection between a cause and its effect. Men could not 
know necessary connections; therefore they could not know power. 
Hume applied this to the power of the will in three reductio 
arguments. If men knew the power of willing, then they would also 
know the nature of body, soul and the connection between them. 
If men knew power, then they would know a priori why willing could 
move some organs of the body but not others. If men knew power, then 
all the intermediate causal connections between willing and moving 
the body would also be known. In each case, men knew nothing of 
the matters in question. Therefore, Hume contended men did not 
know power from the experience of willing movement in the body. 
Experience merely taught "how one event constantly follow e d1 
another without instructing us in the secret connection, which 
bind them together, and renders them inseparable". 
128 
Whereas Gregory saw Hume's doctrine of ideas as a visionary 
hypothesis, he regarded his subsequent reasonings about power as 
another illustration of the danger of ambiguous terms in meta- 
physical reasoning. 
129 Hume had confused two senses of the term 
power and treated them as the same. One was the power of acting 
or not acting according to one's discretion, or what Gregory called 
"animal power". The other was a metaphorical sense applicable to 
a series of natural causes and effects, or what was sometimes called 
"physical power". 
130 Gregory emphasised that 
These two circumstances or kinds of power comprehended 
in the seemingly simple operation of moving the hand by 
a voluntary effort, must be carefully distinguished. 
The making of the effort is an exertion of optional or 
discretionary power: the effort when made is a physical 
power or cause, which as usual in physics is followed 
by its proper effect. 131 
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Because Hume showed no respect for Gregory's demarcation between 
optional power and physical causation, his reasonings were viewed 
as unintelligible. This is apparent in Gregory's assessment of 
Hume's criteria for knowing power. Hume demanded knowledge of 
necessary connections for both mental and physical power to be 
known. Gregory considered that this was an absurd demand for 
mental power. To know power did not rest upon knowing the 
circumstances upon which the exercise of it depended. The very 
fact that Hume demanded these criteria to be fulfilled was 
evidence for the fact that Hume regarded mental power as a 
physical cause. But even in the latter case, Gregory regarded 
the demand for demonstrative knowledge of the exact circumstances 
of a causal relationship as a mistaken basis for men's knowledge 
of causes. Thus Gregory actually criticised Hume for making the 
same error as Reid. 
Both Reid and Hume denied that men knew necessary connections in 
nature. Reid argued that men still had an idea of productive or 
efficient causation. Hume stated they did not. However, what 
Gregory persistently attacked was the appeal to the absence of 
perceived necessary connections as a means of either denying 
knowledge of power in Hume's case; or for introducing the deity 
as an omnipresent productive principle, as in Reid's. Thus 
Gregory spoke of Hume's denial of necessary connections between 
causes and effects as if it were a continuation of "all such 
speculations concerning the circumstances by which a cause is 
enabled to produce its effect and the manner in which an effect 
proceeds from its cause". 
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At first sight, this might seem a simple misunderstanding of Hume. 
However, Gregory's reading is also entirely intelligible. Gregory 
interpreted Hume's denial of necessary connections perceivable 
between events as the ground for Hume's subsequent nescience 
regarding power, whether mental or physical. As a matter of fact, 
Gregory endorsed the position that there were no necessary 
connections between physical events and that because of the nature 
of human power as optional and discretionary, there could be none 
for mental events. However, from Gregory's perspective, Hume 
was not simply denying the existence of necessary connections in 
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nature, he was using this to deny men's knowledge of power, just 
as Reid used it to assert the superintending role of the 
Jeity. 
In keeping with his former stipulations of Hume as non-empirical, 
covertly deductive, and conceptually ambiguous, Gregory read Hume 
as resurrecting the misplaced demand for necessary connections as 
a basis for a sound knowledge of nature. Such discriminations only 
make sense as part of a strategy according to which Gregory sought 
to distinguish his position from Humes, precisely because there 
were perceived similarities between them, as there were between 
Hume and Reid. In particular, these similarities seem to converge 
around the concept of necessary connection, to which we now turn. 
3.3. Greory' s criticisms of necessary connection 
Clearly, Gregory considered Hume's demands for knowledge of the 
idea of power to be misplaced. He therefore regarded Hume's 
scepticism about power as unfounded. However, Gregory did not 
stop at denunciation of Hume's negative-destructive views. He 
perceived that Hume denied men's idea of power for a purpose. This 
was evident from Hume's subsequent treatment of liberty and necessity 
in Enquiry 8. Having reduced power to a constant conjunction 
relation, equivalent to men's knowledge of cause and effect in 
physics, Hume had paved the way for his "reconciling project" 
concerning liberty and necessity. Gregory considered Hume had 
'new-modelled' the argument for necessity by contending the relation 
of motive and action was precisely the same as cause and effect in 
physics. In both cases, there was a constant conjunction such 
that men's knowledge of motives preceding actions was precisely 
the same as their knowledge of causes and their effects in physics. 
Gregory completely opposed Hume's necessitarianism which he regarded 
as repugnant to "the natural suggestions of the human faculties" 
and "the irresistable conviction of mankind". 
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Gregory made his own position quite clear. According to his 
" 
pluralistic theory of change, there were different species or 
relations of event. One was physical causation, characterised 
by the constant conjunction of causes and effects. Another was 
activity, characterised by the exertion of optional power by 
active beings in order to produce change. Gregory's account of 
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these relations have been extensively discussed. His published 
Essay dealt with a third relation of event between motives and 
actions. Again, his purpose was to confine motive and action 
within its proper sphere and so segregate it from other relations 
men had confounded it with, such as the relation of cause and 
effect in physics. He regarded this as Hume's chief error and the 
characteristic feature of the 'new-modelled' necessitarianism 
advocated by men such as Priestley. It was made possible by what 
Gregory regarded as the misappropriation of the notion of constant 
conjunction. 
134 Thus Gregory announced the aim of the Essay was 
to show that the relation of motive and action was not constantly 
conjoined like cause and effect in physics but entailed 
a certain independent self governing self-determining 
power which j man] may at his own discretion exert 
by acting either according to motives or in opposition 
to motives, or without any motives at all. 135 
Gregory's first task was to refute Hume's argument put forward in 
Enquiry 8 that, despite men's protestations of liberty, they were 
really practical necessitarians. This was because men always 
believed and acted upon the basis of a constant conjunction between 
motives and actions. Hume offered an explanation of why most men 
nevertheless repudiated necessity. This was as follows. Men 
always felt there was some kind of necessary connection between 
physical causes and their effects instead of a mere constant 
conjunction. When they reflected upon the connection between 
motives and actions, they could not find an equivalent feeling 
to physical necessity. Therefore men mistakenly concluded that 
there was a different basis for the connections between motives 
and human actions and physical causes and effects. Furthermore 
they attributed this difference to men's freedom of will and 
contrasted it with the necessity of nature. 
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As we have seen, Gregory regarded the common and vulgar perception 
of liberty as irrefragable evidence for its reality. 
137 Gregory 
perceived and completely opposed Hume's naturalistic approach in 
which, for example, the feeling of liberty or power was seen as 
"a phenomenon or matter of fact" to be accounted for in terms of 
Hume's principles. 
138 Hume was one of 
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those philosophers who have thought fit to erect 
themselves into a tribunal of higher authority 
than the voice of nature or the common sense of 
mankind. 139 
The "tribunal" in Hume's case was the doctrine of ideas and 
impressions. 140 Gregory adopted the same argument used in Power 
to show how Hume explained fallacious or misplaced feelings of 
liberty or necessity, by stating there was no corresponding 
impression from which they could be derived. As before, Gregory 
argued that Hume's restricted sense of an idea as something 
derived from a precedent impression enabled him to deny the 
existence of some ideas which men undoubtedly had, irrespective 
of whether such ideas were justifiable. 
14' 
Gregory challenged all Hume's stipulations about what men really 
thought and felt. Yet Gregory continued to stress that appeals 
to the evidence of consciousness counted for little in the face 
of counter-claims about men's common sense. Therefore, in his 
Essay, he sought to demonstrate the difference between motives and 
actions, and causes and effects in a way that commanded men's 
assent. Only demonstration could give immunity from the 
politicisation of experience and consciousness, which had 
emerged in the clash between necessitarianism and voluntarism or 
Humeian metaphysics and Reid's philosophy of active powers. The 
exact details of Gregory's proposed demonstration are considered 
subsequently. However, as a preliminary to demonstration, Gregory 
sought a clarification of the meaning of necessary connection. 
Gregory's discussion of Hume's usage of necessary connection 
concentrated upon a passage from Enquiry 8: 
Let anyone define a cause, without comprehending, as 
a part of te definition, a necessary connexion with 
its effect; and let him show distinctly the origin 
of the idea, expressed by the definition; and I shall 
readily give up the whole controversy. 
I41 
Gregory found Hume's use of necessary connection here a puzzling, 
ambiguous and contradictory one. He stated that Hume could not 
mean that it was impossible to define cause without any necessary 
connection between cause and effect, because in Enquiry 7, Hume 
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had actually given two such definitions. 
143 Surely it was the 
whole purpose of that section of the Enquiry to show the relation 
of cause and effectaia 
Timply 
any such necessary connection? Yet 
in this passage, Hume said it was impossible to define cause 
without necessary connection. 
144 Gregory was not alone in being 
puzzled by Hume's use of necessary connection. Gregory drew 
Reid's attention to it, who discussed it twice in his letters. 
According to Reid, Hume "meant to say the contrary of what he 
said [but] the word without ha Ld] slipt into the sentence by an 
oversight of the author or printer": 
For does not he himself define a cause, without 
comprehending as a part of the definition, a 
necessary connection between the cause and the 
effect? Does he not maintain that we have no 
idea of necessary connection? 145 
Both Reid and Gregory found it contradictory that Hume could say 
most men considered events in nature were necessarily connected, 
while at the same time, he denied men ever had any idea of 
necessary connection. But whereas Reid made no attempt to probe 
into Hume's meaning of necessary connection in Enquiry 8 as 
opposed to Enquiry 7, Gregory pursued the matter further. 
For Gregory, necessary connection was a particular kind of 
relation and as the self-appointed natural historian of all 
relations of change, he sought to define it as a species distinct 
from others. In its common usage: 
The phrase necessary connection may be supposed to 
mean a connection which from the nature of things 
must take place, or more accurately speaking, 
according to the laws of thought, must be conceived 
by us to take place; the contrary of it, or any 
supposition inconsistent with it being not merely 
false, but either intuitively or demonstrably 
impossible and absurd. 146 
Necessary connection was a characteristic of all geometrical 
relations and some relations in various other subjects to which 
Gregory alluded but did not specify. Gregory maintained that this 
was the sense of necessary connection which Hume used when he said 
men had a tendency to believe there were necessary connections in 
the matter of fact operations of nature. In Enquiry 7s Hume always 
contrasted this sense of necessary connection with constant 
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conjunction, attacking the former in order to establish -the 
latter. 
In Enquiry 8, Gregory noted another and different usage of necessary 
connection. This sense 
is what Mr Hume has with much greater propriety called 
regular, uniform, constant conjunction. Other words 
might easily be employed to denote the same meaning; 
such as inseparable connection, or more strictly 
speaking, a connection which men cannot separate. 147 
It was Hume's contention that necessity, as a constant 
conjunction between motives and actions, had never been rejected 
by philosophers or ordinary men in the relation of motives to 
actions. Thus in the passage cited above, Hume actually meant: 
let anyone define a cause without comprehending a constant 
conjunction with its effect and he would give up the controversy. 
Gregory saw Hume advocating that either there was a constant 
conjunction between all causes and their effects, including 
motives and actions; or there was no connection at all. Gregory 
stated that in the proper sense of necessary connection, it was 
impossible to demonstrate that necessary connections existed 
between either physical causes and effects or motives and actions. 
He quoted the following challenge made by Hume in order to show 
that Hume had set libertarians such as himself the wrong task: 
It may only perhaps be pretended that the mind can 
perceive in the operations of matter some further 
connection between the cause and the effect; and 
a connection that has not place in the voluntary 
actions of intelligent beings - And it is incumbent 
on these philosophers to make good their assertion, 
by defining or describing that necessity, and pointing 
it out to us in the operation of material causes. 148 
From Gregory's perspective, liberty was not to be defended by 
demonstrating necessity in physical nature. He endorsed Hume's 
analysis of constant conjunctions between physical causes and 
effects. Instead the task for the libertarian was to demonstrate, 
not that there was any more than constant conjunction in material 
nature, but less than constant conjunction 
between motives and 
action. In other words, Gregory perceived his task to be a 
demonstration that the behaviour of inanimate bodies on the basis 
of constantly conjoined physical causes and effects was not 
analogous to the actions of men on the basis of their motives. 
Precisely how he did so is considered in chapter six. 
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4. HUME, NATURAL KNOWLEDGE AND THE PROBLEM OF CAUSATION 
In the last section it was shown that Gregory perceived Hume's 
necessitarianism as well as his scepticism regarding causation. In 
this sense, he was untypical of most other 18th century commentators 
and critics. However, Gregory's particular attempt to understand and 
resolve the meaning of Humeian causality is representative of the 
severe problems of interpretation Hume's metaphysics posed for his 
contemporaries and successors. The purpose of this section is to 
bring out more clearly the possible foundations for divergent 
interpretations of Hume's philosophical 'message' about causation. 
The analysis is largely restricted to Enquiry 7 and 8, because these 
sections formed the basis of Gregory's own critique. As we shall see, 
understanding the 'Janus-faced' nature of Hume's philosophy of causa- 
tion provides the key to its importance in the discourse of Scottish 
scientific metaphysics generally. 
In the. new-modelled, EsndAtreamlinedversion of 
his. earlier Treatise, 
-Hume 'contrasted his>, own "abstract"_ and E"profound" philosophy 
with 
another ' kind'which, was m ore, -!! easy: 
', aisd "obvious". 
149 But, at 
`the' same =, time, sbe" presented 
his own metaphysics as "carrying the 
war 'intootne `secret, recesses,. - of 
Lhe enemy", land also offering, 'a 
challenge to7rival- systems . of,. abstract; philosophy. 
'lSd Hume, 
considered, his; -metaphysics.. 
could, undertaKe, this, critical, role 
because-nit, was; accur-Italy , 
founded, upon, the nature of human 
-understanding. ýThis, 
is,. nowhere. more, apparent than in Hume*s Wll 
; analysis of ; causation. , 
The, limits Hume,, imposed. 
, 
upon man's 
knowledge af,. cause,, and-effect, also circumscribed 
the limits of 
thuman;; understanding, ano, confineci. 
thepractice ofmetaphysics 
. withip,, 
its, proper: bounds,, what., were chose 
limits? 
Hume argued that all reasonings about causes and effects were founded 
upon customary past experience and inferred future expectation. Men 
were hostages to analogy. The applauded virtues of experience and 
observation ultimately come down to the statement "From causes which 
appear similar we expect similar effects". 
151 This relied upon a 
taken-for-granted assumption about the uniformity of nature. Beyond 
the assignment of mundane causes, the "ultimate springs and 
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principles [were] totally shut up from human curiosity and enquiry". 
These limitations upon the knowledge of causal inference, had direct 
implications for both natural philosophy and metaphysics generally. 
The most perfect kind of natural philosophy "only stave [dj off 
our ignorance a little longer; the most perfect metaphysics serve [d] 
to discover larger portions of it. "152 
0 
In spite of Hume's professed causal nescience, he actually used his 
conception of causality in a very positive way to solve,. or rather 
dissolve, a number of standard topics in 18th century thought. As 
we have seen, he attacked received conceptions of power and necessary 
connection, and put forward a view of philosophical necessity based 
on the constant conjunction of causes and effects. He also identified 
a common instinctual basis for reasoning and applied it to both animals 
and man. He questioned the existence of miracles, particular providence 
and a future state. In all these cases Hume made direct use of his 
theory of causality to attack metaphysical orthodoxy in crucial 
institutionalised areas of discourse. It is significant that Hume did 
not specify the exact nature of the metaphysics he wished to destroy. 
Where he cited authors, they were Aristotle, Malebranche and Locke. 
From the diversity of this admittedly brief list, it is likely that 
Hume did not even have a particular school of thought directly in view, 
much less an individual writer. Instead, Hume attacked the grounds of 
inference by which metaphysicians connected events together. He 
undermined their sense of necessary connection between the succession 
of events in the natural world. But he also applied this to the 
necessary connections asserted between natural events and divine 
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events. 
To balance what has just been said, it is important to emphasise that 
Hume did not necessarily deny the existence of connections of either 
sort. What he attacked were misconceptions about the nature of 
causal inference which lead to false assessments of the certainty 
of human knowledge. Hume held what present-day philosophers now 
describe as a regularity theory of causality which operated in 
conjunction with a theory of belief that was itself causal. The 
technical details of this do not require elaborate discussion here. 
154 
The significant point is that alongside his professed causal 
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nescience and emphasis on perceived regularities, Hume repeatedly 
made reference to a philosophy of nature which had important 
connotations and resonances for his contemporaries. Hume supplemented 
his account of regular customary causes with continual references to 
the "powers", "forces" and "principles" of nature which were variously 
described as "natural", "hidden" or "secret". 
155 These intrinsically 
unknowable powers and principles were ultimately responsible for all 
human belief based upon the customary constant conjunction of causes 
and effects: 
Here then, is a kind of pre-established harmony between 
the course of nature and the succession of our ideas; 
and though the powers and forces, by which the former is 
governed, be wholly unknown to us; yet our thoughts 
and conceptions have still, we find gone on in the same 
train with the other works of nature. 156 
Hume referred to the capacity by which the associations of ideas produced 
beliefs that actually corresponded to events in nature as "a species 
of natural instinct". 
157 How it operated was wholly beyond the capacity 
of human reasoning, thought and understanding. 
It is difficult unproblematically to assess the image of natural order 
hinted at in Hume's Enquiry. However one thing is clear: it was not 
the kind of voluntarism endorsed by John Stewart. Hume in fact made 
several references to occasionalism in Enquiry 7, all of them highly 
critical. He attacked the theism of occasionalism, in which all 
activity in nature was attributed to divine intervention of one sort 
or another. Hume actually wrote in a manner which suggested this 
viewpoint had been gaining ground. In a footnote he asked, "By what 
means has it become so prevalent among our modern metaphysicians7"158 
Hume located the origin of occasionalism in Cartesian philosophy, but 
he stated that it had no previous authority in England. Rather, Locke, 
Clarke and Cudworth had always insisted that matter had a "real, though 
subordinate and derived power". By also citing Newton's use of "an 
etherial active fluid" to explain gravity159 Hume revealed his 
familiarity with debates about the powers of matter. Unfortunately, 
he did not expand upon the upsurge in occasionalism which seemed to be 
occurring in the 1750s. 
Interpreting the significance of Hume's footnote about occasionalism 
is beset with difficulties. It could be read as evidence for Hume's 
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support of Stewart's limited voluntarism. Or on the other hand, it 
might appear that Hume was sympathetic to active etherial fluids, an 
interpretation favoured by Christie. 160 Neither of these alternatives 
is entirely convincing. This is because Hume's metaphysics did not 
directly raise the problems of the nature of matter and spirit, the 
ontological staple of Scottish scientific metaphysics as a whole. 
Instead Hume's epistemology placed severe strictures on this form of 
discourse. He explicitly denied the cogency of accounts which 
emphasised different kinds of causes in nature based upon the 
existence of different kinds of ontological substances such as matter 
and spirit. In their place he put a causal monism founded on the 
mind's constant conjunction of perceived customary successions of 
events. Thereby, Hume gave the debate over the powers of nature, 
mental and physical, a further epistemological twist which further 
interiorised the whole problem of natural knowledge for his contempor- 
aries and successors. 
Hume developed a sophisticated-form of anti-occasionalism or 
necessitarianism, in which the order of nature could only be known as 
an order in the succession of ideas and impressions in men's minds. 
By definition, occasional events could not be known. At the same 
time, all causes were themselves necessary connections. Hume expressed 
the positive aspect of his philosophy in Enquiry 8. It was also the 
nearest he came to discussing the nature of matter. Hume argued that 
the meaning of necessity lay in the way the idea was actually applied 
to the behaviour of bodies: 
Our idea, therefore, of necessity and causation arises 
entirely from the. uniformity observable in the operations 
of nature where similar objects are constantly conjoined 
together, and the mind is determined by custom to infer 
the one from the appearance of the other. These two 
circumstances form the whole of that necessity which we 
ascribe to matter. )6 
For Hume, necessity was something men granted matter based upon the 
constant conjunction of similar objects and the inference from one to 
another. But the necessity itself was actually in men's minds. This 
is why Hume moved so readily between ideas and objects in his 
definitions of cause and the same sort of thing can be found in his 
discussions of matter. Thus 
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It is universally allowed that, matter, in all its 
operations, is actuated by a necessary force, and that 
every natural effect is so precisely determined by the 
energy of its cause that no other effect, in such 
particular circumstances, could possibly have resulted 
from it. 162 
Taken at face value, this statement was a direct contradiction of 
other views held by Hume. Matter possessed a necessary force; yet 
Hume denied power. Every natural event was determined by the energy 
of the cause; yet causes had no "energy". No other effect could have 
resulted; yet anything might follow from anything else. 
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Many other statements found elsewhere in the Enquiry and in the earlier 
Treatise are subject to a similar dilemma associated with Hume's 
Janus-faced approach to scepticism and naturalism. However, the 
resultant interpretive problems are more apparent in the Enquiry. This 
is because Hume compressed or even omitted sections from the Treatise 
which might have helped to clarify hisposition. Apart from the material 
on ideas and impressions, probability and the external world which all 
received less treatment, Hume's most significant and puzzling omission U)US0, T101 
in 4av% %6"NG e"Rules by which to judge causes and effects". 
164 In 
the Treatise, Hume made it much more apparent that he regarded his 
rules as a philosophical species of probability. However, he held 
that they were the best available means of correcting human judgement, 
which was continually subject to the detrimental effects of superstition, 
natural and supernatural, all acting on the imagination of man. 
'65 
Thus the analogical rules of causal reasoning were a pragmatic, if 
fallible means of connecting evidence and belief, through which the 
inevitable antinomies of human reasoning could be, to some extent, 
ordered and controlled. 
Despite widespread hostility to his philosophy, Hume's Scottish 
contemporaries all accepted the importance of the issues that 
Humeian metaphysics addressed. These can be expressed by two connected 
questions which had enduring significance for members of the Scottish 
scientific metaphysics community: They were: "where does the power of 
nature lie? "and "how is the order of nature to be discovered and known 
in men's minds? ". Hume's contribution was to reformulate the meanings 
of key terms routinely used in the vocabulary of scientific meta- 
physics such as "cause", "power", "necessary connection", "law". 
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"rule" etc. In so doing, he transposed the debate from the analysis of 
the causes and powers of nature, and the rules and laws they obeyed, into 
a parallel one about the causes and powers of men's mind and the rules 
and laws it obeyed. Suggesting some of the grounds for divergent 
readings of Hume's philosophy provides a way of understanding rather 
than dismissing the variety of responses to him made by Scottish 
scientific metaphysicians. 
Hume's epistemological sophistication and lack of ontological 
commitments posed problems of interpretation for his contemporaries. 
Hume's Scottish commentators and assessors had to 'make out' Hume. 
For example, Hume could be re-processed as an occasionalist because he 
had denied the existence of necessary connections between causes and 
effects. This approach can be found in Dugald Stewart. 
166 Or, his 
conclusions about causation could be regarded as appropriate for 
physical events but not human activity. As we have seen, this was 
Gregory's and Reid's position. Alternatively, continuities could be 
found between Hume's radical epistemology of causation and its use by 
materialists later in the century such as Priestley. Precisely 
this sort of a connection was perceived to exist between Hume's 
philosophy and Kames's necessitarian materialism in the 1750s. 
Whatever the strategies of appropriation to be found in this period, 
one thing is abundantly clear: Hume's philosophy was itself an 
effective strategy for the epistemological interiorisation of nature 
which had either to be endorsed or confronted. 
167 At the same time, 
the relationship between Hume's philosophy and Scottish scientific 
metaphysics as a whole was a 'Janus-faced' one. Hume was both a 
participant in Scottish scientific metaphysical discourse and its 
principal subversive element. 
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5. CONCLUSION 
In the preceding sections, Gregory's criticisms of Hume and Reid have 
been extensively documented and discussed. Some indications of Reid's 
and Hume's views upon the nature and importance of causality have also 
been given. Now is remains to assess the general significance of 
Gregory's attempt to drive a wedge between what he perceived as their 
voluntarism and necessitarianism. It is important first to note the 
apparent similarity that exists between Reid, Hume and Gregory about men's 
knowledge of causality. All three were emphatic in the denial of men's 
perception of necessary corrections in nature. Similarly, they 
endorsed the appropriateness of constant conjunction as a description 
of how men actually perceived the connection between physical causes and 
effects. 
It is equally necessary to note that this apparent similarity between 
Reid, Gregory and Hume masks a more fundamental disagreement over 
deployment of necessary connection and constant conjunction as limiting 
conditions of men's perception of change in nature. This concerns what 
might be called the 'directionality of nescience'. It is most evident 
in the contrast between Hume and Reid. Hume's denial of necessary 
connections was a means of re-establishing man's central role as the 
productive and necessary architect of his own experience. But Reid's 
apparently similar denial pointed in a quite different and opposite 
direction. For Reid, the protestation of nescience was a means of 
establishing God's central role as the productive and free architect 
of men's experience. Thus Hume reintroduced a necessary connection 
into constant conjunctions in the form of a customary transition of 
the imagination from causes to effects and vice versa. This was why 
in Hume's view, a cause was always necessary. Reid reintroduced 
necessary connection in the sense of the deity acting as an efficient 
principle producing the order of nature according to his laws, which 
men only perceived as constantly conjoined causes and effects. The 
obvious question is: where does Gregory fit in here? 
In Gregory's case, the attempt to drive a wedge between Reid's 
voluntarism and Hume's necessitarianism resulted in the directionality 
of nescience disappearing altogether. Denying necessary connections 
between physical events was not a means of reintroducing it under the 
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aegis of man's or God's efficiency. Rather, it wasýa consequence of 
Gregory's attempt to eliminate the idea of production from physical 
causation altogether. For Gregory, the question of how a complex 
cause produced its effect was pragmatically answered by an enumeration 
of the simple parts involved. But in the case of simple causes or 
relations of event, the further question of production was "nugatory 
and absurd". This applied to both senses of efficiency emphasised by 
Hume and Reid. 
Differences between Reid, Hume and Gregory over the deployment of 
constant conjunction and necessary correction were not just confined 
to physical causation. There were also disagreements over how these 
concepts should be used to convey and circumscribe the conditons and 
constraints of men's knowledge of mental events. For Hume, power 
was itself a synonym for necessary connection and on a par with 
other words such as "force", "energy" or "productive quality". 
Therefore to know power, Hume claimed men had to know the means of 
either, how thoughts were connected together; or how the mind 
controlled the body. These were necessary preconditions if power 
was to be foreknown independently of experience. In this sense, 
Hume made no distinction between knowledge of physical and mental 
phenomena. As we have seen, Reid also denied that men knew the 
productive quality of mind called power as a necessary connection. 
But he maintained men nevertheless knew power, through the internal 
experience of willing gained in childhood. Historically, this 
experience of willing had become sedimented in the roots of language 
through active verbs. Thus Reid certainly did not accept Hume's 
criterion that to know power either speculative or active, one had 
to know the means by which such power produced its necessary effect. 
For Reid, power meant something that was intrinsically optional; it 
could not be foreknown in advance. Because of the close analogy 
between human and divine power, Reid was prepared to see men's 
experience of willing eroded to the extent that other agents might 
be the real productive means of change when men exerted their power. 
This was because Reid held that men's knowledge of power was under- 
written by his second metaphysical principle of necessary truth "That 
whatever begins to exist must have a cause which produced it". 
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When we turn to Gregory, we find that he certainly considered men 
knew power without needing to enumerate all the means by which power 
produced its effect. Also power was intrinsically optional. But 
what also occurs in the Project is an attempt to put men's knowledge 
of power upon a new footing, by appealing to the demonstrative 
evidence of language usage, rather than upon the perhaps questionable 
introspective experience of willing. He was not explicit about whether 
power implied a means of production men actually possessed. Gregory 
certainly never sought to justify men's knowledge of power on the 
basis-of their direct experience of it. Instead, he substituted 
analyses of the relations of activity and motive and action in which 
power was always implicated, but never analysed directly. In both 
these cases, Gregory placed correspondingly more emphasis upon 
relations than productions. The final consideration is that 
Gregory continually strove to segregate the idea of power from the 
common notion of cause and effect in physics, in which production 
had no part. Hence Gregory's reluctance to equate constant 
conjunction between physical causes and effects and laws of nature 
as Reid had done. 
By looking at the fine detail of negotiations about concepts such as 
"efficient cause", "physical cause", "necessary connection", 
"constant conjunction", "law of nature", "power", etc, one cannot 
fail to take account of the remarkable latitude and diversity of 
their application and use in Hume, Reid and Gregory. This makes 
any generalisations about their deployment in particular instances 
very difficult. However, one way of approaching this difficulty is 
to see that in Reid and Hume, the overall use of these concepts 
served to maintain their respective voluntarist and necessitarian 
orientations. In other words, conceptual deployment was goal 
directed in order to maintain systematic and different images of 
natural order. In particular, the philosophical metaphors of 
necessary connection and constant conjunction can then be understood 
in relation to the search for the epistemological interiorisation of 
nature. They functioned in Scottish scientific metaphysics as 
expressions of the conditions under which men perceived relations 
between objects or events. Thus the denial of necessary connection 
in physics was an expression of men's nescience about the physical 
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world. The protestation of nescience confined the manner in which 
men could know how things occurred in nature. Knowing how things 
occurred implied knowing causes. To deny necessary connections in 
nature meant that men could not know the manner in which physical 
causes produced their effects. All they knew was*that causes 
seemed constantly conjoined with their respective effects. 
Alongside the professions found in Reid, Hume and Gregory were a 
series of counterclaims about men's certain knowledge of the 
probable. This is evident in the different ways each writer sought 
to transpose men's knowledge of the succession of events away from 
perceived constant conjunctions and towards various kinds of necessary 
connection. Reid's fundamental distinction between mind-based 
efficient causes and body-based constant conjunctions upheld his 
voluntarism and was an expression of common sense dualism. This 
was ultimately underwritten by the view that men's beliefs were 
guaranteed by the deity, who was responsible for men's constitutional 
dispositions, including power itself, and the propensity to believe 
that men's perceptions corresponded to a real state of affairs in 
nature. In Hume we find the profession of a different kind of 
certainty, based upon men's propensity to make causal inferences 
about nature. Gregory on the other hand, rejected both a voluntarist 
justification of men's knowledge of cause and effect in physics 
based on introspection and the broader claims of necessitarianism. 
He therefore sought to erect new criteria for demonstrating the 
probable, such as the evidence of linguistic usage. But, as we 
shall see in chapter six, Gregory's search for the certainty of 
demonstration was not confined to the evidence of language alone. 
In the Essay, Gregory eliminated men's sense of necessary connec- 
tions from nature, in order to reintroduce it as the awareness of 
a logically valid inference from axiomatic propositions. 
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In previous chapters, the principal features of Gregory's 
metaphysics of physical causation have been analysed and discussed. 
This culminated in Gregory's critique of Reid and Hume, which was 
described in chapter four. In the writings of all three, substantial 
linguistic agreement can be found concerning the nature of physical 
causation. Each endorsed the philosophical metaphor of constant 
conjunction as an appropriate characterisation of men's perception 
of change in the physical world. Also, Gregory, Reid and Hume 
considered that the discipline of natural philosophy should never 
concern itself with power or the efficient causes of phenomena. 
Yet this apparent agreement also masked more substantial disagreements 
about the actual meaning, deployment and significance of concepts 
such as "physical cquse", "efficient cause", "power", "law of nature" 
and "necessary connection". It has been suggested that for Reid and 
Hume, the meaning of such terms was determined by the way they were 
used to sustain voluntarist and necessitarian images of natural 
order which permeated Scottish scientific metaphysics. Gregory was 
intensely critical of these broader, systematic connotations he 
perceived in Reid and Hume. He accused each man of advocating. 
particular kinds of causal monism, by means of which they 
articulated and justified their voluntarism and necessitarianism. 
In Reid's case It was a hegemony of efficient productive causes which 
were regarded as the only real causes in nature. In Humes, it 
was constantly conjoined antecedents and consequents applied 
ubiquitously to all phenomena, rather than a unilateral restriction 
to physical events. 
Gregory's disagreements with both men on this issue emerged most 
clearly over what I have called the 'directionality of nescience'. 
Reid and Hume denied men's perception of necessary connections in 
nature with specific goals in mind. Reid's voluntarism emphasised 
man's nescience in order to reintroduce the deity as the sole 
productive cause, thus binding God, the mind of man and nature into 
a hierarchical relationship. In Hume's 'new-modelled' necessitarianism 
this hierarchy was displaced. Men were determined by a customary 
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transition of the imagination to infer future events upon the 
basis of past regularities. This placed man's mind at the apex of 
the hierarchy, followed by the order of nature perceived in men's 
minds. But it left God in an ambiguous position, perhaps only to 
be inferred from the questionable evidences of mind and nature. 
Gregory considered that Reid's and Hume's commitment to particular 
systems of thought distorted the utility metaphysics had in 
specifying the object of study suitable for natural philosophy. 
Therefore he sought a reappraisal of the key concept of physical 
cause outside the confines of either voluntarism of necessitarianism. 
In this sense, Gregory's metaphysics of physical causation was an 
act of demarcation and confinement appropriate to the emergence of 
natural philosophy as an independent discipline. 
Before the analysis of Gregory's work can be developed any further, 
there is an immediate problem: Gregory was not a natural philosopher, 
nor did he ever write in any detail about the theory of mechanics. 
Therefore, his concern to reform physics on the basis of the nature 
and limits of the human understanding found no expression outside 
the immediate concerns of the Project itself. However, prior to, 
and during the time Gregory wrote the Project, he was Professor of 
the Theory of Medicine at Edinburgh. His views on the current 
state of physiology and therapeutics were set down in the 
Conspectus and delivered in his Lectures. 
' The general purpose of 
this chapter is to explore some features of Gregory's concern with 
causality within the realm of physiological and medical knowledge. 
In particular, it will be shown that his aim to develop an adequate 
account of physiological causation was a central aspect of 
Gregory's opposition to the use of voluntarist and necessitarian 
images of natural order within the theory of medicine. 
As this is a potentially vast subject, some limits are imposed on 
the scope of this chapter. Firstly, no attempt is made to consider 
aspects of the practice of medicine. Gregory never published upon 
this subject. Surviving copies of his lectures on the practice 
of medicine indicate that he presented his own opinions as a kind 
of running commentary on Cullen's textbook, First lines of the 
practice of physic. 
2 
Hence, we only have very imperfect accounts 
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of his position. Similarly, reconstruction of how Gregory 
actually treated individual patients is beyond the scope of this 
thesis. Therefore all discussion is restricted to the Conspectus 
and, where relevant, to the Lectures. Secondly, the physiological 
and therapeutic issues within the theory of medicine which are 
dealt with here concern the nervous system only. Topics considered 
in subsequent sections include Gregory's general account of the 
nervous system; his views on the nature of muscular motion; and 
finally, his statements about sympathy and the action of stimulant 
and sedative remedies. Thirdly, these subjects are discussed in 
comparison with the alternative views of Robert Whytt and William 
Cullen. This is in order to bring out the salient features of what 
I refer to as Gregory's 'common sense nescient physiology' within 
the local context of later Scottish scientific metaphysics. 
Whytt, Cullen and Gregory succeeded one another as Professor of the 
Theory of Medicine during the emergence of the Edinburgh Medical 
School as one of the foremost centres of medical learning in 
Europe during the later 18th century. 
3 Against this background 
of institutional change and the emergence of Edinburgh as a fully 
independent site of medical learning, intellectual changes also 
occurred. During the period, Scottish medicine showed a pervasive 
and distinctive concern with the nature of nervous sensibility and 
the related idea of sympathy. This has been well noted by Lawrence. 
4 
However, the increased interest in the properties of the nervous 
system was also part of a much broader intellectual change within 
British and Continental physiology as a whole. This was from 
earlier forms of mechanism, in the late 17th and early 18th century, 
to forms of vitalism which displaced them. 
5 As a result of both 
the circulation of doctors and students between England, Scotland 
and the Continent, especially Holland, and the wider frame of 
reference of medical knowledge generally, the emphasis upon an 
exclusively local Scottish focus here may require amendation. 
6 
Nevertheless, in keeping with Edinburgh's emerging institutional 
independence, medical discourse also began to show a parallel 
autonomy. This is less so in Whytt's case but it is more apparent 
in Cullen and Gregory. Thus, whereas we find Whytt presenting his 
account of nervous action within a more international frame of 
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reference, this is less noticeable in Cullen. Indeed, his relative 
independence from Boerhaavian doctrines is said to have caused 
concern in case it was detrimental to the developing popularity and 
esteem of the Edinburgh Medical School. 7 Finally, when we come 
to Gregory, he seems to have put forward his views largely in 
relation to Cullen's opinions. Therefore, as Gregory is the 
principal actor in the thesis, a tight local focus is more 
appropriate than it might at first seem. 
The self-referring nature bf later 18th century developments in 
Scottish physiology and medicine also applies to the precise form 
that discourse about the nervous system actually took. Once again, 
an examination of the form of physiological and medical discourse in 
Britain as a whole indicates it was informed by a common context of 
disciplines which embraced the philosophy of mind, natural 
philosophy and natural theology. 8 This common content is reflected 
in the use of vocabularies of mind and matter, motion and 
causality to conceptualise processes in the body which were also 
found in accounts of mechanics and in the philosophy of perception. 
Crucially, the deployment of key concepts such as physical or 
proximate causes of physiological change, nervous po_ower. and laws of 
the animal economy gave rise to problems of natural theological 
propriety similar to those already discussed in mechanics. In the 
pre-1750 period, Baxter's Inquiry into the nature of the human soul 
is a concrete example of how these subjects were perceived to be 
interrelated. 9 However, when we turn to Cullen, it is evident 
that his preferred metaphysical resources for articulating men's 
knowledge of the nervous system can be related to local developments 
which occurred in the Scottish scientific metaphysics community 
around the 1750s. 
In the sections to follow, it is shown that Cullen developed his 
sceptical physiology using a conceptual framework derived from 
sensationalist epistemology generally but also one refined by Hume, 
especially in the central area of the language of causality. The 
situation with Whytt is less clear. But it will be argued that he 
articulated his preferred account of the nervous system using a form 
of voluntarism similar to the kind put to work by John Stewart 
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in the debate with Kames. Finally in Gregory's case, the particular 
philosophical apparatus he uses to account for the nervous system 
can be directly related to what he perceived as necessitarian images 
of natural order popularised by Hume, and used by Cullen. Furthermore, 
his manner of combatting necessitarian claims about men's knowledge of 
the nervous system has clear affinities with Reid's views. They can 
also be found set to work for similar ends in the writings of 
Dugald Stewart, another second-generation ally of common sense 
philosophy. 
In the following sections, Whytt's, Cullen's and Gregory's accounts of 
various aspects of the nervous system are viewed in relation to the 
general theme of the search for the epistemological interiorisation of 
nature. In this case, it is reflected in each man's articulation of 
the conditions which underlay men's knowledge of events in the nervous 
system. The order of presentation is as follows. In the first part 
of the chapter, I show that their respective accounts of the nervous 
system were articulated by means of preferred metaphysical views of 
the nature of mind, matter and the causal relationship between them. 
Thus Whytt's views were founded upon a traditional philosophy of 
mind which attributed all processes in the nervous system to a 
sentient self moving principle or soul. In conjunction with his 
reliance upon conceptual resources provided by sensationalist 
epistemology, Cullen also utilised a mechanism for the transmission 
of sensation based upon a subtile etherial fluid within the nerves. 
Finally, Gregory expressed a common sense account of the nervous 
system based upon a purely phenomenal description of the nature of 
internal and external sensation. 
These broader metaphysical positions informed each writer's 
specific approach to the causation of events within the nervous 
system. For Whytt, all motion produced in the nervous system was 
the result of the sentient principle acting throughout the nervous 
system as a necessarily self-moving efficient cause. Cullen's 
account was founded upon a theory of causation which emphasised the 
constant conjunction of uniform antecedents and consequents in 
nervous processes. Finally, Gregory's professed nescience about the 
nature and operation of the nervous system was based upon an 
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assumption about the distinctiveness of animate causation, which 
placed severe limits upon the search for causal regularities in 
nervous processes at the interface between mind and matter. 
Of their general orientations to the nervous system, Whytt is 
referred to as a sentient physiologist, Cullen as a sceptical 
physiologist and Gregory as a nescient or common sense physiologist. 
It is argued that despite the use of very different metaphysical 
technologies for securing the epistemological interiorisation of 
the nervous system, each writer could present his views as 
theologically acceptable. 
In section three, the comparison is developed further in order to 
clarify each writer's conception of nervous action in a specific 
problem area. This is the nature and mechanism of muscular 
movement. It is shown that Whytt's Cullen's and Gregory's 
disagreements over men's knowledge of this subject can be understood 
in relation to their differences over the concept of nervous power. 
For Whytt, nervous power was coterminous with the self-moving 
sentient principle; whereas for Cullen, it was referrable to the 
motion of an etherial nervous fluid. Gregory, on the other hand, 
rejected any account of nervous power in terms of motions, howsoever 
produced. 
In section four, it is suggested that different images of body order 
can be found in Whytt's and Cullen's physiological writings about 
the nervous system which resemble the voluntarist and necessitarian 
images of natural order identified previously in the Kames-Stewart 
debate. It is argued that while Gregory's nescient physiology 
corresponded in some ways to Whytt's voluntarism, it cannot be 
fully accommodated to it. Gregory's opposition to the use of 
natural philosophical concepts of motion and causation in physiology 
made him censorious of both the self-moving sentient principle, and 
the motile nervous fluid accounts of nervous action found in Whytt 
and Cullen. This viewpoint is supported with reference to their 
different conceptions of and attitudes to nervous sympathy and 
the operation of stimulant and sedative remedies. 
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2. THREE PERSPECTIVES ON THE NERVOUS SYSTEM 
2.1 The sentient physiology of Robert Whytt 
The greater part of Whytt's writings dealt with the nature of nervous 
action and related problems. 
10 He considered that the nervous system 
as a whole, including muscle fibres, was animated by an active 
"sentient principle", mind or soul. Although the sentient principle 
was united to the material part of the nervous system, Whytt continually 
emphasised that it was wholly distinct from matter. He specified its 
characteristics in relation to existing traditions of medical thought. 
He was critical both of mechanically inclined physicians and of Stahl, 
whom he considered to have over-emphasised the hegemony of the soul as 
a rational agent controlling bodily processes. 
" 
Against the 
mechanists, he argued that the behaviour of muscle during contraction 
did not correspond to any known laws of matter, and could not be 
accounted for in wholly physical terms. Against Stahl, Whytt maintained 
that his conception of the sentient principle was not to be associated 
withithe Stahlian rational soul. It did not regulate vital motions 
according to any process of ratiocination; nor was it conscious. 
In his attempt to clarify the nature and status of nervous power, 
Whytt referred to the existing distinction between "anima" and "animus" 
which paralleled his own between sentient and rational principles of the 
mind. However, he considered it probable that both were only the same 
principle acting in different capacities. 
12 
The essential difference 
lay in Whytt's characterisation of the involuntary response to stimuli. 
In this case, the sentient principle was 
determined by an ungrateful sensation of stimulus affecting 
the organs to exert its power in bringing about these motions 
as in a cale which by mechanical laws turns with the greatest 
weight. 
Thus, for Whytt the sentient principle, although immaterial, acted 
necessarily when responding to a stimulus and contracting involuntary 
muscle in bodily movements. 
In considering objections to his notion of a sentient principle, Whytt 
discussed his underlying conception of causation in greater detail. 
Whytt stated that if the critic persisted in questioning whether the 
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sentient principle was-an aspect of mind, then the question became: - 
'what else could it be? ' Although Whytt believed involuntary responses 
were necessarily determined by stimuli, he did not think that the 
cause of motions in the body could be attributed to laws. In fact it 
was 
vain to attribute them to any law which it may be pretended 
the Deity has established, since a law can produce no effect 
of itself and without some agent to execute, it is only a mere 
name or empty sound. 14 
Because sentient and active substances alone could be causes, only 
three alternatives were possible. Either motions were-produced by 
the immediate agency of the supreme being. Or by "some general 
inferior nature which he [had constituted for this purpose". Or 
finally, "to the energy of a particular active principle united with 
the body". Although Whytt conceded that the first two alternatives 
were possible, he believed the third was probable. He therefore 
stated that the immediate cause of motions produced by the nervous 
system was "that sentient and intelligent principle with which the 
Creator has animated our bodies". 
15 
Whytt believed that his notion of "the extensive influence of some- 
thing in the bodies of animals" wholly distinct from the nature of 
matter was more suitable to explain muscular motion than one founded 
upon some modification of matter. This was because the involuntary 
movements of the body displayed features which were inexplicable on 
the basis of the inertness of matter. 
16 Whytt concluded that in 
order to effect muscular movement, the sentient principle must be 
distributed throughout the nervous system. He was aware these 
views might have implications for the extension and divisibility of 
the soul. Yet, in the face of a possible accusation of unorthodoxy, 
he emphasised that 
whoever considers the structure and appearances of the 
animal frame, will soon be convinced that the soul is 
not confined to an invisible point but must be present 
at one and the same time if not in all parts of the body 
where nerves are found, yet, at least at their origin, 
i. e. it must be, at least, diffused along a great part of 
the brain and spinal marrow. 
He added that upon these grounds, some writers had thought the soul 
was extended. He cited More, Newton, and Clarke as examples. 
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In support of his position, Whytt emphasised that the issue rested 
upon a complete ignorance of body-soul interaction. However he 
added the following analogy: 
As the Deity is every where present and, in the infinitely 
distant parts of space, actuates at the same time a vast 
variety of different systems, without any inconsistency 
with his unity or indivisibility; so may not the souls of 
animals be present everywhere in the bodies, actuating and 
enlivening, at the same time, all their different members? 
18 
To summarise, Whytt stipulated that in order to explain the manifold 
involuntary motions which proceed from a stimulus, it was necessary to 
acknowledge that the consequent muscular-contractions indicated 
properties of sensibility or feeling. As these were inconsistent with 
the known properties of matter, then they must be caused by some other 
principle. Also, as this feeling was distributed throughout the 
nervous system, then so was the animate intelligent sentient principle 
which caused it. Any further difficulties concerning the soul's 
extension and divisibility were due to ignorance over the precise 
manner of the soul's existence and its principle of union with the 
body. Whytt regarded his position as a theory of nervous action 
and considered it would guide the practice of explaining and curing 
nervous diseases. 
19 
In the conclusion of his Essay, Whytt explicitly connected his 
physiology of the nervous system to theological considerations underlying 
the study of nature. Commending his own essay, Whytt stated it was 
evident- "how unjustly the study of physic 
[had been accused of 
leading men into scepticism and irreligion". However 
"If the human frame is considered as a mere corporeal 
system which derives all its power and energy from matter 
and motion; it may perhaps, be concluded, that the immense 
universe itself is destitute of any higher principle: but 
if as we have endeavoured to show, the motions and actions 
of our small and inconsiderable bodies, are all to be 
referred to the agency of an immaterial principle; how 
much more necessary must it be to acknowledge, as the 
author, sustainer and sovereign ruler of the universal 
system, an incorporeal Nature everywhere ... The true 
physiology, therefore, of the human body, not only serves 
to confute these philosophers who rejecting the existence 
of immaterial beings, ascribe all the phenomena and 
operations in nature to the powers of matter and, motion; 
but at last, like all other sound philosophy leads us up 
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to the first cause and-Supreme Author of all, who is ever to 
be adored with the most profound reverence by the rational 
part of his creation. 20 
For Whytt, "sound philosophy" and the "true physiology" reinforced one 
another. The correct study of nervous processes within the body 
also promoted recognition of God's ultimate superintendence of nature. 
Whytt's sentient physiology and its natural theological role were 
bound together as a dual enterprise by a theory of causation in which 
mind alone had causal efficiency. 
2.2 The sceptical physiology of William Cullen 
Cullen described the nervous system as "the organ of sense and 
motion". 
21 He classified it into four constituent parts. These 
were the brain, by which Cullen understood the medullary substance 
of the cranium and vertebral cavity; its continuation in the form 
of the nerves; the sentient extremities of those nerves fitted for 
the impulse of external bodies; and finally, the "moving or muscular 
fibres" of the body. Cullen stipulated that all the parts of the 
nervous system were fibrous in nature and continuations of the same 
medullary substance. He referred to it collectively as the "living 
solid" which displayed the property of facilitating motions propagated 
from any one part to every other part of the nervous system. Somewhat 
confusingly, Cullen regarded the condition of the nervous system which 
facilitated such motion as the "nervous fluid". Therefore the most 
significant part of the living solid was in effect the nervous fluid. 
22 
Cullen noted that, while almost all physicians believed nervous action 
took place by means of propagated motions within the nerves, men 
differed over precisely how this happened. In his usage of the 
nervous fluid, Cullen claimed not to pre-judge anything about its 
source, nature and manner of acting. The term merely conveyed 
"nothing more than there Lwas a condition of the nerves which fit Eted] 
23 
them for the communication of motion". 
A similar profession of nominalism occurs in Cullen's discussion of 
the relationship between the mind and the nervous system. He 
stipulated that the mutual interconnection and communication between 
mind and brain was simply a fact to be taken for granted, not to be 
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understood or explained. Cullen clarified his views in relation to 
existing traditions of physiological thought. Like Whytt, Cullen 
aimed to define a middle position distinct from both materialists and 
Stahlians. However, he populated it with Boerhaave, Haller and Whytt 
himself. After quoting from these men, Cullen summarised what he 
considered to be their collective position. Each endorsed the self- 
evident distinction between mind and body. However, they also 
emphasised that in the living state, the mutual influence of mind and 
body was characterised by "a physical necessity". Cullen's strongest 
criticisms were also reserved for Stahlians, precisely because their 
conception of an acting rational soul was not determined by a physical 
necessity. Cullen stated that although the Stahlian spoke of causes, 
these must always be physical and not arbitrary. Because 
if we do not suppose that the causes acting upon the 
human body produce their effects from a physical 
necessity, we can neither judge of the effects of the 
causes of disease, nor of the operation of remedies. 
24 
The direct consequence of Cullen's search for the physical causes of 
the nervous system was that after conceding immaterial mind operated 
as a first cause which inaugurated all thought and motion, he then 
ejected it from the concerns of physiology. As a result, Cullen 
acknowledged that his mode of expression 
will seem to be the same with the language of the 
materialists but a very little explanation. will always 
show the difference. I, in using their language, 
will seem to talk as a materialist; and very unhappily 
some persons have understood me so. I have however 
particularly guarded against this. 
25 
The language Cullen used derived from the sensationalist epistemology 
of Locke and Hume. Cullen regarded sensation cif a perception of' 
thought, which immediately arose in the mind as a direct result of the 
motion produced by the impulse of external bodies upon the sentient 
extremities. He distinguished sensations from ideas, which were 
recollected sensations or perceptions, adding that "it was Mr Hume who 
first thought of distinguishing between the first perception arising, 
and that depending on recollection or memory". 
26 
Thus Cullen retained 
Hume's use of "idea", but he considered the term "sensation" more 
suitable than "impression". Further echoes of Hume's terminology 
appear in Cullen's subdivision of sensation into "sensations of 
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of impression" and`"sensations-of'consciousness". The former arose from 
the action of external bodies, the latter from the mind's consciousness 
of its own action and of the motions it excited. Thröughout Cullen's 
physiology, "impression" served as a general descriptive term for all 
the various modes of giving or exciting motion. 
This emphasis upon motion and contact action is very evident in 
Cullen's discussion of sensations of impression. He gave the sense of 
a touch paramount importance and accommodated it to the receptiveness 
displayed by the nervous system as a whole to certain impressions. 
Therefore touch became a virtual synonym for feeling itself. Cullen 
stated that other "genera" of sensations of impression, sight, bearing, 
smell and taste were "also the organs of touch because in the stricter 
view, they are organs fit for receiving mechanical action". 
27 
Even 
when he discussed "sensations of consciousness", the emphasis was 
always upon motions, in this case produced by internal circumstances 
of the body.. 
28 
Cullen's physiology endorsed a model of nervous action which 
emphasised the role of impressions, impulses and motions produced in 
the sentient extremities and perceived in the brain. Thereupon, 
the will inaugurated a responsive motion which was propagated along 
the nerves to produce muscle contraction. Within this framework, 
he put forward his general and theoretical account of the nature of 
sensation in a manner I described here as 'physiological scepticism'. 
Cullen maintained there were no necessary connections; between objects 
and the sensations they produced. This absence of any connection 
between primary and secondary qualities certainly applied to sight, 
hearing, smell and taste. But even in the case of touch itself - 
which seemed intimately connected to the idea of extension - Cullen 
emphasised "we must not be very rash in concluding from sensations as 
to the nature of the actions occasioning them". Cullen used the 
example of a fallacious sensation of weight felt in a limb which 
actually proceeded from a particular condition of the nervous system. 
Thus "a sense of resistance to the motion of the nervous power in the 
crural nerve" could be the real cause of such feelings, rather than 
an external object. 
29 
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Cullen's use of this and"'several'other examples, indicates the most 
significant aspect of his physiological scepticism: it was mitigated 
rather than absolute. The absence of a necessary connection between 
objects and their representative sensations and ideas opened the 
possibility of the uncertainty of men's conception of the world. 
But Cullen always emphasised that there was a pathological causal 
explanation of misleading sensations. This mitigation is very 
evident in several of his proposed "laws or general circumstances 
of sensation". It was evident to Cullen that many sensations were, 
disproportionate to the force of impression which occasioned them. 
Also, the same stimulus could produce different sensations in 
different people, or even variations in the same person at different 
times. How were such circumstances to be explained? Cullen 
considered these features of sensation were in principle always 
referable to the state of the nervous system. Therefore he proposed 
a list of physiological conditions which affected sensibility. ' Among 
the general causes were: the original state of the medullary 
substance; its contingent states such as susceptibility to heat, 
tension, the state of the brain and nerves; and also the state of 
attention of the mind itself. 
30 
Other laws of sensation dealt with sensations of consciousness. Here 
the debt to sensationalist epistemology is even more apparent. 
Cullen considered that sensations were severally combined as "complex 
ideas", the comparison of which produced new "sensations of relation". 
In cases where a perception was renewed independently of the occasioning 
object, and when this was attended with the consciousness of a 
difference between the liveliness of the two perceptions, it was 
called an "idea". Where there was no consciousness of such a 
difference, this was due to the "imagination", while the faculty of 
renewal itself was "memory". The use of Locke's and Hume's account 
of these faculties is evident. However in Cullen's physiological 
account, such faculties were explicitly accommodated to the general 
model of motions excited in the mind. Indeed, he emphasised that 
both memory and imagination were dependent upon internal causes in 
the brain. 
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Cullen's final laws of sensation dealt with the agreeableness and 
disagreeableness of sensations and their different effects on the 
nervous system. In so doing, he stated a key principle which conveys 
his general approach to the relationship between sensation and the 
mind. He previously emphasised that "the soul perceive[d] in the 
brain only and not in the sentient extremities". 
31 
Here he added 
that "no sensations [arose] originally in the mind without a previous 
state of the body". 
32 Cullen's approach was neatly expressed in the 
aphorism "The force of impression is everywhere absolute". 
33 
Thus, 
while it was clear that there were numerous instances where the body 
moved the mind, "in no one case do we see that the mind moves the 
body". 
34 
The best illustration of these principles at work occurs in 
Cullen's discussion entitled: "Of the functions of the brain". 
In presenting his account of the brain, Cullen used the starting- 
point of Stahlian physiology to provide a contrast with his own 
position. 
35 
Previously, he had distinguished Whytt from Stahl. 
This was because Whytt considered the sentient principle was subject 
to a physical necessity and not the result of an arbitrary and 
contingently acting rational soul. However, Cullen subsequently 
noted that Stahlian and "some other physiologists" considered the 
soul was co-extensive with the nervous system as a whole. 
36 This was 
in fact Haller's criterion for regarding Whytt as a Stahlian. 
37 
It is probable that Cullen included Whytt in this group. Cullen 
conceded that without mind, the brain would not be able to perform 
its various functions. However, he also argued that to emphasise 
perception took place only in the brain was the necessary first 
step "towards destroying the Stahlfan system in its foundations". 
Also Cullen claimed to differ from other physicians "with regard 
to the extent of the powers of the mind, 
[and] with regard to its 
manner of action": - 
38 
The brain is not only the organ of the soul, but that, 
in every motion of the soul, some corporeal motion of 
the brain accompanies it ... and so far as a corporeal 
organ is employed, all the operations of thought, 
arising in consequence of sensation are operations of 
the brain and modified by'its various condition. I 
mean to say that the soul acts by means of he brain, 
and that it does not act without the brain. 
'9 
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Cullen stipulated that there was hardly any communication between 
different parts of the nervous system without the intervention of 
the brain. Therefore, as the control organ of the system, the 
brain was "fitted to propagate the motions arising in one part to 
the other parts of the nervous system". Hence the condition of 
the brain itself had a great effect upon the system as a whole. 
He identified two fundamental conditions of the brain, which 
determined the overall condition of the nervous system: a "state 
of excitement" and a "state of collapse". 
40 
Both of these referred 
to the degree of mobility of the nervous fluid. Cullen stated that 
an examination of the cases of waking and sleeping indicated that the 
nervous fluid was susceptible to different states of motion. 
For example, when the relative absence of sensation induced sleep, 
this could be accounted for in terms of a "slowing of the mobility 
of the nervous fluid, whereas, a certain degree of heat induced waking 
because of a quickening of it". In fact, Cullen took his views much 
further. He argued that, in so far as it was a corporeal phenomena, 
life depended upon the excitement of the nervous system and death 
represented the destruction of that excitement. From these remarks, 
it is clear that Cullen developed a cephalocentric conception of the 
living organism in which the nervous system and particularly the brain 
had paramount importance. 
In his account of excitement and collapse, Cullen emphasised he was 
using such language to express a matter of fact "without intending by 
these terms to express or determine anything with regard to the nature 
of the nervous fluid, or wherein its different states consist"* 
41 
Similarly, his discussions of the causes exciting the activity of the 
brain, and of the various connections between the brain and other 
organs of the body, emphasised that the particular facts of nervous 
communication should be. attended to: 
In all or any of these cases in which the action of the 
brain takes place, we cannot perceive the manner that is, 
the mechanical means, by which the several causes produce 
their effects; and we perceive only an institution of our 
Maker establishing a connex4ln between the several causes 
and the motions that ensue. 
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Cullen acknowledged no inconsistency between this viewpoint and his 
search for causal explanations-of the natural function and'pathology 
of the nervous system, based upon the operation of a nervous fluid. 
He regarded the search for material connections which explained nervous 
processes mechanically as wholly inappropriate, because the "modus 
operandi [was] entirely without our reach". As a result, Cullen's 
position amounted to a denial of the existence of necessary connections 
within the nervous system. Instead he utilised a theory of physical 
or "proximate" causation based upon the observed and uniform succession 
of antecedents and consequents. Cullen's clearest statement of his 
general position on causation was written with reference to his theory 
of fever, but it is equally germane to his account of the nervous 
system. In both cases, Cullen claimed to mean by 'theory' only the 
"chief facts and laws" with respect to the matter in question: 
for it is no more than saying that there are certain 
states of the body which are combined together in a 
certain order of succession and that from this constant 
combination they ar to be considered as a series of 
causes and effects. 
3 
In the Lectures introductory to the course on the practice of physic, 
Cullen enlarged upon his general view of causal processes in living 
bodies. The intimate connection of parts meant that 
every action is with regard to some other both a 
cause and an effect, and the whole turns, in this respect, 
as in a circle; so that there is no understanding on part 
without studying in some measure the whole. 
44 
However, Cullen added that the best approach to follow was one which 
"consider led] them as regularly as may be, according to the series of 
causes and effects". Cullen had no doubt that despite difficulties 
due to the interactive causation of bodily processes, all connections 
were "determined by a certain mechanism of the body [and governed by 
the laws of matter and the motion that affect every part of nature". 
45 
Expressed in terms of the philosophical metaphor constant conjunction, 
Cullen's conception of physical or proximate causality informed his 
general view of the nature, object and status of medical knowledge. 
He utilised a vocabulary of impression, sensation, and motion derived 
from sensationalist epistemology and supplemented by analogies drawn 
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from natural philosophy and chemistry. 
46 
These combined resources 
enabled him to generalise aspects of the complex relationship between 
body and mind implicated in the structure of the nervous system. 
It also gave him the means of discussing problematic subjects, such 
as the mechanism of nervous power, the nature of muscular movement, 
sympathy and the operation of stimulants and sedatives. 
In conclusion, it is important to emphasise that neither his theory 
of causation nor his general reliance upon sensationalist epistemology 
precluded Cullen from claiming that his conception of the nervous 
system was theologically acceptable. Cullen took note of Berkeley's 
views upon the errors of sensation, adding "even the sceptics, who 
do not carry matters so far, alleged that things were not perceived as 
they really are". However, 
We can condescend upon many instances of our mistaking 
on this aspect, from which we might extend the possibility 
to the whole. But we are not to be disturbed in the least 
by any subtleties of this sort; it is enough that we unavoidably 
suppose and conclude the existence of body, and that we 
do distinguish it in different cases by our different 
senses. 47 This is the unavoidable practice of the human 
mind ... 
Cullen always remained a physiological sceptic in a mitigated sense. 
He doubted the veracity of sensation in order to uncover underlying 
somatic determinants expressed as a causal pathology of aberrant 
sensations. Elsewhere he stated that men experienced an irresistible 
propensity to search after causes adding that 
Sceptics and academics may demonstrate the fallacy of the 
rash presumption of human reasoning but they will never 
persuade men to give it up, not even to be restrained, 
in the use of reasoning. 48 
In the absence of perceived necessary connections among observed 
phenomena, all conjunctions of causes and effects between mind, matter, 
motion and sensation in the nervous system were ultimately "an 
institution of our maker" well suited to "the purposes of the animal 
economy". Cullen noted that this adaption of parts to ends was 
the foundation of a posteriori proofs of the existence of the deity. 
He commended his own physiological vision of the "smallest internal 
functions" of the body as an extension of former proofs offered by 
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writers such as-Ray-and Derham who relied either upon the external 
functions of organisms or more widely upon moral causes. In fact 
Cullen himself made use of a teleological function of the body in 
his explanations of particular diseases. This was that property 
by which "nature", or the constitution of the animal economy, 
preserved itself against injuries and disease. Cullen referred to 
it as the "vis medicatrix naturae"; and it played a role within his 
system of medicine analogous to the sentient principle of Whytt or 
Stahl's rational soul. 
49 
Cullen actually used the vis medicatrix 
naturae in a very specific way to explain the operation of stimulants 
and sedatives. This distinguished his appropriation of the concept 
from former usages. However, with a suitable theological gloss, 
Cullen could claim his explanations of nervous diseases were always 
consonant with the imperatives of "sound theism", given man's 
ultimate nescience about nature. 
2.3 The common sense nescient physiology of James Gregory 
The significance of Gregory's relatively brief account of the nervous 
system lies not so much in his theory about its operation, but in his 
steadfast refusal to put forward any systematic views about it. 
Gregory acknowledged that the admirable properties of the nervous 
system attracted the attention of many philosophers who sought its 
causes and manner of operation. These were put forward in terms 
of various "conjectures". However, 
no rational plan has yet been proposed for ascertaining 
the matter by experiment; and the experience of two 
thousand years has afforded evidence, more than sufficient,,. 
how very seldom it happens that even the wisest men can 
discover the arcana of nature by conjecture. 50 
Gregory stated that the common feature of all such conjectures about 
the nervous system was that sensation and muscular action were 
explained in terms of "certain motions appropriate and peculiar to 
the nervous system". - Thus sensation was the result of a motion 
communicated from the senses to the brain; in voluntary muscular 
movement, something was communicated from the brain along the nerves 
to the muscles. 
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Gregory considered disputes over the-means by which such motions 
were transmitted in the nervous system had occurred in advance of 
any experimental evidence. This applied both to vibrations along 
the nerves, and to the existence of an. etherial nervous fluid. 
He regarded all accounts of the kinematics of sensation as logically 
inappropriate and therefore nugatory. This was because such motions 
were "in, no respect sensation, neither did they resemble. it, nor 
[were] they ever.. convertible to it, according to any known laws of 
nature". 
51 Gregory's rejection of the standard-vocabulary of 
sensationalist epistemology played a substantial role in his subsequent 
description of the properties of the nervous system. 
Gregory treated sensation as a simple term, easily understood and 
therefore requiring no definition. Even descriptions in terms 
such as "a change in the state of the mind, of which we are conscious, 
produced by some change in the state of the body" were regarded by 
Gregory as "tedious, inacurate and trifling. circumlocutions". He 
argued that they confounded two distinct senses of sensation. One 
referred to sensation in terms of a change in the state of the mind. 
It related 
to the mind alone, is peculiar to'it, in its nature 
fleeting and perishing, at the same time most simple, 
incapable of definition or description, entirely 
dissimilar to the object which excites the sensation, 
in nature and circumstances extremely different from 
everything corporeal, so that neither itself, nor 
anything similar to it, can exist in the external 
object which we perceive. 
52 
But the qualities of objects perceived by means of sensation pertained 
to those things alone, and cannot, by any means, exist 
in the mind; nor have they anything similar to it, or 
in common with it, or its various states; in their own 
nature they are constant and durable, whether perceived by 
us, or unknown and neglected. 
53 
For Gregory, there was a fundamental ontological divide between 
sensation in the mind and the qualities of bodies. However, in 
spite of the absolute independence between sensation and the objects 
represented to the mind, Gregory noted that almost all useful knowledge 
was easily and unproblematically acquired through the senses. 
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Therefore it was very evident that "these sentient- powers [hadi been 
bestowed on us by the Supreme Author of our frame". 
54 
When Gregory discussed the various properties of sensory perception, 
he briefly listed items such as the force of sensation, its persistence 
after an external impulse had ceased, and the roles of custom and 
attention. But there was no attempt to relate to the nature of 
the nervous system. While Gregory's list of the various properties 
of sensation actually resembled Cullen's laws, they were always 
offered as particular descriptions of sensory experience, rather than 
laws which indicated the nature of an underlying nervous mechanism. 
For example, Cullen had suggested that the resistance of sensation after 
an external object was withdrawn implied that sensation took place by 
an oscillatory motion in the nervous fluid. For Gregory, this was 
simply a phenomenon to be noted which, if it implied anything, indicated 
the incorporeal nature of sensation and its unaccountability in terms 
of physical processes. In some cases, Gregory questioned and rejected 
other "laws or circumstances of sensation" endorsed by Cullen. He 
regarded it as an open question whether or not the mind could attend to 
one or more sensations at once. However, Gregory flatly contradicted 
Cullen's general physiological scepticism about the intersubjectivity 
of sensations. 
55 
He argued that 
we have no evidence, either that the same impression 
produces a different sensation or perception in the 
same person at different times; or that the same object 
or impression produces a different sensation or perception 
in different persons, unless in some very rare instances. 56 
Whereas Cullen referred to factors such as the status of the medullary 
substance, the tension of adjacent blood vessels and the state of 
tissue lying between the nerve and the site of external impression, 
Gregory treated sensation as substantially unaffected by the status 
of the nervous system. Instead, the individual differences between 
people or in one person at different times, only affected the degree 
of pleasure or aversion which attended sensation' itself. Thus Cullen 
and Gregory both referred the properties of sensation to conventional 
causes such as custom. But they understood their effects upon 
sensation in very different ways. Cullen considered various 
environmental and somatic factors affected the very constitution of 
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sensation itself. Gregory stated that it only affected the accompanying 
feeling of pain or pleasure; the sensation perceived in the mind 
remained unaltered. Nor did Gregory make any attempt to explain why 
certain sensations were accompanied by pleasure or pain. He simply 
noted that "Such diversities of sensations have not yet been accounted 
for". 
57 
Throughout his general account of sensation, Gregory consistently 
emphasised the pleasantness of sensations. Where pain occurred, it 
was often to ensure that the pleasures of sense were not over-gratified, 
and, 
upon the whole, it seems reasonable to conclude, that 
nature has provided for man with such benignity and 
liberality, and furnished him with so many pleasures, 
that he might not only live but enjoy life which she 
hath given.. 58 
For Cullen, the deceptiveness of sensations lay at the heart of his 
physiological scepticism based upon proximate causes. Gregory on the 
other hand, stressed a eudaemonic conception of sensation, consistent 
with the intentions of a providential creator who framed human 
sensibility in harmony with external nature. Whereas Cullen used the 
resources of sensationalist epistemology to ground his physiology, 
Gregory drew upon the philosophy of mind developed by Reid and the 
common sense school. 
After Gregory's initial chapter on sensation, he devoted the next five 
to discussion of the various external senses. While the order of 
treatment varied from Reid's Inquiry, Gregory's descriptive phenomenology 
of the varieties of sensory experience resembled Reid's own treatment. 
But instead of discussing the common sense philosophy of mind it was 
founded upon, Gregory simply took this for granted and proceeded 
immediately to a symptomatology of the depravities attending particular 
senses. In keeping with the common sense emphasis of sight over tough, 
Gregory devoted more discussion to the former; whereas Cullen, in his 
very brief discussion of the genera of sensation had argued that all 
the varieties of external sensory experience were ultimately dependent 
upon touch. 
59 In most cases, Gregory added suitable encomia upon 
the utilities displayed by the various individual senses, for which, 
again, "the bountiful Parent of all" was responsible. This pattern 
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of description, use, and depravity of the external senses was continued 
in chapter ten where Gregory discussed the internal senses of memory, 
imagination and judgement. 
60 
He'stated that these faculties 
operated without external impulse or 'assistance and that "the organs 
most subservient to them being internal, concealed, and inaccessible 
to external objects, act 
led] by powers peculiar to themselves". 
61 
Although Gregory regarded the internal senses as wholly incoporeal 
aspects of mind, he acknowledged they also depended upon "a certain 
state of the brain for their proper exercise". 
62 
The brain therefore 
was the primary organ they should be referred to. But the implications 
of this for the relationship between body and mind received a very 
brief notice. Gregory remarked that there were 
philosophers and medical men of considerable celebrity, 
who deny that any change or conception takes place in 
the mind, unaccompanied with a definite and corresponding 
change in the brain. The matter is rather uncertain, of 
little utility and not easily brought to the test of experiment. 
He then continued: 
So far from having any knowledge of the changes which take 
place in the brain, or of the manner in which its various 
parts operate during the exercise of memory, imagination 
or judgement, we have not hitherto been favoured even with 
a plausible conjecture on these subjects. 63 
Thus Gregory pronounced a deep physiological nescience regarding the 
relationship between mind and brain. This was not unusual. But 
Gregory extended this into a general nescience regarding the operation 
of the nervous system as a whole. For example, where Cullen discussed 
the functions of the brain in his third chapter on the physiology of 
the nervous system, Gregory did not devote a single chapter to the 
brain at all. Given his absolute disjunction between sensation and 
its physical correlate, the nervous system itself became a wholly 
unknown mediator between mind and body, about which Gregory's 
statements were reserved and circumspect. Gregory regarded the. 
relation of event between mind and body in the nervous system to be 
completely distinct from physical causation. It did not display 
a uniformity of antecedents and consequents. As a result, this 
precluded any law-like statements of'its nature and operation. 
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In the opening: chapter of the"Conspectus, Gregory outlined the 
conventional types of cause which had been used to characterise and 
explain the aetiology of disease. These were "proximate" and 
"remote" causes, the latter of which was further subdivided into 
"predisposing" and "occasional or exciting", sometimes referred to 
as "noxious powers". Gregory gave the following definitions of each: 
(i) The proximate cause was "that which, being present, 'removed, 
or changed, the disease is present, removed, or changed 
accordingly": 
(ii) The predisposing cause was "that which merely renders the 
body liable to become diseased, namely, on the application 
of an exciting cause": 
(iii) The occasional or exciting cause was "that which actually 
excites disease in the body already predisposed to it". 
64 
Gregory claimed that physicians used "the term 'cause' with great 
latitude of meaning, and in a sense somewhat different from its 
ordinary acceptation in the writings of philosophers, or in common 
speech". Gregory stated that both kinds of remote causes were of 
great importance for medical practice. Although errors regarding them 
were often made, in many cases "observation and experiment, and sober 
reasoning" had led to the correct identification of the remote causes 
of disease. This however, was not the case for proximate causes 
which were usually "very confused, obscure, and formed from too hasty 
a view of facts": 
For medical men, not readily finding the cause for which 
they are in search invent to themselves some cause of 
every disease, whence that disease may arise, nearly in the 
same manner in which the various changes or effects, 
observable in inanimate objects proceed from their causes. 
65 
However, disease processes did not resemble simple effects observed 
in the physics of inanimate objects. Instead, they were a series of 
events or sequences of causes and effects which were not regular 
because interruptions in the chain did not always produce the same 
effects each time. Thus they did not conform to chains of causes 
and effects in inanimate nature. 
66 
Gregory extended this view of 
the distinctive causation of disease to animate nature generally: 
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For in the living body there exists some. principle of 
change ... differing widely from the nature of inanimate 
matter, a principle not easily defined with the requisite 
diligence and accuracy. It is with propriety named the 
vital principle, to which, not less than the causes 
commonly observed, numerous changes, both morbid and 67 
salutary, which affect the body are to be attributed. 
Gregory professed a general nescience regarding proximate causes. 
In practice, the proximate cause of a bodily process could not be 
unproblematically identified because of the multiplicity of mutually 
implicated causal processes involved in animate change. Furthermore, 
conceptions of medical theory and practice based upon proximate causes 
were so "altogether futile, and not only false, but so confused and 
obscure, that they scarcely 
[could] be understood, and probably never 
were understood sufficiently by their authors themselves". 
68 
Gregory's nescience regarding proximate causes became a critical weapon 
to censure views about the nervous system which he considered 
hypothetical and based upon inappropriate conceptions of causation. 
It extended not only to Cullen's use of a proximate nervous fluid, but 
also by implication, to Whytt's necessary sentient principle. His 
nescience regarding such matters place severe limitations upon what could 
meaningfully be said about the nervous system. As a result, Gregory 
restricted his account to a descriptive phenomenology of sensation, 
largely free of analogies taken from the kinematics of material bodies. 
The justification for this treatment rested ultimately upon a common 
sense appeal to God as the guarantor of the connection between men's 
sensations and the world to which they referred. 
In conclusion, it is evident that aspects of both the organisation and 
content of Gregory's Conspectus owed a great deal to Cullen's 
"Physiology". However, Gregory did not publicly acknowledge any debts 
to former writers such as Whytt, or to Cullen himself. It appears 
that he regarded almost all physiological theories of the nervous 
system as largely hypothetical and therefore useless. Because of 
manner of treating 
the nervous system, 'common sense nescient 
physiologist' is a very appropriate description for Gregory's general 
perspective. But in a sense, Gregory was very much more of a 
physiological 'sceptic' than Cullen. Gregory's rhetorical appeals to 
the evidence of observation and experiment must ultimately be seen in 
4 
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this light. His emphasis upon the absence of. sound experimental 
evidence was underpinned by a systematic methodological denial of 
the very possibility of detailed causal knowledge of the nervous 
system and, indeed, of bodily processes generally. 
In this section, Whytt's Cullen's and Gregory's general perspectives 
on the nervous system have been described and discussed. It is 
evident that the language of metaphysics was a central resource in 
accounting for men's knowledge of nervous processes. In particular, 
concepts of causality were important for two major reasons. Firstly, 
they had a technical utility in conveying the status of men's con- 
ception of change in the nervous system. Secondly, they were 
perceived to have an important mediating role between the natural and 
theological dimensions of physiological discourse. It is noteworthy 
that, despite using quite different metaphysical resources, Whytt, 
Cullen and Gregory could legitimate their accounts of the nervous 
system by aligning them with the interests of "sound theism". All 
three showed ingenuity in accommodating their accounts to natural 
theological sensibilities. But at the same time, they each displayed 
sensitivities to the manner in which others attempted this. Hence 
there were sharp disagreements about the theological propriety and 
moral soundness of accounts of the nervous system. Also, because of 
the existence of different metaphysical technologies by which each 
man articulated statements about the nervous system, they disagreed 
considerably over what was to-count as a 'matter of fact' about it 
and what constituted a 'sound' account of nervous action. These 
disagreements about the form, content and validity of physiological 
knowledge emerge more clearly in their discussion of muscular motion. 
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3. A CASE STUDY IN THE NATURE OF NERVOUS ACTION: THE PROBLEM 
OF MUSCULAR MOTION 
Unlike Cullen and Gregory, Whytt did not put forward his conception 
of nervous action in a systematic textbook form. Instead, his fore- 
most concern was "to investigate cause or causes which enable 
stimuli of various kinds to excite the muscles of living animals 
into contraction". 69 In particular, Whytt dealt with involuntary 
muscular motion which he regarded as "spontaneous" because it 
proceeded without the attention of the "rational mind" directing 
its operation. Thus his views on the nature and mechanism of 
nervous power, or the sentient principle, were most frequently put 
forward in reference to the problem of how muscular contraction 
occurred. 
Whytt regarded involuntary muscular motion to epitomise the 
operation of the sentient principle. Therefore he expressed very 
definite views about how contraction occurred and what general 
significance it displayed. He accepted that various physical 
processes were necessary conditions for contraction to occur; 
for example, the distention of muscle fibres with fluid. However, 
these were by no means sufficient. They were in fact accessory to 
the sufficient action of the immaterial sentient principle which in 
a fundamental, though inexplicable, way moved the muscle fibre. 
Whytt argued that all cases of muscular action were properly inter- 
preted as extensions of nervous action. This was because the contrac- 
tion of. muscles displayed properties inconsistent with the behaviour 
of matter. Whytt was intensely critical of accounts which 
accommodated muscular action to the behaviour of matter. If 
contraction proceeded in a completely mechanical way, then it was 
impossible to explain why the power of muscular action was 
disproportionately greater than the force of the stimulus acting 
upon the muscle. This was because in cases of wholly mechanical 
causation 
so long as the cause acts on the organ, the effect must 
continue to follow; and if the cause becomes gradually 
weaker, so also must the effect, till it ceases. 7° 
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But this was manifestly not the case in muscular contraction. 
Therefore Whytt argued, it must be due to a non-mechanical cause. 
One particular opinion Whytt took repeated note of was the performance 
of muscular contraction by "some subtile etherial or electrical matter 
residing in the nerves. " To explain contraction by oscillations in an 
elastic ether was fundamentally mistaken because 
these must follow the laws of vibration observed in other 
elastic bodies, which are yet inconsistent ... with alternative 
and vibratory-like contractions of muscular fibres occasioned 
by irritation. 71 
While Whytt was critical of other modes of transmission within the 
nervous system, such as the vibration of solid nerves, it was the 
nervous fluid as a preposed vehicle of nervous power which 
preoccupied his refutations. Whytt did not actually deny the 
existence of a nervous fluid. He acknowledged nerves were a 
continuation of the medullary substance of the brain, and it was 
probable that they derived a fluid from there. However, even if this 
were actually so, he argued the very size and subtlety of the proposed 
nervous tubes made it impossible to reach an understanding of its 
nature and properties. As a result, it could not be known whether 
the nervous fluid was only a source of nourishment for the nerves or 
"the medium by which all their actions [were] performed. "72 Whytt 
regarded further questions about nervous power such as "what [wasJ the 
material cause in the brain, nerves and muscle fibres? "; or "how 
[did] 
the mind put the muscles in motion? " to be speculative. They lacked 
either experiments or natural appearances to warrant any opinion about 
them. 
73 
Whytt acknowledged there was some dispute over the ontological status 
of the nervous fluid and other means of muscle contraction such as an 
active but latent power lodged in the muscle fibres themselves. He 
responded to the latter possibility by saying: 
It seems to be improper to attribute active powers to that, 
which, however, modified or arranged is yet no more than a 
system of mere matter, powers I say, which are not only 
confessedly beyond those of mechanism but seemin$ly 
contrary to all the known properties of matter. 7µ 
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This and preceding remarks reveal that Whytt's objections to 
alternative accounts of muscular contraction and nervous power, 
which did not utilise the sentient principle, were founded upon 
metaphysical criteria. He regarded his account of an immaterial 
sentient principle as a complete explanation of nervous power. This 
was because for Whytt, mind alone was capable of producing motion75; 
whereas a nervous fluid could never account for activity sensibility 
or reason. 
76 He regarded it as gratuitous concession to unknown 
77 
causes and labelled those who used it "modern materialists". 
Whytt considered it was imperative to defend the aetiology of muscular 
contraction upon the basis of the sentient principle. He therefore 
cited a series of phenomena and circumstances which would show that 
his interpretation was factually correct. 
78 Although much of Whytt's 
subsequent defences of the distinctive aetiology of the sentient 
principle were framed in relation to specific objections raised by 
Haller, their controversy did not begin until after the "Essay" was 
published. 
79 The Whytt-Haller exchanges fall outside the scope of 
this account. However, the prior comments made in the "Essay" can serve 
as a useful introduction to the more general issues at stake. 
In a variety of circumstances involving decollation or the excision, 
whytt argued that the persistence of contraction and relaxation by the 
fibres indicated residua of sensibility. Because Whytt held the 
sentient principle to be active throughout the nervous system, he 
interpreted this behavious of muscle as a confirmation of its presence. 
Whytt's reasoning on this matter was syllogistic. Sensibility was 
referable to the sentient principle as the sufficient cause of all 
motion in the nervous system. The various limbs, parts and muscles 
showed signs of sensibility. Therefore, they contained the sentient 
principle for some time after death or excision. Whytt regarded this 
as a demonstration that the soul did not leave the body immediately 
after death Thus all the various phenomena of decollation and excision 
were regarded by Whytt as experimental proof of the following points. 
First, sensibility was dependent upon the nerves and brain without 
which it could not function. Second, the sentient principle or 
necessary cause of nervous action was diffused through the nervous 
system generally, otherwise excised limbs would not display residual 
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sensibility. Hence Whytt's experimental results were readily 
synthesised with his metaphysical predilections concerning the 
sentient principle. 
In his subsequent writings, Whytt interpreted Haller's position as 
symptomatic of those "modern materialists" who endowed muscles with 
innate power. This was because he considered that the notion of 
irritability did not depend upon the sensibility of nerves and 
therefore on the sentient principle. Instead, the contraction of 
muscles when subject to a direct stimulus was due to "muscular glue" 
or the "glutinous matter of the muscles". 
80 In criticising Haller, 
Whytt developed an explicit analogy between Haller's position and those 
who considered gravity to be essential to matter. In both cases it was 
evident that gravity and irritability were both ultimately due to some 
immaterial cause. Whytt commented: 
After all that has been said to show that the motions of 
irritated muscles are owing to a property of irritability 
in them, or their glue, ... we are at last obliged to refer 
them to the active power of an immaterial cause; unless we 
shall, contrary to sound philosophy, ascribe feeling and 
spontaneous activity to matter. And as gravity must finally 
be resolved into the power of that BEING who upholds 
universal nature; so it is probable, that the irritability 
of animals is owing to that living sentient principle which 
animates and enlivens their whole frame. 81 
Whytt found it puzzling that the imperatives of what he called "sound 
philosophy" and its ally "true physiology" were disregarded by his 
contemporaries. He pointed to the regularity and uniformity of 
gravitational, electrical and magnetic phenomena which were at 
least consistent with the behavious of matter, even though they must 
also ultimately depend upon immaterial causes. However, he stated 
that all the motions of bodies responding to a simulus were obviously 
the result of "an uneasy feeling" and 
their various appearances can be so easily explained upon 
this supposition, and are so unaccountable on any other, 
that I am surprised to find so many learned and ingenious 
physiologists endeavouring to refute this opinion, and to 
derive these motions from inanimate matter. 82 
Thus the phenomena of muscular motion were accommodated to the action 
of the sentient principle operating according to the logic of immaterial 
causes. Whytt's distinctive aetiology of nervous power informed his 
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interpretation of the facts of contraction which were thereby 
rendered consistent with "sound philosophy" and the "true 
physiology". 
Cullen's general views on the nature and mechanism of muscular 
movement occur in the second chapter of his Physiology, "Of the action 
of moving fibres". Cullen wrote in the wake of the Whytt-Haller 
controversy and his own distinctive views encorporated aspects of both 
their positions. Cullen was critical of Haller's distinction between 
irritability and sensibility and, like Whytt, he sought to accommodate 
muscular action within nervous action generally. 
83 However, he did not 
thereby endorse Whytt's position or make use of any arguments based 
upon the aetiology of the sentient principle. Cullen articulated his 
own position in terms of a vocabulary of powers. He distinguished 
between "nervous power", which represented the contraction of muscle 
fibre produced by nerves; and the "inherent power" of contraction 
itself, which corresponded to Haller's own "vis insita" of muscles. 
Finally, because nervous power was itself determined by the will, he 
called this power of the mind acting in the brain "animal power", or 
sometimes the "energy of the brain". Cullen contended that the 
contractility of muscles depended in part upon all three powers. It 
was probable that: 
the nervous and the inherent powers are somewhat of the 
same nature; and it is also probable, that in entire and 
living bodies, both the nervous and inherent powers have 
a constant dependence upon the animal. 84 
Cullen supplemented his triad of powers with a fourth, "tonic power", 
which was responsible for the constant tendency of muscles to contract. 
It was an aspect of the inherent power of muscle and depended upon the 
animal and nervous power, such that any increase or decrease in them would 
produce proportional effects in the tone of muscles. To summarise his 
general position, he concluded with "a little piece of theory in 
confirmation of the whole" which synthesised his notion of powers with 
their physical basis, the nervous fluid. If 
the nervous power is an elastic fluid, in common to the whole 
of the nervous system, such is the nature of elastic fluids, 
that they will constantly endeavour to restore themselves to an 
equilibrium; wherever there is a communcation, every part 
constantly presses upon another, so that there must be a 
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constant energy from each part, and more especially 
from the brain. But this is enough to prove that the 
inherent power will be, in all cases, in some measure in 
proportion to the state of the nervous and animal powers. 85 
Cullen described the role of the ether as a general account of the 
means of motion in nature. He noted precedents for its use in 
Newton. Also, "several of the foreign of the greatest rank" had 
argued for "the presence of an elastic fluid", which produced the 
cohesion of bodies and explained the behaviour or inanimate 
elastics. 
86 With respect to the nervous system, he stated: 
all our theory requires, is to suppose that this subtile 
elastic fluid is by various means excited to a greater 
degree: we have some illustration of it in the case of 
electricity and magnetism which are only modifications of 
this subtile fluid; and we need only suppose that this 
elastic fluid can be thus excited upon the nerves ... 
and that, in consequence of a certain degree of excitement, 
the nerves are rendered sentient ... 
87 
From Cullen's account of the moving fibres of the body, it is clear 
that his explanatory theory of muscular contraction was dominated by 
the concept of "animal power", "energy of the brain", or what he 
generally called "excitability". But Cullen did not explicitly 
identify the enact nature of animal power; rather he professed a form 
of nescience about it. Yet at the same time, he linked his 
vocabulary of powers with the operation of "an elastic fluid common 
to the whole nervous systeu" which served as a proximate cause. 
Because Cullen's powers had what he regarded as a legitimate physical 
basis, he was prepared to reason about them, even though there was no 
empirical means of identifying them. He claimed they were merely 
ways of describing the causal efficacy of the nervous fluid in 
rendering the nervous system sentient. Cullen also said he did not 
identify sensibility either as a form of mechanical energy, or as a 
necessary sentient principle. Instead he expressed its action using 
the vocabulary of fluid mechanics, and spoke of its mobility. Yet 
Cullen could contend his language was largely analogical. 
88 However, 
he regarded his theorising upon the basis of a nervous fluid to be 
ultimately justifiable because the causes he identified were not 
arbitrary. Instead they had a physically proximate basis within the 
nervous fluid itself. 
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Cullen's doctrine of nervous power and its proximate causal basis, the 
nervous fluid, was central to his system of medicine as a whole. 
Assumptions about the nervous ether informed his central doctrine of 
excitability. In putting forward his views, Cullen often made 
analogies with processes in natural philosophy, especially the notions 
of excitement in electricity, magnetic power and affinity. 
89 In his 
discussions of sleeping and waking, excitement and collapse, Cullen 
made repeated references to the condition of the nervous fluid. At 
one point, he explicitly described the excited state of the nervous 
fluid in the medullary fibres of the brain as the essence of life 
itself. Also, he developed a distinctive pathology of tonic power 
based upon the notion of muscular spasm. Tonic power depended upon a 
combination of tension in the muscle fibre and the state of animal 
power. In cases of spasm, Cullen claimed there was an inhibition of 
animal power which in turn reduced the mobility of the nervous fluid. 
Upon this basis Cullen gave a distinctive explanation of the nervous 
aetiology of fever. Thus in a variety of ways muscular motion and its 
modus operandi, the nervous fluid was central to Cullen's views. 
Cullen stated that the theory of muscular movement was crucial "for if 
we knew it more exactly, it would throw light upon every other part of 
our system. " 
90 
Gregory's account of muscular motion is a particular instance of his 
general approach to the nervous system which was pragmatic, descriptive 
and common ensical. In the Conspectus, his views were expressed with 
great brevity. He made use of several concepts developed by Cullen. 
But they were not deployed in the form of a proximate causal 
explanation of motions in the nervous'system. For example, Gregory 
stated the vis insita was simply "that state of the muscles, by which 
their fibres contract themselves on the application of a stimulus". 
91 
The "nervous energy" of muscles resulted from a stimulus applied to 
nerves and differed from the vis insita only in terms of its location. 
Finally, Gregory used Cullen's notion of "animal power", but in a 
wholly nominal way to denote the control of muscles by volition 
alone. 
92 
In the Conspectus, Gregory referred to the "eager and fruitless 
inquiry" to account for how muscular action came about; but he did not 
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expand this further. However, in the Lectures he went into greater 
detail. There, he drew attention to Haller's work and the various 
opinions on the causes of muscular motion commenting: 
It may appear rather strange that I should declare my total 
ignorance of this subject; but from that you may find, that 
near 30 hypotheses have been formed to account for this: yet 
none of them are founded on facts; nor one of them, tho' 
admitted would account for the phenomena. 93 
Gregory's approach to nervous action was based upon the absolute 
disjunction between sensation interpreted as perceptions in the mind, 
and any form of motion transmitted along the nerves which produced 
muscular motion. Consequently, he was very critical of proposed. 
mechanisms of nervous power which were dependent on some form of 
motion. Like Whytt, Gregory rapidly dismissed the option of 
vibrations of the nerves and discussed in some detail the motions 
produced by "a subtile and very active fluid" in the nerves, moving 
"according to peculiar laws" and possessing "many surprising properties 
and excellencies. " Gregory stated that many philosophers had recourse 
to a "Universal Ether" pervading the universe, assisting and attending 
all the processes of nature. He made a literary plea for its demise 
in philosophy: 
Let this ether, extremely useful and active to be sure, 
but nowhere tangible, nowhere brought to the test of 
experiment, so that it might disclose its operation, 
more mutable and fleeting than Proteus himself, so long 
and so violently agitated and all to no purpose, at 
length rest in peace. For what hope of catching that 
"cui in plures jus est transire figuras? 94 
Gregory's opposition to the ether was founded upon his commitment to 
a strict dualism which discriminated sharply between mind and matter. 
He considered that uses of the ether to explain sensory processes were 
all instances of accommodating the action of mind to the behaviour of 
matter. With respect to the latter, Gregory conceded that it was 
virtually impossible to conceive of change taking place without some 
form of motion occurring. However, he stated that the phenomena of 
external and internal sensation, volition and the effort exerted by 
the mind to move a limb, were "neither corporeal' things, nor to be 
explained on the principles which are applicable to these". 
95 As a 
strict dualist, it was inconceivable to Gregory how the ether could 
play any sort of mediating role between mind and body. 
II 
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Gregory refused to speculate upon the cause of muscular motion. He 
made no concessions to Whytt's necessarily self-moving sentient 
principle. He rejected etherial fluid explanations put forward by 
Cullen. Whereas the latter sought to build analogies between natural 
philosophy, chemistry, and physiology, Gregory took an opposite 
viewpoint. He argued that just as the phenomena of chemistry were 
distinct from mechanical phenomena, so too was muscular action: 
There are no doubt certain laws of nature, common to all 
bodies; but there are also peculiar laws, and therefore 
in the investigation of nature, we should not only judge 
of the uniformity, but the variety of it. 96 
Similarly Gregory endorsed the fact that there were no doubt different 
powers involved in muscular action; but this did not mean that each 
had to be distinguished by different names. Thus Gregory's account, 
although founded upon conception of the distinctiveness of animate 
causation, was completely lacking in any causal explanations of 
muscular action. Instead, he simply described the observed phenomena 
of contraction itself. The whole bundle of muscle fibres in contraction 
became "shorter, thicker, harder, wrinkled, and sometimes pale, while 
the muscle contract Ced] then it [was] relaxed, and again [became] 
plain, smooth, soft and long, and, in short, repeatled] its 
contraction .,, 
97 
Gregory's nescience about nervous action could certainly be harmonised 
with the kind of providentialism found in Whytt. For example, on 
the distinction between voluntary and involuntary motion, Gregory 
wrote: 
The provident Parent of all things seems therefore, to have 
applied the necessary stimuli to those organs, the actions 
of which were absolutely necessary to sustain life, to refresh 
the body, or to the exercise of certain functions of life. 
He has given man a partial control over those organs, which 
partly perform some vital function and are partly subservient 
to other less import and temporary offices: the rest he has 
subjected to his complete control. 
98 
However, Gregory's views also rested upon arguments about the logic of 
causality applied to animate processes where there was no uniformity 
of antecedents and consequents. Hence Gregory did not deny the 
existence of pervasive connections between body and mind in 
physiological processes such as muscular movement. What he rejected 
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was that they were in any way constantly conjoined, inseparable or 
necessary, which was a, pre-condition for any explanation of the 
nervous system in terms of physical causes: 
By the constitution of our nature, certain operations of 
minds are connected with certain changes of body: we have 
no direct power of moving our body more than of creating 
one; but there is a connexion between the operations of 
mind and the contraction of muscles. This is however 
separable. The nervous power evidently can act and often 
acts without our efforts, as in disease. 99 
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4. VOLUNTARISTIC AND NECESSITARIAN IMAGES OF NERVOUS ORDER, THE 
PROBLEM OF SYMPATHY AND THE OPERATION OF STIMULANTS AND SEDATIVES 
Whytt and Cullen's differences over the causal of the nervous system 
display strong analogies with features of the Kames-Stewart debate 
discussed in chapter two. Whytt's approach to nervous action, based 
upon the sentient principle, corresponds to Stewart's voluntarist 
account of the foundations of mechanics. Cullen's views in which the 
nervous fluid played a central role, have continuities with the 
necessitarian image of natural order favoured by Karnes. The voluntarist 
image of nervous order to be found in Whytt's sentient physiology 
maintained the hegemony of efficient causes. Cullen's sceptical 
physiology was necessitarian insofar as it emphasised physical causes 
and effects, considered as-constantly conjoined antecedent and 
consequent phenomena and subject to a physical necessity. 
In chapters three and four, it was shown that Gregory's Project 
involved a critique of both voluntarist and necessitarian images of 
natural order in physics. Gregory criticised Reid and Hume because 
they referred all change to either efficient or physical causes. 
Gregory's physiological writings on the nervous system also express 
his opposition to voluntarist and necessitarian images. of nervous 
order, found in Whytt and Cullen. This emerges clearly in the 
different attitudes each writer displayed to nervous sympathy. 
Throughout their discussions of the nervous system, Whytt and Cullen 
emphasised men's nescience about how nervous power or sensibility was 
actually produced. Men were ignorant of necessary connections in the 
nervous system; as a result, they could only make judgements about 
causes on the basis of effects. This common starting point of men's 
nescience is also evident in the Kames-Stewart debate. But the best 
evidence for the parallel lies in the subsequently similar distribution 
of substances, powers and laws in the nervous system and inanimate 
nature. For Whytt, the phenomena of nervous sensibility indicated the 
operation of an active, immaterial, intrinsically self-moving efficient 
cause. For Cullen, the same properties of nervous action lead him to 
conceptualise several distinct powers of the nervous system closely 
associated with the physically proximate nervous fluid. Both 
positions correspond to Stewart's emphasis upon active beings and Kames's 
discussion of the powers of matter. 
II 
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The respective forms of causal reasoning underlying the distribution 
of`substances and powers in the nervous system was also remarkably 
similar to that found in the Kames-Stewart debate. Whereas Whytt and 
Cullen seemed to deny the feasibility-of action at a distance icd 
64a%xCoJ the contiguity between causes and their effects, they each 
emphasised different kinds of causes. For Whytt, the nature of 
sensibility implied it was a form of mind or spirit. But for Cullen, 
nervous power had to have a physically proximate basis in the form of 
a nervous fluid. Thus the quality of their judgements about causes 
was quite different. Similar sorts of inferences can be found in 
Stewart's logic of immaterial causes, and Kames's arguments for the 
location of the powers of inanimate motion within matter. All these 
features, when taken together, suggest a similar metaphysical technology 
at work in Stewart and Whytt, one quite distinct from the kind evident 
in Kames and Cullen. In the former, the directionality of nescience 
was always towards superintending active beings. Whether they acted 
-mediately or immediately was a matter of some doubt, but they were 
always interpreted as God's immaterial and intelligent agents in 
nature. In the latter, nescience pointed towards men and the 
conditions and constraints of men's perception of change, expressed 
in terms of customary constant conjunctions of uniform antecedents 
and consequents. 
The rhetoric of justification which each respective pair used was also 
strikingly similar. Stewart and Whytt drew heavily upon a particular 
interpretation of Clarke and Newton in order to denounce materialism 
and preserve a role for secondary causes as the legitimate objects 
of natural philosophical enquiry. In Kames and Cullen, there was a 
sustained attack upon the role of mind and immaterial beings as sole 
agents of change in nature. This was combined with a careful 
justification of what Cullen called "the language of materialism", 
which could be glossed, as analogical, metaphorical and innocuously 
conformable to standard a posteriori proofs. for the existence of the 
deity. Also, there was a correspondingly greater emphasis upon the 
role of reasoning and theorising. 
Clearly, some differences of emphasis exist between Stewart and Whytt, 
Kames and Cullen . These were much less apparent among the voluntarists, 
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where even the forms of expression were remarkably similar in 
discussions of subjects such as the interpretation of gravity, the 
inertia of matter, the theological obligations of 'sound mechanics' 
and 'the true physiology'. In the case of the necessitarians, 
differences were more evident. Cullen was more explicit in his use 
of Humeian terminology. This applied both the philosophical metaphor 
of constant conjunction and the vocabulary of sensationalist epitemology. 
Kames had a similar orientation; but he did not use the same modes of 
expression found in Hume. However, the continuities far outweigh any 
discrepancies and warrant two interim conclusions. Firstly, the 
Scottish concern with the epistemological basis of natural knowledge 
is also very evident in the physiological discourse of Whytt and Cullen. 
Thus the general search for the epistemological interiorisation of 
nature in Scottish scientific metaphysics had a specific manifestation 
in the study of nervous sensibility. Each writer made stipulations 
about how men could know the nervous system consistent with the nature 
and limits of human understanding. Secondly, there were different and 
conflicting voluntarist and necessitarian strategies for securing the 
order of the nervous system in men's minds. This clash is particularly 
evident in Whytt's and Cullen's accounts of nervous sympathy. 
100 
Whytt held that the appropriate theoretical basis upon which to 
explain and cure nervous diseases was in terms of sympathy, conceived 
of in its broadest sensc as a "nervous consent" which existed between 
the various parts of the body. Whytt considered that most nervous 
diseases depended upon "an uncommon delicacy or unnatural sensibility 
of the nerves" and therefore sympathy was a "subject of the greatest 
importance in pathology". He rejected all other pathologies of 
nervous disease founded upon changes in the nature and properties of 
the nervous fluid; or expressed in terms of a "fight", "repercussion" 
or "confusion" of animal spirits, which somehow resulted in disease. 
In his view, this was only to refer nervous disease to more unknown 
causes. However, it was commonly accepted that the nerves were 
endowed with feeling and that "general sympathy", or the relationship 
between organs in the body as a whole, and "particular sympathy" or the 
consent between specific organs were well known facts. Even if sympathy 
was considered to be an occult cause on a par with nervous fluids and 
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animal spirits, Whytt maintained it still had a very significant 
advantage over rival explanations: it showed that sympathy proceeded 
from exclusively mental causes. 
101 
Cullen also accepted that the existence of certain parts of the body 
with "a common function and peculiar constitution" was of great 
significance for understanding both health and disease. -Such 
communications between different parts of the body, Cullen-noted, 
"have been called, in general, consent or sympathy". However 
Every term which is like establishing a power exerted 
between bodies at a distance without contact and motion,. 
and therefore a term for an occult quality if properly 
rejected I would wish, therefore, that the terms 
"sympathy" and "consent" were rejected from our system. 102 
These and other remarks indicate Cullen was criticial of 
sympathy and its use in the writings of Whytt and-others. He was 
particularly critical of the manifold particular sympathies discussed 
by physicians. For example, he argued that the relation between the 
sight of food and salivation in a hungry person was not due to a 
special consent between retina and salivary glands. Instead he stated 
that such phenomena should be referred to "the general causes of 
communication" within the nervous system. In practice, this meant 
acknowledging sympathetic nervous action was always mediated by the 
brain. He gave the examples of connections between the brain and the 
alimentary canal (especially the stomach), the circulatory system 
(especially the extremities of vessels) and the urino-genital 
system. 
103 
Returning to Whytt, it is evident that he also emphasised that "all 
sympathy must be referred to the brain itself and spinal marrow, the 
source of all nerves". 
104 Whytt put forward a range of evidence to 
support this. This included experimental findings involving the 
decollation and destruction of spinal marrow in animals, and the 
effects of opium upon nervous consent. He also pointed to the effect 
passions had upon bodily functions and various features of sensory 
perception. But despite Whytt's marshalling of a variety of 
experimental, observational and introspective evidence to support 
the role of the brain in sympathy, two features distinguish his 
account from Cullen's. Firstly, Whytt kept a host of particular 
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sympathies, including those explicitly criticised by Cullen on the 
grounds that they were considered independent of brain mediation. 
Secondly, Whytt's emphasis upon the presence of the sentient 
principle throughout the nervous system tended to blur any 
distinction between the brain as a control agency and the nervous 
system as a whole. This can be seen in Whytt's reluctance to specify 
how the brain was involved in sympathetic action. Instead, he 
emphasised men's ignorance about the structure of the brain and 
its connection with the body. He stated that to suppose sympathy 
may be 
owing solely to the particular situation arrangements, or 
connection of the medullary fibres of the brain, or to the 
union of the nerves proceeding from it, is as unreasonable 
as to imagine that thought may be the result of a motion 
among the particles of the animal spirits, or other subtile 
matters in the brain. 105 
For Whytt the unknown nature of sympathetic nervous action was 
actually a positive resource for securing the epistemological 
interiorisation of the nervous system. Its contingent and non- 
contiguous properties precluded forms of mechanical or material 
explanations and enabled him to re-emphasise its efficient, 
immaterial and intelligent aetiology. In doing so, Whytt displayed 
the theistic directionality of nescience, characteristic of 
voluntarism: 
The farther we push our enquiries into nature, the more 
shall we be convinced of our ignorance, and how small a 
portion is known of the works of the Great Creator. 106 
In Cullen, one finds an equivalent nescience about sympathy. Like 
Whytt he placed strictures upon explaining the necessary connections 
which underlay sympathetic processes. Phenomena such as tickling 
producing laughter, or grief producing tears, even made it 
uncertain whether all sympathetic connections followed from 
"communication by nerves". Because there were no perceivable 
necessary connections between parts of the nervous system, all it 
was possible to do was learn the factual relations which obtained 
there. He even acknowledged that such "institutions of our Maker" 
were, "for the most part", benevolent. 
'07 Cullen maintained there 
was 
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no other explanation of what may strictly be called sympathy 
and consent, but the accessory concurrence of certain actions 
" to a volition or propensity, and the concurrence of several 
motions of the system produced in consequence of these 
volitions and propensities. 108 
. 
Cullen sought to accommodate sympathetic action to necessary "laws 
of. the economy" based upon uniform antecedents and consequents. 
This resolution of men's knowledge of nervous communication provided 
"welcome relief from much of the confusion and appearance of mystery, 
which the language of sympathy has introduced into our system". By 
emphasising the role of the brain, Cullen directed accounts of 
nervous pathology away from views based upon immaterial principles 
diffused throughout the nervous system and towards a consideration of 
animal power, or the energy of the brain. On the future of the 
language of sympathy and consent, Cullen wrote: 
As long as we have no idea on what the connection depends, 
the term may be used; but if we can find out its foundation, 
and the means of communication - which ought to be attempted - 
the term will be no longer be proper. '09 
Should this occur, then sympathy would no longer represent an 
arbitrary, contingent "occult quality", which Cullen regarded as 
an embarrassment to his necessitarianism. 
The kind of foundation Cullen sought for sympathetic action is 
suggested in the remarks he made about the process of how pain was 
referred within the nervous system generally. Cullen noted that 
when pain was referred from one part of the body to another, it was 
usually to a more sensible area. This process is somewhat analogous 
to sympathy. In his proposed explanation, Cullen rejected the notion 
that sensibility was due to the quantity of nerves present. Rather, 
it was because of increased oscillations along nerves in more 
sensitive areas: 
If an oscillation is propagated along a nerve, so long 
as the course of the nerve is perfectly free, the oscillation 
will not be accumulated; but if there is a stoppage, the 
oscillation will be accumulated there, and so its force 
considerably increased. In this way, I explain the many 
instances of motions propagated till they arrive at a more 
sensible part, or to an extremity, where a stop is put to 
the oscillations. I10 
Cullen presented this as a proximate causal explanation of a 
particular law of sensation. It 
is probable he envisaged a similar 
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form of explanation for the laws of sympathy interpreted in terms 
of the vis medicatrix naturae. 
Whyttsand Cullen's divergent attitudes to the nature and operation of 
sympathy have been discussed. These can be understood in terms of 
wider commitments to voluntarist and necessitarian images or nervous 
order, as alternative strategies for knowing the nervous system. 
This raises the question of whether Gregory's own views on sympathy 
can be accommodated to either of these positions. Gregory appeared 
to follow Whytt and Cullen by emphasising that sympathy proceeded from 
the animal power of the brain. However, he refrained from any 
speculation upon the actual cause of sympathy. Nor did he propose any 
general relationships between the energy of the brain and bodily organs. 
Instead, it was simply a matter of fact and observation that "when the 
nerve of either of the consenting parts 
[was] cut ... there 
[was] no 
sympathy". 
"' Also Gregory did not draw any conclusions that the 
operation of sympathy might indicate for a systematic nervous pathology. 
He merely noted that "some consents, or sympathies [were] natural, 
and other diseased. " He ignored Cullen's objections to the pro- 
liferation of particular sympathies and showed an eclectic pluralism 
in his own brief listing of the various features characteristic of 
sympathetic nervous action. Thus, Gregory did not propose any 
explanations of sympathy in terms of Whytt's sentient principle, or 
Cullen's animal power operating in terms of constantly conjointed 
antecedents and consequents. 
In keeping with both of his predecessors, Gregory was equally 
dismissive of former attempts to explain sympathy in terms of disguised 
mechanical continguities such as anastomosing arteries which connected 
sympathetically related parts. However, he was also critical of the 
view that sympathy depended upon the mind alone. In the Conspectus, 
he was unforthcoming about who had explained sympathy in this way. 
But in his Lectures, Gregory referred to Stahl. In itself, this is 
not particularly significant because Whytt and Cullen both claimed 
a middle-ground for their own views located somewhere between Stahl 
on the one hand, and those physicians perceived as mechanists and 
materialists on the other. However, while discussing Stahl, Gregory 
added that "others seem to [have meant] the same thing by considering 
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L ympathj as intelligent. "112 Thus Gregory seems to have been as 
critical of Whytt's voluntaristic interpretation of sympathy as he 
was of Cullen's necessitarian reservations concerning it. 
It is clear that Gregory's nescient physiology had no directionality 
in relation to voluntaristic and necessitarian images of nervous 
order. As in the former example of muscular motion, he endorsed a 
wholly nominal notion of sympathy because of its utility in 
demonstrating common sense limitations upon men's knowledge of the 
nervous system. General consent or the interconnectedness of the body 
as a whole epitomised the complex integration of living systems. This 
ruled out explanations of physiological processes in terms of uniform 
antecedents and consequents characteristic of inanimate nature. 
Sympathy as a phenomenon was subject to the distinctive logic of 
animate causation where 
the same causes produce different effects. Motions 
therefore may be produced by causes very different 
from what hath been supposed to produce them, or 
have been formerly observed to produce them. 113 
Because Gregory did not subscribe to either voluntarist or 
necessitarian images of nervous order, this does not mean that he 
failed to endorse the search for the epistemological interiorisation 
of nature. I have repeatedly emphasised that causation was the 
central theme in the process of interiorisation. 
Voluntarism was founded on the hegemony of mind-based productive 
causes, operating as intelligent agents in nature. In necessitarianism, 
it was a hegemony of physical causes, treated as related antecedents 
and consequents. I have shown that Gregory considered each kind of 
causality to be the legitimate object of mental philosophy and 
physics or natural philosophy. Gregory's Project was an act of 
demarcation based upon the distinctive logic appropriate to the object 
of each discipline. The less apparent third aspect of Gregory's 
enterprise was the identification of a logic of causality appropriate 
to physiological knowledge, in order that men might know animate 
nature. 
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In medicine, the utility of knowing animate nature was self evident: 
if physicians could understand the nature of processes in the human 
body, then they could identify and alleviate disease using remedies. 
The second part of the Conspr ectus dealt with therapeutics, considered 
as the knowledge of the qualities of remedies and their manner of 
operation. 
114 But how precisely were men to make judgements about 
the aetiology of diseases and so proceed with a therapeutic 
intention to cure them? Again, this is an enormous subject. Here 
Gregory's views on the logic of animate causation are discussed in 
relation to the operation of stimulants and sedatives only. 
The operation of stimulants and sedatives was an important subject in 
18th century Scottish medicine. This is because their operation was 
perceived to be closely associated with the transmission of sensibility 
within the nervous system as a whole. Therefore they were considered 
as a part of the wider concern to account for the nature and mechanism 
of nervous action generally. Charles Alston, Whytt, Alexander Monro 




and latterly John Brown, 
117 developed distinctive theories of 
how stimulants and sedatives operated upon the body. It is evident 
that Whytt and Cullen developed their accounts of stimulants and 
sedatives in keeping with their orientations to the aetiology of 
nervous power discussed formerly. 
For Whytt, the manner of operation of opium indicated it produced its 
effects by means of the nervous system. He argued that the only role 
the blood had in the transmission of opium was to bring it to the 
nerves. It did not carry the opium to the brain; instead opium 
produced its immediate effects upon the parts of the nervous system 
it touched. Whytt argued that: 
opium, by affecting the extremities of the nerves of 
the parts to which it is applied, does by means of their 
connection and sympathy with the brain and spinal marrow, 
destroy or prevent, through the whole nervous system, 
the operation of that power upon which depends sensation 
and motion in the bodies of animals. 118 
Hence opium was accommodated to the sympathetic action of the 
sentient principle. As with the former case of muscular motion, the 
operation of opium was a resource for Whytt to maintain the distinctive 
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aetiology of nervous action. The effect of opium was to inhibit the 
general sympathy of the nervous system. All his explanations pf 
its operation were based not upon what opium as a physical substance 
caused to happen, but upon what the causally efficient sentient 
principle no longer did when affected by opium. Whytt made no 
reference to the dual nature of opium as a sedative which at a 
certain dosage could act as a stimulant. However, to Cullen this 
property was central and in need of theoretical explanation. 
Cullen held that because remedies were almost always efficacious in 
relation to living, rather than non-living, matter, it was 
reasonable to refer them to the sentient and irritable parts of 
the body, that is to "motions excited and propagated in the nervous 
system". 
119 Cullen noted that, in practice, it was always difficult 
to explain how stimulants and sedatives operated. But, in characteristic 
fashion, he added: 
it seems enough to observe that we know in general that 
the nervous power may be in different states of mobility 
and that there are substances which applied to the nerves 
have a power of increasing or diminishing the mobility of 
the fluid contained iý2Ö em. The former we name stimulants, 
the latter sedatives. 
As in the former example of muscular motion, Cullen equated the mobility 
of nervous power with the operation of a physically proximate nervous 
fluid. Cullen wrote: 
To be more explicit on this subject, we assume the hypothesis 
we have before maintained, that there is a subtile elastic 
fluid inherent in the medullary substance of the brain 
and nerves upon the motions of which all sense and vital 
motions depend; and by which, therefore, motions are 
communicated from every one part to every other of the 
Nervous System. 121 
In keeping with the search for a proximate causal basis of nervous 
action, Cullen did not merge the operation of stimulants and sedatives 
into sympathy, as Whytt had done. Instead, he explained it in terms 
of physical causes, which either accelerated or retarded the nervous 
fluid. Like Whytt, he regarded their action in terms of an 
immediate effect upon the nerves rather than in terms of a prior 
transmission to the brain via the blood. However, as formerly, he 
utilised a quite different conception of nervous action itself. Also, 
122 
Cullen applied this explanation in principle to all remedies. 
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Cullen discussed what he regarded as the fundamental problem about the 
operation of stimulants and sedatives with reference to opium. 
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It was evident that although opium was principally a sedative, it 
frequently acted as a stimulant. But how could the same substance 
both retard and excite the movement of the nervous fluid? Cullen 
rejected the view that opium was composed of two substances, one 
stimulant and the other sedative, in favour of another explanation. 
The cause of the dual properties of narcotics like opium was to be 
found in the nervous system. itself. Cullen made a distinction between 
the "direct power" of standard stimulants and what he termed the 
"indirect stimulant" effect produced by opium, other narcotics and 
alcohol. The cause of the latter was the vis medicatrix naturae, or 
"that resistance and consequent activity, which the animal oeconomy 
suited to oppose to every application that has a tendency to hurt 
it.,, 124 
In his various comments about the operation of remedies Gregory 
emphasised that how particular remedies actually acted upon the body 
was completely unknown. However this did not matter, as long as the 
effects were certain and their nature and usefulness sufficiently 
understood. 
125 It has been shown how both Whytt and Cullen used 
the operation of stimulants and sedatives to highlight and confirm 
their preferred aetiologies of nervous action. Gregory also drew 
a lesson from the way they appeared to act. In his view, all 
proposed accounts of stimulants and sedatives epitomised the peculiar- 
ities associated with animate change, which inhibited any explanation 
of their manner of operation. 
Gregory discussed several proposed examples of how stimulants and 
sedatives were thought to operate. For example, it was agreed that 
each had a simple and uniform natural effect, but that the 
subsequently observed contrary effects followed from a defensive 
response by the body. 
126 Gregory considered that all such 
explanations which made use of the vis medicatrix naturae, or some 
other term to convey the innate powers of the human body, did not 
alleviate the fundamental problem. In cases where different and 
contrary effects proceeded from the same remedies 
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It makes no difference whether one or a thousand steps are 
interposed between the remedy applied to the body, and the 
ultimate and manifest effect that is discerned in it; since 
whatever be the number of the steps, every one of them must 
be accounted the effect of that which preceded it, and the 
case of that which follows, - so that the same reason which 
renders the connexion of the first and next step sure and 
steady, renders the continuation and chain of the whole 
fixed and immutable. 127 
In particular, the distinctive action of stimulants and sedatives ruled 
out wholly physical explanations in terms of uniform antecedents 
and consequents. Many similar remedies produced entirely different 
effects, while the same effect often resulted rrom different remedies. 
Also the condition of the nervous system varied from person to person, 
or within one person at different times. These factors resulted in 
many unforeseen effects during treatment. However, Gregqry argued 
that the greatest difficulty was 
The magnitude of the effect of such remedies by no means 
corresponds to the magnitude of the cause; so that the 
increase of the latter does not always insure the proportionate 
increase of the former. The circumstances are so far other- 
wise, that if we increase the dose considerably, the first, 
and, as it were, natural effect of the remedy, either stimulant 
or sedative quickly terminates, and passes, as it were, into 
the very opposite; ... 
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Thus the action of stimulants and sedatives did not correspond to the 
characteristic features of cause and effect in physics, which 
Gregory discussed in his Project. Animate causes were not 
constantly conjoined such that causes always had their full effects. 
Hence Gregory's strongest criticisms were reserved for necessitarian 
claims about the proximate causes of stimulant and sedative action. 
He maintained that no credible explanations had ever been given of the 
primary action of chemical remedies. Nor should they be because the 
medical practitioner had "no interest in the primary, obscure, and 
almost undiscoverable action of remedies, if such there be, which 
is so slight and fleeting. "129 Instead, his knowledge rested upon 
what experience told him were "the ultimate powerful, evident and 




In section two, it was shown that as a nescient common sense 
physiologist Gregory was equally censorious of Whytt's sentient 
physiology and Cullen's sceptical physiology. However, it was 
emphasised that despite their alternative metaphysical technologies, 
which utilised different conceptions of causality, each writer could 
successfully 'make out' his conceptions of the nervous system to be 
consistent with the natural theological obligations of 'sound' 
theism. In section three, it was shown that each writer's meta- 
physical predilections informed his statements about the nature of 
muscular motion. In section four, Whytt's and Cullen's conceptions 
of nervous action were equated with the voluntarist and necessitarian 
strategies for the epistemological interiorisation of inanimate 
nature found in the Kames-Stewart debate. The divergencies between 
these approaches was illustrated further in relation to Whytt and 
Cullen's attitudes to nervous sympathy. It was argued that Gregory's 
nescient physiology had no directionality in relation to voluntarism 
or necessitarianism and this was also evident in Gregory's attitude 
to sympathy. However, because Gregory did not endorse the hegemony 
of either efficient or physical causes, he did not thereby abandon 
the search for the epistenological interiorisation of animate nature. 
Instead he endorsed a conception of animate causation which was 
neither entirely mind-based, nor did it correspond to the constant 
conjunction of physical causes and effects. 
Gregory's emphasis upon the distinctive logic of animate causes was 
most clearly and directly expressed in relation to stimulant and 
sedative remedies. His remarks. there applied equally well to other 
reservations he expressed about knowledge of the nervous system 
generally and about perception muscular motion and sympathy in 
particular. In each of these cases, Gregory was more censorious of 
necessitarian strategies for securing the epistemological interiorisa- 
tion of physiological knowledge, than the voluntarist alternative. 
A close comparison between Gregory's remarks and Cullen's writings 




Gregory considered that proximate causal explanations of processes 
in the nervous system such as perception, muscular motion, sympathy 
or the operation of remedies rested upon "a philosophy so vain and 
fallacious which exceedingly corruptted) medical science. " This 
philosophy had no utility; furthermore it distracted "the minds of 
medical persons, especially students, " from more serious matters. 
He continued: 
Let none, then, rashly confide in those maxims concerning 
the order of nature, and laws of philosophising in which 
some who think themselves philosophers, attempt to intrench 
themselves; since some of these rules are vague and futile, 
others even utterly false; some, perhaps, are in a certain 
sense true and useful, but neither so general as some 
persons believe, nor so certain and fixed as to be assumed 
for truths in opposition to experience. 13' 
The kind of maxims about causal inference which Gregory identified 
were that "the same cause always produces the same effect"; that 
"the same or similar effects always proceed from the same or like 
causes"; and that "the magnitude of the effect is always proportioned 
to the magnitude of the cause. " Gregory challenged necessitarian 
applications of these rules. Although, it was "probable if not 
certain, and the principle and foundation of all natural science, 
that the course and order of nature 
[was] 
uniform and unalterable, 
and therefore that the same cause always produced the same effect. " 
But this remained the case only if all corroborating circumstances 
remained constant. But this was rarely so in animate nature where: 
the same or, at any rate, very similar effects, often 
proceed, from causes very different, sometimes quite 
opposite; and so far from the magnitude of the effect 
always corresponding to the magnitude of the cause, from 
a greater cause the effect frequently is less, sometimes 
new, and sometimes even opposite to what is usual. 132 
By specifying the kinds of causes appropriate to particular 
disciplines, Gregory considered he was assisting in the general 
search for the epistemological interiorisation of nature. Only by- 
clarifying the conditions of men's perception of change was it . 
possible to proceed to the legitimate knowledge of nature. Some 
indication of his attempt to carry this out in the field of medical 
physiology has been discussed. Gregory's special medical competences 
led him to consider a range of esoteric topics, rarely treated by 
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other Scottish scientific metaphysicians. However, Gregory certainly 
was not alone in his general attempt to develop a logic for different 
disciplines, based upon a legitimate application of the rules of 
causal reasoning. A similar enterprise received notice in the 
first part of Stewart's Elements. He also considered the underlying 
rules of the philosophy of mind should form the basis of a 
comprehensive logic which would define the objects of study in 
various disciplines. 
133 Stewart commented that, even at the end of 
the 18th century, far less progress had been made in this area than 
was usually imagined. 134 He added that a thorough study of the 
"rules of philosophising" was still necessary in natural philosophy 
itself, despite its recent achievements. Stewart's own contribution 
to this enterprise was delayed until he eventually published part two 
of the Elements, which falls outside the scope of the present study. 
But he did some provisional remarks on the crucial distinction 
between efficient and physical causes, 135 and on the propriety of 
18th century theories of perception. 136 On the latter subject at 
least, Stewart's views correspond very closely to remarks made by 
Gregory in the Conspectus. Stewart's own discussion of this subject 
is also representative of the overlapping concerns of the philosophy 
of mind, physiology and mechanics in later Scottish scientific meta- 
physics. In particular, Stewart also dealt with the extension of 
concepts of mind, matter and motion from natural philosophy to the 
physiology and philosophy of perception. Like Gregory, Stewart 
opposed this. He sketched the outlines of how the connected 
problems of accounting for motion in mechanics and explaining the 
process of perception using kinematic analogies from natural 
philosophy could be resolved. This involved applying Boscovich's 
criticisms of motion produced by impulse and contact action generally, 
to reform men's understanding of the causes of motion in mechanics. 137 
If this was accepted in natural philosophy, and action at a distance 
became the norm rather than the exception, then both physiologists 
and philosophers would also reform their mistaken theories of 
perception. 
138. This involved rejecting the metaphysical axiom that 
there could be no action at a distance which Stewart regarded as the 
underlying feature of both materialist and spiritualist-inspired 
accounts. 139 
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An important consequence of Gregory's concern with causation and 
epistemological interiorisation generally was to erect boundaries 
between disciplines. While all knowledge of nature was to be 
referred to the nature and limits of the human understanding, 
according to Gregory and Stewart, this process informed men of 
differences in the objects of study particular to physiology, 
natural philosophy and the philosophy of mind. 'However, if we 
return for a moment to Cullen as a representative of necessitarianism, 
the same process led to very different conclusions. Cullen's use of 
the constant conjunction account of causation is an indication of his 
own particular concern with epistemological interiorisation. Yet 
the net effect of this strategy for securing the order of nature in 
men's minds was an opposite one in relation to the creation and 
maintenance of boundaries between disciplines. If men's perception 
of change was restricted to the constant conjunction of events, then 
boundaries between disciplines became less relevant. This was 
because what some men might call different kinds of causes, were all 
reducible to men's perception of the constant conjunction between 
antecedents and consequents. When lecturing to his students, Cullen 
raised the general problem of the role of philosophy in physiology: 
I must necessarily speak the language of metaphysics because 
there is hardly any phenomenon of the nervous system in which 
the operations of the mind are not more or less concerned; if 
therefore, you will call the consideration of these operations 
metaphysics, their use is altogether unavoidable. I employ 
metaphysics, because every physiologist has employed them; 
they have been used to corrupt and destroy physiology to a 
great degree, and they are not to be counteracted but by 
means of their own weapons -I think that every part of the 
history of the human mind may be, on one occasion or another, 
useful in physic. The physician must at times be the moral 
philosopher also; and he will sometimes practice with little 
success, unless he can apply himself to the mind. '40 
In conclusion, it must also be emphasised that the specification of 
an appropriate logic for men's knowledge of causation also had an 
important role to play within the realms of physiology and medical 
theory. Statements about what kind of causes could be reasonably 
identified in processes of health and disease were clearly relevant 
to conceptions of the form and object of-medical practice. However, 
Gregory's views on this subject are very difficult to recover for 
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reasons already mentioned. Instead, after writing the Conspectus, 
Gregory appears to have devoted his intellectual energies to the 
reform of natural philosophy. Enough has been said to show the 
broad continuity between his physiological writings and the 
concerns of the Project as a whole. Both were united by the search 
for the epistemological interiorisation of nature, or the conditions 
of men's judgements about causes and effects. Gregory's last Essay 
in the Project involved a comparative assessment of the conditions 
of human judgement about causes in physics and the motives of men's 
actions. It'was also the final salvo in his attack on necessitarianism 
and is considered in the last chapter. 
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See "Physiology", Works, 157. There, he urged his students 
who considered his views too theoretical to suspend judgement 
until his conclusions were "established as a matter of fact. " 
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44. Cullen, "Lectures" (ref. 43), Works, vol. 1,436; also 
"Physiology", Works, vol. 1,6 for a similar viewpoint. 
45. Cullen, "Physiology", Works, vol. 1,10. 
46. In a continuation of the above passage inserted by Thomson from 
manuscript sources, Cullen added "I do not know where gentlemen 
have a better opportunity of studying these, in the most 
fundamental manner, than in this university. " 
47. Ibid., Works, vol. 1,52. 
48. Cullen, "Lectures" (ref. 43), Works, vol. 1,417-18. 
49. Cullen, "Physiology", Works, vol. 1, -111-121 also "Lectures", 
Works, 404. See also CCullen collection (ref. 21), 132, 
nTservations on the vis medicatrix naturae". 
50. Conspectus, 33. 
51. Ibid., 34. 
52. Ibid., 36. 
53. Ibid., 37. 
54. Ibid., 36. Even Gregory could not eliminate all aspects of 
tii vocabulary of motion from his own discussion. However, he 
was always careful to record his disapproval of it. For example, 
discussing sensations resulting from external causes he noted 
these were "said by medical men to take place by impression or 
impulse. " 
55. Cullen, "Physiology", Works, vol. 1,37. 
56. Conspectus, 40. 
57. Ibid., 41. 
58. Ibid., 44, and the preceding three pages for his general 
comments. 
59. On the general significance of sight and touch in Scottish 
metaphysics see G. E. Davie, The Scotch metaphysics (D. Litt. 
thesis, University of Edinburgh. - . 
60. See Conspectus, 44-65. 
61. Ibid., 65. 
62. Ibid., 68. 
63. Ibid. 
64. Ibid., 17-18. 
65. Ibid., 19. 
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66. In contrast, Cullen made no such distinction between chains of 
causes and effects in disease and those in physics. See Thomson, 
Life of Cullen (ref. 21), vol. 1,331-32. 
67. Cons ectus, 19. See also Lectures, 3, where Gregory used this 
conception of animate causation to distinguish between the medical 
and mechanical acts: 
The laws of natural objects are easily known, and the 
changes they undergo may soon be learned. But in the 
structure of the human body the parts are minute and 
the texture delicate, and perhaps hardly ever to be 
known. 
68. Conspectus, 19. See also Lectures, 137. 
69. Whytt, "Essay", Works, 122. 
70. Ibid., 130. 
71. Ibid., 127. 
72. Whytt, "Observations", Works, 489,525. 
73. Whytt, "Essay", Works, 172. 
74. Ibid., 127. 
r 
75. Ibid., 143. Where Whytt used the term "motion", it was usually 
as a metaphysical rather than a physical concept. He regarded 
it as an inherent property of mind, rather than a literal 
description of"transmissions in the nervous system. 
76. ibia", 142. 
77. Ibid., 147. As a suitable antidote to theologically dangerous 
materialistic views of the nervous system, Whytt made repeated 
references to Clarke in his footnotes. 
78. Ibid., 183-200. 
79. French, Robert Whytt (ref. 10), 63-76. 
80. Whytt, "Observations on sensibility and irritability" (ref. 10), 
Works, 293. 
81. Ibid., 294-95. In his comparisons with accounts of gravity, 
WE tty noted that gravity had been ascribed to two causes. One 
was the immediate operation of an immaterial being. The other 
was "the action of some subtile elastic medium on matter. " 
In the latter case, Whytt believed that the elasticity of its 
parts would also have to be referred to an incorporeal cause. 
82. Ibid., 305-06. 
4 
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83. Cullen's principal objections to Haller's views occur in 
"Physiology", Works, 66-82. Cullen's mäin points can be 
summarised as follows: 
(1) He disagreed that all nervous power was extraneous 
to muscles and all muscular power (vis insita) came 
from within. 
(ii) He disagreed that some parts of the body were 
without sensibility. 
(iii) He disagreed that muscular power was more evident 
in some muscle fibres than others. 
(iv) He disagreed that animals without brains still 
displayed irritability. 
(v) He considered that irritability confounded two 
distinct concepts; "mobility", or the facility 
with, which contraction could be excited; and 
"vigour", or the force with which it could be 
performed. 
Cullen put forward his views on muscular contraction in 
reference to a number of experiments. But, unlike Whytt, he 
did not perform these himself. They were carried out by one of 
his students, Thomas Smith, and eventually published in Smith's 
dissertation, De actione musculari (Edinburgh, 1767). Smith 
compared the effects of stimuli applied directly to excised 
muscles and indirectly to their attached nerve endings. Smith 
found that the responses were identical in both cases. From 
this Cullen drew two important conclusions. Firstly, there was 
a continuity of medullary substance or nervous fluid between 
nerves and muscles. Secondly, because the duration of contrac- 
tions in both cases was also the same, it was evident that 
sensibility and irritability were always equivalent. Cullen 
presented this as a refutation of Haller's segregation of these 
concepts. 
Despite this disagreement with Haller over the distinction 
between irritability and sensibility, Cullen agreed with him 
upon an equally fundamental point: muscular contraction was 
performed by a power which differed only in degree from 
inanimate elastics. Cullen acknowledged there were unique 
properties of muscular contraction, such as its force being 
stronger than the applied stimulus, or the regular attention 
of contractions and relaxation of healthy muscle fibre. These 
were the same phenomena emphasised by Whytt. However, Cullen 
did not regard such features to be confirmation of the presence 
of a sentient principle in the muscle fibres. Rather they 
followed from the peculiarities of muscular contraction itself. 
For example, the tone of the fibres prior to contraction could 
account for the disproportionality between stimulus and 
contractile response. 
84. Cullen, "Physiology", Works, 70. 
85. Ibid., 83. 
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86. Ibid., 73. Unfortunately, Cullen did not specify who these 
foreign philosophers were. However in keeping with Newton, 
Cullen stated that he considered that: 
the cohesion of bodies depends upon the presence of 
an elastic fluid, which is more rare in the pores of 
bodies, and more dense upon their surface, by which 
the parts are kept together. 
87. Ibid. As Cullen considered the ether to be implicated in the 
phenomena of electricity and magnetism and to be elastic and 
oscillatory, his vocabulary for the nervous ether drew freely 
upon all these terms. A good example of this occurs in Cullen's 
explanation of Newton's "circle of fire" experiment. Because 
sensations persisted after external stimuli had ceased, Cullen 
considered that this "law of sensation" showed that "the 
motion excited in the sentient extremity must be of the 
oscillatory or vibratory kind, somehow depending upon an 
electric tremor". On the role of the ether generally in 
Newton's philosophy see J. E. McGuire, "Force, active principles, 
and Newton's invisible realm". Ambix, 15 (1968), 154-208; 
P. M. Heimann, "'Nature is a perpetual worker': Newton's aether 
and eighteenth century natural philosophy", Ambix, 20 (1973), 
1-25; P. M. Heimann and J. E. McGuire, "Newtonian forces and 
Lockean powers: concepts of matter in eighteenth century 
thought", Historical studies in the physical sciences,. 3 (1971), 
233-306, on 240-45; Simon John Schaffer, The Newtonian cosmology 
and the steady state (Ph. D. thesis,. University of Cambridge, 1980), 
172-94. For Newton's own remarks on the nervous ether see 
"General scholium", Principia, 547; Queries 14,23,24 and 31, 
p0 t icks, 346-403. For the wider role that ideas of perception 
played in Newton's thought see Martin Tamny, "Newton, creation, 
and perception", Isis., 70 (1979), 48-58. See also Roderick W. 
Homes "Electricity and the nervous fluid") Journal of the history 
of biology,. 3 (1970), 235-51; Roger K. French, "Ether and 
physiology", in G. N. Cantor and M. J. S. Hodge, eds., Conceptions 
of ether: studies in the history of ether theories 1740-1900, 
Cambridge, 1981), 111-34. For Cullen 's use of the ether in a 
chemical context see J. R. R. Christie, "Ether and the science of 
chemistry, 1740-1790", ibid., 85-110; and for religious uses of 
the ether see G. N. Cantor, "The theological significance of 
ethers", ibid., 135-56. 
88. Cullen, "Physiology", Works, vol. 1,17. 
89. Ibid., , 
90. Ibid., 72-73. 
91. Conspectus, 71. 
92. Ibid., 75. Cullen also referred animal power to the will's 
government; but he considered volition to be consequent upon 
previous motions produced by impressions elsewhere in the 
system ("Physiology", Works, vol. 1,65). However, Gregory 
referred it to the will considered as undetermined by prior 
events in the nervous system. 
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93. Lectures, 385. 
94. Conspectus, 34. Part of the difficulty confronting Gregory, 
Reid and Stewart over the ether was the citation of Newton by 
writers such as Cullen who favoured its use. In view of this, 
Gregory wrote: 
Some writers have very grossly abused even the 
venerable name of Newton, by referring wholly to his 
authority the opinion they wish to defend: although, 
with his accustomed modesty and prudence (which most 
authors are disposed rather to praise than to imitate) 
he proposed his ideas on the subject only as a 
conjecture or question, to be refuted or established 
by suitable experiments and arguments. But it is not 
permitted to adopt as truths the conjectures even of a 
Newton. This were neither to imitate him, nor to 
promote science. 
(Ibid., 33). 
For similar problems of 'Newton-management' see Dugald Stewart, 
Elements of the philosophy of. the human mind (London, 1843), 44; 
Thomas Reid, "Letters to Lord Kames", Works, 58. 
95. Conspectus, 35. 
96. Lectures, 387. 
97. Conspectus, 72. 
98. Ibid., 76. 
99. Lectures, 405. 
100. For an assessment of the wider social significance of the ideas 
of sensibility and sympathy see-Lawrence, "Nervous system and 
society" (ref. 4). 
101. Whytt, "Observations", Works, preface (pages unnumbered, but 
written 15/11/1764). Whytt was quite explicit about the 
superiority of his account in this wider sense and made his 
point using an example. This involved the manner in which 
grief produced tears. But by attributing this process to 
sympathy, understood as an exclusively mental or spiritual 
cause, this ruled out other forms of proposed explanations 
in terms of "any compression of the lachrymal glands or their 
ducts by the neighbouring muscles. " Whytt also made a further 
comparison with accounts of gravity, arguing that although 
Newton did not explain the cause of gravity, nevertheless the 
principle of gravity was an improvement in natural philosophy, 
not least because it eliminated fallacious hypotheses such as 
vortices. 
102. Cullen, "Physiology", Works, vol. 1,155. 
103. Ibid., 149. 
104. Whytt, "Observations", Works, 510. 
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105. Ibid., 512. 
106. Ibid., 524. 
107. Cullen, "Physiology", Works, vol. 1,, 111. 
108. Ibid., 157. 
109. Quoted from Thomson, Life of Cullen (ref. 21), vol. 1,309. 
110. Cullen, "Physiology", Works, vol. 1,52. 
111. Conspectus, 81. 
112. Lectures, 439. 
113. Ibid. 
114. Gregory's conception of a remedy was not restricted to 
medicine. It included every change which could effect a 
salutary change in the body. Other major parts of remedies 
included "surgery" and "mode of life". After a general 
opening chapter, Gregory arranged each subsequent chapter 
according to a particular kind of remedy known by-its effect. 
Among those he included were astringent, emollient, 
corroborating and lithontriptic remedies. 
115. Charles Alston was Professor of Materia Medica at Edinburgh. 
His death during the 1760-61 session was the occasion of 
Cullen's secondment to lecture in his place while still 
Professor of Chemistry. Alston's own lectures were published 
posthumously in 1770. See also C. Alston, "A dissertation 
on opium", Medical essays and observations (Edinburgh, 1771), 
vol. 5,93-146; Whytt, 'Account o opium (ref. 10), Works, 
309-27; Alexander Monro, "How opium [acts on nerves to w ich 
[it is] applied [and brings) the rest of te nervous system 
into sufferance ... by sympathy ..., "Essays and observations 
physical and literary (Edinburgh, 1771). vol. 3,292-365; 
John Clarke, "The effects of a very large dose of opium", 
ibid., 121-28. 
116. Cullen did not write separately upon stimulants and sedatives. 
His views can be found in passages in the "Physiology", and in 
two general works on materia medica. These are Lectures on the 
materia medica (London, 1771), which was a pirated edition of 
his original 1760-61 lectures. Shortly before his death, Cullen 
produced a revised edition, A treatise of the materia medical 
2 vols., (Edinburgh, 1789). A more detailed appraisal of Cullen 
would take into account the original holograph manuscript, 
Lectures on the materia medica, at the Royal College of 
Physicians of Edinburgh Library (ref. 21), M. S. C15. Cullen 
also supervised the publication of the sixth edition of the 
Edinburgh Pharmacopoea in 1774. See also J. W. Crellin, 
"William Cullen: his calibre as a teacher and an unpublished 
introduction to his. 'Treatise of the materia medica', Medical 
history, 15 (1971), 79-87. 
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117. See Dr. John Brown, Elementa Medicinae (Edinburgh, 1780); An 
enquiry into the state of me icine inburgh, 1781); 
Observations on te princip es o the old system of physic 
(Edinburgh, 
118. Whytt, "Account of opium" (ref. 10), Works, 323-24. 
119. Cullen, Treatise (ref. 116), vol. 1,59. In the restatement of 
the properties of the nervous system in his last work, Cullen 
seemed more inclined to distinguish between sensibility and 
irritability than in the "Physiology", written 17 years earlier. 
However, Cullen restated his former views in a very condensed 
way and the matter is not conclusive. 
120. Ibid., vol. 2,132. 
121. Ibid., vol. 2,218. 
122. Cullen's conception of what a stimulant or sedative actually was, 
extended far beyond the whole mechanism of sensation itself, to 
be a stimulant in the broadest sense and upon which the energy 
of the brain was ultimately dependent. See ibid., vol. 2, 
133; "Physiology", Works, vol. 1,125-31. 
123. Cullen, "Physiology", Works, vol. 1,113-14. 
124. Cullen, Treatise (ref. 116), vol. 2,221. 
125. Conspectus, 233. 
126. At the time Gregory wrote the Conspectus, there was a dispute 
between Cullen and Brown over the nature of excitability and the 
duality of stimulants and sedatives. For an introduction to the 
matters at issue see Thomson Life of Cullen (ref. 21), vol. 2, 
passim. 
127. Conspectus, 264-65. 
128. Ibid., 263. 
129. Ibid., 265. 
130. Ibid. 
131. Ibid. 
132. Ibid., 266. 
133. Dugald Stewart, Elements (ref. 94), 25. 
134. Ibid., 5,32. 
135. Ibid., 39-41. Although Stewart's discussion is brief, it 
appears that like Reid, he held efficient causes to be 
attributes of immaterial substances only. 
136. Ibid., 43-47. 
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137. Ibid., 47-49. Stewart was critical of accounts of both the 
communication of motion in physics and the communication of 
sensation in perception. He argued that, in discussing the 
latter, men had made analogies with the former. Thus the 
transmission of sensations in the nervous system was inter- 
preted as a form of impulse motion. Stewart encouraged the 
reception of Boscovich'S ideas because, if impulse action 
based upon material contiguity-was rejected in physics, then 
the analogical appeal of impulse-based accounts of perception 
would also be subverted. Similarly, Boscovich's ideas had a 
theological utility. Stewart noted that the nature of gravity 
was usually cited to impress "the mind with a sense of that 
mysterious agency, or efficiency, into which general laws must 
be resolved. " At the same time, general laws also had a 
tendency to weaken "those emotions of wonder and curiosity" 
excited by nature. However, by taking the familiar and habitual 
facts of impulse and rendering it "unaccountable", then this 
re-kindles men's "attention" and "curiosity": 
If the theory of Boscovich should ever be established 
on a satisfactory foundation, it would have this tendency 
in a still more remarkable degree, by teaching us that 
the communication of motion by impulse (which we are apt 
to consider as a necessary truth), has no existence 
whatever; and that every case in which it appears to our 
senses to take place, is a phenomenon no less inexplicable, 
than that principle of attraction which binds together the 
most remote parts of the universe. (49) 
See Richard Olson, "The reception of Boscovich's ideas in 
Scotland", Is, 60 (1969), 91-103; also the general discussion 
in Robert E. Schofield, Mechanism and materialism: British 
natural philosophy in an age of reason (Princeton, 6-41. 
It was not without prophetic insight that Thomas Melville wrote 
to William Cullen: 
I have not attempted so much to confute what [ ames's 
essayl advanced as to. shew" it leads to mystery [and] 
scepticism or at last: -terminates naturally in the system 
of Boscovich the Roman Professor who denies the existence 
of Atoms [and] reduces all matter to active [and] moveable 
points of no magnitude. 
See Thomas Mellville to William Cullen, 21/2/1752, Cullen 
collection (ref. 21) and quoted in Roger L. Emerson, "The 
Philosophical Society of Edinburgh, 1748-1768", The British 
journal for the history of science, 14 (1981), 133-76, o 58. 
138. Stewart's remarks in the Elements certainly bring out the 
theological directionality of nescience characteristic of 
voluntarism. See also his Notes from a course of lectures 
delivered at the University o Edinburgh, 1785-86, A er een 
Univerii-t-yLibrary MS 190-91, lectures 53-55 or further 
confirmation. These were written by an unknown student and 
seem to have been taken down almost verbatim. However what is 
perhaps more noticeable, is that, where these subjects are 
discussed in the Elements, the treatment is remarkably like 
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that found in Adam Smith's "The principles which lead and 
direct philosophical enquiries; as illustrated by the history 
of astronomy", Essays on philosophical subjects (London, 1869), 
325-85. 
This was originally edited by Joseph Black and James Hutton and 
first published in 1795, some years before part one of Stewart's 
Elements was published. However, as Smith's essay is believed 
to have been composed during the 1750's, it is possible Stewart 
may have seen it beforehand. Gregory, on the other hand, did 
not use this psychologistic language, nor did he make any detailed 
references to Smith in his work. On Smith's philosophy of 
science see Josep R. Lobera, "The Enlightenment and Adam Smith's 
conception of science",, in Alun Jones and Henrika Kuklick, eds., 
Knowledge and societ : studies in the sociolo of culture past 
and present (Connecticut, 1981), vol. 3,109-36; D. D. Raphael, 
The true old Humeian philosophy' and its influence on Adam 
Smith", in G. P. Morice, ed., David Hume:. Bicentenary papers 
(Edinburgh, 1977), 23-38; Andrew S. Skinner, "Adam Smith: 
science and the role of the imagination", in William B. Todd, 
ed., Hume and the Enlightenment (Edinburgh and Austin, Texas, 
1974), -164-88. 
139. In general, Stewart's frame of reference for discussing this 
subject was a local one. He referred to Porterfield, to the 
Kames-Stewart and to Monboddo's various views on motion and 
- 
perception. 
140. Quoted in Thomson, Life of Cullen (ref. 21), vol. 1,260-61. 
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In chapters one, three and four, the principal features and goals of 
the Project were discussed. In chapter five, it was shown that many 
concerns in the Project also appeared in Gregory's writings on the 
theory of medicine. The connections between them were of two kinds. 
They were thematic because, in both metaphysics and medicine, 
Gregory sought to specify the nature, constraints and form of human 
judgements about causes, and so interiorise men's knowledge of 
nature in terms of the nature and limits of the human understanding. 
But there were also specific connections because Gregory opposed 
similar uses of voluntarist and necessitarian images of natural 
order in both disciplines. However, although Gregory had reservations 
about forms of voluntarism he perceived in Reid, John Stewart and 
Robert Whytt, he was consistently more critical of the necessitarianism 
exemplified in the writings of Hume, Kames and Cullen. His Essay was 
exclusively devoted to attacking the use of necessitarian accounts of 
causal judgements to characterise the relationship between, men's 
motives and their actions. 
The full title of the last part of Gregory's Project was an "Essay 
on the difference between the relation of motive and action and that 
of cause and effect in physics: on physical and mathematical 
principles". It was eventually published in 1792 as the Philosophical 
and literary essays. Despite the title, it only contained the single 
Essa , sandwiched 
between a lengthy Introduction and a concluding 
Appendix. More is known about both the pre-publication circulation 
of the Essay and subsequent responses to it. These details are 
provided in appendix IV in order to concentrate upon the contents 
here. Gregory's Essay is the most difficult part of the Project to 
discuss and evaluate. Therefore it is useful to outline its argument 
before going into greater detail later. 
Gregory's pluralistic theory of change involved specifying different 
"relations of event" appropriate to different areas of enquiry. His 
major criticism of voluntarism and necessitarianism was that both 
collapsed different relations of event into forms of monism based 
upon a hegemony of either efficient or physical causes. In particular, 
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Gregory noted that besides treating physiological causes on a par 
with causes and effects in physics, necessitarians also maintained 
that the relation between men's motives and their actions was also 
a constant conjunction of antecedents and consequents. In other 
words, moral necessity was entirely conformable to physical 
necessity and that, although man had the freedom of choice between 
two alternatives, his will was necessarily determined by antecedent 
motives. Gregory's Essay was devoted to falsifying this claim and 
hence, demonstrating that the relation of motive and action was not 
equivalent to cause and effect'in physics. Gregory considered that 
man's freedom extended beyond the notion of choice according to the 
stronger motive and included the exercise of the will independently 
of antecedent motives. Thus, for Gregory, the relation of motive 
and action was intrinsically separable. 
In reasserting the claims of liberty against necessitarianism, 
Gregory was merely one historical actor participating in a debate 
which can be conveniently thought of as commencing with Clarke at the 
beginning of the 18th century, and culminating in Reid's writings. 1 
However, the precise form that Gregory's own defence of liberty took 
was unusual. To make his case, he made use of intellectual resources 
drawn from physics itself, rather than the conventional metaphysical 
apparatus of the moral philosopher. In fact, Gregory's whole 
argument was built around Newton's first corollary to the laws of 
motion, commonly known as the parallelogram of forces. 
2 The general 
significance of this in physics is that it offers a mathematical 
means of representing the behaviour of bodies when subject to the 
simultaneous action of two forces which are not directly opposed. 
Although Gregory did discuss some aspects of Newton's own demonstra- 
tion he did not go into the technical and mathematical issues 
surrounding the composition and resolution of forces. Instead, 
Gregory was more interested in the moral purposes he could make 
the corollary serve in the controversy with necessitarianism. Thus 
he presented Newton's corollary as a symbolic model of the way in 
which men made judgements about bodies on the basis of causes and 
effect in physics. ' In the Essay, Gregory aimed to show there was no 
analogy between this process and judgements about motives and actions. 
Just why Gregory should use this remarkably indirect way of refuting 
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necessity can be provisionally answered by reconsidering the 
relationship between the search for epistemological interiorisation 
and the common context of scientific metaphysics in Scotland during 
this period. 
In the 18th century, historical actors routinely made inferences 
about items of natural knowledge in mechanics, physiology and other 
areas, conceptions of matter and spirit, views of God's nature and 
the form of his involvement with the created world, and, finally, 
accounts of man's own nature and moral status. It has been argued 
that, in later Scottish scientific metaphysics, these manifold 
inferences can be understood in terms of two major patterns or 
images of natural order, voluntarism and necessitarianism. Gregory's 
own position has been located largely in terms of his opposition to 
these strategies for securing the order of nature in men's minds. 
More generally, the argument developed here has been that in the 
Scottish context, ideas about causality were central to sustaining 
images of natural order because this was perceived as the means by 
which men could attain knowledge of nature. In the period after 
1750, Hume's account of causality and the responses to it by Gregory 
and others helped to create a distinctive form of Scottish scientific 
metaphysical discourse. 
Given the nature and goals of Scottish scientific metaphysics, 
conceptions of the nature of men's minds were probably more important 
than anything else, precisely because epistemological interiorisation 
involved referring the evidence of nature to the nature of mind. 
Thus two different conceptions of man can be found embedded within 
voluntarism and necessitarianism. In the former, men were considered 
as active beings, endowed with free will; in the latter man was a 
being who acted freely in the sense of being able to choose between 
two alternatives, but this choice was not itself uncaused. Hence 
within necessitarianism, men's motives determined their actions. 
This brief characterisation does not take into account the 
sophisticated negotiations of conceptions of mind which actors 
displayed in actual controversies between necessitarians and 
voluntarists. It merely notes the main point at issue. 3 In Scotland 
after 1750, Hume and to a lesser extent Kames, were both instrumental 
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in the precise form that debates about liberty and necessity took. 
Although these subjects were discussed before this by Scots such as 
Andrew Baxter and William Dudgeon, 4 the growing popularity of 
Hume's and Kames's views during the 1750s and 60s inaugurated a new 
phase in the debate. It has been suggested by Phillipson that both 
men fostered a climate of "polite determinism" within Edinburgh's 
Enlightenment culture. 5 
Hume's and Kames's conceptions of necessity have already been treated 
in previous chapters. Both men reformulated the central tenets of 
necessity according to their own preferred philosophical resources but 
the common ground between them was the emphasis upon the role of 
experience and'feelings, and a mutual concern to accommodate the 
feeling of liberty to the scheme of necessity. Where they differed 
was that Hume's commitment to experience and feelings used the 
doctrine of ideas as its chosen vehicle of expression. Kames, on 
the other hand, relied upon intuitive principles of belief in a 
fashion which foreshadowed common sense philosophy. 6 A further 
difference concerned ontology. Kames's views on necessity appealed 
to the intrinsic activity of matter in conjunction with a scheme of 
inevitable law-like causal sequences. Hume, on the'other hand, 
remained in the domain of ideas and impressions and the principle of 
association. Also, for Karnes, philosophical necessity was the means 
to a reformulation of natural religion on a sounder basis. Hume's 
account of the nature of causal inference placed severe constraints 
upon the role of reason in the demonstration of the existence and 
attributes of the deity. However, despite these divergences, their 
respective treatments had much in common.? Hume and Kames both 
reformulated and defended philosophical necessity on grounds they 
considered more scientific. This involved an appeal to the laws 
of reasoning in philosophy which had been successful in bringing 
order to men's natural knowledge. Such rules constituted 
prescriptions about how to judge of causes and effects. Both men 
sought to apply similar criteria in order to uncover the causes of 
human conduct. This is most apparent in Hume's "reconciling 
project" between liberty and necessity, which argued that motives 
and actions were constantly conjoined exactly in the manner men 
perceived the connection between causes and effects in physics. 
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Therefore, Hume argued, men's actions were as necessary as the 
observed behaviour, of inanimate matter *8 
Gregory's Essay can be situated as part of the subsequent response 
to Humeian 'new-modelled' necessitarianism by common sense philosophers 
generally. It was written at the same time Reid was reformulating 
voluntarism on the basis of the constitutionally given intellectual 
and active powers, of men's minds. 
9 However, Gregory did not re- 
state the claims of liberty by appealing to men's common sense and 
the direct evidence of consciousness. Instead, he put forward a 
form of demonstration which he claimed was independent of such 
considerations. Yet this did not involve a return to the evidence 
of language used earlier in the Project. The nature and significance 
of the new metaphysical resources Gregory brought to the task of 
refuting the claim by modern necessitarians is the subject of this 
concluding chapter. 
Throughout the Project, Gregory continued to attack Hume's 
philosophy and pointed to its dangerous influence upon members of the 
Scottish scientific community. However, in the Essay he widened his 
criticisms to include Joseph Priestley. Gregory considered that 
Priestley's scientific metaphysics exemplified the pernicious 
influence of Hume's new-modelled necessitarianism. In fact, Priestley 
was perceived by Gregory to have used Hume's views on causation in 
ways that were similar to local Scottish uses by men such as Kames, 
Cullen and Hutton. Thus Gregory's criticisms of Priestley were also 
a means of attacking local instances of Hume's influence in Scottish 
scientific metaphysics. As an English intellectual, Priestley had an 
important and virtually unique role in later 18th century Scottish 
debates about necessitarianism. In section two, some details 
concerning Priestley's criticisms of common sense philosophy are 
given to provide an intellectual context for Gregory's refutation of 
necessity on the indirect basis of different kinds of philosophical 
relations, rather than by immediate appeals to the ontological status 
of men's minds. In particular, the account concentrates on Priestley's 
use of the connected concepts of constant conjunction and necessary 
connection which were central to his own account of philosophical 
necessity. In section three, more details of Gregory's argument are 
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given. ' It is shown how Gregory made use of a-particular theory of 
human judgement to sustain his demonstration of the disjunction 
between causes and effects and motives and actions. This is 
followed-up in section four, where the contents of three responses 
to Gregory's Essay are discussed. In section five, I return to the 
role of judgement 
r_in 
natural philosophy and Gregory's views on the 
demonstrative basis of physics are compared with similar opinions 
held by John Robison, Professor of Natural Philosophy at Edinburgh. 
In conclusion, the central features of Gregory's account of men's 
judgements about causes and effects are summarised. His opposition 
to necessitarianism is situated in the context of a shared enterprise 
carried out by other Scottish scientific metaphysicians who also 
sought the reform of natural philosophy and the philosophy of mind 
on the basis of human understanding. 
271 
2" THE CONCERN WITH PHILOSOPHICAL NECESSITY IN LATER 18TH CENTURY 
SCOTLAND: PRIESTLEY'S CRITICISMS OF REID 
Priestley published his attack on Scottish common sense philosophy 
in 1774. Although his Examination of Reid, Beattie and Oswald 
considered other writers, the exposition here is focused largely on 
his criticisms of Reid. The most persistent theme of Priestley's 
critique of Reid's Inquiry was that, despite attacking Hume, Reid had 
"himself introduced almost universal scepticism and conclusion". 
10 
Priestley saw Reid as a sceptic because, like Hume, Reid had also 
denied the existence of necessary connections in nature. By imposing 
what Priestley called an "impassable gulph" between the mind, the 
contents of perception and external objects, Priestley suggested Reid 
was in fact closer to Berkeley than the common sense realism to which 
Reid laid claim. Firstly, Reid denied things had a "real instrument- 
ality of their own". 
>> Secondly, because his theory of mind was 
founded upon "independent arbitrary instinctive principles", 12 men 
only had access to a "relative truth"13 which was wholly dependent 
upon their constitution. Priestley stated that the aim of his 
critique was to challenge the claims of common sense by "ascribing a 
little more to habit, and to the necessary connections and consequences 
of things". 
14 
The kinds of necessary connections Priestley had in mind were those 
founded upon the association of ideas. He contended that all Reid's 
instinctive principles were actually acquired through experienced 
associations between phenomena. 
15 Priestley routinely accepted 
there was an external world to which ideas corresponded by the 
mechanism of association. He acknowledged this was in fact a 
hypothesis, but one for which there was "a reasonable degree of 
evidence". 
16 Reid had stumbled over this point. He wrongly 
considered that scepticism was the inevitable outcome of sensationalist 
epistemology. Therefore, to oppose Hume's doctrine of ideas and 
impressions, Reid had sought what Priestley referred to as a "plenary 
assurance" based upon ultimate principles. 
17 Priestley rejected this 
common sense epistemology of instinctively felt beliefs in favour of 
a rational belief that "all the connections which had been supposed 
to exist between the several phenomena, powers and operations of the 
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mind actually had a real basis in nature". 18 However, an opposite 
viewpoint was evident in Reid. Priestley wrote: 
Where all the rest of the world see the most clearly 
connected chain of reasoning, [Reid] is always ready to 
suspect that some link is wanting, and as ready to 
supply the imaginary defect, not with another link, but 
with something that is no proper part of a chain, but 
some invisible power to keep the two parts together. 19 
Priestley's adoption of a relational constant conjunction theory of 
causality lay at the basis of his system of philosophical necessity. 
He stated that the aim of his philosophy was to reduce the manifold 
appearances of nature into classes by inferring similar causes from 
similar effects on the basis of the association of ideas. 
For Priestley, the means of displaying necessary connections between 
men's minds, ideas, sensations and material objects was Harley's 
physiology. 
20 Priestley criticised Reid's apparent ignorance of 
Hartley in the Inquiry. He was incensed at Reid's parodying of the 
doctrine of vibrations which Reid had grouped with other "engines" 
of the nervous system. 
21 Priestley viewed Reid's nescience about 
necessary connections in the nervous system as another instance of 
his general philosophical scepticism. Instead of seeing Hartley's 
work as a reasonable physiological basis for the association of 
ideas, Reid had dismissed it. Priestley saw Reid as segregating the 
physiology and philosophy of mind, so that the mind and the nervous 
system became problematically separated. Hence Reid's need to 
ground men's belief in the material world by an instinctive principle, 
antecedent to all experience. 
Priestley also attacked common sense philosophy because of its 
rejection of moral necessity. He criticised Reid and his associates 
for advocating a corrupted Arminian doctrine of the will. 22 Their 
voluntarism emphasised that men had the power to do different 
actions where the antecedent motives and circumstances governing 
their conduct remained the same. For Priestley, this made morality 
unaccountable. Unless motives were constantly conjoined with actions, 
then men were not responsible for their acts. In his alternative 
system of philosophical necessity, Priestley advocated moral necessary 
connections, where men had liberty or the power to do what they 
willed. 
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Priestley'also regarded his commitment to philosophical necessity 
as an essential basis for rational natural religion. Otherwise it 
was impossible to provide rational proof of the being and attributes 
of the deity. Although Priestley placed greater stress upon an 
equally rational revealed religion, natural religion was also 
important. He saw it as a shop window to attract the passing 
philosophical unbeliever. Once inside, he might also be converted 
to rational Christianity. Therefore Priestley was concerned to 
develop the best possible arguments and proofs for natural religion. 
This provided further grounds for attacking the common sense 
philosophers. Even though Reid made use of arguments about causality 
in his own defence of natural religion, Priestley considered his 
denial of necessary connections led him to place too much emphasis 
upon the wrong "kind of faith"23 in the deity. In his Examination, 
Priestley did not rehearse the basis of his own rational reconstruc- 
tion of natural religion. However, a consideration of his other 
works reveals that it followed from the same general principles as 
the rest of his thought. 
24 The truths of natural religion were to 
be resolved with reference to the association of ideas, formulated 
in terms of a theory of judgement about how men knew causes and 
effects in nature. The rules of philosophising about causes and 
effects dictated that men sought a unitary cause adequate to produce 
the manifold effects of nature, including man himself. Therefore men 
must infer a single godhead endowed with infinite power and 
intelligence to design, produce and sustain nature. 25 
As well as Priestley's stress upon ontological, physiological and 
moral necessary connection, he also embraced a form of logical 
necessary connection. Priestley considered that human judgements 
concerning the truth of propositions about nature was a further , 
instance of the association of ideas. 
26 Nature, the mechanism of 
perception and human judgement were all equally necessary and in 
complete correspondence with one another. All these processes were 
at bottom the same kind of necessity for Priestley. By departing 
from the standard of philosophical necessity based upon the associa- 
tion of ideas, the common sense philosophers broke down the links 
between ment, s mindsv the physiology of the nervous system, external 
nature and God. 
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In his Examination, Priestley's insistence upon necessary connections 
had several interrelated aspects. He variously put forward the claims 
of ontological, physiological, moral, natural theological and logical 
necessity. At the centre of his system of philosophical necessity 
lay a theory of judgement and evidence that was itself causal, 
necessary and founded upon the association of ideas. 
27 On the basis 
of laws of reasoning, or what Priestley called the "rules of 
philosophising", men made causal judgements about God, nature and 
their fellow men. The chief criterion for these judgements was 
the constant conjunction between analogically similar causes and 
effects. Because human understanding was so formed, these. manifold 
constant conjunctions were the basis of areasonable belief in real 
necessary connections throughout nature: 
For a cause cannot be defined to be any thing but such 
previous circumstances as are constantly followed by a 
certain effect; the constancy of the result making us 
conclude that there must be a sufficient reason in the 
nature of things why it should be so produced in these 
circumstances. 28 
Applied to mind, this meant that, although in practice, a man's 
conduct might not be known in advance, in principle, an acquaintance 
with his "disposition of mind", "precise situation", and "view of 
things" would enable a prediction about it to be successfully made. 
Alternatively, if circumstances remained the same, and a different 
effect followed from that expected from ponstant laws of nature, then 
this would imply an effect without a cause. However: 
if one effect might take place without a sufficient cause, 
another, and all effects, might have been without a cause; 
which entirely takes away the only argument for the being 
of a God. 29 
To illustrate his conception of the necessary determination of the 
will by motives, Priestley repeatedly compared it to the behaviour of 
a balance when weights of varying kind were placed in the opposing pans. 
Like weights, motives acted invariably and mechanically according to 
human physical laws. Thus: 
Strengthen the motive, and the action is more vigorous; 
diminish it, and its vigour is abated; change the motive, 
and the action is changed; intirely withdraw it, and the 
action ceases; introduce an opposite motive of equal 
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weight, and all action is suspended ... As far as we 
can judge motives and actions do in all possible cases 
strictly correspond to each other. 30 
Priestley also made considerable use of arguments which appealed to 
linguistic usage. Common speech showed that men considered motives 
to be real causes and that this circumstance was implied in the idea 
of "agency". 31 In this sense, Priestley considered that the 
"vulgar" actually subscribed to philosophical necessity. Whereas 
the vulgar were Priestley's alliesp common sense philosophers 
generallyq and especially Reid, were perceived as opponents of his 
evolving system of philosophical necessity. Their views on the 
freedom of the will disrupted the accountability of men's reasoning 
and reduced men from being the necessary architects of their own 
experience to a contingent dependency upon the innate principles of 
their mental constitution. 
An examination of Priestley's philosophical necessitarianism 
reveals substantial similarities with the views of Hume and Kames. 
Although Priestley was critical of both men for lacking a scientific 
understanding of the association of ideas found in Hartley and he 
also attacked Hume for his religious opinions, it seems likely that 
his presentation owed much to them. There is probably insufficient 
biographical information to confirm this directly in relation to 
Priestley Is own non-conformist education and his subsequent role as a 
32 
teacher in the dissenting academies. But indirect evidence 
suggests that Priestley's scientific metaphysics may have been derived 
from Scottish necessitarian sources. 33 Certainly, Kames, Hume and 
Priestley each endorsed the search for a scientific resolution of 
necessity. Each writer's willingness to employ forms of causal 
reasoning in moral subjects which were current in natural philosophy 
harmonised all three accounts of necessity. Furthermore, Priestley 
seems to have specifically made use of Hume's vocabulary of constant 
conjunction and necessary connection to 'new-model' necessitarianism. 
The central feature of this was the transposition of men's perception 
of constantly conjoined events into _necessary connections of 
various kinds. Thus despite the limits of men's understanding, men 
had access to a form of certainty relative to the nature of men's 
minds. 
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3. PORTERS, PARALLELOGRAMS, AND THE INERTIA OF MIND: 
GREGORY'S "ABSURD" ARGUMENT 
Reid's public response to Priestley was delayed until the appearance 
of the "Intellectual powers" and "Active powers" in 1785 and 1788 
respectively. 34 Although Reid's various references to Priestley are 
usually allusive rather than direct, they are frequently pointed out 
by Reid's editor, Hamilton; or they can be identified on the basis 
of textual evidence. In the "Active powers" especially, Reid 
discussed the respective claims of liberty and necessity. Two 
features of his characterisation of necessity are very relevant to 
Gregory's particular treatment in the EssaX 
,. 
Firstly, Reid 
identified the major claim of necessitarianism that motives operated 
like causes and effects in physics: 
It is a law of naturd with respect to matter, That every 
motion and change of motion, is proportional to the force 
impressed, and in the direction of that force. The scheme 
of necessity supposes a similar law to obtain in all the 
actions of intelligent beings; which, with little altera- 
tion, may be expressed thus: Every action, or change of 
action, in an intelligent being, is proportional to the 
force of motives impressed, and in the direction of that 
force. 35 
Reid noted this law of nature about matter was founded on the 
principle that it was passive. Necessitarians, by applying an 
analogous law to human action, supposed that intelligent beings were 
equally inactive. Secondly, he also noted that Hume and Priestley 
were advocating a form of necessity based on the constant conjunction 
theory of causation. 36 These two observations were common starting 
points for Reid's and Gregory's respective attacks on the 
philosophical necessity. 
Despite Gregory's criticisms about the implications of voluntarism 
I 
for natural philosophy, he declared his complete support for Reidis 
37 
account of men's active powers. Yet if both writers' accounts of 
the liberty of human agents are compared, the contrast could not be 
more striking. In Reid's presentations, we find all the typical 
worries of the moral philosopherl concerned with what he perceived 
as the consequences for moral and religious conduct if necessity 
were true. Reid opposed necessity because he considered that if 
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38 adopted it made men unaccountable to God and morally ungovernable. 
But in Gregory's caseq these concerns were scarcely raised in the 
Essazl. He certainly never appealed to such criteria in arguing 
againstnecessitarianism. Reid persistently referred liberty to a 
God-given power of men's constitution and manifested in the 
reasonable,. intelligent exercise of men's will. Gregory did not 
discuss the origin of men's power of willing at all. In fact, he 
rarely referred to the mental act of willing. Gregory preferred to 
speak about the contingentrelation between motive and action, rather 
than publicly inaccessible mental acts. However, the most important 
difference was that, Reid considered the best argument for liberty 
was "because Iman] has a natural conviction or belief, that, in 
many cases, he acts freely. 
39 But Gregory did not base his account 
on men's conviction of liberty at all. In fact, he explicitly 
contrasted his own approach with others which relied on introspection 
and men's feeling of power. In this sense, Gregory endorsed the 
force of criticisms about common sense justifications of liberty made 
by necessitarians such as Hume, Kames and Priestley. The clashes 
between voluntarists and necessitarians who advocated different 
accounts of mind had, in effect, politicised human experience. 
Accounts based upon the internal testimony of consciousness alone 
were now perceived by Gregory to be unacceptable, especially to 
necessitarians, who claimed men's sense of liberty was actually 
deceitful. Thus Gregory considered that this kind of evidence no 
longer had the power to secure consent in men's minds. Therefore 
his Essa was an attempt to transcend appeals to consciousness and 
so resolve the debate upon what he regarded as a more objective 
scientific basis. 
In Power and Activity, Gregory developed his views on language and 
the structure of verbs in order to display the difference between the 
relations of physical change and human activity, Also, it has been 
shown how he used 'aspects of his own position to censure both Reid 
and Hume. Buts significantly, Gregory sought to present his new 
metaphysical technology of linguistic usage as a demonstration of 
the "real difference between the relation of activity and that of 
cause and effect". This demonstration was to be based upon strictly 
necessary deductions from certain axioms, such as Gregory's self- 
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evident proposition that "language must be the expression of thought". 
The point of such demonstrations was that if the simple truths of the 
human mind could be axiomatised, then conclusions from them, if 
necessary, must command the assent of all men. In other words, 
demonstrations actually made consent in men's minds. For reasons 
which are unclear, Gregory did not bring his new metaphysical 
technology, of active and neuter verbs to bear directly on the 
problem of liberty and necessity. 40 Instead, he put forward a 
model of strict demonstration based upon the laws of human thought. 
As we have seen in chapter four, Gregory perceived that the argument 
behind Hume's position was founded upon the particular sense Hume 
gave to necessary connection within his "reconciling project". 
In Gregory's view, Hume had completely changed the form of the 
debate by reformulating the doctrine of necessity in terms of the 
theory of constant conjunction of causes and effects. Hume 
relocated necessity within the general framework of the association 
of ideass where it became the customary inference performed by the 
mind on the basis of previously conjoined causes and effects. This 
was adopted by Priestley who represented it as the essence of 
philosophical necessity. In the face of their "new-modelled" 
necessitarianismg Gregory redefined the aims of the philosophical 
libertarian. He had to show that there was no constant conjunction 
between motives and actions. This then is the general framework 
within which Gregory's Essay was situated. Gregory was in fact 
competing for control of the notion of constant conjunction as a 
key resource. Hume and Priestley made use of it in order to promote 
the cause of, philosophical necessity and to apply it to all the 
phenomena of nature. Gregory, on the other hand, wanted to restrict 
its application to physical processes alone, by showing that it did 
not apply to motives and actions. 
Rejecting all appeals to consciousness and reflection, Gregory 
sought to engage philosophical necessitarians upon their own terms. 
The principal claim underlying the use of constant conjunction in 
the necessitarian case was that this offered a scientific account of 
human nature. Men acknowledged that a constant conjunction between 
physical events was the basis of all natural philosophy. In so far 
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as there was the same constant conjunction between motives and 
actions, then the claims of philosophical necessity were as well- 
grounded as those of science as a whole. Therefore Gregory sought 
to test the claim that motives and actions were constantly conjoined 
according to "that kind and degree of evidence which we have in 
mathematical and physical science". 
41 Gregory reiterated that he 
would make 
no further appeal to the thoughts of mankind, on the 
subject in question, than is done in geometry; I mean, 
for. the admission of axioms, or self-evident necessary 
truths, and for the validity of strictly logical 
inferences. 42 
Gregory emphasised that the presuppositions underlying all 
reasoning in mathematics, logic and physical science were "laws of 
thought". For reasoning to be possible, it was necessary to grant 
two premisses. One was the perception of self-evident necessary 
truths. These functioned as the axioms from which all subsequent 
deductions follows. The other was man's irresistible conviction of 
a necessary connection between successive steps of valid logical 
reasoning. Without such guaranEeed status for axioms and logical 
inferences, scientific enquiry would be impossible. To Gregory, it 
was evident that 
The doctrine of necessity seems to imply many necessary 
inferences with respect to the actual conduct of men, on 
the application of motives, strictly corresponding to the 
result in similar cases of the application of physical 
causes to lifeless bodies; but widely different from what 
might be, and probably would be, the result, on the 
supposition of liberty or self-governing power in the 
agents. 43 
If the logical consequences implied by necessitarianism could be 
shown as palpably absurd, then the supposition that motives and 
actions were constantly conjoined analogously to cause and effect 
in physics was false. Hence it could be demonstrated, albeit 
indirectlyp that there was a self-governing power in agents. 
The foundation of the necessitarian position was based upon the 
irresistibility of motives. Gregory called this the "inertia of 
mind" since, if motive and action was constantly conjoined in the 
manner of cause and effect in physics, then the behaviour of men 
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was as inevitable as the behaviour of matter subject to forces. 
Gregory argued that if this were so, then there would be a necessary 
mechanics of human nature. To test this supposition, he sought to 
apply Newton's first corollary to the laws of motion to human action, 
and to see whether what was already known and accepted concerning 
the behaviour of matter could serve as a model for the actions of 
men's minds. In his presentation of what is now known as the 
parallelogram of forces, Gregory made use of a simple diagram and 
some algebraic notation. 44 
Using this model, Gregory claimed to deduce a number of necessary 
consequences which followed from the post-Humeian doctrine of the 
irresistibility of motives. The foundation of this position, or 
what Gregory called "the inertia of mind"q was that motives and 
actions were constantly conjoined in the manner of physical causes 
and effect. Or another way of putting this is that the inertia of 
mind was analogous to the inertia of matter because mental causes 
were constantly conjoined with their actions exactly as physical 
causes were constantly conjoined with their effects. If the 
necessary consequences following from this viewpoint could be 
shown to be absurd, then the supposition that motives and actions 
were constantly conjoined was false. Therefore it could be 
demonstrated indirectly that there was in fact a self-governing 
power in agents. 
The substance of Gregory's case was an ad absurduM argument which 
involved taking the analogy between motives and actions and causes 
and effects for granted, in order to show it was absurd and false. 
If truel the analogy implied the behaviour of men was as regular 
as the behaviour of bodies in mechanics. Therefore variations in 
actions caused by motives should correspond to variations in the 
motion of bodies under the influence of forces. Cases where 
motives were complementaryq opposed and combined should correspond 
to parallel cases in physics resulting from the additions, 
subtractions and combination of forces. The respective actions 
resulting from particular combinations of motives should be analogous 
to the corresponding behaviour of bodies under the influence of 
particular constellations of forces. 
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Gregory considered the case of a porter given a reward to carry a 
letter in a given direction. If he were offered one guinea a mile 
to carry it in the direction AB, then, given no intervening motive 
or physical obstacle, he would go in the specified direction. 
Further, he would continue to do so until*acted on by another motive 
or cause. Similarlyq if, quite independently, he were offered half 
a guinea a mile to go in the direction AC, the same conditions 
would apply. Gregory stated that these observations would be 
agreed by both necessitarians and libertarians, provided they 
accepted the assumption that the financial incentives were a 
suitable metric for the force of a motive. 45 The libertarian case 
did not deny some analogy between causes and effects in mechanics 
and motives and actions. Necessitarians objected to the constancy 
of the conjunction between them. Thus in the separate cases of a 
man going to AB or AC, there was a real resemblance between the 
behaviour of bodies determined by the first law of motion and the 
actions of the letter bearer, However, the crucial test occurred 
when both the above motives were applied at the same time, such that 
if he earned the guineas, he could not earn the half guineas - The 
analogy in mechanics was that the body will move in the diagonal AD, 
describing the distance AD in the same time as it would have 
described AB or AC separately. If the constant conjunction of motive 
and action was maintained, then it followed that the porter, 
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according to the principle, has nothing for it but 
to go peaceably, and without murmuring, in the diagonal 
AD: for in this case both motives are conjoined with their 
actions, as far as is consistent with their mutual inter- 
ference and modification: the result partakes of both, and 
is different from what either action would have been singly, 
as the application of one of the motives by itself. 46 
But this necessary consequence was self-evidently absurdt it meant 
that the porter could not earn either reward, or "that for the sake 
of which" he originally set off. This deduction was an absurd 
conclusion from a principle which had been assumed true in order to 
carry out the proof. The principle was the constant conjunction of 
motives and actions, the heart of 'new-modelled' necessitarianism, 
and therefore Gregory stated, he had falsified it demonstratively. 
This was Gregory's principal argument and proposed refutation of 
philosophical necessity. The rest of the Essay was taken up with 
further subsidiary cases which also confirmed want of analogy 
between the relation of motive and action and cause and effect in 
physics. These variously took into consideration the opposition 
and addition of motives as well as their combination. But in all 
cases Gregory's basic strategy of refutation was identical. He 
deduced necessary consequences which followed on the assumption of 
a constant conjunction between motives and-actions. These were then 
shown to be contradictory and absurd. Therefore, Gregory concluded, 
the principle upon which they were based was false. 
Gregory's refutation of necessitA was based upon an underlying view 
about the conditions under which men made judgements about events. 
This viewpoint is evident in Gregory's conception of metaphysics 
itself. If the science of human nature gave a just description of 
the principles and laws of human thought, then this would "appear 
at once to all men natural and true". 47 This was because-all men 
were subject to the same laws of human thought. 40 Gregory relied 
upon this assumption in his refutation of philosophical necessity. 
By avoiding ambiguous language and not appealing to the uncertain 
and subjective evidence of consciousness, Gregory claimed to draw 
necessary consequences from axioms and principles admitted by the 
necessitarians. Consequently, as they perceived the porter's 
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predicted diagonal movement to be absurd, then they were themselves 
compelled to reject the premisses as false. Hence Gregory viewed 
his Essay as a kind of public apparatus for manufacturing consent 
about the truth of liberty in the biased minds of necessitarians. 
Gregory emphasised the need for a form of scientific metaphysics 
that would serve as an irenicon of human judgements about mind and 
matter. He wrote: 
We want an instrument that shall fairly separate and 
distinguish all our different thought, as Newton's prism 
does with respect to the different rays of light. 49 
In support of the claim to have developed precisely this kind of 
metaphysics, Gregory cited three characteristics of his approach. 
Firstly, it contained no appeals to consciousness "which might place 
men of science in the unpleasant situation. of contradicting one 
another in circumstances where one party or the other must be 
deemed guilty Of willful falshood". 
50 Secondly, it contained the 
means of directing any such falsehood 
"with that same degree and 
kind of evidence that is held sufficient to convict a person of 
bearing false witness in a court of justice". Finally, it brought 
a long lasting metaphysical controversy to the test of 
that kind and degree of evidence ' which we 
have in 
mathematical and physical science; employing only strict 
mathematical reasoning by necessary consequences, and 
bringing the result of such reasoning, and every question 
of fact to the test of open unequivocal experiment. 51 
Gregory presented the necessitarians with two alternatives to his 
scientific refutation of their position. Either they found an 
inconsistency in his reasoning, or they accepted his refutation. 
Since he-saw that Priestley and others did neither of these things, 
he accused them of "mala fides". Because they refused to grasp 
either horn of Gregory's dilemma of judgement, they were guilty of 
acting "uncandidly", "unreasonably" and even of promoting 
"deliberate inconsistency". 52 Gregory considered that his Essay 
was actually a proof of "mala fides" on behalf of necessitarians. 
If such men could with "bona fides" deny the necessary consequences 
of principles they endorsed, then 
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demonstration would be impossible, a syllogism would 
be a kind of absurdity, and the science of logic as 
arrant an imposition on mankind as magic or judicial 
astrology. 53 
By failing to respect what Gregory viewed as the logical preconditions 
of the human understanding which made judgement and reasoning possible, 
the necessitarians had made common sense itself an absurdity. 
In this section, Gregory's proposed demonstration of the difference 
between the relations of motive and action and cause and effect in 
physics has been discussed. In the EssaX, Gregory presented his 
account as one in conformity with clearp unambiguous axioms, from 
which strictly necessary inferences could be drawn, forming a 
demonstrative chain of reasoning. For Gregory, this was a means of 
securing men's judgement about the difference between agency and 
inanimate causation. In the next part of the chapter, three 
responses to the EssaX are considered to illustrate some aspects 
of the widespread dissent about the nature and constraints of men's 
judgements. Howeverv before doing so, it is useful to compare 
Gregory's attitude to demonstration with the views of a friendly 
critico Thomas Reid. 
It has been noted by recent historians of probability that in the 
17th centuryg there was a systematic erosion of the boundary 
evident in scholastic thought between knowledge and opinion, or 
probabilityo54 This resulted in the concept of probability 
gradually losing its pejorative usage and becoming a basis for 
reasonable belief. Men began to aspire to forms of mitigated or 
"moral certainty" in matters of fact and observation. 55 Although 
this tendency was evident in a variety of subjects9 developments 
in natural philosophy during this period were central to the spread 
of new attitudes to certainty during the 18th centuryo Members of 
the English scientific community developed forms of enquiry which 
emphasised the role of appearances, phenomena and facts, The 
evident successes they achieved popularised and legitimated more 
empirical forms of enquiry generally. 56 Many of these changes are 
evident in Locke's EssaX concerning human understanding, and his 
views were a natural starting-point for subsequent treatments, such 
as Reid's own in the "Intellectual powers". 
57 
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A full comparison of Locke and Reid's views is beyond the scope of 
this account. However, the significant point for present purposes 
is that Locke broadened the category of certain knowledge to include 
not just the demonstrative kind, but also what he called "intuitive 
knowledge". 58 In fact, he regarded the latter as more fundamental, 
because it was more immediate than that provided by the process of 
demonstration. Furthermore, Locke also entertained the possibility 
of extending demonstration to other areas besides mathematics, for 
example, to moral truths. Reid also discussed the latter point. 59 
Reid disagreed with Locke's example, emphasising that particular 
moral truths were contingent and therefore undemonstrable. But 
Reid considered demonstrative reasoning in metaphysics was possible. 
Reid commented that such demonstrations of metaphysical necessary 
truths were likely to be very. -: short, unlike-the long trains of 
necessary inferences which made up mathematical proofs. He added 
that such truths, in keeping with all abstract propositions, usually 
had a degree of evide'nce which was analogous to a mathematical axiom, 
rather than actually being amenable to proper demonstration as such. 
Reid's particular statements about the Essay which dealt with its 
claim to be demonstrative are a concrete illustration of the general 
views found in the "Intellectual powers". Reid wrote to Gregory 
that the relation of a cause 
to its effect is so self-evidently different from the 
relation of a motive to an action, that I am jealous 
of a mathematical demonstration of a truth so self- 
evident. Nothing is more difficult than to demonstrate 
what is self-evident. 60 
Despite this, Reid conceded that the reasoning in Gregory's Essax 
was justified on the basis of the necessitarian hypothesis he 
opposed. 
61 But he suggested that Gregory should express "less 
confidence" in his mathematical reasoning. Also, Reid continued to 
have reservations about the use of Newton's corollary. 62 The 
issue Reid did not raise was Gregory's application of mathematical 
reasoning. This seems surprising, given Reid's former criticisms 
of Hutcheson on these grounds. 63 Yet it is also comprehensible in 
terms of Reid's own distinction between the applicability - even if 
only in a restricted form - of demonstration to metaphysical truths, 
but not to moral ones. Presumably, Reid held the difference between 
1 11 
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causation and activity to be a self-evident necessary truth, 
whereas statements which speciflAthe duties of men were contingent. 64 
Reid convicted Hutcheson of a double mistake. Firstly, he had tried 
to demonstrate moral truths. Secondly, he did so in an explicitly 
mathematical way. Howeverg Gregory's distinction between the 
relations of physical causation and activity was not a moral truth, 
although it was clearly perceived to have moral implications. 
Therefore, Reid was not actually inconsistent in failing to 
criticise Gregory on such grounds. But what about the second point 
of applying mathematical reasoning to a non-mathematical subject? 
Here, Gregory explicitly claimed he could justify his use of 
mathematical reasoning in the Essay and do so on the basis of 
criteria specified by Reid himself in "On quantity". He appealed to 
Reid's distinction between proper and improper quantity, arguing 
that, while the strength of a motive had no proper quantity itself, 
it could be assigned a measure. 
65 In the case of the porter, this 
was based on his assumed desire to earn money. This could be 
measuredg provided different sorts of other desires the porter might 
have were not compared with it, or that different instances of the 
same kind of desire were subject to the op? rations of multiplication 
or division. It could not be said, for example, that the desire to 
earn a shilling was twice that to earn sixpence. Thus, Gregory 
considered that the two criteria Reid identified for applying measure 
to improper quantities had been met: degrees of greater or less, and 
a relation to something that has proper quantity such that "every 
degree of the one must have a determinate magnitude or quality of the 
other corresponding to it,,. 
66 In "On quantity", Reid also said 
that "tastes, smells, the sensations of heat and cold ... and all the 
affections and appetities of the mind" had not been reduced to measure 
and "perhaps" never could be. 
67 Gregory's EssaX was an adroit 
exploitation of Reid's "perhaps". But it is also an indication of 
something more important. The Essay's whole approach suggests that 
the inclusion of self-evident truths within the category of certain 
knowledge was more problematic for Gregory that it had been for 
Locke and especially Reid. Instead of viewing self-evidence as the 
epitomy of certainty, in effect, he inverted this hierarchy and 
sought to demonstrate the self-evident. Once again, this suggests 
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that Gregory's perception of the incommensurability of judgements 
about self-evident truths made by necessitarians and their 
opponents, led him to resurrect the former ideal of demonstrative 
knowledge to eliminate dissent and uncertainty. 
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4. RESPONSES AND REPLIES: JUDGEMENT IN THE BALANCE 
In this section further aspects of the dissent that Gregory's own 
EssaX actually produced are considered. Three sets of criticism are 
discussed, together with Gregory's particular replies. The first 
to be considered is by Alexander Crombie who attacked the Essay in 
hislAn essay on ghilos2phical necessity, published in the following 
year. 68 The second comprises the anonymous "Objections" to 
Gregory's views which were included in the A22endix, and very 
similar views found in Hutton's An investigation of the RrinciRles of 
knowledge and the progress of reason from sense to science and 
phil sophy. 69 The parallels between them suggest that Hutton was 
himself the author of the "Objections". But because this imputation 
rests only on textual evidence, it is not made essential to the 
discussion. Finallyp the criticisms of John Allen are considered 
which were put forward in his Illustrations of Mr. Humels_essay 
concerning liberty and necessiýZ in answer to Dr. Gregory in Edinburgh 
by a necessitarian'. 
70 To assist the exposition, details of the 
circulation and reception of the Essaylare given in appendix IV, while 
the full text of the "Objections" is provided in appendix V. 
4.1 Alexander Crombie's criticisms 
Despite sending his Essay to Priestley and inviting him to reply, 
Gregory failed to elicit a response from him directly. However it did 
receive some consideration from other members of Priestley's dissenting 
circle. In fact, Priestley had passed the job of replying on to 
Thomas Cooper, who accepted. But all that came of his promised 
refutation was the following remark: 
The doctrine of necessity has been opposed by Dr Gregory 
of Edinburgh, but with a weakness of argument, and a 
petulance of language, that places his work in the lowest 
rank among the writers who have adopted the same side of 
the question. 71 
Gregory's work also received short shrift from William Enfield, tutor 
at the Warrington Academy, who criticised it briefly in The monthly 
review#72 However, it was considered in greater detail by Alexander 
Crombie in his Essal on Rhiloso2hical necessity, and in the Letters 
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which subsequently passed between Crombie and Gregory. Crombie 
had been an Aberdeen divinity student, a former pupil of James Beattie, 
and one-time advocate of the common sense libertarian position. He 
remained so until reading the writings of Priestley and Hartley. 
Crombie eventually moved to London and served as an assistant to 
Theophilus Lindsey, another of Priestley's closest associates. 
73 
Crombie is a shadowy figure; what further information upon him 
there exists, can be found in McCosh. 
74 Gregory was convinced that 
Crombie replied to the EssaX at Priestley's invitation. He gave his 
reasons for believing so in the Answer and these were subsequently 
disputed by Crombie. 75 
Crombie's first two chapters reiterated the tenets of philosophical 
necessity, emphasising the constant conjunction of motive and action 
and quoting Hume's EnSu-iry VIII. He also made use of Priestley's two 
rules of philosophising regarding the necessity of causes and similar 
causes producing similar effects, to argue for "that same necessary 
conjunction between cause and effect subsistEing] in the moral and 
intellectual worldg as in the materiall'. 
76 Crombie also considered 
objections to the Hume-Priestley resolution of necessity. He devoted 
particular attention to Reid's criticisms of Humeian causality and, 
in keeping with Priestley's use of constant conjunction, he saw 
Hume's resolution as conducive to religion, rather than contrary as 
Reid insisted. In the third chapter, "Dr. Gregory's essay in 
defence of philosophical liberty answered", Crombie put forward his 
objections to the argument of the Essay. 
Crombie devoted many of his criticisms to Gregory's use of the 
parallelogram of forces applied to a porter given two simultaneous 
motives to carry a letter in different directions. In order to 
falsify Gregory's case he sought to find disanalogies between the 
situation of the porter and the behaviour of a body subject to forces. 
He argued that Gregory's argument proceeded upon the assumption that 
the motives for which the porter acted were only indirectly opposed. 
Crombie maintained that they were directly opposed, and therefore 
there could be no resultant motive to go in the diagonal AD. Crombie 





If the two motives to go in the directions AB and AC were completely 
opposed, then there was no motive to go in the diagonal AD. This 
fallacy in Gregory's treatment was obvious if reapplied to predictions 
about inert bodies. Given the operation of forces tending to AB and 
AC, Gregory's position would be analogous to deducing a resultant 
force tending to AF, instead of AD. Crombie also stated that 
Gregory ignored what was the most important part of the corollary, 
because he eliminated the temporal dimension implied in its formulation. 
Gregory had not specified anything about the time taken to go in the 
diagonal AD; therefore his application of Newton's corollary was 
illegitimate. 78 
Crombie was also sceptical of one further aspect of Gregory's treatment 
of the porter example. Given that it was an absurd-deduction for the 
porter to go in the diagonal, he must go in the direction of either 
AB or AC. But if he did so, Gregory argued this would mean one motive 
was separated from its proportionate effect; therefore there was no 
actual resemblance between the relations of cause and effect in 
physics and motive and action. Crombie considered that Gregory was 
mistaken in arguing that "because one motive is overcome by another, 
the former, therefore, was separated from its effect". 79 This was 
evident in the analogous behaviour of a loaded balance. If Gregory 
maintained that by going in the direction AB, the motive for going AC 
was separated from its effect, as if when one weight preponderated 
over another in a balance, the lighter weight was separated from its 
effect. But Crombie pointed out that when fixed weight overcame one 
lighter in the opposite pan, this result occurred whether or not there 
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was only halfv a quarter or three-quarters'of its weight in the 
other pan. The case was identical for motives and actions. Just 
because, the porter went along AD, this did not mean-that the other 
motive to go in AC had no effect. Crombie also drew in a chemical 
example to make the same point: 
No man will pretend to say, that there is no 
necessary attraction between an acid and a metal, 
because there is a stronger attraction between an 
acid and an alkali. 80 
It was equally absurd then to state that when a motive was overcome 
by a stronger one, it was not still necessarily connected with the 
action in question. By disregarding intermediate mental steps 
between motive and action, Gregory left no role for the mental state 
which accompanied an action. Crombie argued that this was where to 
find the effect of the weaker motive. When subject to the counter 
motive to go in the direction AC, the porter acted with less 
promptness. Gregory, he argued, confounded action and the desire for 
which it was done. Because Gregory left the temporal aspect from his 
account, there was no metric for inclination. 
Crombie persisted throughout in this line of argument. He argued 
that in the case of mechanics, the physical causes operating on body 
were all external whereas for a man, there was a combination of 
internal and external causes. Because, in these respective domains, 
the operating causes were different in kind, one could not reason 
from one to another. On this basis Crombie rejected Gregory's use of 
the phrase "inertia of mind" to characterise the necessitarian view- 
point. Although man acted necessarily, this did not imply he did so 
mechanically or blindly. The crucial factor to be considered was 
the person's "state of mind": 
81 
The two physical powers act on a brute material 
substance, incapable of either perception or volition. 
The two motives, on the contraryt are addressed to a 
being, endowed with a capacity, of thinking, judging 
and willings and who feels, at the same time, a desire 
to obtain a proffered good. 82 
When viewed more generallyq there is an evident symmetry in the 
structure of Crombie's and Gregory's exchanges. This revolved 
around the use of two central analogiesq the parallelogram of forces 
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and the behaviour of the loaded balance. Where Gregory made a 
comparison between the mechanics of matter and the necessitarian 
"inertia of mind", he used it to re-assert the claims of liberty. 
As a result, Crombie resisted the analogy and emphasised that this 
was an inappropriate model to judge human action on the basis of 
motives. Where Crombie himself used the analogy between the 
behaviour of a balance and the weighing of motives in men's minds, 
Gregory strove to refute it. But whereas appeals to the analogy of 
the balance were a standard resource in necessitarian writings, 
Gregory's particular adaption of Newton's corollary was unusual. 
In his Introductiong Gregory recounted the precise circumstances 
which led him to consider ways of showing that the relation of 
motive and action differed from cause and effect in physics. His 
initial interest was aroused by a passage from Reid's "Intellectual 
powers". This dealt with necessitarian uses of an analogy which 
compared the operation of a balance to the behaviour of a mind 
weighing the motives for an action. The action of the balance 
according to the distribution of weights in each pan was analogous to 
the situation of a man weighing the strengths of opposing motives. 
Both Gregory and Reid shared the view that this analogy was "the most 
fruitful source of error. with regard to the operations of our 
minds" . 
83 
In his dispute with Crombie over the balance as a suitable analogy 
to represent the process of men's minds in making judgements, Gregory 
wrote: 
The plausible appearance of it will at first be 
gratifying to those Necessitarians who are unacquainted 
with real science, which I know well is ... the case with 
a very large proportion of them. 84 
Gregory argued that the use of the balance to support necessitarian 
claims was superficial. By failing to take into account the momentum 
with which the pans moved up or down, they had taken an "inaccuratep 
partial and false view" of it. The "turn of the balance" was therefore 
a wholly inappropriate analogue to the operation of the will deciding 
between relative motives, despite its obvious visual appeal. 85 
Gregory stated that "Crombiet Priestley and Co" had overreached 
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themselves by placing too much store in "the ignorance,, credibility 
and cullibility, even of those people for whose edification their 
Essay seems chiefly intended ... the Dissenters, clergy and laity, 
disciples and admirers of Dr. Priestley". 86 Gregory was in no 
doubt why he had been attacked. The dissenters sought to discredit 
him as: 
The man who had presumptuously shown that their 
great Apostle in philosophy, as well as in theology, 
was, in philosophy at least, an arrant mountebank and 
pretender to science. 87 
By implication Gregory identified "real science' with the underlying 
judgements men made about the forces of nature which were formalised 
and demonstrated mathematically in Newtonýs corollary. This raises 
the question of whether Gregory considered natural philosophy to be 
demonstrable and, if so, in what sense. The significance of Gregory's 
attitude to the parallelogram of forces in physics and its relation- 
ship to his search for the epistemological interiorisation of nature 
is considered more fully in section five. For now, it is of note 
that Crombie also found Gregory's views problematic. He repeatedly 
attacked Gregory's aspirations to demonstration and his particular 
view of science: 
I will not sayq that the Doctor - like the Taylor of 
Laputa, who when measuring Gulliver for a suit of cloaths, 
took the gentleman's altitude by the help of a quadrant; 
or like the Irishman, who went with a candle to a sun 
dial, to see how the night went - has applied mathematical 
reasoning to a subject to which it is wholIX incongruous, 
though I think him, in some degreeg chargeable with this 
error; but I scruple not to affirm that the form of 
mathematical demonstration was never in any instance 
more shamefully abused and prostituted. 88 
More generally, Crombie remarked that Cregory's mathematical 
demonstrations were "intended for sage philosophers and mathematicians 
of this and all future generations". Crombie's own criticisms were 
"merely for the Erofanum_vulgas, the illiterate herd of common 
readers". 89 Elsewherep Crombie referred to "the proud and 
ostentatious display of mathematical demonstration, the vanity the 
arrogance and the illiberality" displayed by Cregory's approach. 90 Or 
again, with heavy irony, "Oh for a ray of your Mathematical Science 
to illuminate their benighted minds". 91 
294 
4.2 The-Rublished "Objections" 
Although Gregory received several sets of written criticisms of the 
Essay, only one writer allowed him to publish them, and then only 
anonymously. What is known of the circumstances surrounding their 
publication is discussed in appendix IV. As the contents of the 
"Objections" are remarkably similar to views expressed by Hutton, 
who also discussed Gregory's Essa in his Investigation of the 
princiEles of knowledge, these are considered together here, 
Certainly, the textual evidence presented below suggests the 
"Objectionsit were probably written by Hutton. However, as I have no 
independent evidence to confirm this, the matter is by no means 
certain. Therefore the full text of the "Objections" is provided in 
appendix V, so that the suggestions made here may be independently 
assessed, and perhaps corroborated in the future. 
A key feature of Gregory's treatment in the Essay was his simplifica- 
tion of the relationship between motives and actions. He eliminated 
from consideration all intervening mental processes such as 
deliberating, choosingo willing etc. Gregory considered that 
necessitarians often had recourse to these private acts of mind in 
order to bolster their arguments with reference to secret motives 
or other inaccessible mental operations. Gregory argued it was 
irrelevant however many mental steps intervened between motives and 
actions, as long as they made a chain of constantly conjoined causes 
and effects. Provided necessitarians maintained that motives were 
irresistible on the basis of the inertia of mind, then the overt 
act remained the sole consideration and measure of motives. But this 
reasoning was challenged in the "Objections": Gregory's demonstration 
was valid only if necessitarians were compelled to concede that every 
motive 
must have an influence on the understanding, in a 
manner perfectly similar to that of forces in physics, 
in order to be entitled to maintain that its operations 
proceeded by immutable laws; and that the relation of 
constant conjunction takes place among them, the 
substance of the argument in the Essay would ... remain 
solid. 92 
Rather like Crombie, its author maintained that the influence of 
motives was subject to completely different laws from those found in 
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physics. Nevertheless, necessitarians were still justified in 
emphasising that these laws were immutable and that the influence of 
motives on actions was as uniform as the operation of forces in 
physics. The "Objections" put forward an alternative view of 
necessity based upon the nature and role of human judgement as an 
intermediate mental process between motive and action. 
All necessitarians endorsed the view that "similar effects will 
93 
always result from similar causes in the mind" . However, the 
conflicting though not strictly opposing motives applied to the 
porter bore no analogy to the application of different forces to a 
body. The author stated that such motives could not be combined to 
form a judgement because "the intelligence of the mind renderfed] 
the combination impossible". 94 The porter would always take the 
greater sum and move in the direction AB* Concerning the effect 
of the other motive for moving in the direction AC, he commented: 
It had all the effects that by the immutable laws of 
the understanding it was fitted to have. It was felt, 
observed, its inferiority to a desire, the gratification 
of which was incompatible with it perceived, that 
gratification judged preferable to it accordingly; and 
it then probably ceased to exist and was forgotten. 95 
This author emphasised that while volition was constantly conjoined 
with its previous "train of thought'll this. did not mean that every 
train of thought was constantly conjoined with a volition. In his 
view, it was unnecessary to posit a self-governing power to prevent 
all trains of thought from culminating in their appropriate actions. 
The points made in the "Objections" were articulated in terms of 
the language of constant conjunction. Alsov the continued emphasis 
upon "the laws of the operation of the understanding" and "judgements 
of the understanding" reveal the author's preoccupation with the same 
themes discussed by Gregory and his critics generally. But the 
treatment of them is quite unusual. This was acknowledged by the 
author himself, who also noted the incommensurabilities of. style 
and language between his views and Gregory! s Essay. At some points 
he even tried to rephrase his own criticisms in conformity with it. 
For instance, he equated his own phrase "apprehension and desire of 
attainable good" with Gregory's use of "motive". Like Gregory, 
II 
296 
he also emphasised that the question of liberty was to be referred 
to "The nature and operations of the understanding". 96 But his 
metaphysical technology made use of overtly teleological categories, 
as his paraphrase for motive might suggest. The interpretation of 
necessity in terms of men's desire for happiness as the determining 
factor-of judgement suggests a style of Scottish metaphysics found 
in Monboddo and in the "science of wisdom! ' put forward by Hutton. 
In particular, opinions very like those in the "Objections" can be 
found in Hutton's Investigation of the princiEles of knowledgel. 
Un like Monboddo, Hutton also explicitly referred to Gregory's EssaX. 
In the preface of his book, Hutton emphasised that his concern was 
with the nature and progress of the human understanding. By 
revealing the process by which men were "made to know", they achieved 
the purpose of their existence: happiness and wisdom. The search 
for the scientific principles of the understanding was possible "only 
to the enlightened part of mankind" present in every "polished 
society", and Hutton explicitly identified such men as the audience for 
his book. 97 
Interestingly, Hutton noted that the role of metaphysics in securing 
truthq happiness and wisdom for mankind was not shared by even those 
enlightened thinkers who could engage in it. Hutton held that in 
order for metaphysics to fulfil its role of guiding men towards 
wisdom and happinesst it must be capable of discovery. However* he 
acknowledged that other forms of scientific metaphysics claimed not to 
discover anything. They contended that only physics produced 
discoveries; metaphysics dealt with laws of thought already known to 
men. Hutton cited a passage from Gregory's Essay to illustrate this 
viewpoint. In fact9 Hutton appears to have written the whole preface 
in contradistinction to Gregorian metaphysics, quoting him at length. 98 
The professed object of Huttonian scientific metaphysics Was to display 
"the various means or conditions of our judgements and to show the 
evidence and certainty of scientific reasoning". 99 This was a 
theoretical enterprise which embraced both physical and mental nature. 
Hutton considered that "the motions or actions of material things" and 
the "actions or motives of men proceeding upon intellectual and moral 
A 
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principles" were "necessarily related in a general system". This was 
"devised in wisdom". "founded on benevolence" and, as the effect of a 
"supreme design", it "proceed[ed] from one cause" and "operatEeý) to 
one end". 100 The emphasis upon order, necessity, the determination of 
judgement, the important role of theoretical reasoning and the search 
for laws of the understanding evident in the Investigation, are all 
themes of the "Objections". Although Hutton's reference to Gregory 
in the Investigation 
, 
may be coincidental, it was also unusual. In 
the course of his three volumes of over 2,000 total pages, it is 
rare to-find references to anyone other than Locke, Berkeley and 
Hume. 101 However, the best evidence for Hutton's authorship comes 
from his own discussion of liberty and necessity in which Gregory 
again figured prominently. 102 
Hutton regarded the dispute between libertarians and necessitarians 
as unresolved. It had not been concluded to the degree that "science 
requirled] to command belief". This state of affairs was evident in 
the recent clashes: 
Such is the case with Dr. Priestley and Dr. Price, who 
endeavoured to convince each other to no effect. Such 
is the case with the late David Hume and Dr. Gregory, 
the most estimable of men, though differing thus in 
opinion. 103 
A similar orientation is apparent in the closing remarks of the 
"Objectionsil. The author noted that a just demonstration actually 
caused belief, as in the paradigm example of a geometrical theorem. 
Because the critic did not experience any sense of infallible 
conviction, he suspected some inaccuracies in Gregory's argument. 
104 
In the Investigation,. Hutton argued that Priestley and Gregory had 
equal claim to bona fides; yet they disagreed. Therefore the whole 
subject of liberty and necessity had not been "scientifically 
discussed". Not only was Gregory's claim to demonstration premature; 
in Hutton's view, it tended to confirm the necessitarian position. 
Hutton also re-presented the argument found in the "Objections" about 
the influence of motives upon judgement prior to resultant actions. 
These "metaphysical motives" 
are applied to the porter's mind# and they are to have 
an effect upon his will* through the means also of his 
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judgement. His will being thus influenced, he 
judges again, how far the means are in his, gower, 
to attain the end or object of his desire. 5 
Hutton distinguished these "metaphysical motives" from what he called 
"physical motives". He regarded them as incommensurable such that 
the latter could not be a test of the former. Indeed, by proposing 
such an experiment Gregory had begged the question because 
without knowing the rule or order of metaphysical 
causes and effects, we cannot propose an experiment 
to try if that order be observed; for nothing can be 
learned or no reasoning proceed from disorder. But 
the confessing such an order implies the necessary 
connection or natural succession, of these things. 106 
In his subsequent chapter "Concerning free will and moral agents"t 
Hutton went on to give a resolution of liberty and necessity very 
similar to Monboddols. 
107 He distinguished between physical 
necessity which would obtain if men were wholly determined by 
sensation, and the necessary determination of the intellect, 
according to men's ideas. Man's freedom lay in his ability through 
reason, to choose the good. Therefore: 
A free agent is not a person who governs himself 
independently of the system of intellectual things 
in which he is placed; but it is one who, in the 
progress of his intellect, has obtained the 
government of his animal affections, so as not to be 
determined by them in opposition to the dictates of 
his conscious, that is, of his moral principle. 108 
If men acted in such a fashion, then their actions could be predicted 
"in like manner as the physical events which proceed[ed] from the 
inviolable laws of matter". Therefore man were free to judge, but 
their actions were necessary insofar as wisdom was a sLvencee'09 
From this brief exposition it is quite clear that Hutton's 
necessitarianism was part of a more general search for the 
epistemological interiorisation of nature. However, the precise form 
this took differed appreciably from other accounts of philosophical 
necessity based upon constant conjunction, which Gregory criticised, 
despite Hutton's use of the language of necessary connection and 
constant conjunction popularised by Hume himself. Hutton's 
necessitarianism was more overtly teleological. The necessary 
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progress of the intellect "from sense to science" was part of God's 
wisdom. Men's access to the science of wisdom brought them happiness 
and fulfilment. The order of nature and the order of men's minds were 
necessarily connected. This manifested itself in the perceived link 
between the epistemology of natural philosophy and the logic of 
moral science, between the self sufficient powers of the system of 
the earth and the equally self-sustaining powers of the intellect. 110 
Gregory persistently claimed that those who dissented from his 
demonstration misunderstood it. But his subsequent response to the 
"Objections" indicates an almost total incommensurability of viewpoint 
over the question of necessity. Gregory's conception of philosophical 
necessity was founded upon the irresistibility of motives constantly 
conjoined with actions. He therefore found the formulation put 
forward in the "Objections" to be a vague, older conception of 
necessity. This simply asserted that all acts of willing and 
subsequent actions were causedl and that their causes were to be 
found in the nature of mind. 111 In his subsequent remarks, Gregory 
made it clear that the author was attacking a view of liberty which 
construed the operation of the will as uncaused. However, this was 
not Gregory's view. He did not claim the will was uncaused, but that 
it depended upon a "principle of change" dissimilar to physical 
causes. The model of causation Gregory used to characterise the 
relation of motive and action was analogous to his earlier treatment 
of physiological causes. Gregory conceded that physical events were 
implicated in the operation of the will; but also "something else" 
was involved which was allied to the vital principle in living 
bodies. 112 Because of this "something else", Gregory reserved the 
possibility that the will might act without motives, although he 
never claimed to prove this in the EssaX itself. 
The portrayal of the libertarian will as uncaused in the "Objections" 
was very like views expressed by Kamesq Cullen, Hume and Hutton 
himself. 113 Gregory discussed these accusations much as Reid had 
done. 114 He argued that men were the cause of their actions, and 
rather than dispute the necessary consequences of liberty he simply 
added that he was not "a theologian"l and "neither inclined nor 
qualified to reason about prescience and predestination". 
115 By 
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raising such issues, Gregory argued that the"'Objections" did not 
address the central question of the Essay was the motive of an 
action in an identical relation to causes and effects in physics? 
I 
In his further criticisms, Gregory emphasised the incommensurability 
of his own position and the viewpoint found in the "Objections"* 
He criticised its language and the use of appeals to consciousness 
when discussing the relationship between desire, judgement, willing 
and action. The phenomenology of mind taken for granted in the 
"Objections" was precisely what Gregory had eliminated from his 
demonstration in order to bring matters to a decisive test. He 
repeated that the essence of his position could be: 
ascertained without meddling with the various 
intermediate steps, or links, of the process of 
thought, or series of events, between the desire 
and the ultimate overt act. 116 
This was because if the constant conjunction between motive and 
action corresponded exactly to physical causation, then however many 
intermediate mental operations were juxtaposed between them, his own 
demonstration was still secure# 
In conclusion, Gregory rejected the role accorded to human judgement 
expressed in the "Objections". This emphasised the necessary 
determination of judgement in every case. Gregory reiterated that in 
the last act of judgement immediately preceding action, there was an 
element of willing. 117 Gregory emphasised that his argument revolved 
on the issue of whether motives were constantly conjoined to actionst 
not whether desires influenced the will. He argued that if Hume's 
original position was that actions were determined by "those desires 
only on the preference of which the understanding has decided"9118 
then the dispute between libertarians and necessitarians was absurd. 
If this was the kind of necessity put forward in the "Objections", 
then, Gregory argued, it was merely tautologous. 119 
4.3 John Allen's criticisms 
At various points in his Essay, Gregory related his view of cause and 
effect in physics to the discipline of chemistry. 
120 He referred to 
chemical causes as a different "species" of physical causation which 
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demanded some form of independent investigation. However, he stated 
that both kinds were physical causes dependent upon the constant 
conjunction of uniform antecedents and consequents. Therefore, in 
principal, everything known about causation in the laws of mechanics 
applied to chemical causes as well. The major aim of the 
Illustrations was to show that Gregory's stipulations about the 
nature of causal processes in physics were not even applicable to 
chemistry. In particular, ! ý- argued that the simple algebra of 
constantly conjoined causes and effects Gregory developed in 
relation to his use of Newton's corollary could not be applied to 
the combinations of chemical substances according to their 
affinities. The Illustrations were written by John Allen who received 
his M. D. at Edinburgh in 1791 and acted as an extra-mural medical 
lecturer in Edinburgh during the 1790s. As Allen's arguments are 
quite detailed and technical, it is necessary to return first to 
some aspects of Gregory's views on causes and effects in physics. 
Gregory characterised physical causes as constantly conjoined. 
In chapter threep it was shown that Gregory drew three implications 
about this kind of causal relation. Firstly, there were no perceivable 
necessary connections between physical causes and effects. Secondly, 
the effects of such causes were constant. Thirdly, that physical 
causes had no power. In the Essayq Gregory went into greater detail 
about the second implication of physical causes and effects. He 
presented his views in the form of simple algebraical formulae, which 
were then used to state the case against the necessitarians. Gregory's 
main point was that, because there was a constant conjunction between 
physical causes and effects, then every variation in the cause 
necessarily involved a proportional change in the effect. For example, 
in mechanics, where forces either concurred, opposed or were combined 
according to the parallelogram of forces, then this was proportionally 
evidence in their effects. Throughout the Essay Gregory argued that 
this kind of proportionality was not evident between motives and 
actions. Therefore this indicated that the relation between them was 
not a constant conjunction. 
As Allen's criticisms were also expressed using Gregory's own symbolism, 
it is necessary to briefly re-state Gregory's case in these terms: 
121 
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(1) let X and Y denote physical causes, A and B their 
respective effects 
(2) let the constant conjunction between them be 
represented by - 
(3) let the combination of forces neither concurring or 
directly opposing be represented by 1; ý- 
it followed that: (a) X+Y-A+B denoted the concurrence 
of forces 
(b) X-Y a& A-B denoted the opposition 
of forces 
(c) X mY 9-= AMB denoted the combination 
of forces 
(5) if. X and Y now d* enote motives, A and B their respective 
actions then the argument of the Essay was: if motives and 
actions were constantly conjoined, as necessitarians 
maintained they were, then it followed that (4(c)) was 
true; this was shown to be false in the case of the 
porter. Therefore motives and action relations were not 
constantly conjoined. 
By substituting various chemical compounds for X and Yp Allen sought 
to show that all Gregory's formulae representing the logic of 
causes in physics were "repugnant to everything known in chemistry". 
122 
For example, Allen said let X stand for the affinity of sulphuric acid 
and 11potasse"; and A represent the effect of that affinityp or 
I'sulphate of potasse". Similarly, let Y and B stand for the affinity 
of carbonic acid and 11potasse", and the "carbonate of potassell 
respectively. What then, Allen asked, did the deduction XKY me AM B 
represento or for that matterg X-YmA-B? All the presence of 
carbonic acid in the reaction did was render the sulphate more 
easily decomposed. The implications of these facts for Gregory's 
claims were apparent: 
Motion is the plain and obvious effect of mechanical 
force; combination of chemical affinity; A-B is 
distinguished from A in mechanics by the retardation of 
the motion; but is the combination less perfect in 
A-B than in A? Contrary affinities in chemistry are 
unable to modify the effect of superior affinities; 
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they merely facilitate decomposition; Dr, Gregory's 
formulae are therefore inapplicable, and even 
unintelligible in that science. 123 
A further attack on Gregory concerned his understanding of 
constant conjunction itself. Allen argued that Gregory's sense and 
use of constant conjunction was not in fact Hume's own. Hume's 
doctrine was that "like objects in like circumstances will produce 
like effects". In the case of varied circumstances, all Hume 
argued was that the principle of constant conjunction was then 
insufficient to determine what would then happen. While it 
followed that the same causes in the same circumstances produced the 
same effects9 so that if XA and if Y ram 9, this meant that 
circumstances being equal, cause X will produce effect A, and 
likewise for Y and B. However, the consequences deduced by Gregory, 
A+B, A -B AMB, could not strictly be deduced from constant 
conjunction because: 
Change the circumstances by introducing X along with Yj 
and instead of B, the effect may be C or D, or there may 
be no effect whatever referable to Y ... when a new agent 
or new circumstance is introduced into the experiment; 
nothing in that case remaining, but to observe the 
event. 124 
When this experiment was replicated exactly, the same effects might 
be expected in the future. This was because like causes produced 
like effects in the same circumstances. However, Gregory had 
suppressed that part of Hume's theory of constant conjunction which 
related to the continued need for more experiment and experience in 
situations where there were different or changed circumstances. 
Applied to the issue of Gregory's demonstration, this meant that the 
combination of motives and actions simply could not be compared to 
causes and effects because the circumstances were different. 
Despite their opposing intellectual loyalties and attitudes to 
Hume, it is clear that both Allen and Reid repeatedly appealed, to the 
same three criteria in their accounts. These were: the established 
order and regularity of nature; Hume's theory of constant conjunc- 
tion; and the legitimate role of experience and experiment in 
science. However, the differences between them are to be found in 
the different ways they used these similar resources. Once again, 
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different applications of the concept of constant conjunction 
were crucial. Whereas Gregory thought the notion of constant 
conjunction was an unambiguous account of men's perception of 
physical events, Allen considered it needed more specification 'in 
view of men's knowledge'of chemical processes. In view of the 
complexity of reactions between different substances, he argued 
that the only. guide was experience: 
By experiment and observation, we are taught in what 
combinations of circumstances A is produced; and we 
expect with confidence, as the result of our uniform 
experience, that in whatever circumstances A has once 
been produced, in the same circumstances it will 
always be produced. 125 
It was this relationship between the necessity of nature and the 
basis of human experience which Allen commended as the substance of 
Hume's theory of constant conjunction. He went on to argue that 
this true Humeian sense of constant conjunction was applicable to 
the relation of motive and action, and that the human mind 
llpreserv[eýo its analogy to the other works of nature". 126 The 
pragmatic difference was simply a matter of evidence, in the absence 
of which the mind was confronted with more apparent irregularities. 
However, this situation with respect to mind, and analogous to the 
current state of chemistryp did not lead men to abandon the maxims 
"That the order of succession of events [was] established on immutable 
principles"9127 and from "like objects placed in like circumstances, 
like events may always be expected". 
128 Significantly he quoted 
Hume's remarks in Enquiry 8 that in every part of nature there 
were hidden causes responsible for the apparent "contrariety of 
events"q rather than "any contingency in the cause[s] 11 themselves. 
129 
On this basisp anomalies in the knowledge of mind were equivalent to 
as yet unexplained processes in sciences such as chemistry. 
Allen reiterated that the whole of Hume's argument on cause and 
effect was founded upon "our experience of the uniformity of human 
conduct, as evinced by the records of past times, and implied in the 
daily intercourse of society". This was the only source of our 
inferences, according to Hume. Allen wrote: 
 a 
This is the doctrine of necessity; this is the constant 
conjunction of cause and effect maintained by Mr. Humeg 
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this is the philosophy which has been stigmatised as 
subversive of moral distinctions, as eradicating the 
notions of right and wrong from the human breast., 130 
Therefore, Allen concluded, as this was not the doctrine of constant 
conjunction actually used in the Essay, then Gregory had not 
succeeded in refuting Hume's necessitarianism, even though his 
reasoning was logically unimpeachable. 
If these various criticisms are viewed collectively, it is evident 
that widespread dissent existed about the conditions and constraints 
of men's judgements about natural and moral events. However both 
Gregory and his critics were in agreement that the question of 
liberty and necessity should be resolved scientifically with 
reference to natural philosophy. Issues about man's moral nature 
and the nature of the physical world were perceived to be inextricably 
linked through the central question of the nature and status of men's 
judgements about causes and effects. Despite their different 
metaphysical technologies, all the necessitarians considered that 
the internal order of events in men's minds corresponded, in 
principlel to the order men perceived in external nature. For men's 
actions to be accountable$ they had to be constantly conjoined to 
antecedent motives. Hence constant conjunction, as a philosophical 
metaphor to characterise the condition of men's judgement, was 
equally applicable to the behaviour of men and matter. However, the 
way each of Gregory's critics conceived of and applied the notion of 
constant conjunction differed considerably. Allen, in particularg 
challenged not only Gregory's attack on the necessitarian use of 
constant conjunction to characterise the behaviour of men, but also 
questioned how Gregory conceived it to operate in physics. Allen's, 
criticisms lead back to Gregory's actual use of constant conjunction 
as an appropriate account of men's judgements about causes and effects 
in physics. This lay at the basis of his Essay and the Project as a 
whole. In the final section Gregory's views are reconsidered in 
relation to the conception of mechanics put forward by John Robison. 
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THE FORCE OF JUDGEMENT AND THE JUDGEMENT OF FORCES: 
GREGORY, ROBISON AND THE BEFORMATION OF MECHANICAL PHILOSOPHY 
The significance of Gregory's Essay does not lie solely in his 
attempt to apply scientific and mathematical reasoning to a moral 
subject. Instead, his attitudes to evidence and belief, judgement 
and demonstration express many of the distinctive concerns of later 
18th century Scottish scientific metaphysics. These features emerge 
most clearly in Gregory's discussion of the nature, form and status 
of Newton's first corollacy to the laws of motion. Gregory considered 
this to be: 
the basis of a*vast fabric of the most important 
physical knowledge which all who inderstand it admit 
to be as firmly established as the abstract truths of 
pure geometry. 131 
Aspects of Gregory's moral use of the parallelogram of forces, and 
the various objections to this by necessitarians, have been considered 
in previous sections. Here the focus is upon the role Gregory 
perceived Newton's corollary to play in natural philosophy. Once 
again, it will be evident that there was no such dividing line 
between moral and scientific uses. Just as Gregory used Newton's 
corollary to secure the consent of judgements about liberty and 
necessityp sog as part of the apparatus of Newton's laws of motion, 
it could be used by him and John Robison to secure consent in 
natural philosophy. What was perceived as the basis of this 
consent and precisely how it was to be demonstrated in men's minds 
is the subject of this final section. 
The precise wording of "Corollary I" in the Princi2ia was "A body 
acted on by two forces simultaneouslyp will describe the diagonal of 
a parallelogram in the same time as it would describe the sides by 
those forces separately. "132 As part of his introductory discussion, 
Gregory discussed the meanings that the key terms "body" and "force" 
had in physics. 
133 Unlike Robison, Gregory did not discuss the 
nature and significance of Boscovich's point atomism in any 
detail. 134 Nor did he capitalise on the potential religious uses 
which can be found in Stewart's work-135 Yet his brief discussion 
of ideas about body was clearly informed by such considerations. 
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He noted that, for all men knew, body might actually be reducible 
to "a mere atom or an indivisible moveable point", without figure, 
extension, solidity or divisibility. 136 However, as long as body 
was subject to inertia and lacked self-activity, then all Newton's 
deductions about the behaviour of bo4ies were still valid. If on 
the other hand, body was "capable of moving itself"t then Newton's 
corollary became inapplicable, just as it was to predice the 
behaviour of the porter. 
137 
This was one of the rare instances in the'Project1that Gregory 
actually discussed the nature of substance, and when he did so, he 
was prepared to concede that many of the accepted common sense 
properties of body might actually be illusory. In fact, Gregory 
considered it a particular merit of his scientific metaphysics that 
it made no such appeals to men's introspective experience of the 
nature of body. Instead, he concentrated upon the epistemological 
conditions which underlay men's conception of change in nature. 
Thus the notion of inertia and the passivity of matter were 
transposed into an account of the status of cause and effect 
relations in men's minds, and their "correct" expression in 
language. Because Gregory was insistent upon the necessary force 
of men's judgements about cause and effect in physics, he was 
relatively unconcerned with the nature of substance, provided body 
did not actually become an agent in its own right. 
After clarifying his attitude to the notion of body, Gregory moved 
on to consider 11force"p the other key term of Newton's physics. He 
noted some ambiguity in its usage. Force sometimes meant the 
supposed causes of motion as well as the stricter and more correct 
sense of denoting merely "certain tendencies to move". However, 
this ambiguity was unimportant, so long as causes were always 
constantly conjoined to their effects: 
The nature of these causes Newton did not specifyo and 
in the PrinciLia he frequently warns us that he did not 
know it: ýnor indeed was it of any consequence to him, in 
his mode of reasoning, of what nature the causes of 
motion wereq provided only they were constantly conjoined 
with their effects. 138 
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Gregory generally preferred not to use the language of force. Like 
the term "law", which he largely restricted to laws of the operation 
of the mind, it had connotations of the kind of voluntarism Gregory 
sought to avoid. Gregory preferred to express the principles of 
mechanics in terms of the vocabulary of causality. For Gregory, 
Newton's corollary actually rested upon the perceived constant 
conjunction of causes and effects. But also, constant conjunction 
was itself intimately connected to the notion of the inertia of body. 
The family resemblance which Gregory perceived to exist between 
these concepts is evident. Gregory wrote that the inability of 
body to move itself was 
virtually implied in the first law of motion; and both 
the constant conjunction of cause and effect, and the 
inability of a body to move itself are implied in the 
common notions of cause and body. 139 
Gregory argued that the inertness of body based upon constantly 
conjoined causes and effects constituted the demonstrative basis for 
Newton's corollary. This was not immediately apparent in the 
Princi2ia because Newton had simply assumed and not stated such 
"self-evident necessary truths", "axioms" and "ultimate physical 
facts" in his exposition. In his own discussion, Gregory considered 
he had supplied these missing assumptions. These, in conjunction 
with others, such as a body must exist in some place, and not in 
two places at once, completed Newton's inadequate proof: 
I hope I shall not be accused of arrogance when I say 
that I conceive this little commentary to be a 
demonstration of [Newtonls3 first corollary. 140 
Arrogance it certainly was; but it was also something more. 
Gregory's reformulation of Newton's own demonstration reflects many 
of the distinctive concerns of later 18th-century Scottish scientific 
metaphysics. In the search for epistemological interiorisation, 
Gregory's metaphysics utilised the rhetoric of empiricism and 
instrumentalism. He repeatedly appealed to "patient impartial 
observation" and "cautious induction". etc. He claimed to emulate 
the "plain mirror" of Bacon's philosophy, 141 and so deliver 
metaphysics from the hands of necessitarians whose analogies of mind 
and physical nature distorted both the site of power in nature and 
I, 
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the active nature of men's minds. The function of the "plain 
mirror" of Gregorian metaphysics was epistemological. It served 
to "distinctly reflect to man the features of his mind". 142 Thus 
despite Gregory's profession of empiricism, the reference of his 
discussion of Newton's corollary shifted away from external nature 
and became "interiorised" within men's minds. He sought to uncover 
and demonstrate the necessary ground for men's belief in nature. 
Or as Gregory put it: 
the question is not whether body can act, either 
where it is, or where it is not; but simply whether 
it be consistent with the laws of human thought to 
believe, that such relations may subsist among bodies. 143 
Gregory's EssaX dealt with physical causation in the external world. 
But he made it quite clear that his demonstration was -not based upon 
the order of nature. Instead it depended upon the necessary order of 
men? s minds, according to which they must hold certain beliefs. 
Therefore his demonstration relied less upon laws of physical nature 
and more upon laws of human thought, expressed as first principles 
to which all reasonable men must consent. Gregory's search for the 
compelling grounds of human belief about causality expressed in 
terms of deductions from self-evident axiomatic truths dominated 
the concerns of the Pro*ect, notwithstanding the apparent counter- 
claims of Gregory's rhetoric which emphasised observation, fact and 
induction. Despite his defence of the freedom of men's will, 
Gregory remained committed to the necessary status of man's beliefs 
about nature. Like the necessitarians Gregory opposed, he considered 
that the force of human judgement was inevitable and compelling. In 
physics, this rested ultimately upon men's perception of the 
constant conjunction between physical events. 
How are we to assess the importance of Gregory's interpretation of 
Newton's corollary and his resolution of the judgmental basis of 
mechanics in later 18th century Scottish scientific metaphysics? 
Part of the difficulty here lies in the incomplete nature of 
Gregory's Project. He claimed to discuss cause and effect in 
physics; but it has been shown earlier that Gregory's views on 
mechanics have to be "extracted" from his essays. This is because 
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he did not actually consider physical causation in its own right. 
Rather, the characteristic features of his concept of causality in 
physics have to be recovered by a careful interpretation of statements 
found throughout the Project. This has been done here in terms of 
Gregory's search for the (ýpistemological interiorisation of nature. 
Gregory's discussion on Newton's corollary is the final part of his 
Project to be viewed in this way. However, once again, despite the 
fact that all Gregory's essays dealt with cause and effect in physids, 
his statements about natural philosophy were usually oblique and 
ostensive, rather than concrete and factual. Nevertheless, the 
significant point is that Gregory modelled his approach on a form of 
reasoning he considered to be appropriate to natural philosophy. 
For Gregory, demonstrative proof was "the highest kind of evidence 
that human reason has yet discovered or can conceive". 
144 
As part 
of his justification of the approach followed in the Essay he wrote 
that "nearest of all to his situation was that of the geometer and 
the mechanical philosopher. " 
145 
- In view of 17th century uses of 
the term "mechanical philosopher", Gregory's comparison is very 
puzzling. Precisely why Gregory should view natural philosophy as 
demonstrative and certain rather than empirical and probable can be 
appreciated by considering the views of John Robison# Professor of 
Natural Philosophy at Edinburgh from 1774 to 1805. 
Before Robison took up his appointment at Edinburgh, he had a 
varied scientific career which variously combined academic posts and 
widespread travel on the Continent as an adviser. He -served as general 
secretary to the Royal Society of Edinburgh from its foundation in 1783 
until his death in 1805. During this timep Robison was highly 
respected by other members of the Scottish. scientific community. 
146 
As well as editing Black's Lectures on the elements of chemistry. 
147 
he produced several influential textbooks and wrote a number of 
scientific articles for the third edition of the Encyclopaedia 
Britannica. It has been argued that his views on the nature of force 
were crucial to the emergence of physics on 19th century Britain, 
148 
and that his influence is particularly noticeable in the writings of 
John Playfairt William Thomson and William Rankine. 
149 Despite 
Robison's status as arguably the most important 18th century Scottish 
scientist y he has received relatively 
little from modern 
scholarship. 
150 However, his more polemical Proofs of a conspiracy 
has received attention. 
151 
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At various points in the Project, Gregory referred to Robison in a 
manner which suggests considerable familiarity with the latter's 
views. Gregory consulted Robison on the structure of Slavonic 
transitive verbs. 
152 However, in Activity 2., Gregory actually 
quoted Robison who confirmed that there were rules of Slavonic and 
Russian syntax for denoting activity and physical causation 
separately by the use of an associated preposition in the former 
but not the latter case. This extended the generality of Gregory's 
own argument about the syntax of active and passive verbs in Latin. 
Gregory acknowledgdd his debt to Robison and commented that Robison 
did him 
the favour to revise several of these disquisitions, and 
who I find had anticipated me in many of my reflections 
and reasonings on this subject-153 
Robison's concern with the structure of language as part of a 
metaphysical technology to maintain the passivity of matter is 
certainly evident in his published works. Three examples given 
below are chosen for their obvious resemblance to statements made by 
Gregory in the Project. 
The relation of physical cause to effect is expressed 
metaphorically in the words which belong properly to the 
relation of agent and action ... But the language and 
even the actions of all men show that they have a notion 
of the relation of an agent to the action, easily 
distinguished because all distinguish it from the 154 
relation between the physical cause and its effects. 
Language is the expression of thought and every word 
expresses some notion or conception of the mind; therefore 
it must be allowed that we have such notions as are 
expressed by causep powerg energy. 155 
The term action is frequently used in natural philosophy 
with great ambiguity. The only meaning which we can 
affix to it, without the risk of being led into mistakes, 
is the effect which is produced. 156 
The use of very similar terminology here suggests a continuity 
between the concerns of the Project and Robison's work. This is 
particularly apparent in Robison's development of a theory of forcet 
according to which he articulated the principles of dynamics as part 
of a reformed system of "mechanical philosophy". 
157 
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Robison defined mechanical philosophy as 
the study of the mechanical appearances of the universe 
in order to discover their causes to explain subordinate 
appearances and to improve art. 1.59 
Throughout his writings, Robison placed great emphasis on the 
general doctrines of, dynamics as the core of mechanical philosophy. 
Although he discussed the notion of matter, his emphasis was 
consistently on motion and "moving forces". Thus, "mechanical 
appearances" were those changes of motion of which men were 
sensible; "mechanical forces" were the causes men ascribed to 
them. The latter constituted events which could be considered 
attributes of matter: 
A particle of matter under the influence of a moving 
force is the object of purely mechanical contemplation, 
and the consideration of the changes of motion which 
result from its condition as thus described may be 
called the mechanism of the phenomenon. 159 
In fact, Robison's basic model of moving forces was thoroughly 
relational. Given a sensible change of motion associated with one 
body which was constantly conjoined to the situation and distance of 
another body, then these "mechanical relations" were considered to 
be "mechanical affections" of the two bodies in question. 160 Here 
Robison was particularly sensitive to ambiguities of language and 
remained circumspect and cautious in his descriptions. He continually 
made use of locutions such as "is said to", "is called", "is 
conceived"q etc. However, what were actually only the "mechanical 
relations" of "mechanical appearances", men spoke of as the real 
affections of matter and bodies composed of matter: 
These affections of matter are frequently terms powers, 
forces, an account of a resemblance of the phenomena which 
we consider as their effects, to the phenomena which are 
consequent on animal exertions. 
161 
In a manner very similar to Gregory's Project, Robison criticised this 
language and confirmed-that action was a term correctly predicated of 
active beings only. 
162 Both men used the same examples of 
"magnetism" and "gravity" to state that these terms expressed 
relations not inherent properties. 
163 The difference between them 
was that Gregory only used the term "force" in his technical 
discussions such as the status of Newton's corollary. There he was 
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critical of misuses of this term as a further instance of the 
metaphorical usage of active verbs in philosophy. Therefore Gregory 
sought to adapt the vocabulary of causes, preferring the rather 
cumbersome phrase "the reIation of cause and effect in physics". 
Robison discussed technical issues in mechanics throughout his works. 
He retained the language of force for the pragmatic reason that it 
was current usage in dynamics. But he also reformulated its meaning 
and recast it as the central concept of mechanical philosophy. 
Hence: "the term 'force' in all [Robison's] comparisons mean[t] 
nothing but some or any qualities that are proportional to observed 
phenomena". 
164 It is evident then, that although the linguistic site 
of application was somewhat different in Robison and Gregory, the 
kind of conceptual work each did was very similar. This is further 
apparent in Robison's own discussions of the nature of causality and 
the conditions of human judgements about forces in nature. 
It has been shown that Robison's conception of mechanical philosophy 
emphasised the role of "sensible motions", and "mechanical appearances". 
However, a fundamental question remains. How did Robison make the 
step from men's perception of sensible motions to the accreditation of 
the underlying causes to which they referred? This was an issue 
which was relevant to all the topics Robison treated as parts of 
mechanical philosophy. But it can be illustrated here with reference 
to his own views on Newton's corollary. Like Gregoryq Robison attached 
great importance to it. He spoke of it as "a fundamental elementary 
proposition of continual and indispensible use in all mechanical 
enquiries ". 
165 Yet despite its importance, Robison also noted that 
following later. 18th century dissatisfaction with the proof offered 
by Newton, there had been several other equally unsatisfactory 
attempts. 
166 The precise details of his own proposed solution are of 
less importance than his diagnosis of the underlying metaphysical 
problem and how this was to be solved. 
167 
In Robison's viewp all these difficulties had arisen because of a 
general failure to distinguish between the composition of motions 
and the composition of forces, and the appropriate kind of evidence 
and proof for each. 
1.68 The former of these received countless 
empirical confirmations in everyday life. A suitable example was 
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the resultant motion when a man walked on an ice floe which was 
moving in anotýer direction. However these were not actually 
illustrations of combining forces, or what Robison called 
"determinations to motion". These examples "serve 
Fýj very well 
to exhibit to the mind the mathematical composition of two motions" 
which was certain and demonstrable. 
169 But this was quite 
different from the "physical question" of whether: 
two natural powers, which are known to be productive 
separately, of two determinations of a body to two 
distinct motions, will, by their joint action, produce 
a determination to that motion which is com ounded of 
those which they would produce separately. 
150 
. 
In this case, Robison stated that men did not see clearly that two 
forces which separately produced motions with directions and 
velocities expressed by the sides of a parallelogram, would Jointly 
produce motion in the diagonal. 
171 However, men could be confident 
that there was a perfect agreement between the composition of 
motions and forces. 
VIP- 
led by an instinctive principle of our mind to confer 
every change which we observe to happen in the state of 
things as an effect, indicating the existencel characterising 
the kind, and determining the degree of its cause. 
172 
As in Gregorys the issue turned upon the necessary force of men's 
judgement. In Robison, this was not restricted to Newton's corollary. 
It constituted the general basis upon which man made judgements about 
all forces in nature. Discussing the laws of motion# Robison wrote: 
Such being our notions of motion, and of the causes of its 
production and changesp there are certain resultsp which, 
by the constitution of our mindsp necessarily arise from 
the relations of these ideas. These are laws of human 
judgementg independent of all experience of external nature, 
just as it results from the laws of judgement that the three 
angles of a right lined triangle are equal to two right 
angles, although there should not be a triangle in the 
universe. 173 
This viewpoint was also enshrined in Robison's conception'of dynamics 
which formed the core of mechanical philosophy. It was 
that department of physico-mathematical science which contains 
the abstract doctrines of moving forces; that ist the necessary 
results of the relations of our thoughts concerning motion and 
the causes of its production and change. 
174 
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For Robison, the abstract doctrines of mechanical philosophy were 
"in reality, descriptions, not of external nature, but of the 
proceedings of the human mind in contemplating or studying iti,. 
175 
All Robison's remarks considered here indicate that his conception 
of dynamics was itself interiorised and ultimately referable to the 
conditions under which men made causal judgements. Therefore, it 
was also demonstrable on the basis of the necessary relations 
between men's ideas. So construed, the tautologous laws of 
dynamics were the necessary connections of ideas about motion which 
men displayed in demonstration and to which they must consent. In 
Robison, as much as in Gregory, the twin themes of the force of 
judgement and the judgement of forces were inextricably intertwined. 
The exposition of Robison's views has so far been largely drawn from 
his textbooks. On this basis, it has been argued that Robison and 
Gregory held similar views on the use of language, on relational 
concepts of causality and force, and most importantly on the 
demonstrative role of mechanical philosophy or physics. In 
Robison's Encyclopaedia Britannica articles, the connections with 
issues raised in Gregory's Project are yet more apparent. These 
concern Robison's attitudes to efficient causality and the relation- 
ship to the paired concepts of constant conjunction and necessary 
connection. 
Like Humet Reid and Gregoryp Robison consistently emphasised man's 
nescience about necessary connection, power or efficient causality in 
the material world: 
the principle which connects the pairs of concomitant events, 
rendering the one the inseparable companion of the other, is 
totally unknown to us, because it is not the immediate object 
of our perception-176 
Yet by "the constitution of the human mind", man had a feeling of 
expectation that the course of nature would remain constants However, 
Robison argued that such feelings were "accompanied by an instinctive 
reference of them to something distinct from the feelings themselves". 
He added: 
In precisely the same manner, the irresistible connection of 
ideas is interpreted as the sensation or sign of a necessary 
connection of external things or events. These we supposed 
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to include something in their nature which renders them 
inseparable companions. To this bond of connection 
between external things we give the. name causation. All 
our knowledge of this relation of. cause and effect is 
the knowledge of what passes in our own minds during the 
contemplation of the phenomena of nature. 
177 
In his article, Robison followed this remark with a criticism of 
Hume. He stated that Hume's account of necessary connection in terms 
of the customary transition of the imagination was false, and 
attacked it along with former accounts which stressed pre-established 
harmony or the constant supervision of the deity. 
1.78 However, Hume 
was cited in support of the position that the perception of necessary 
connection in nature is an instinctive first principle. 
179 In his 
Lecture notes, Robison seems to have considered Hume and Reid as joint 
exponents of this viewpoint .. 
180 However, just as he was critical of 
Hume for actually assimilating necessary connection to custom, 
Robison appears to have also resisted attempts to associate it with 
the constant supervision of the deity, and for which Gregory 
criticised Reid. He wrote that any further attempts to investigate 
the necessary connections of phenomena were "precisely the same 
absurdity or inconguity as to propose to examine light with a 
microscope".. 
181 Robison's relationship to both Reid and Hume 
requires careful discussion beyond the scope of the Robison-Gregory 
comparison undertaken here. However, Robison's various remarks on 
the origins of force throughout his writings indicate that# like 
Gregory, Robison was reluctant to relate force to the experience of 
human willing, or to the operation of mind generally. 
The basis for Robison's search for the epistemological interiorisation 
of nature lay ultimately in men's feelings. These included the sense 
of an external world to which men's sensations referred; a feeling 
of expectation that the course of nature would remain constant and, 
cruciallyt a feeling that sensible motions themselves referred to 
underlying causes and powers which ptoduced them. Such feelings 
were the result of "first principles" or instincts implanted in men's 
minds by God. Further analysis was impossible because it pre- 
supposed these very principles in operation. However, in the few 
instances where Robison mentioned men's feeling of exertion or 
resistance as a perception of force, he remained suspLcious about it. 
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Whereas Reid could assert that without the feeling of exertion, men 
would only perceive constant-conjunctions, Robison underplayed the 
importance of men's volitional access to power. This is particuarly 
evident in his accounts of resistance,. 
182 
and men's feeling of the 
heaviness of bodies: 
The feeling of pressure which a heavy body excites might 
be considered as its characteristic phenomenon; for it is 
this feeling that makes us think it a force - we must 
oppose our force to it; but we cannot distinguish it from 
the feeling of any other equal pressure. It is most 
distinguishable as the cause of motion, as a moving or 
accellerating force. In shortg we know nothing of gravity 
but the phenomenon, which we consider, not as gravity, but 
as its indication. It is like every other force - an 
unknown quality.. 183 
Robison generally resisted analogies with human effort and volition 
'in mechanical philosophy. They led to artificial and misleading 
divisions of force into attractive, repulsive, pressure and impulse 
lion account of the resemblance between the phenomena and those which 
we observe when we pull a thing towards us, push it from us, kick it 
away, or forcibly compress itit.. 
184 At besto these were only 
"abbreviated descriptions or hints of the phenomena".. 185 Robison 
did not explicitly equate this position with Reid, as Gregory had 
done. But Robison's perception of the opponents of mechanical 
philosophy certainly included one sect of philosophers who equated 
force with motion produced by mind alone. Their position was to be 
opposed, just as the position of materialists and necessitarians 
was also to be challenged: 
What these authors have been pleased to call mindq the whole 
world besides have called by another name FOR7CE-, whichl, 
though borrowed from our exertions, is yet-su-fficiently 
distinctive, and never leads us to confound things that are 
different, except in the language of some modern philosophers, 
who apply it to the laws of the agency of mind; and when 
speaking of the force of motives, &c. commit the same mistakes 
which the followers of Aristotle commit in the use of the 
term 'mind'. Force in the language of these philosophers, 
means what connects the operations of mind; as mind in the 
language of Lord Mo7ýgddo, is that which connects the 
operations of body., 
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Robison contended for a middle-ground occupied by mechanical 
philosophyt poised between two ontological sitings of force. Those 
who equated force with mind, and those who equated it with an 
inherent power of matter were both to be criticised. This 
corresponded very closely to Gregory's objections to necessitarian 
and voluntarist accounts of natural philosophy and physiology. 
Despite differences in terminology concerning "force" and "the 
relation of cause and effect in physics", Gregory and Robison 
shared similar views-on causality in physics. Both employed a 
linguistic technology to maintain the passivity of matter. Both 
emphasised relations and events. Both employed notions of 
judgements about the physical world based upon instinctive first 
principles and necessary deductions from them. Each man developed 
views using a conceptual vocabulary derived from the epistemological 
writings of Hume and, Reid. Finally, both perceived a similar role 
for a reformed "physics" or "mechanical philosophy". poised between 
what they saw as an extreme voluntarism of mind, and a form of 
necessitarianism which equated the behaviour of men with the 
behaviour of matter. Yet it is also evident that Gregory and 
Robison considered that men's judgements about nature were the 
necessary outcomes of their constitution based upon 
instinctive 
first principles. Men's conclusions about forces, or causes and 
effects in physics, were the necessary results of the 
force of 
men's judgement. Men could not 
judge otherwise than their common 
sense dictated. Therefore, despite the fact that the correspondence 
between human judgement and the external world could not be known 
independently of men's constitutional predispositions, men's 
judgements were nevertheless necessary and demonstrable. Having 
eliminated necessary connection from external nature, 
Robison and 
Gregory relocated it in men's minds. With this shift, the 
epistemological interiorisation of mechanics was secured and the 




In this chapter, Gregory's Essay has been discussed from several 
points of view. Fristly, it was situated with reference to 
necessitarian accounts of the relationship between motives and 
action. It was shown how Gregory perceived his work to be a 
demonstrative refutation of the kind of necessitarianism put 
forward by Hume and Priestley, based upon the analogy between 
co nstantly conjoined motives and actions and causes and effects in 
physics. Secondly, three replies to Gregory were con sidered in 
order to show that the central issue between Gregory and his critics 
concerned the nature and process of human judgements about cases and 
effects. All participants agreed that a truly scientific account of 
the problem of liberty and necessity was to be referred to the order 
of men's minds. Also, it is apparent that the same criteria were 
to be appealed to in understanding the natural world generally. 
Finally, the theme of epistemological interiorisation, or the search 
for the conditions of human judgements about causes and effects in 
physics, was discussed in relation to John Robison. It was shown 
that Robison and Gregory had similar conceptions of physics, in 
which the truths of mechanics were to be situated in relation to the 
nature of human understanding. They argued that men's nescience 
precluded knowledge of necessary connections in external nature. 
But men recovered necessary connections in their minds based upon the 
instinctive principles of their constitution and expressed as self- 
evident necessary truths felt by all men. Because human judgement 
and belief were the inevitable consequence of the evidence of men's 
senses, both Gregory and Robison regarded the truths of natural 
philosophy to be demonstratively true, in spite of their problematic 
reference to the external world. The underlying theme of Gregory's 
Project was his conception of the involuntary relationship between 
evidence and belief. 
In keeping with his emphasis upon relations of eventq Cregory 
considered evidence and belief as a particular relation among several 
others which had to be carefully distinguished and classified: 
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With respect to this relation, we certainly have no choice, 
liberty or self-governing power: the force or influence of 
evidence is absolute and irresistible, and our belief is 
completely determined by it.. 187 
However, men's beliefs were determined according to certain kinds 
of evidence, not all of which were constantly conjoined. But unlike 
the separable relationship between belief and the evidence of 
consciousness, the evidence appropriate to natural philosophy was 
unimpeachable. Thus 
the intuitive evidence of an axiom, and the distinct 
conclusive evidence of demonstrationj produce firm and 
perfect belief, not to be shakeng nor confirmed, nor in 
any way modified, by the evidence of experiment, or of 
induction, or sensation, or of testimony. As little can 
demonstration be offered as evidence, in opposition to 
experiment, or sensation or consciousness with respect 
to any matter of fact.. 1,89 
For Gregory# the problem of experiment and induction was that man 
experienced degrees of certitude because of inevitable inconsistencies 
in evidence about matters of fact. Especially in cases where 
testimony was central, men 
experience irresistibly the various degrees and states 
of probability, conviction or doubt, according to the 
nature, the amount, the concurrence, the combination or 
the opposition, of evidence before us. 189 
Gregory's conception of physics or mechanical philosophy was framed 
in terms of instinctive axiomatic beliefs from which necessary 
inferences could be made in the manner of mathematical demonstration. 
Men failed to agree in natural philosophy, not because their under- 
lying common notions were heterogeneous, but because of sectarianism 
and extraneous misunderstandings about analogies and language$ and 
erroneous appeals to men's consciousness. Gregorian scientific 
metaphysics was in effect a nosology of these infirmities of human 
understanding focused upon the problem of causality, where their 
effects were most apparent and damaging. 
The persistent problems of locating the site of power in nature and 
justifying how the order of nature could be known in men's minds 
preoccupied Scottish scientific metaphysicians generally-in this 
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period. Gregory's concern with the nature of causality is 
indicative of the first of these issues. However, his joint 
involvement with metaphysics and physiology also expressed a 
prominent aspect of the search for the order of nature. If men 
could display the nature and processes of human judgement, and 
thereby uncover the basis for reasoning, both metaphysics and 
natural philosophy would be reformed. Then truths about men, 
nature and God would receive universal assent. Men would be united 
in the future pursuit of knowledge. Despite differences between 
Scottish scientific metaphysicians over what was to count as human 
nature, and whether judgement itself depended upon instinctive first 
principles or the experienced association of ideas, or even transcendental 
ideas, they all subscribed to Reid's imminent vision of the "third organon" 
of human reasoning. 
190 
If Gregory's writings as a whole are viewed from this perspective, 
the central themes of linguistic evidencel the nature of demonstration 
and the role of human judgement are all indications of the pervasive 
interaction between natural knowledge and metaphysics during the 
period as a whole. But the simplest and best illustration of his 
concern with epistemological interiorisation can be found in Gregory's 
persistent emphasis upon the analysis of relations. Perhaps this is 
where the fundamental characteristic of the "Scotch intellect" is to 
be found. George Davie has pointed to the abstractionist legacy of 
18th century Scottish thought, in which an intellectual-classical 
approach was reflected in the emphasis upon mental acts of comparison 
which gave men sound knowledge. In the important instance of 
mathematical knowledgeg McLaurin defended geometry from the sceptical 
attacks of Berkeley and Hume. 
191 He emphasised that men might 
demonstrate relations between things, even though things themselves 
were doubtful and unknown. Hence a rapprochement between the 
competing claims of nescience and knowledge, constant conjunction and 
necessary connection might be achieved by relocating certainty in the 
nature of men's minds. This thesis deals with one man's attempt to 
demonstrate the certainty of a particular relation which men could 
know by an act of mind: the relation of cause and effect in physics. 
Gregory's search for the epistemological interiorisation of nature 
culminated in the identification of a fundamental act of human 
judgement regarding the physical world. 
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However, Gregory's emphasis on the necessary conditions of men's 
perception of causes and effects as the means of securing consent 
in natural philosophy had problematic consequences. So formulated, 
mechanical philosophy virtually became a certain, a priori science, 
independent of observation and experiment and interiorised in 
relation to men's minds. Faced with alternative resolutions of the 
status of natural philosophy by those he perceived as sceptics, 
materialists and spiritualistso Gregory sought a form of 
'constitutional' certainty for the relation of cause and effect in 
men's minds. But once interiorisedt the problem of "exteriorlsation". 
or the correspondence between the contents of men's mindsand the 
order of nature, re-emerged more dramatically. Once the relation of 
physical causation had been delineated, the second stage of the 
Project was to assess whether it was "just and rational" by comparing 
it with relations of event in nature itself. Yet this was the blind 
spot of the whole enterprise. At best, the problem of correspondence 
could only be resolved on traditional common sense grounds, where 
God underwrote the connection between external nature and men's 
minds as the common author of both. Thus in spite of Gregory's 
defence of human liberty, he endorsed the viewpoint that men's 
judgements were necessarily determined by constitutional first 
principles which were indefeasible. But this remained the case 
whether or not there was a real world to which men's judgements 
actually referred. Therefore, like so many of his fellow 18th century 
Scottish scientific metaphysicians, Gregory located the order of 
nature and the site of the power in the same place: both ultimately 
lay within men's minds. 
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to have professed a complete materialism, asserting a necessary 
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connection between the properties of perception and the state 
of the brain, based upon this constant conjunction: 
Certainty and universality of * concomitance 
between 
two or more phenomena, is the only direct reason we 
have for asserting a necessary connection between 
them. (186-87) 
At one point, Cooper actually criticised Priestleylsvi-ews for 
what he perceived as Priestley's over-emphasis upon the deity 
as an agent active in nature. (185). This is not the same 
Thomas Cooper who added observations on Priestley's Memoirs, 
although, rather confusingly, the latter Thomas Cooper quoted 
the former in the passage referred to above. However, both 
seem to have held very similar views. See, for example, 
Memoirs, vol. 1, appendix 2, passim. 
72. The monthlX review, 11 (1792), 361-73; 15 (1794), 128-36. 
Enfield is identified as the author in Benjamin C. Nangle, 
The monthly review, second series, 1790-1815 (Oxford, 1955), 20. 
73. On Priestley's dissenting circle see the biographical sources 
cited under ref. 32. Also useful is Roland N. Stromberg, 
Religious liberalism in 18th century-England (London, 1954); 
Robert E. Schofieldo The Lunar Society of Birmingham: a social 
history of 2rovincial-s-c-i-ence and'industry in eighteenth 
century EnEland (Oxford, 1963). 
74. McCosh, Scottish Rhilosophy (ref. 4) 265-66, who notes that 
Crombie argued against materialism and for the immateriality 
of the soul in his Natural Theology 2 vols. (London, 1829). 
Although Crombie was a necessitarian, he did not thereby 
subscribe to either Priestley's or forms of materialism 
found, for example in both Coopers. Rather, the common factor 
seems to have been arguments for philosophical necessity based 
upon inferred constant conjunctions. 
75. Answer, 7; Letters, 8,79-80. 
76. Crombie, On necessity (ref. 68), 63. 
77. Ibid., 287-89. 
78. Ibid., 356. See Essay 227-28, where Gregory stated his 
argument did not-rest on the time taken for the porter to arrive 
at point D, but only that he must go in the direction of the 
diagonal AD if necessitarianism were true. 
79. Crombie, On necessity (ref. 68), 365. 
80. Ibid., 398. 
81. Ibid., 389. 
82. Ibid., 355. 
83. Reid,, "Intellectual powers", Works, 237. 
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84. Answer, 121. 
85. Ibid., 111-159 121-22. Here and in the Essay, 299-301, 
rr-egory discussed the notion of a "totter-l-n-g-balance" suggested 
to him by Daniel Rutherford, Professor of Botany-at Edinburgh. 
By adjusting the centre of gravity of this balance, and making 
it coincide with its centre of motion, then the smallest 
additional weight would make the whole balance tip from the 
horizontal to the vertical. This would be an even more 
striking illustration for the necessitarian case. But, Cregory 
arguedq whereas this was more appealing to the "eye",. it was 
of no help to the "understanding" in deciding between the 
respective claims of necessity and liberty. 
86. Ibid., 252. 
87. Ibid., 443. As well as referring to his opponents collectively 
as "Crombie, Priestley and Co. ", Gregory satirised them as 
"brother" or "brethren" necessitarians, the "flocks and herds" 
of the dissenting community. See ibid., 5,451. 
88. Crombie, On necessity (ref. 68), 424-25 (emphasis in original). 
89. Letters, 74. 
go. Ibid., 179. 
91. Ibid. 9 256. 
92. "Objections", Appendix 473. 
93. Ibid., 475. 
94. Ibid., 476. 
95. Ibid. 
96. Ibid., 473. 
97. Hutton 0 Investigation 
(ref. 69). vol. 1.3. On Hutton see 
P. Gerstner, "James Hutton's theory of the earth and his theory 
of matter", Isis, 59 (1968)9 26-31; D. R. Dean, "James Hutton on 
religion and geology"q Annals of science 32 (1975), 187-93; 
R. Grant, "Hutton's theory of the earth", in L. J. Jordanova and 
Roy S. Porter, eds. 9 Images of the earth: essaZs in the historv 
of the environmental sciences (Chalfont St. Giles, 1979), 
23-38; Roy Forter. The making of geology: earth science in 
Britain 1660-1815 ZCambr dge, 1977), 184-96. See also 
J. Playfairg "Biographical account of the late Dr. James Hutton", 
Transactions of the RoXal Society of Edinburgh, 5 (1805)v 
39-99. 
98. Hutton, InvestiSation (ref. 69), 5-9. 
99. Ibid., 39. 
100. Ibid., 35. 
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101. Further circumstantial evidence for Hutton's involvement in 
the reception of the Ess! X can be found in-Crombie's Natural 
theology (ref. 74), v3-1.1,13,24,308; vol. 2,364,533. 
102. Hutton. InvestiEation (ref. 69), vol. 3,212-45. 
103. Ibid., 216. 
104. "Objections"p Appendix, 481-82. 
1 05. Hutton, I_nvestigation (ref. 69), vol. 3,218. 
106. Ibid. 0 219. 
107. See James Burnett, Lord Monboddo, Ancient meta2hysics or the 
science of universals, 6 vols. (Edinburgh, 1779-99), vol. 1, 
book 2. chapter 21, "On free will and necessity". 297-99. 
108. Hutton, Investigation, (ref. 69) vol. 3,233. 
log. Ibid., 233-37. 
110. Although Hutton's "Theory of the earth" was actually read to 
the Royal Society of Edinburgh around the time of Gregory's 
various performances of the Project, it received no mention 
in the Essay. Howevert Hutton'r-s-r"T-1heory of rain" did receive 
a brief -notice by Gregory. See Essay, 198-99, where Gregory 
seems to have viewed Hutton's th-eory about the action of heat 
to follow from inactivity of matter and the constant conjunction 
of causes and effects in physics. See James Hutton, "Theory of 
the earth; or an investigation of the laws observable in the 
composition, dissolution and restoration of land upon the 
globe", Transactions of the Royal Society of Edinburah 1 
(1788)9 
209-304; "Theory of rain", ibid., 41-86. Hutton also summarised 
his theory of rain in Disse7tations on different subjects in 
natura 1 philosophy (Edinburgh, 1792), part Is dissertations 1-3. 
See also A. Donovan, "James Hutton, Joseph Black and the 
chemical theory of heat". Ambix, 25 
(1978), 178-90. 
111. "Objections"t Appendix, 468. 
112. Appendix, 489-90. 
113. See for example H. Home, Lord Kames I The principles of morality 
and natural religion_(Edinburgh, 1751)p 174-75. 
While Kames 
modifi-ed his position in successive editionsp 
he maintained the 
general attack upon Arminian conceptions of an uncaused will. 
114. See Reid, "Active powers" Workst passim, especially essays I 
and 4. 
115. Appendix, 691- 
116. Ibid., 553. 
117. Ibid. * 567-68. 
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118. Ibid., 538. 
119. Ibid., 552. 
120. See Introduction cxliv, ccxxxvi-ccxli; Essay, 197. Apart from 
these remarks anj Gregory's brief comments a out heat (See 
refs. 65 and 110), it is surprising how little he mentioned 
chemistry. The standard text for the development of chemistry 
during this period is A. L. Donovan, Philosoýhical chemistry in 
the Scottish Enlightenment (Edinburghq 1975). 
121. This is a paraphrase of Gregory's argument using his own symbolism 
discussed in Essay, 164-243. In the rest of his Essay, Gregory 
also strove t3 prove the falsity of 4(a) and 4(b)--wTe-n applied 
to motives and actions. 
122. Allen, Illustrations (ref. 70), 39. 
123. Ibid., 41. 
124. Ibid., 30-31. 
125. Ibid. 9 10. 
126. Ibid. p 15. 
127. Ibid. 9 1. 
128. Ibid., 5. 
129. Hume I Enquiry 8,87, and cited 
in Allen, Illustrations (ref. 70), 
17-18. 
130. Alleng Illustrations (ref. 70), 17-18. 
131. EssaX., 166. 
132. Newton, Principia 14. 
133. Ibid., 315-26, In keeping with the interests of Activity 2, 
Gregory discussed the meaning of Newton's concepts-G-their 
original Latin as well as their English equivalents. 
134. See John Robison's article "Boscovich" in George Gleig, ed., 
Supplement to the third edition of the Encyclo2aedia Britannica, 
2-vols. (EdinbUrghg 1801) vol. 1,96-110; also his "Boscovich's 
theory"in System (see ref. 154), vol. 1,267-339. Robison 
referred to Boscovich throughout his writings. A particularly 
important statement of his views can be found in the manuscript 
interleaved copy of his Outlines of mechanical philosophy, 
. 
Edinburgh University Library MS Gen. 2012, opposite page 22. 
This is the draft of a letter in Robison's handq answering an 
anonymous query about Boscovich. It raises the complex question 
of precisely how Robison read and used Boscovich. See Richard 
olson, "The reception of Boscovich's ideas in Scotland", I-sis, 
60 (1969), 91-103. 
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135. For Stewart on Boscovich see chapter five, ref . 137. 
136. Ibid., 316. 
137. Here, Gregory differed from Priestleyl. s views found in the 
appendix of his Disquisitions relatiný to matter and spirit. 
(ref. 18). Priestley specifically considered the objection 
that Newton's philosophy was "overturned" if there was no vis 
inertiae of matter. He rejected it, arguing that the laws of 
motion w re founded upon facts "which result[ed] just as easily 
from [his] hypothesis concerning matter, as from the common 
one" . (334). Once again, Boscovich is implicated in -the developL 
ment of Priestley's matter theory. See L. L. Whyte, ed, , Roger Jose2h 
Boscovich S. J., F. R. S., 1711-1787: studies of his life and work on- the 
250t7-anni-versary of his bT_rth (London, 196WIN-: ý_72; 7john G. 
McEvoy, "ý; ome comments on Professor Schofield's views", Ambix, 
15 (1968), 115-23. This dispute whether Priestley or, for 
that matter, Reid and Stewart were influenced by Boscovich, 
and whether they understood and applied his theories correctly 
parallels those about Newton referred to earlier in chapter 
four. A more helpful perspective would focus upon the perceived 
uses of Boscovich's ideas by different historical actors. In 
this way, inconclusive debates about influences and their 
nature can be avoided. 
138. Essay, 318- 19. 
139. Ibid. , 328. 
140. Ibid., 329. 
141. Introduction, lxxvii. 
142. Ibid. 
143. Ibid., ccxii-iii. 
144. Ibid., cccii. 
145. EssaX, 78. 
146. For details on John Robison, see John Playfairl, "Biographical 
account of the late John Robison LL. D., F. R. S. E., and 
Professor of Natural Philosophy in the University of Edinburgh", 
Transactions of the Royal Society of EdinbuELh, 7 (1815), 
495-540; Thomas Youngg "Life of Robison" " Miscellaneous works 
of Thomas Youngo ed., G. Peackock, 3 vols. (London, 1855), vol. 2, 
505-17. 
147. See J. R. R. Christie, "Joseph Black and John Robison" in Joseph 
Black, 1728-1799: a co=emorative symposium (Edinburgh, 1982), 
47-52. 
148. See Crosbie Smith, "Mechanical philosophy and the emergence of 
physics in Britaing 1800-1850"p Annals of science, 33 (1976)0 
3-29. 
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149. See Crosbie Smith, "A new chart for British natural philosophy: 
the development of energy physics in the nineteenth century", 
History of science, 16 (1978), 231-79. See also his "From 
design to dis oluti on: Thomas Chalmer's debt to John Robison", 
British journal for the history of science, 12 (1979)v 59-70. 
150. For example see Richard Olson, Scottish philosophy and British 
physics., 1750-1880 (Princeton and London, 1975). 158-71. 
Olson devotes thre6 pages to Robison, who is probably the best 
case for the interaction between Scottish philosophy and physics. 
On page 159, he notes his ignorance of any references to Reid by 
Robison. As I show later, Robison's lecture notes contain 
several important references to Reid. Also in the published 
Supplement (ref. 134) Robison refers to "On quantity" by Reid 
(see ref. 168) and discussed a number of optical experiments 
carried out with him. See ibid., "Impulsion", vol. 1,782-8109 
on 802. 
151. See J. B. Morrell, "Professors Robison and Playfair and the 
"theophobia gallical: natural philosophy, religion and politics 
in Edinburgh 1789-1815", Notes and records o the Roya Society_ 
of London, 26 (1971), 43-19. 
152, Activity 1,27. 
153. ActivitZ 2,25. 
154. John Robison, A system of mechanical 2hiloso, hy, 4 vols. 
(Edinburgh, 1812), vole 1,4-5. This was edited by David Brewster 
and consists of a compilation of Robison's various Encyclopaedia 
Britannica articles, plus material re-worked from Robison's 
original manuscript drafts. 
155. "Philosophy"g Encyclopaedia Britannica (ref. 6). vol. 14,, 
573-6005on 586-. This was co-auth; -r-ed with George Gleigt the 
general editor. I have used this article sparingly because it 
is not entirely clear precisely which parts were written by whom. 
A natural division would be on page 582. Before thisq there is 
a general account of the history of philosophy which may have 
been written by Gleig. Afterwards, the subject is9the method 
of natural philosophy, which was certainly written in part by 
Robison, as there are many passages which relate directly to 
his other writings. However, there are also other sections 
which may be the work of Gleig. Compare, for example, 
statements throughout this article on Reid and the nature of 
instinctive feelingsp with those found in Gleig's article 
"Instinct", ibid., vol. 9,259-69. 
156. John Robisont Outlines of mechanical philosophy (Edinburgh, 
1.781), 18. 
157. John Robisong Elements of mechanical EhilosoRhy, (Edinburgh, 
1804), "Advert i-s -ement ". - 
158, Robison, outlines (ref. 156)0 2. Some variations of this early 
definition can be found in later workss where Robison introduced 
the restriction that mechanical philosophy dealt only with 
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sensible motions into the definition itself. See Outlines of 
a course of mechanical philosoEhX (Edinburgh, 1797), 
"Introduction"; "Physics", Encyclopaedia Britannica (ref. 6). 
vol. 14,647. 
159. Robison, Elements (ref. 157), 84-85. See also System (ref, 154), 
r 34, where-M -his discussion of the laws of moti3-nq Robison 
wrote that these propositions were not about body as such but 
"the operations of our minds when contemplating body". 
160. Robison I Outlines (ref. 156), 17. See also "Physics" (ref. 158), 637, for a discus ion of relations. 
161. Robison, Outlines (ref. 156). 18. 
162. Robison, Elements (ref. 157), 345. 
163. See ibid., 691 for Robison's views on gravity in this context* 
164. Robison, Outlines (ref. 156), 20. 
165. Robison, System (ref. 154), vol. 1,51. 
166. See Elements (ref. 157), 115, where Robison mentioned former 
attempts by Daniel Bernoulli, RiccatilDIAlembert and Frisi. 
For the background to Newton's corollary and its subsequent 
reception see Harvey F. Girvin, A historical apEraisal of 
mechanics (Scranton, Pennsylvania, 1948) 68-71; Co Truesdell, 
Essays inthe history of mechanics (New York, 1968), 138-43 
14ax Jammer, Concepts offorce; a study in the foundations of 
d, Uamics (Cambridge, Mass. t 19573,128-33. 
167. Robison gave his own proofs for both the composition of motions 
and the composition of forces. See ibid., 51-53; System 
(ref. 154)t vol. 1,57-64. Some indication of Robison's 
development of these proofs can be found in the annotated 
interleaved manuscript copy of Robison's Outlines (ref. 156). 
Edinburgh University Library MS. Gen. 2012,7. and opposite 
23-25. 
168. For an account of some of the technical difficulties surrounding 
the parallelogram of forces in relation to Newton's conception 
of force, see Richard S. Westfall, Force in Newtonts phZsics: 
the science of dynamics in the seventeenth century (London and 
New Yo7k-, 101), 435-400 471-919 especially 477. Also useful 
for a general account of Newton's laws is Mary B. Hesse, 
Forces and Fields: the concept of action at a distance in the 
T71story o (London, 1961). 134-44. The major-issue 
underlying the parallelogram involves its appropriateness as a 
mathematical measure of impressed force producing uniform 
accelleration as well as uniform velocity. Robison himself 
acknowledge d. that a "demonstration of the composition of 
pressures [wasl still wanted in order to render mechanics a 
demonstrative science"* (Systemý 57). Robison's views on the 
measure of forces cannot be considered here. However, he 
persistently emphasised that change of sensible motion was the 
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only "correct" measure of force. He supported his views in 
favour of the "Newtonian" measure of force against the 
"Leibnizian" using Reid's "On quantity". See System, vol. 1, 
19; Elements 98,105-06. From Robison's whole account, it is 
clea7 that he perceived there was considerable doubt and 
dissent about the foundation ,s 
of mechanics and the appropriate 
measure of force. For an account of opposing Newtonian and 
Leibnizian measures of force in the 18th century see Carolyn 
Iltis, "The Leibnizian-Newtonian debates: natural philosophy 
and social psychology", The British journal for the history of 
science, 6 (1973), 343-77; and her "Leibniz and the vis viva 
controversy"g Isis, 62 (1971), 21-35; Thomas Hankin's 
"Eighteenth century attempts to resolve the vis viva 
controversy". Isis, 56 (1965), 281-97; L. L. Laudai-,. --TrThe 
vis viva contr , oversy, a post-mortem", Isis, 59 (1968). 131-43. 
169. Robison, Elements (ref. 157), 55. 
170. Ibid., 55-56. 
171. Ibid. 0 115. 
172. Robison, Outlines, (ref. 156)9 1. In the annotated manuscript 
copy (ref-. --16-77-, this note included the reference "Hume Ess. I10 
106" added by Robison. 
173. Robison, Elements (ref. 157)t 99. 
174. Ibid. v 88. 
175. Ibid., 157. 
176. Robison, "Physics" (ref. 158), 645. 
177. Robison, "Philosophy" (ref. 155), 583. 
178. Ibid., 586. 
179. Ibid. 9 587. The passage cited 
by Robison can be found in Hume, 
Yn--quiry 5,55. Changes of expression indicate that Robison used 
an edition prior to the final 1777 one, upon which Selby-Bigg- 
Niddich is based. 
180, Lectures of John Robison, Professor of Natural PhilosOphZ_in the 
University ot Edinburgh, on mecNanics, hydrFdZ2amics; astronomy, 
optics, electricity and magnetism etc. 9 40 volsep Edinburgh 
University Libraryq MS Dc 7.1-40. Mse are a heterogeneous 
compilation of lecture notes, drafts of articles, letters etc. 
There is no consistent pagination, nor do the volumes follow any 
consistent chronological order. The material on Hume and Raid 
may be found in two separate sets of introductory lectures, 
Dc 7.2 and Dc 7.29. Where there are page references, these are 
cited; otherwise the numbers refer to the sheets themselves which 
make up each volume. There are numerous references to both men 
in the sections Dc 7.2 240 34-41; 44-64l (marked"Lecture 4, 
Causation"), and Dc 29 73,106-19. See also the annotated 
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edition of the Outlines (ref. 167) for further material on 
Hume, especially the third page of notes added by Robison 
before the printed text begins. 
181. Robison, "Philosophy" (ref. 155), 587. See also a similar 
expression in Lecture notes (ref. 180), Dc 7.2,21. 
182. Robison, Elements (ref. 157), 95-98. 
183. Ibid., 320. 
184. Ibid., 91. 
185. See also ibid., 654 for similar strictures on "nisus", "conatus" 
etc. 
186. Robison, "Physics" (ref. 158), 640 (emphasis in original). 
187. Introduction, ccxlvi. 
188. Essay, 211. 
189. Ibid., 216. 
190. Reid, "Account of Aristotle's logic", Works. 713. 
191. George Elder Davie, The democratic intellect: Scotland and her 
universities in the 19th century, 2nd ed. (Edinburgh, 19647,144. 
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APPENDIX 1: MAJOR BIOGRAPHICAL SOURCES AND SIMPLIFIED FAMILY-TREE 
Sources 
The best modern source for Gregory is: 
Paul David Lawrence, The Gregory family: a biographical and 
bibliogra2hical studX. To which is annexed a bibliolraphy of 
the scientific and medical books in the Gregory Library (Ph. D. 
thesis, University of Aberdeen, 1972), 172-91. 
This also contains a bibliography- of Gregory's works, including his 
medical polemics which fall outside the scope of this thesis. 
Other material on him may be found in the following: 
William Anderson, The Scottish nation, 3ývols. (Edinburgh and 
London), vol. 2,379-81. 
G. T. Bettany, Eminent doctors: their lives and their work, 
2 vols., 2nd ed. (London, 
. 
1885), vol. 1,102-08,110. 
Alexander Bower, The history of the University of EdinburLhq 
3 vols. (Edinburgh, 1817-30), vol. 3,, 190-203. 
Robert Chambers, ed., A biogra2hical dictionary of eminent 
Scotsmen, 2 vols., (London and Glasgow and Edinburgh, _1875), 
vol. 2,177-78. 
Sir Robert Christison, Bart., The life of Sir Robert Christison, 
Bart., 2 vols. (Edinburgh and London, 1885), vol. 1,73-840 86. 
Henry Cockburn, Memorials of his time, edited with an introduction 
by Karl F. C. Miller (Chicago and London, 1974), 96-97. 
John D. Comrie, History of Scottish medicine, 2 vols., 2nd ed. 
(London, 1932), vol. 2,474-78. 
John D. Comrie, "John and James Gregory, professors of medicine 
at Edinburgh", University of Edinburgh journal,, 8 (1936-37)9 
126-30. 
Bransby Blake Cooper, The life of Sir Astley Coo2er, Bart., 
2 vols. (London, 1843), Vol. 1,160-64. 
W. V. Craigs History of the Royal-College of Physicians of 
Edinburgh (Oxford, 1976), 17,1019 131,2409 3779 419,420v 424, 
426-36,447,49 1,539,645,683,859 0 944 9 95 It 958 p 960. 
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Sir Alexander Grant, The story of the University of Edinburgh 
durina its first 300 years, 2 vols. (London, 1884), vol. 2, 
404-06.1 
D. B. Horn, A short history of the University of Edinburgh 
(Edinburgh, 1967), 57p. 82,, 108. 
Dictionary of national biograph , vol. 8,542-44. 
Agnes Grainger Stewart, The Academic Gregories (Edinburgh, 1901). 
125-40. 
Robert Thin, College portraitsp_being biographicalsketches 
I 
on portraits in the hall of the Royal College of Physicians 
in Edinburgh (Edinburgh and London, 1927), 71-73. 
The most interesting contemporary account of Gregory's medical 
activities and. publications can be found in John Bell, Letters on 
professional character and manners, on the education of a surgeon, and 
the duties and qualifications of a physician, addressed to James 
Gregory (Edinburghs 
. 
1810). This also contains a list of Gregory's 
polemical medical writings. 
Finally, there are several letters by Gregory held in Edinburgh 
University Library and the National Library of Scotland# together with 
many sets of lecture notes taken down by students. Copies of the 
latter may also be found in other Scottish, English and American 
libraries. 
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SIMPLIFIED FAMILY TREE 
Rev. JOHN GREGORY (1598-1650) 
DAVID of Kinnairdy JAMES (1) 
(1625-1720) (1638-1675) 
111 
(2) (4) (6) 
DAVID JAMES CHARLES MARGARET JAMES 










'=- 182 1 
1. Professor of Maths at Edinburgh 
2. of if is 
3. Professor of Maths at St. Andrewsp later at Edinburgh 
4. Professor of Maths at St. Andrews 
5. Mother of Thomas Reid 
6. Professor of Medicine at Aberdeen 
7. it to of 
8. Professor of Philosophy and later of Medicine at Abordeeng fin4lly 
Professor of Medicine at Edinburgh 
9. PROFESSOR OF. MEDICINE AT EDINBURGH 
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APPENDIX II: DIAGRAM ILLUSTRATING THE CHRONOLOGICAL SEQUENCE OF 
GREGORY'S METAPHYSICAL WRITINGS 
"An essay towards an investigation of the exact import and 
extent of the common notion of cause and effect in physics, 
and of the real nature of that relation. " 
PART I Introduct_orX essa,, 
("motive and action") 
PART II Power 
PART III Activity, sections 1,2 
and 3. 
PART IV "Essay on the difference 
between the relation of 
motive and action and 
that of cause and effect 
in physics; on physical 
and mathematical 
principles" 
An Answer to Messrs Cronbie 
Priestley and Co. 
Letters from Dr. James 
GregorX with replies by 
the Rev. Alexander Crombie 
Read to RoXal Society of 
Ed =inu-rjzh 
Nov. 1784; Mar. 1785 
Nov. 1785; Jan. 1786 
Transformed into "Theory of 
the Moods of Verbs", read 
June 1787, July 1787 
published T. R. S. E., 2 (1790). 
Probably not read; 
subsequently printed-and 
circulated; finally 
published in Philosophical 
and literary essays, (1792) 
Written 1793-early 1800's. 
privately printed but not 
published, circulated by 
Gregory. Copies in Edinburgh, 
Aberdeen and Glasgow 
University Libraries. 
Written circa 1803-1815 
published -by C'rombLe 1819. 
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APPENDIX III: REID'S LETTERS TO GREGORY 
Among the correspondence of Reid, Hamilton included 21 letters to 
Gregory, placed at his disposal by members of Gregory's family. ' 
Given below is a table of. Hamilton's arrangement and his description 
of their contents. In his editorial comments, Hamilton noted that 
he had not included a letter of condolence on the death of Gregory's 
first wife because this had already been quoted by Stewart in his 
Account of the life and writings of Dr. Reid. 2 Also, from what 
Hamilton said about the disappearance of letter XXI, it seems that 
even when he was compiling Reid's Works, at least one, if not more of 
Reid's letters had been lost. Now, apart from Letter VI, it seems 
that Hamilton's copies are the only available source. 
The importance of the letters is evident, even from a brief assessment 
of their contents. They contain information upon the presentation and 
publication of "Intellectual powers" and "Active powers" (Letters I-VI 
and IX); anecdotes about Newton's Scottish connections and the 
history of the Gregory family (Letters III and X); incidental details 
about Hunter's bequest to Glasgow University (Letter I); information 
about an essay on cause and effect read to the Royal Society of 
Edinburgh by Dugald Stewart (Letter IV); information on Dr. Price 
(Letter VIII); comments by Reid on Bentham's Letters on usery 
(Letter XIII) and Crombie's Essay on philosophical necessitZ 
(Letter XX). Howeverg the bulk of the letters are taken up with 
Reid's views on causation, motive, action, language, activity, laws 
of naturej geometryo power, necessary connectiont instrument and 
volition. Reid's philosophical discussions of these topics give the 
letters their enduring value and interest. 
The format within which Hamilton arranged the correspondence contaLns 
two different sorts of sub-headings which refer to the contents of 
individual letters. Hamilton's own capitalised lists at the 
beginning of some letters were intended to provide some indication 
of whAb-. philosophical issues were raised in which letters. However 
along with Hamilton's lists# several letters contain other sub- 
headings which were Reid's own. These have been italicised by 
Hamilton. It is the second kind of sub-headings which provide clues 
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to the dating of Letters XV-XIX, which form the bulk of the 
correspondence. Reid's sub-headings and the letters to which they 
refer are given below. 
"Remarks on the introduction" LETTER XV 
"Volume first" LETTER XVI 
"Volume second" 
"Volume third" 
"Motive-sect. I" LETTER XVII 
"Of the notion of Instrument" it 
"Power" to 
"Activity-sect. I" is 
"Activity-Sect. 2" to 
"Remarks" LETTER XVIII 
"Remarks on the Essay" LETTER XIX 
Reid's comments under each heading contained numerous page references. 
Hamilton was aware that the headings and references referred to 
Gregory's work. At various points in his letters Reid either 
acknowledged receiving material from Gregory or returning it to him 
(Letters I, XIq XIV9 XVI, XI). Hamilton correctly noted that some 
material concerned Gregory's Theory of the moods of verbs (Letter XI). 
However, he considered that all Reid's other comments dealt with 
Gregory's Essay. Realising there were obvious discrepancies 
between titles given by Reid and in many of the page references, 
Hamilton stated: 
The Essay was probably considerably modifed before 
publication; and I have been unable to attempt the task 
of discovering how far, and to what pages of the published 
book, the following remarks apply. 3 
When he arranged Reid's letters, the information Hamilton lacked 
was the relationship the Essay had to other parts of Gregory's 
Project. By considering this, it is possible to locate precise 
references for Reid's comments and also to suggest a much more 
satisfactory ordering of the material included 
in the undated 
letters. 
Reid's headingsý actually referred to titles used by Gregory to 
distinguish various parts and sections of the Project. Sometimes 
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this was entirely direct as in "Power" and "Activity Sects. I and 2". 
for example. On other occasions it was indirect. Thus the "three 
volumes" Reid acknowledged receipt of, in Letter XVI in fact 
referred to Power, Activitv and Gregory's Introductory essaZe From 
these circumstances, it follows that Reid actually commented twice 
upon Power and ActivitZ, once under their proper titles and once 
under the headings "Volume third". This circumstance is not at all 
unusual or in need of further explanation. Reid followed a similar 
pattern in his comments upon Gregory's Essa. It seems that Reid 
presented Gregory with his comments in two stageso In the first, 
he gave his comments, often as part of a letter which strove to 
reformulate Reid's perception of the differences between them, or 
one which began with details of former matters of dispute between 
them. Seev for example, Letters VI, VIIIt XI, and XIV. At 
this stagey Reid appears to have given Gregory initial reactions, 
rather than considered responses. The second stage of criticism 
was quite different. Reid provided Gregory with a series of 
detailed criticisms and comments with specific page references. 
Reid gave these sort of remarks the titles which Hamilton 
distinguished by italics in his presentation of the letterso 
Once this is realised, it becomes clear that Hamilton actually 
treated many of Reid's titled remarks as if they were separate 
letters. As a result, Hamilton's organisation gives the impression 
of more letters sent from Reid to Gregory than there probably were, 
even when Hamilton first viewed them. Hamilton also appears to 
have strung together sequences of Reid's headed remarks which he 
then treated as a letter, and distinguished it from othersv which 
he constructed along the same lines. Also, in the case of Letter 
XVI, he joined together a fragment of a genuine but undated letter 
with a sequence of headed remarks. The only indication of this 
procedure in Hamilton's edition of the letters is that he Used 
evenly spaced dots to indicate breaks in Reid's narrative. In the 
above example, Hamilton did this because the undated fragment 
referred to Reid's reception of Gregory's "three volumes" and the 
sequence Hamilton appended had the titles "Volume first"q "Volume 
second", and "Volume third". However in all other cases, Hamilton's 
arrangement is arbitrary and misleading. By relating dated letters, 
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and undated remarks, to the known contents and order of the essays 
in Gregory's Project, it is possible to re-arrange the contents 
of the letters in a more consistent and logical way. Whether this 
corresponds to their actual chronology can only be confirmed if 
the letters are subsequently found. Nevertheless, the following 
re-distribution probably approaches the original sequence of the 
letters and remarks. 
Hamilton's fragment of Letter XVI is probably the earliest part of 
the surviving correspondence between Reid and Gregory. It 
referred to Reid's receipt of Gregory's "three volumes". These 
were the Introductory essaX, Power and Activity I and 2. Also, the 
letter mentioned Gregory's correspondence with Dr. Rose on Reid's 
behalf. Rose was party to negotiations over the publication of 
Active powerss as Letters III and IV indicate; and it is possible 
that Gregory may have put Reid into contact with him. Further 
evidence for this early dating occurs in Letter I. Referring 
presumably to the same "three volumes", Reid stated he had "put off 
examining those you have sent" until his own manuscript of essays 
from Intellectual powers was returned to him. This letter was 
dated April 7,1783. 
If we take Reid at his word, the subsequent comments by him 
("Volume first". "Volume second" and "Volume third") were probably 
written around May 1783. Reid made his later comments on "Volume 
second" and "Volume third" under their assigned titles, Power and 
Activity. However, these were included by Hamilton as part of the 
remarks compiled to form Letter XVII. 
4 It is not possible to state 
their date with precision. However, their continuity with Reid's 
general remarks is clear; and together, both should be seen as part 
of the early exchanges between Reid and Gregory. Interestingly, 
Reid made no reference to ActivitX 3. The unfinished character of 
this manuscript has already been noted. It consisted of a su=ary 
and reformulation of material in Activity I and 2. It also 
considered a number of possible "Objections" to his views. Gregory 
stated that they were proposed to him by "different persons for 
whose judgement and knowledge 
[he] entertain [ea] very great 
respect". 
5 One of these was certainly Reid. It is one of several 
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instances where Gregory either reformulated or excised passages in 
response to Reid's criticisms. 6 Internal evidence also suggests 
that the comments under the sub-title "Of the notion of instrument". 
which Hamilton included in Letter XVII, was also a part of these 
early exchanges. 
7 All the points so far mentioned conspire to 
suggest a more satisfactory ordering of the first four "letters" 
of the correspondence as follows: 
Letter A: Introductory fragment of Hamilton's Letter XVI, 
Letter B: Hamilton's Letter I. 
Letter C: Compilation of the following comments by Reid. 
(May 17837) 




(iii) "Volume third" 
(iv) "Power" 
M "of the notion of instrument" 
(vi) "Activity sect. W Hamilton's 
(vii) "Activity Sect. 21' (excluding Letter XVII 
the second paragraph) 
Letter D: Hamilton's Letter II 
(June Sth, 1783). 
Gregory almost certainly received all the above comments from Reid 
before Letter V, December 31,1784. In this Reid referred to the 
disagreement between them over the sense Gregory gave to the term 
"notion". An internal reference for this can be found in Raid's 
comments on "Volume first", which confirms its date as earlier than 
Letter V itself. However, the best evidence for regarding this block 
of remarks comes from the dates of Gregory's performance of the 
Introductory essaX to members of the Literary Class of the Royal 
Society of Edinburgh. He began reading his first essay in November 
1784.8 Obviously, Reid's comments would have been most beneficial 
before Gregory actually began to read parts of his Project in 
Edinburgh. 
The block of four letters following on from new letters A-D are 
straightforward. They correspond to precisely dated material, 
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correctly arranged by Hamilton. Thus: 
Letter E: Hamilton's Letter III 
Letter F: of 11 IV 
Letter G: it V 
Letter H: it vi 
In Hamilton's Letter VII, June 14,1785, Reid noted Gregory's 
"speculation to demonstratet mathematically, the difference between 
the relation of motive and action, and the relation of cause and 
effect". 9 The letter went on to offer some general comments which 
were typical of Reid's "first stage" remarks about other essays. 
Reid returned to the subject in Letter IX March 1786, where he 
statedthat"the style of this essay [was] more simple than that of 
the last". 10 In another letterg (XIV July 30,1789) Reid mentioned 
receiving a copy of Gregory's "book". Finally in Letters XV, XVIIO 
XVIII and XIX, Reid also made a series of undated remarks upon the 
Essay. All Reid's various references to Gregory's "speculation", 
to his "essay" being more simple than "the last", and finally, to 
his "book" refer to the various stages the Essay went through 
before publication in the Philosophical and literary essays, 
As with earlier parts of the Project, the problem is to relate the 
sequence of undated comments made by Reid to successive stages of 
the Essay and hence, arrange them in a more logical and chronologically 
probable sequence. 
Hamilton's response to the relationship between the letters and the 
published_Eýýa was to note that "some pages correspond[ed] to the 
published work, others [did] not". He concluded that at this staget 
the Essay was probably printed but in proof. 11 He also noted that 
some of Reid's comments referred to the Introduction of Gregory's 
Philosophical and literarX essays published in 1792g which 
contained the essay on motives and action causes and effects, 
However, from information provided by Gregory himself in the 
Introduction to the Philoso2hical and literary essays'. it is 
possible to piece together the transformation of the EssaX from a 
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"speculation", into the final published version and to suggest 
which of Reid's remarks applied at which stage. 
The first mention of Gregory's "speculation" on motives and 
actions, causes and effects occurred in Letter VII, JUne 14,1785. 
Gregory actually referred to this in the Introduction to the 
Philosophical and literary essays stating: 
After considering by myself the argument and illustrations 
for more than a twelvemonthq I ventured to communicate ; 
he principle and general tenor of them to a friend of whose 
talents and knowledge I had ... the highest opinion. 
12 
Gregory's next step was to put it in writing and, over several years, 
he circulated it to "thirty or more mathematicians, physicists and 
metaphysicians". Inevitably, one of these was Reid himself. In 
Letter IX, March 1786, Reid referred this time, to the return of 
Gregory's "essay". Thus between June 14,, 1785 and March, 1786, 
Reid read a draft of it. This earliest draft form has not survived. 
It is very probableg howeverv that Reid made comments upon it* Of 
the various "Remarks" which Hamilton included, several either bear 
no relation to the printed text, or Reid's page references do not 
correspond to the published text of the Essay. It seems likely 
therefore that these refer to this first draft. For example, 
Letter XVII contained a section entitled "Motive - sect. 1119 giving 
the page reference, 27. The matter referred to by Reid eventually 
appeared on page 21, as Hamilton noted. 
13 Also in the published 
, 
EssaX the title was changed from "Motive - Section P to "Hume's 
views examined". Thereforet it seems probable that the former 
title referred to a heading in the first draft of the essay which is 
now no longer extant. I have applied this principle to other 
problematic passagesq in order to distinguish them from those which 
refer more directly to the Essay. 
in Letter XIVI July 30,1789, Reid mentioned that he had received 
Gregory's "book". He also noted Gregory's intention to dedicate 
it to Reid "if published". - From what Gregory stated 
in his 
Introduction, we know that he had the Essay printed some two years 
or so before it was eventually publishedq supplemented by a lengthy 
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Introduction and AEpendix. This, Gregory noted, was in Midsummer 
1789.14 This then is the appropriate place for Reid's detailed 
and referenced comments given in part of Letter XVIII and in Letter 
XIX. The reason why the comments ascribed to the missing first 
draft of Gregory's Essays could not equally refer to the separately 
printed version is as follows. From a copy of this separate printing, 
it is clear that the pagination was unchanged when the PhilosoRhical 
and literarX essays were compiled for publication. 15 In the light 
of this, Hamilton's remark that Reid's page references did not 
correspond because the Essay was in proof when he read it, is almost 
certainly wronge 
As well as remarks referring to a lost early draft and to the 
separate printing of the Essay, Reid also gave a third category of 
comments. These were grouped under the heading "Remarks on the 
Introduction". It is evident that these referred to Gregory's 
Introduction which was not completed until January 20th, 1792.16 
Reid's page references correspond to the printed form of the 
Introduction and it is therefore likely that they represent Reid's 
latest and final comments on Gregory's writings. 17 
On the basis of this three-tier structure of Reid's comments 
referring to the various stages of Gregory's Essay, the following 
reordering of Reid's remaining letters can be proposed: 
Letter I: Hamilton's Letter VII June 14,1785 
Letter J: if It VIII 
Letter K: it if Ix 
Compilation of (i) XVII, "Motive sect* W 
(ii) "Activity sect. 2", paragraph 2; 
XVIII, "Remarks" p. 27 & 76 
Letter L: Hamilton's Letter X 
Letter M: Hamilton's Letter XI 
Letter N: XII 
Letter 0: XIII 
Letter P: XIV July 30,1789 
Compilation of (i) XVIII9 "Remarks" p. 2, p. 72 
(ii) XIX, "Remarks" 
Letter Q: Hamilton's Letter XV 
Letter R: it of xx 
Letter S: if If xxi 
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TABLE SHOWING HAMILTON'S ARRANGEMENT OF REID'S LETTERS TO GREGORY 
GIVING NUMBERING, DATE, PLACE,, AND HIS SYNOPSIS OF THEIR CONTENTS. 
Number, Date and Place 
I April 7,1.783, Glasgow College 
II June 8,1783, 
III Mar. 14,1784j 
IV 1784, Glasgow College 
V Dec. 31,1784, it it 
vi May 2,1785, 
VII June 14,1785 
VIII Sept. 1785, Glasgow 
Ix (March 1786) 
x Aug. 24,1787 
xi Aug. 26s 1787 
x1i (1788) 
XIII Sept. 5,1788, Glasgow 
x1v July 30,1789 
xv N. D. 
xvi N. D. 
XVII N. D. 
XVIII N. D. 
Hamilton's synopsis of letter 
contents 
ON THE MEANING OF NOTION 
MEANINGS OF CAUSE - l, '. OTIVE - 
LAW OF NATURE 
MEANING OF CAUSE 
ON CAUSE AND EFFECT - MOTIVE 
AND ACTION 
ON THE ORIGINg PROGRESS AND 
THEORY OF LANGUAGE 
ON USURY 
CAUSE - PHYSICAL CAUSE - LAWS 
OF NATURE - AGENT - POWER AND 
ACTIVITY 
ARISTOTELIC SPECIES OR CAUSES - 
ORIGIN OF NOTIONS OF CAUSE AND 
POWER - WHAT ESSENTIAL TO THE 
NATURE OF CAUSE - DISTINCTION OF 
PHYSICAL AND METAPHYSICAL CAUSES, 
ON CAUSE - OBJECTS OF GEOMETRY 
POWER - AGENCY9 & E, 
AN AMBIGUITY OF HUME - MEANINGS 
OF WILL AND VOLITION - POWER 
ON THE TERMSg PHILOSOPHICAL 
NECESSITY AND NECESSITARIAN ON 
DETERMINATION BY STRONGEST 
MOTIVE - REPROACH OF MALAFIDES - 
CONSCIOUSNESS OF LIBERTY - 
ARGUMENTUM PILGRUMv &c - IN A 
PAPER ENTITLED - 
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XIX N. D. ON VULGAR NOTION OF NECESSARY 
CONNECTION INADVERTENCY OF HUME - 
REID'S REFUTATION OF IDEAS - 
REID'S USE OF THE WORD CAUSE 
INERTIA, PASSIVITY9 STATE OF 
MIND - AND SUNDRY OBSERVATIONS 
ON THE NECESSITARIAN CONTRO- 
VERY - IN A PAPER ENTITLED 
XX 1793 ON A NOVAL USE OF THE WORD 
MOTIVE - CAUSALITY OF MOTIVES &c. 
XXI N. D. (The following letter to 
Dr. Gregory is quoted by 
Mr. Stewart in his 
"Dissertation of the Progress 
of Metaphysical and Moral 
Science". The date is not 
given; and the original is not 
now extant among the letters 
of Reid in the hands of 
Dr. Gregory's family) 
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REFERENCES TO APPENDIX III 
1. Reid, Works, 39. 
2. Ibid., 34. Hamilton noted that this letter should properly find 
its place with Letter IV, 1784. 
3. Ibid., 76, Hamilton's-footnote to Letter XVI. 
4. Ibid., 80-82. 
5. Activity 3,30. 
6. An example of the former occurred in the continuation of 
"Note A" Power, opposite pages 77-79. Gregory used the same 
locution: stat ng "I have found that some persons whose judgement 
[and] knowledge I have the greatest respect, are not satisfied 
with this reasoning". This was a direct response to Reid's 
nnmments on the same note (see Letter XVIII, section on 
"Power". Works, 80. ) 
7. It is likely that Reid's criticisms under the heading "Of the 
notion of instrument" (Works, 79) referred to a passage in Power, 
66-67, which Gregory su-bsequently omitted. If the paginati-on 
of Power is examined, the text elides from page 65 to 68. Reid 
useT -the heading "instrument" because the discussion in Power 
referred to the question of the action of mind upon body, ý 
considered as its "instrument". 
8. See appendix I for precise dating. 
9. Reid, Works, 65. 
10. Ibid., 67. 
11. Ibid., 82. 
12. Introduction, cclvii cclviii. 
13. Reid, Works, 79. 
14. Introduction, cclxiii iv. This date coincides with Reid's 
receipt oi-the book. 
15. See James Gregory, New College Library, TQM4 Gre. 3. 
16. Introduction, cccxxxi. 
17. Although they appear not to have survived in the Birkwood 
Collection of Reid's papers, or in the recent rediscovery of 
more of Reid's papers, Hamilton noted several others written 
by Reid in connection with Gregory's EssaX (Works, 88). These 
were: 
"Remarks on three sets of objections by a distinguished 
natural philosopher to Dr. Gregory's EssaX in the years 
1786,1789 and 1790. " 
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(ii) "Remarks on the objections to Dr. Gregory's Essay 
which were printed in the appendix to that essay" 
(iii) "Remarks on a pamphlet entitled Illustrations of 
liberty and necessity in answer to Dr. Gregory, 
published in 1795. " 
(ii) and (iii) refer to the "Objections" and Allen's 
criticisms; (i) is unidentified. Could it have been 
1. L John Robison? 
i h r  i ted i  t  ndix t  t t ii - -yr 
iii  arks   phlet titled Ill trations f 
li rty  ssity i  er t  . ory, 
lished i  .  
ii   iii  f r t  t  jections"  ll 's 
iti isms; i  i  i entified. ld it   
.   ison? 
354 
APPENDIX IV : THE CIRCULATION AND RECEPTION OF GREGORY'S ESSAY 
Gregory's Essay has-received very little attention from contemporary 
scholars. ' However, this was not. the case among Gregory's 
contemporaries. It was widely circulated and actually precipitated 
considerable controversy in the period from the late 1.780s until the 
early 1900s. Even by the time Hamilton edited Reid's Works, he could 
still speak of Gregory's "distinguished talent", and express regret 
that his Answer was never published. From cooments made in Gregory's 
works and various other sources, the circumstances surrounding the 
reception of the Essay can be stated in some detail. 
The various stages of production of Gregory's Essay have been noted in 
tjiRpendix III.. After communicating the plan of it in June 17859 Reid 
commented on a lost draft in March 1786; finally he received the 
published Essay without the Introduction and ApRendix ' 
in July 1789. 
Between this time and its eventual- publication as the Philosophical 
and Literary Essays in 1792, Gregory circulated it to some thirty 
2 
people familiar with scientific research, mathematics or metaphysics. 
He invited them to give him their comments and undertook to publish 
any objections they might have. Gregory stated they included both 
libertarians and necessitarians, and that several gave him replies 
viva voce and in writing. However, only one allowed his written 
objections to be published, and these Gregory included in the Appendix 
3 
of his work. This person chose to remain anonymous, although 
4 
Gregory described him as a "metaphysician". Gregory, it appears, 
considered the reply unworthy of publication. In order not to be 
seen to go back on his offer of publication, he asked two referees 
to give their opinion of it. Gregory described these men as 
friends and wholly familiar with his arguments. One had given 
Gregory two lists of chiefly mathematical objections; the other an 
'-'imagined falsification". The former Gregory described as "a meta- 
phýsician as well as a mathematician"; the latter as a "simple 
=thematician". However,, Gregory noted that both men sent him 
testimonials approving of the published objectionst and stating 
further objections to Gregory's Essay. 
5 Gregory described the former 
as Ila great admirer of Mr. Hume". He also used the term 
"metaphysico- 
mathematicb-philosopher"; this expression occurs 
in the Introductory essav_, 
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to characterise those: 
who disbelieved the existence not only of geometrical 
figures but of everything else, and had even great 
doubts about their own existence, had yet no doubt 
of the validity of mathematical demonstration, and 
were very certain that they themselves, whether they 
existed or not, firmly believed it. 6 
Gregory unfortunately never named these meng nor have their testimonials 
or remarks survived. 
Of the others who saw Gregory's Essay, Daniel Rutherfordp Professor of 
Botany, was explicitly mentioned. 
7 Gregory also referred to Professor 
Thomas Gordon, Principal of King's College Aberdeen, 8 and Dr. Campbell, 
Principal of Marischal. 
9 With the exception of the latter, Gregory 
mentioned no other Scottish necessitarians by name. The only other 
evidence for other Scottish readers of the Essay was a statement by 
Gregory that he sent the Essay to the only Edinburgh woman whom he 
thought would either be interested in it or understand it. She 
subsequently sent it to a Church of Scotland minister, who also sent 
Gregory objections, and then acquiesced upon Gregory's subsequent reply. 
Later, this gentleman took part in the debate with Crombie. 
10 
Despite the aura of total or partial anonymity surrounding those to 
whom the Essay was sent, three sorts of circumstantial evidence help to 
clarify who they were. Firstly, the fact that it was sent to thirty 
metaphysicians, philosophers and scientists. If this number is correct, 
it must mean that Gregory circulated it to most of the scientific 
literati in Edinburgh. Secondly, Gregory's Project was well known to 
the fellows and officers of the Royal Society of Edinburgh. As well 
as being the most regular performer in the Literary Class from its 
foundation until 1790, Gregory was also one of the secretaries of the 
Physical Class. Given the association between the Project and the 
Royal Society of Edinburgh, it is likely Gregory circulated his Essay 
to many of its fellows. Thirdly, Gregory was educated and subsequently 
became a professor at Edinburgh University. He was taught by Cullen, 
Black, Hope, and Alexander Monro secundus ,. 
He was a friend and 
colleague of Stewart, Rutherford, and Playfair. it is probable that 
most, if not all, of the above were presented with copies of Gregory's 
work. Alsop given Gregory's literary contacts such as Henry MacKenzie, 
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it is very possible that men such as Robertson, Dalzel and Blair also 
saw it. 
During the mid 1780s until the mid 90s, the coT= n institutional focus 
of virtually all of these various scientific friends, contacts and 
colleagues was the newly-formed Royal Society of Edinburgh* 
11 
Robison was the secretary during this period. Gregory's medical 
teacherst Cullen, Monro, Hope and Black dominated the early presidency 
of the Physical Class. Other professors made up the majority of the 
elected counsellors, or were secretaries such as Playfair and Walker, 
who succeeded Gregory when the latter became a counsellor. In the 
Literary Class, Robertson and Blair were constantly re-elected as 
presidents, while Alexander Fraser Tytler and Dalzel, Professor of 
Greek at Edinburgh, were its secretaries. When office-holding 
professors such as Hope and Cullen died during this period, they were 
replaced by a re-arrangement of existing incumbents. Non-professbritc& 
office holders with scientific interests included Hutton and Benjamin 
Bell. As the probable author of the "Objections", Hutton played an 
important role in the reception of Gregory's Essay. Bell was a surgeon 
and Gregory's colleague at the Infirmary. Also, Adam Smith# who also 
died during this period, was made a president of the Literary Class for 




Drawing these factors together, the following list are likely recipients 
of Gregory's EssaX. The thirty metaphysicians, mathematicians and 
scientists almost certainly included Robison, Playfair, Stewarts Hutton, 
Rutherford, Walker, Black and Home. As the Essay was circulated in 
1.789, Cullen and Smith, as surviving members of Hume's circle, probably 
received copies before they died. Also, it is possible that A@F, Tytler, 
Dalzel, Robertson, Blair, Smellie, Meadowbank, Bell, MacKenzie, Fergusson 
and perhaps John Bruce, Professor of Logic and F. R. S. E. j were included. 
The rest of the number mentioned by Gregory can be made up as follows. 
Gregory mentioned Gordon, and Campbell from Aberdeen. Given his family 
connections it is likely that men such as Beattiev Gerrardl Dunbar, 
Skene, Copland and Scott were either presented with or received "passed- 
on't copies. Also, Reid's contacts with Glasgow probably embraced man 
such as John Anderson, James Williamson. Again, many of these man were 
F. R. S. E. 
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The only university not mentioned so far is St. Andrew'sp where 
Gregory had no obvious contacts, except perhaps John Huntert Professor 
of Humanity, and once Monboddo's amanuensis. The overall picture is 
one of an inter-connecting professorial elite in Scotlandv centred 
upon the Royal Society of Edinburgh, which Gregoryv through birth, 
education, profession and personal contacts had an almost unique and 
widespread access to. 
The only information on Gregory's non-Scottish correspondents and 
discussants concerns Priestley, Cooper and Price. In the Introduction 
Gregory noted that he sent copies to Price and Priestley with 
accompanying letters in Midsummer 1789, shortly after it was printed. 
Price, according to Gregory, acquiesced in the demonstration. 
However, Priestley stated in a letter that he had delegated the invitation 
to reply to Cooper. However, Gregory received no further comaninication 
from the latter. As a result, Gregory wrote again to Priestley 
shortly before the Essay was published, and in the Introduction he 
included a full account of these circumstances, reprinting his latter 
and Priestley's subsequent reply. 
13 Gregory accused Priestley and 
Cooper of mala fides because of their conduct towards him. 
These then are the circumstances surrounding the circulation of Gregory's 
Essay. To summarise, Gregory sent it to Edinburgh's scientific and 
literary elite. Via Reid he sent it to other members of the Scottish 
professoriate at Aberdeen, and probably Glasgow and St. Andrews. 
He also distributed it to Priestley and hence, to other members of the 
English dissenting community. We also know that it reached at least 
one expatriot member of the Church of Scotland in England. In many 
ways, these details epitomise the social transmission of metaphysical 
ideas during this period. Through societiest through discussions, 
through letters and through publications, metaphysical ideas were 
canvassed, transmitted and popularised. Taken as a whole, these 
processes make up the social intelligence system underlying metaphysical 
discourse. 
A number of written responses to Gregory's Essay have survived. it Ls 
impossible to state what proportion they represent of the total replids 
Gregory received. They include the following: 
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W Comments found. in Reid's "Letters to Gregory". 
Ui) Comments in Bishop Gleigfs article, "Metaphysics", in 
the Encyclopaedia Britannica, 3rd ed.,. 18 vols. 
(Edinburgh, 1797). 
Vol. 11, part 3, Ch. 5, "Of liberty and necessity", 
594-98. 
Co=ents by Alexander Crombie. These were contained in his 
EssaX on philosophical necessity (London, 1793), Ch. 3, 
"Dr. Gregory's essay in defence of philosophical liberty 
answered". 
Comments by John Allen in his Illustrations of Mr. Hume's 
Essay concerning liberty and necessity in answer to Dr. Gregory 
of Edinburgh (London, 1795). This appeared anonymously by 
lea Necessitarian". 
(V) Comments by the anonymous author of the "Objections" to the 
Essay included in the Appendix, and probably by James Hutton. 
(See Appendix V). 
(Vi) Comments by James Hutton in his An Investigation of the Brin_ciples 
of knowledge and the proaress of reason from sense to science and 
philosophy, 3 vols. (Edinburghg 1794), vol. I, Prefacev passim; yck. '% 
215-20. 
of Gregory's replies, we have: 
(i) Co=ents found in An Answer to Messrs Crombie, Priestley and Co. 
(unpublished). 
Comments exchanged between Gregory and Crombie in Letters from 
Dr. James Gregory with replies by Alexander Crombie LL. D. 
(London,, 1819). Despite the publication date, the letters were 
actually written much earlier. 
(iii) Co=ents in the Append referring to the "Observations". 
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1. One exception to this is Richard Olsong Scottish philosophy and 
British physics (Princeton, 1975) 83-84. - However there are 
several inaccuracies in his brief treatment. For example, Olson 
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the status of mathematical objects (Workp 72). However, this 
remark actually referred to a passage in Gregory's early 
IntroductorX EssaZ 
, 
86-89, and not the Essay itself. Similarly, 
Olson equates Gregory with Hutcheson because both tried to put 
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3. Appendix, 468-82, and-consisting of 16 numbered objections. 
4. Introduction, clxi. 
5. Ibid., clxviii. 
6. Introductory essay, 89. 
7. Answer_, 122. 
8. Ibid., 336. 
9. Letters, 405; Answer 336-40. 
10. See Answer, 458-72, where Gregory reprinted the clergyman's 
letter to the lady, attacking Crombie. 
On the founding of the Royal Society of Edinburgh see Steven 
Shapin "Property patronage and. the politics of science: the 
founding of the Royal Society of Edinburgh", The British journal 
for the history of science, 7 (1974)9 1-41. Also his The Royal 
7o-c-Te-t-yof Edinburgh: a study of the social context of 
Hannovarian science (Ph. D. thesisq University of P`=nnsylvania, 
1971), chapters -5-8,170-330. 
12. On the office holders of the society see Transactions of the 
Royal Society of Edinburgh 1 (1788)p 98-100o ibid., 2 (1790)9 
34-36; ibid., 3 (1794), 27-28; ibid ., 4 (17987,31-32. Shapin 
has not7-dthat several of the no =1ity and legal lords had 
amateur scientific interests like Kames. Also, some of these 
men were elected to offices in the society. However, it is 
not clear what role such men played. Allan Maconochie, 
Lord Meadowbank, one of the founders of the Speculative Society 
would be a case in point. However# because of a lack of 
information about such men, I have excluded them fron considera- 
tion in reconstructing the catchment for Gregory's Essay. See 
the standard Scottish and national biographical souF-c-es for 
other names mentioned in this appendix. 
13. introduction, cclxvi-cclxxxv. 
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APPENDIX V: THE TEXT OF THE PUBLISHED "OBJECTIONS" AGAINST 
GREGORY'S ESSAY 
I 
I believe the doctrine of the Necessitarians is, That human 
actions, or the acts of the will which prompt them, depend as 
much as any other events on causes; and that these causes are 
to be found in the nature of mind, and in those perceptions, 
sentiments and opinions, which arise in it. 
2. The physical constitution of the mind, on which its existence 
and the performance of its operations, depend, must naturally be 
supposed to contain the proper physical cause or causes of the 
acts of the will as well as of every other mental operation: 
For I think we cannot conceive a change to take place in any 
substance, without supposing that there is a physical cause 
for it in the nature of the substance. But this constitution 
we have no faculties for examining. The perceptible operations 
of the mind, however, or the processes of thought which attend 
on volition, may be considered as exciting causes of the acts 
of the will. If there is any thing contingent in these 
processes of thought, or if the acts of the will are not 
constantly conjoined with them, it is evident that however 
constantly conjoined the acts of the will be with their proper 
physical cause, if that physical cause is only attended with 
its effect when stimulated by something contingent, the 
doctrine of the Necessitarians must be erroneous. If# on the 
other hand, processes or trains of thought are constantly 
conjoined with the acts of the will, and there is nothing 
contingent in those trains of thoughtt it appears to me, that 
the doctrine of the Necessitarians must be well founded; as, 
in that case, the relation of constant conjunction must take 
place between the acts of the will and trains of thought which 
invariably precede them. 
3. It has been hitherto thought by the Necessitariansq that every 
volition is very obviously the result of a train of thought; 
and that the relation of constant conjunction is very perceptible 
in such trains of thought, at least as far as it is necessary to 
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trace back the steps of them. I understand the object of the 
Essay is, to show, in the following manner, that absurdities 
result from this hypothesis. The doctrine of the Necessitarians 
is supposed to be, That of every apprehension and desire of 
attainable good, or in the language of the Essay every motive, 
is attended with an influence on the will, commensurate to the 
intensity of such desire; and then, by having recourse to the 
known laws of physics, it is proved that instead of the human 
actions which do happen, other the most absurd and extravagant 
would necessarily result from the opposite and combined effects 
of certain and such motives. 
4. But if it can be showng that, according to the doctrine of the 
Necessitarians, the will is not, and need not be, exposed to 
such combinations or oppositions of influences, it seems to me 
to follow, that the argument in the Essay fails in its 
foundation. 
5 The Necessitarians maintain, That the will is invariably 
determined by the judgement of the understanding, or the last 
step inthe train of thought previous to volition; and that 
this judgement is involuntary; and that no apprehension and 
desire of attainable good has any influence on the will, till 
the understanding decides on its preference, or on the 
expediency of attempting the pursuit of it. It is therefore 
a mistake to have supposeds that, according to the 
Necessitarians, every apprehension and desire of attainable 
good had a determinate influence on the will. I believe there 
is no Necessitarian that would require any demonstration or 
argument to be convincedo that such sentiments occur every day 
without producing any effect whatever on the will; and that 
accordingly there is no constant conjunction between them 
and human actions. 
Again, I believe it will not admit of dispute, that the 
decisions of the understanding are involuntary. It seems to be 
admitted in the Essay, that belief, which is a judgement of the 
truth or falsehood of a proposition, or of an event is 
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involuntary; and I can see no reason for doubting, that an 
opinion of what is preferable, or otherwise, is equally 
involuntary. The former kind of judgements is indeed more 
uniform and steady than the latter, which varies according to 
the state of a person's health, or other circumstances; but 
there is no reason for esteeming them to be less involuntary 
than the former. 
Neither will it admit of disputet that a judgement will never 
be pronounced by a person in health, in favour of two pursuits 
at one and the same time, that are incompatible, or admit only 
of combinations which are inconsistent with each severally. 
8. Unless, thereforep the Necessitarians are under the necessity 
of admitting, that the involuntary judgement of the understanding 
is contingent, or proceeds upon a train of thought, some step of 
which is contingent, the Essay seems to fail in its object; 
since, according to the Necessitariansl the act of the will 
depends on an operation' of the understanding which is itself 
involuntary, and excludes all those absurd combinations of 
influence alluded to in No. 3. 
9 The question, therefore, turns on the nature of the operations 
of the understanding. If the Necessitarians must yield, that 
every apprehension and desire of attainable good must have an 
influence on the understanding, in a manner perfectly similar 
to that of forces in physics, in order to be intitled to 
maintain, that its operations proceed by immutable laws; and 
that the relation of constant conjunction takes place among 
them, the substance of the argument in the Essay would, I think, 
still remain solid, not withstanding what has been remarked. 
It appears, however, to me very clear, that the laws of the 
operations of the understanding are immutable; that the 
relation of constant conjunction is universally acknowledged 
by mankind to take place among these operations; and that 
the influence of our desires for attainable good on the 
decisions of the'understandingo respecting the pursuit of them, 
though as certain and, strictly speakingg uniform as that of 
forces in physics, is subject to extremely different laws. 
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10.1 imagine all men will acknowledge that a person will form 
exactly the same judgement todayq for instance, that he did 
a twelvemonth ago, if he is circumstances in precisely the 
same situation, viz. having perceptions, appetites, expecta- 
tions, and discernment, perfectly similar to those which he 
then possessed; and it does not appear to me p ossible that'this 
persuasion can be otherwise accounted for than from a belief, 
founded in consciousness, of the immutability of the laws of 
the operations of the understanding, and of one of those laws 
being constant conjunction in the steps of the trains of 
thought which precede the judgements of the understanding: so 
that we are sure that similar effects will always result from 
similar causes in the mind, as well as elsewhere; or, if a 
different mode of expression is preferred, that familiar 
effects will ensue in the mind-from similar preceding circum- 
stances. * We cannot, as I believe an able writer has observed, 
trace back the rout of the die in the dice box, or the train 
of causes and effects by which a particular face of it comes 
at last to cast up; but we have no doubt of the constant 
conjunction of the whole from the first impulse it receives, 
till it settles on the table; and I think we have as little 
doubt of the same relation pervading the trains of thought 
that issue in judgements of the understanding; though these 
trains are too fleeting and various, and the memory too 
imperfect a faculty, to admit often of our tracing them back 
with accuracy. 
The total want of analogy between the influence of our 
appetites upon the judgement and of forces in physics, appears 
also to me to be so striking, that it is scarcely requisite 
to make any remarks upon it. The desire of earning a guinea 
by going a mile westward, can no more combine with a desire 
to gain half a guinea by travelling a mile southward, in 
forming a judgement, than it would be eligible to travel a mile 
in the diagonal south-westward, than physical forces applied 
to make a ball move with different directions south and northq 
could combine of themselves to make it move to one of these 
points. The intelligence of the mind renders the combination 
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impossible. At the same time, no man can say but that he is 
as certain that the porter, if there is no other appetite in 
the case, will decide upon the preferende of travelling the 
mile westward for the guinea, as that a ball impelled by equal 
forces southward and westward will move south-westward. If it 
is asked, What becomes of the effects of the appetite for the 
half guinea? I answer, That it has had all the effects that 
by the immutable laws of the understanding it was filled to 
have. It was felt, observed, its inferiority to a desire, 
the gratification of which was incompatible with it perceived, 
that gratification judged preferable to it accordingly; and it 
then probably ceased to exist and was forgotten. It is not 
every train of thought that is constantly conjoined with 
volition, though volition be constantly conjoined with a 
previous train of thought; nor is it requisite that every 
train of thought that might terminate involition must be 
prevented from doing so bk a spontaneous exertion of a supposed 
self-governing power: for, independently of these judgements 
which I have said involuntarily put a period to them, or at 
least to our attention to them, we know that any one of a 
thousand external circumstances may occur, and either contrary 
or agreeable to our inclination, monopolise our attention so 
completely as at once to put an end to any of those trains 
of thought that formerly engaged us, and might have terminated 
in action. After turning the subject every way in my mind, 
I cannot discover the smallest use for a supposition, that 
self-governing power was necessary to enable the understanding, 
possessed as it is of intelligence for perceiving the 
incompatibility of two pursuits, to judge the one eligible, 
without absurdly combining it with the other. The sufficiency 
of the understanding for this operation, seems to be the 
natural result of its intelligencep which differences that 
faculty, so infinitely from every thing that is exposed to the 
influence of physical force; and surely it is not meant in the 
Essay to prove, that intelligence cannot be subject to the 
relation of constant conjunction. 
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12. it is said in the Essay "That the action is not always being 
proportioned to the motive, or corresponding to it in point of 
quantity, is equally inconsistent with the principle of constant 
conjunction, and with the supposition of mere chance, or the 
want of power in the being who acts to allow or to prevent the 
full effect of the motive". This appears to me to be a mistake. 
Even in physics, an effect may be constantly conjoined with a 
circumstance, which is in one sense its cause without being 
the measure of it. The explosion of a mine of gunpowder cannot 
measure the quantity of fire that kindled it. The malignity 
of the small pox is no measure of the quantity or quality of 
the contagious matter employed to give the disease. The 
contraction of a muscle is no measure of the stimulus applied 
to produce it* Human actions do not admit of degrees that 
bear proportions to the degrees of our appetites. I need not 
make any remarks on the latter part of the passage. I think 
the involuntary opinion of the understanding always has it 
full effect on the will. 
13.1 could have wished that the Essay had contained something 
more detailed with respect to that self-governing power the 
existence of which it is the object of it to establish. The 
terms option and discretion, which are attribijted to this 
power when acting, as is supposed it often does, without 
motives, or in opposition to motives, or in opposition to 
some, and in favour of others, and the character ascribed 
to it, of being vanquished by appetites or feelings of a 
certain intensity, leave the reader very much at a loss what 
to understand by it, and how to discriminate its functions 
from those of the understanding. One should be aptto think, 
from some of these terms, that it was a faculty which 
decided according to reason and argument; and from the last 
circumstance, its yielding to feelings of certain intensity, 
that combinations of these feelings would, according to the 
doctrine of the Essay, frequently, or at least sometimes, 
lay men under the necessity of performing actions as absurd as 
those whict; are supposed to be the result of the doctrine of 
the necessitarians. 
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14.1 have no occasion in these remarks to concern myself with the 
fact, which possibly may prove to be important, and which I 
think the Essay establishes, that the relation between cause 
and effect is different from that between motive and action. 
It is sufficient for my argument if a relation subsists 
between what is involuntary in the train of thought in the 
mind and the acts of the will, as constant and as certain as 
that of cause and effect". 
15.1 also acknowledge, that ever since I first studied pneumatologyp 
I have been persuaded, that we truly possess a notion of power. 
derived from the consciousness of our mental efforts; at the 
same time I must think that these efforts, or the faculty that 
makes thems are in general under the direction of the under- 
standing, which again is under the necessity of examining what 
is suggested for its consideration, and of forming an opinion 
as to what pursuits appear at the moment most conducive to our 
happiness. 
16.1 shall only further observe, that though I may have been 
unsuccessful in pointing out any defect in the argument in the 
Essay, my remaining unconvinced by it is some ground for 
suspicion against it since I can discover nothing in my 
situation or sentiments that should lead me to suspect I had 
imbibed any invincible prejudice against it; and if it solid, 
I should think, -that, notwithstanding any degree of prejudice, 
it ought to produce infallibly the same degree and facility of 
conviction that results from a theorem in geometry. I confess 
also, it seems to me very clear, that if the acts of the will 
are not determined by the judgements of the understanding, 
but by a self-governing powert which may act, and if I 
recollect right, is supposed to often act without motives, 
and in opposition to all motiveso the human race, instead of 
being moral agents, would sometimes at least be more disorderly 
than any madmen; their manners could be regulated with any 
degree of certainty by no laws; the prescience of God Almighty 
could not. trace their actions; and even his omnipotence, unless 
he altered their nature, could do nothing more for them than 
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make a vast bedlam to contain them. I do not assert, that 
these consequences, even though proved to be just, can impeach 
the validity of a demonstration; butt on the other hand, I must 
think, that the apprehension of such consequences is sufficient 
to justify a suspicion, that there lurks some inaccuracy in it. 
(See ApRendix 467-82) 
